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Liddell Hart was to write in 1950: Lord Wavell’s star rose high at an early stage of the 
war. Its glow was the more brilliant because of the darkness of the sky. His victories 
over the Italian armies in North Africa and East Africa in the winter of 1940-41, were 
Britain’s first striking success after the catastrophic run of defeats in the West. They 
came as a great tonic – not only to the British people but even more to others who had 
been shocked and alarmed by the apparently irresistible advance of the Nazi and 
Fascist dictators.1
 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In central Libya on the border between the provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, on 
31 March 1941, a battalion of British infantry supported by a regiment of field artillery 
were occupying hastily constructed defensive positions in front of the small fishing 
village of Mersa el Brega. These meagre forces were according to General Archibald 
Percival Wavell the then Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C)2 of all British forces in the 
Middle East all that could be found to defend what British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill, called, Britain’s “Desert Flank” ‘the peg on which all else hung’.3
     The all-else upon which Churchill considered everything hung was, in fact, the 
lifeblood of any modern army, oil, without which it would be almost impossible for 
Britain to continue fighting the war. ‘For the British the Middle East was only just less 
important to the waging of the war than their homeland; for it contained round Mosul, 
in Iraq, and at the head of the Persian Gulf the oilfields without which the Royal Air 
Force, the Army and the Royal Navy would be paralysed’.
   
4  Although Britain was not 
wholly dependent on Middle Eastern oil to supply the home island with fuel; its forces 
in the Middle East certainly relied on local sources.5
                                                 
1 Harold E. Raugh, Jr. quoting Basil Liddell-Hart, found in Wavell in the Middle East (London: Brassey’s 
1993) p. 269.     
  Moreover, as Wavell correctly 
observed in May 1940; ‘Germany was short of oil and its naval power was not equal to 
2 Robert Woollcombe, The Campaigns of Wavell 1939-1943 (London: Cassell, 1959) p. 6.  
3 Winston Churchill, The Second World War Volume III (London: Cassell & Co, 1950) p. 173. 
4 Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (London: William Kimber & Co, 1960) p. 22. 
5 Len Deighton, Blood, Tears & Folly (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993) p. 498.  
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that of the Allies; unless Germany could obtain oil in sufficient quantity, Germany 
could not pursue the war. To win the war, therefore, Britain needed to focus on 
preventing Germany from obtaining oil’.6
     Churchill understood perfectly Wavell’s logic in regard to Britain’s need to deny her 
enemy Middle Eastern oil. Furthermore, he recognised that if the enemy defeated the 
British forces in the Western Desert he might, if he was able to exploit his initial 
success, push on through the Libyan/Egyptian desert and jeopardise Britain’s oil 
supplies coming from the Middle East. He recognised that such an advance would 
threaten Egypt, the Suez Canal and ultimately the oilfields of Mosul and Arabia. 
Churchill realised that if this eventuality occurred, and the enemy gained control of the 
Middle East’s oil, then Britain’s war waging capacity would quite quickly grind to a 
fuel starved halt. Moreover, Germany’s oil requirements would be amply satisfied. 
There was, therefore, according to Churchill, ‘no idea in any quarter of losing or risking 
that [the “Desert Flank”] for the sake of Greece or anything in the Balkans’.
   
7
     However, despite Wavell’s and Churchill’s fears and warnings of how disastrous an 
enemy breakthrough on the “Desert Flank” would be, because of the inadequacy of the 
defence at Brega this was exactly what was allowed to happen. In the early morning of 
31 March 1941 a large German force attacked the defenders of British interests in the 
vital Middle East. Rommel was to write; ‘our attack moved forward against the British 
positions at Mersa el Brega, and a fierce engagement took place’.
  
8
                                                 
6 Victoria Schofield, Wavell: Soldier & Statesman (London: John Murray, 2006) p. 143.  
  The approximately 
six hundred young infantry men, mostly recruited from Tower Hamlets in London’s 
East End, fought doggedly most of the day to defend Churchill’s “Desert Flank”. 
However, by late afternoon these troops under relentless pressure, alone and 
unsupported, were forced to abandon their positions. ‘By 6 April, 1941, with most of 
7 Churchill, The Second World War Volume III, p. 173. 
8 Ronald Lewin, Rommel as a Military Commander (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004) p. 33. 
9 
the senior commanders captured, the British forces in what had so recently been the 
quiet backwater of Cyrenaica were now headless as well as disjointed. Benghazi and the 
Jebel Akhadar had fallen; Tobruk formed a precarious rock amid the rising German 
tide’.9
     So why, when the consequences of defeat at Brega were so ruinous, was the enemy 
allowed to succeed? In an effort to answer this question this thesis will focus of four 
separate areas of research which, when brought together collectively, will hopefully 
explain why the British were defeated at Brega. Firstly the work will seek to establish 
how command and command structures functioned in WWII. Secondly the thesis will 
review why, when the consequences of failure at Brega were so great, the very situation 
Churchill and others foresaw, and indeed warned of, was allowed to happen. The works 
third objective will seek to establish whether the various reasons put forward by Middle 
East Command for the loss of Brega stand up to scrutiny. Fourthly the work will 
endeavour to establish whether a creditable military force could have been provided to 
defend Brega adequately and thus avert the defeat.  
   The British withdrawal from Brega opened the way for the Germans and their 
Italian allies to gain access to the road to Cairo, Suez Canal and potentially the oilfields 
beyond. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Stephen Spender the British novelist and essayist wrote; ‘History is the ship carrying 
living memories to the future.’ However, to bring the ship of memories to the future, to 
chart a course that will hopefully deliver the memories accurately and cogently to 
future readers, rigorous methods of research need to be employed.  In this regard, as 
we shall see, the river of history upon which the ship sails to the wide ocean of 
discovery is long and meandering, sometimes slow and peaceful, sometimes raging and 
fierce but always exciting to navigate. 
      
                                                 
9 Barnett, p. 67. 
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METHODICAL INTRODUCTION 
This section of the work will seek to illustrate for the reader how this research project 
was designed and how the various research methods employed were used to support the 
conclusions reached. Looking at the focus of the project, the “lost” Battle of Mersa el 
Brega, we may see that certain facts, although few in number, are readily available and 
are, perhaps, self explanatory. We know for example that the battle was fought on 31 
March 1941 at a place called Mersa el Brega, and the main protagonists involved were 
primarily British and German forces; and we know that the battle was lost by the 
British.   
     However, considering the devastating consequences which followed on from the 
defeat at Brega for the British this degree of information seemed to the author to be a 
rather scant appraisal of what by any yardstick was a pivotal battle. Consequently in 
order to establish how and why events evolved as they did at Brega a research 
framework was designed to answer several, key, and many peripheral, questions.  
     The problems needing answers were considerable. Why, for example, were the 
British so ill prepared to defend Brega?  Why, when the consequences of failure were so 
dire, conceivably the loss of the Middle East and its precious oil, were not adequate 
resources brought to bear?  Were adequate forces available, if not why not, if they were 
why were they not at Brega? Even had resources been available was the Brega position 
defendable? Was the defeat made possible because the British were surprised; was there 
a lapse of intelligence? Might the loss of Brega be the result of poor command and poor 
command decisions?  Or was there some systemic flaw in British tactics? All these 
questions, and many more, were tabulated into a step by step research brief designed to 
establish the “truth” behind the defeat.   
     To achieve the goals set out above various research stratagems and methods have 
been employed. The importance of undertaking extensive background reading was 
11 
acknowledged and has been practised assiduously throughout this research project. The 
information gained from the huge quantity of secondary sources referenced formed 
what might be described as the armature around which the many threads of the research 
have been wound. Indeed although the thrust of the research has been focused on a 
battle which has been virtually ignored by successive historians; the work has been 
enhanced and informed enormously by an awareness of what other authors have thought 
and written about the war in the desert. Moreover, as the research progressed engaging 
with a wide range of critical and diverse opinions uncovered various, and in some cases 
almost diametrically opposed, interpretations of what were essentially the same events.  
     The above being said in virtually all cases the secondary sources accessed 
beneficially informed the research to some degree or other. However, it is recognised 
that even the most scrupulous and thorough secondary source must be assessed 
critically as the views expressed are often influenced by the authors own understanding 
and relationship with the personalities or events being referenced. This factor has been 
taken into account throughout the research project as it is accepted that arriving at the 
'truth' of the event, why the British lost the battle for Mersa el Brega, is the ultimate 
objective of the work.  
     Consequently in this regard the starting point of the research, and initially the most 
significant source of information surrounding the focus of the work came from 
secondary sources. The many accounts of the Desert War found in the myriad of books 
written on the war in North Africa formed what might be described as the “Fountain 
Head” from which the many rivers and streams of more detailed research and analyses 
trickled and flowed. These, as we shall see, included the reading of primary sources, 
such as unit war diaries, written correspondence between senior officers, and the 
thoughts of rank and file soldiers. Moreover, the author managed to find and interview 
12 
an eyewitness and took advice from experts on various issues, such as geography and 
geology.    
UNDERPINNING THE METHOD OF RESEARCH 
There are of course many challenges in writing accurate accounts of events in military 
history. The overall goal of the historian comments Edgar Krentz in The Historical 
Critical Method ‘is explanation and understanding, not the passing of judgement on the 
moral acts of individuals. The historian can evaluate events, institutions, or policies in 
terms of their effectiveness. He can strike a balance between gain and loss. But he 
recognises that the task of history is not judgment, but description and explanation’.10
     Indeed, when reviewing the approach, style and methods that various historians have 
use to arrive at their conclusions, we may see that bias, even when describing the same 
event or events; can, and often does, influence how authors record events. Bias can have 
many origins but is often dictated by the author’s personal background.  William of 
Malmesbury (c. 1095/96 – c. 1143), was a noted 12th century English historian, who C. 
Warren Hollister considers to be the most talented writer of history since 
  
However, while the rules of historical writing illustrated above may well be the ideal 
style, approach and method, seldom, it seems, are they completely adhered too.  
Bede. 
Hollister was to write that William was ‘a gifted historical scholar and an omnivorous 
reader, impressively well versed in the literature of classical, patristic and earlier 
medieval times as well as in the writings of his own contemporaries. Indeed William 
may well have been the most learned man in twelfth-century Western Europe’.11
     However, even so gifted a writer as William of Malmesbury; was not immune from 
indulging in biased writing. Antonia Gransden, in her work Historical Writing in 
England: c. 500 to c. 1307 noted that: ‘In his first period of historical writing, William 
   
                                                 
10 Edgar Krentz, The Historical-Critical Method (London: SPCK, 1975) p. 36.  
11 C. Warren Hollister, Henry I, (The English Monarchs Series) (Yale: Yale University Press, 2001) p. 3. 
13 
showed two kinds of bias. First, he had strong prejudice against a number of magnates 
in the kingdom, both bishops and laymen. Second he had regional bias: he favoured 
Canterbury in the controversy between the metropolitans of Canterbury and York, and 
he favoured Malmesbury abbey and its patron saint, Aldhelm’.12
     As a further example of where bias may influence an author we may cite Arthur 
Marwick. Marwick uses as his example of biased writing the case of an ambassador 
who reporting on the ‘conditions in the country he is stationed may be biased in various 
directions: if he is Catholic in a Protestant country he may tend to exaggerate the 
evidence of a Catholic upsurge; he may send home the kind of information he knows his 
home government wants to hear’.
   
13
     Thus we may see that William of Malmesbury was prejudiced against various 
individuals and institutions which consequently influenced his writing.  In Marwick’s 
example we may see that the relationship between an ambassador and his home 
government biased his writing. However, rank, wealth, political status, friendship and 
many other influences can all prejudice how an author conveys to his reader the 
information he wishes them to see.    
         
     Furthermore, bias is by no means the only divergent path which differing historians 
might take. Their approach to historical research can also vary with groups of historians 
using differing methods to reach their conclusions. Some may be called “descriptive 
historians” this brand of historian will attempt to give an account of the event or 
situation under consideration in its own unique setting. The other group may be called 
“theoretical historians”; they try to find in their subject matter a basis for comparison, 
                                                 
12 Antonia Gransden, Historical Writing in England: c 500 to c. 1307 (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 176. 
13 Arthur Marwick, The Nature of History (London: Macmillan Press, 1973) p. 137. For further reading 
on historical writing see Ernst Breisach, Historiography (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007) and 
Stefan Berger, Writing History Theory & Practice (London: Arnold, 2003).  
14 
classification, interpretation, or generalisation.14
     Most historians will at one time or another fall into both camps even if they claim 
adherence to only one school. Consequently for the impartial researcher doctrinal 
entrenchment, as outlined above, should be noted and taken into consideration when 
reviewing the validity of sources. As this form of bias can often further cloud an already 
murky picture.    
  Again this often leads to wildly 
divergent solutions to the same research problem.  
     Moreover, not only does bias and doctrinal entrenchment influence historical writing 
as Philip Hepworth writes in How to Find Out in History; ‘the writing of history at its 
highest level is a combination of scientific and artistic genius’.15  As the supreme 
example of, “scientific and artistic genius”, Hepworth cites The Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire, which he considers, and perhaps few could argue against his view, was 
the result of painstaking research and artistic understanding.16
     For Hepworth, scientific and artistic genius are by no means; the only factors to be 
considered when assessing historical writing. Hepworth continues with a review of the 
contribution that Thomas Carlyle’s work, The French Revolution, added to the cannon 
of knowledge on the subject of the French Revolution. ‘Carlyle’s French Revolution, 
[Hepworth writes], may not now be regarded as an adequate treatment of its subject, yet 
the exhilaration gained by reading it more than compensates for its subjective distortion. 
It is probable that the whole impression left in the reader’s mind of the great upheaval is 
emotionally as near to reality as any history can give’.
   
17
     So we may see that the background from which an author comes, whether this is, for 
example, from a differing educational standpoint or perhaps from a differential in 
  
                                                 
14 Louis Gottschalk, Generalization in the Writing of History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1963) p.v.  
15 Philip Hepworth, How to Find Out in History (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966) p. 4.   
16 ibid  
17 ibid 
15 
military rank, will inevitably introduce an element of bias into his work. Likewise the 
approach which historians take to develop their arguments whether this is descriptive or 
theoretical will also influence their conclusions. The painstaking research and artistic 
understanding which an author brings to his project will frequently result in a highly 
definitive and accurate account of the subject. The classic example being The Decline 
and Fall of the Roman Empire, but even such an undisputed excellent work may not 
convey the essence of the time to the reader as does, for example, Carlyle’s work, The 
French Revolution. However, for Gottschalk, this diversity of styles is no bad trait; for: 
‘To represent historical episodes with a uniform dullness is thus, at least in part, to 
misrepresent them. In fact, the historian who writes uninterestingly is to that extent a 
bad historian’.18
EXAMPLES OF RESEARCH 
   
We may now turn to the approach, style and methods used by various historical 
researchers to reach their conclusions. The noted war historian Richard Holmes tended 
to write about the experiences of ordinary soldiers, how they felt and the experiences 
they had in whatever war they were fighting in. This approach allowed him to build up 
for the reader an accurate picture of daily life for the individual soldier.  
     Conversely, and perhaps paradoxically, although Holmes interview veterans 
frequently he was very reluctant to rely on their evidence, especially evidence given on 
events which had occurred many years in the past, to support what we might term the 
bigger picture. Holmes felt that contemporary accounts, such as war diaries, veteran’s 
records and archival material were more reliable. As Martin Childs recalled in the 
article he wrote on Holmes after his death. Holmes; ‘tended to avoid drawing on the 
reminiscences of veterans, mindful of the frailties of human recall: he had found that 
first-hand reminiscences differed widely, only 10 years after the event, from those 
                                                 
18 Gottschalk, p 13.   
16 
written down at or near the time: ‘The closer we get to events, the better our chance of 
finding out how people really felt.’19
     The methods referred to above, as used in Holmes work Tommy, in which he 
describes events in the First World War, undoubtedly give a clear and concise view of 
the conflict. That being said, Holmes’ approach, while perhaps suitable for describing 
events which have taken place in a wide ranging and huge conflict is not suitable in all 
cases. When describing smaller conflicts and indeed small action engagements such as 
the battle for Brega, his approach is, this author argues, less suitable.  
   
     After the battle for Brega no even partial first hand British accounts seem to have 
been written. Nor, it seems, over the years have any been sort out. Indeed, until the 
author of this work interviewed David Hurst-Brown, a veteran of the battle, the only 
published account of any part of the battle came from an account given by a German 
soldier. Moreover, official contemporary documents, such as the war diary of 9RB, 
which was the most significant unit at Brega, are sadly missing.  The intelligence truck 
which contained the diarist and the diary of 9RB was blown up at the very start of the 
battle. Consequently no detailed record of the part they played in the battle survives. 
Therefore, if the remembered thoughts of Hurst-Brown had not been sort then vital 
information on issues such as food, water, ammunition and the state of the defensive 
trenches would have been unavailable. Without this information many of the 
conclusions asserted in the work would have remained only probabilities not the near 
certainties they have become.  
     The above being said, however, Holmes view on the reliability of veteran’s 
testimony does have a degree of validity about it. It seems that any veteran evidence, 
and indeed any evidence from whichever source it is obtained, must be evaluated with 
regard to its context and set against other irrefutable facts if it is to be relied upon. As 
                                                 
19 Martin Childs, ‘Professor Richard Holmes’, The Independent 5 May 2011 
17 
Arthur Marwick says in The Nature of History; ‘To establish authenticity the historian 
will apply his technical expertise: he will be familiar with the characteristic forms of an 
early eleventh-century charter, the spirit used, the style of language, and the legal forms; 
if the character in front of him departs from these he will on internal evidence suspect 
its authenticity’.20
     As an example of the historian’s internal recognition, in regard to this work, we may 
look to one aspect of the evidence presented to the author by David Hurst-Brown.  In 
the course of the authors interview with Hurst-Brown he asserted that his battalion, 
9RB, had taken over trenches which had been prepared and occupied previously by 
New Zealand troops. This assumption is completely contradicted by the known facts. At 
this stage of the war the New Zealand Government would not allow individual 
battalions to be detached from the main divisional body. Moreover, all the New Zealand 
battalions were at this time back in Cairo being prepared to go to Greece. His unit 
actually took over from an Australian battalion.  
   
     However, this mistake, in this case, does not devalue the rest of Hurst-Brown’s 
contribution on issues such as food, water and the positions from which he and his men 
fought. Even today for most British people it is difficult to distinguish between an 
Australian accent and a New Zealand accent. For a nineteen year old English man from 
a rural background in 1941 the distinction must have been far more difficult to make.  
     Nevertheless, while there might be scope for error in regard to accent there would be 
less likelihood of error in regard to food, water and where you fought. While Hurst-
Brown may have understandably confused Australian from New Zealander he would 
have been unlikely to mistake whether he had food, water or a good place from which to 
fight. Indeed when pressed on the issues of food he had vivid memories recalling how 
the bread they were issued with each day was freshly baked and when spread with 
                                                 
20 Marwick, p. 137. 
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strawberry jam was delicious. As with most soldiers had he not been fed and watered 
properly, for water read tea, without which no British soldier will perform at his best, or 
had considered his fighting position to be sub standard he would have remembered 
these hardships clearly. Moreover, like most soldiers who have suffered hardship, he 
would have been only too willing to share his plight with anyone who would listen.  
     Holmes indeed confirms this very trait. Veterans, Holmes considered, will often tell 
the listener what he wants to hear, usually gory or heroic episodes from the engagement, 
these reminiscences can cloud the issue and are consequently obvious pitfalls for the 
historian. Holmes felt that veterans when being interviewed ‘sometimes played their 
roles too well: they became Veterans, General Issue, neatly packaged with what we 
wanted to hear, exploding at the touch of the tape recorder button or the snap of a TV 
documentarist’s clapper-board.  Up to my neck in muck and bullets; rats as big as 
footballs; the sergeant major was a right bastard; all my mates were killed’.21
     The above being said Holmes strikes a very relevant chord to this work when he 
gives his opinion on certain aspects of military research. Holmes considers that the 
approach taken by some authors is, in his words, ‘simply not serious or scholarly’. 
Talking of work written about WWI in Tommy, Holmes felt that too many early authors 
had bent ‘its events to fit their own analytical framework, jamming their pastry-cutters 
onto the evidence, and either discarding anything that lay outside their intriguing shape, 
or rolling it extra thin if there was not quite enough’.
       
22
 
  This trait of perhaps not giving 
accurate and unbiased accounts of both events and the actions of certain personalities 
will become a recurring theme in this work. Perpetrated it has to be said by most authors 
who have written about the early desert war.  
                                                 
21 Richard Holmes, Tommy (London: Harper Perennial, 2005) p. xxiii 
22 ibid, p. xxii 
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SECONDARY SOURCES      
As, perhaps, with many retrospective research projects, an initial inclination to research 
the events surrounding the battle of Brega was sparked by reading secondary sources. In 
many of these works there were found many contradictions, anomalies and often a 
general lack of detailed information about the subject. Many authors, Correlli Barnett23, 
Alexander Clifford24, Robert Woollcombe25 and Basil Liddell Hart26
     Investigations were undertaken to establish the extent and availability of written 
sources which referenced the battle, associated events and the personalities involved. 
Investigations in this direction soon revealed that there was a considerable body of 
written material available. However, while these new sources provided some answers 
they again failed to give a satisfactory account of how and why the British lost the battle 
of Brega. Indeed, there were in practically all the many accounts referenced even more 
contradictions relating to why and how events unfolded as they did at Brega. 
, to mention only 
four, have to a greater, or often lesser, extent, referenced the events surrounding the 
battle. Some, it has to be conceded, have even made reference to the battle itself. 
However, in virtually all the sources referenced some degree of ambiguity can be found. 
In an effort, therefore, to establish the veracity of the various assertions, claims, 
counterclaims and conclusions offered in the many sources referenced the initial 
research methods employed were to extend the search and read even more widely.  
     So in an effort to establish which assertions made by those who had contributed 
references to the battle were plausible and which needed clarification a comprehensive 
list of the points upon which the authors agreed and the areas of ambiguity was 
compiled. Careful examination of their works suggested many areas of partial 
                                                 
23 Barnett 
24 Alexander Clifford, Three Against Rommel (London: Harrap & Co, 1943) 
25 Woollcombe 
26 Basil Liddell-Hart, History of the Second World War (London: Book Club Associates, 1973)  
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agreement. However, it must be pointed out that there were, in several instances, sharp 
diversions of opinion.  
ASSEMBLING SOURCES        
From the broad river of information found in the secondary sources relating to the battle 
of Brega many significant and intriguing waterways of research offered them selves up 
for exploration. Topic areas of interest included the personalities involved, command 
and command structures. Also of interest were the geography and geology of the region, 
unit availability, significant political and military events, intelligence and many other 
related factors.  
     In an effort to clarify these aspects of the research it was obvious that primary 
sources would need to be accessed. The identification of politicians, senior commanders 
and rank and file soldiers involved in the events leading up to the Brega battle, indicated 
that memoirs, biographies and auto-biographies would need to be referenced. It was 
also recognised that any eyewitness accounts would be very useful and considerable 
effort was expended to track one down. 
     Form initial reading it soon became clear that the geography and geology of the 
region was critical to the battles outcome. Therefore, detailed investigations would need 
to be undertaken into the topography of the region; and the wider geographical context 
into which Brega fitted. These investigations required, in a macro sense, the detailed 
study of maps. From detailed study of the maps calculations could be made on how time 
and distance effected military operations. Further scrutiny of air, sea and land routes, 
analyses of varying weather conditions and a detailed understanding of the regions 
diverse terrain gave a more detailed understanding of the Brega position. To 
compliment this research a geological, geographical and topographical survey of the 
entire Brega position was required to establish why; or indeed if, Brega had any military 
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importance. To satisfy this requirement the assistance of various experts was sort and 
the detailed study of numerous geography/geology reference books undertaken.    
     From a basic understanding of the chronology of the historical and political events 
leading up to the battle at Brega, it was realised that a more detailed study of how such 
events, might or might not, have influenced the battle was necessary. This work 
involved even wider reading and encompassed research into personalities and events 
stretching from 1941 all the way back in time to the late 19th centaury.  To facilitate this 
aspect of the research it was necessary to scrutinising memoirs, biographies, auto-
biographies, personal correspondence and official communications. Indeed, to find 
definitive answers on a whole range of issues the archives of several document 
repositories were investigated. As the work progressed data from many public 
organisations, institutions, museums, universities and libraries was sort. Prominent 
among the institutions accessed were the Imperial War Museum, the Public Records 
Office at Kew, and the Liddell-Hart Centre London.   
     The analyses of the available intelligence proved to be a complex element of the 
research. Consequently great pains were taken to establish what the senior politicians 
and commanders knew of enemy intentions prior to the battle of Brega. Research was 
carried out looking at intelligence gathered in both London and Cairo. The scant 
intelligence gathered in London and sent to Cairo formed one strand of research. While 
the multifarious intelligence gathered in theatre; and disseminated in Cairo formed a 
second, and more compelling, view of enemy intentions. Indeed prior to the outbreak of 
war so many intelligence summaries were being circulated to over 60 addresses that 
Middle East Command was forced to set up in Cairo its own Middle East Intelligence 
Centre (MEIC).27
                                                 
27 F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1993) p. 66. 
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     However, even with all this information no investigation into the outcome of a battle 
would be complete without a detailed examination of the men who fought in it, the units 
they belonged to and the various weapons they used. To satisfy the requirements of 
these three objectives a multi faceted approach was instigated. Detailed investigation of 
the main personalities involved was carried out using the records held in several 
institutions. Journals, magazines, newspapers and the internet were also extremely 
helpful in this regard.  
     Several journal articles helped with background information on significant 
personalities involved, units and the weapons used in the desert campaigns. The article 
by Trevor J. Constable in The Journal of Historical Review,28
     Which brings us to the battle its self; no investigation would be satisfactory, even if 
all the details mentioned above were known, without a detailed understanding of how 
the battle unfolded. The details of how the battle was fought, it has to be said, presented 
numerous problems. Not least of the problems being the absence of the war diary of the 
leading battalion involved, which, as mentioned, was destroyed in the battle. 
Nevertheless, even with this gap in the research, compensatory methods proved 
satisfactory. The war diaries of all the other units engaged in the battle on the day were 
carefully referenced. Unit histories were trawled for information and the observations 
from any eye witness accounts were included.  
 for example, on General 
Percy Hobart, proved to be very helpful. To establish the whereabouts and fighting 
ability of unit’s regimental histories of all the major participating troops were obtained 
and scrutinised. Unit war diaries were drawn from the Public Records Office and 
thoroughly investigated. With regard to the weapons used extensive research was 
carried out using both technical manuals and data sources. 
                                                 
28 Trevor J. Constable, ‘The Little-Known Story of Percy Hobart, They Called Him 'Hobo'’, The Journal 
of Historical Review, January/February 1999 Issue, Volume 18, number 1.  
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     Indeed, where any verifiable information was found of events which took place on 
the day it was utilised. Several, partial, enemy accounts of the battle were discovered 
and these proved to be very useful. However, one of the most informative sources of 
information on what actually happen at Mersa el Brega on 31 March, as mentioned 
earlier, came from Lieutenant David Hurst-Brown. Brown’s testimony, a soldier who 
actually fought in the battle, was gained by the author during the course of a long, and 
very fruitful, interview.   
ACCESSING SOURCES: ARCHIVAL RESEARCH 
While disseminating accurate information from published sources has its problems, 
such as bias and doctrinal entrenchment, gaining information from archives also has its 
share of problems. Indeed archives often have these pitfalls and also practical 
challenges to be overcome before useful information can be gathered. At the very basic 
level archives are more difficult to access than say books which are available almost 
everywhere. Unlike books which can be bought, loaned or accessed on line there are 
relatively few archives.  However, the benefits of using archives for advanced research 
cannot be overstated. As Michael R. Hill says in his work Archival Strategies and 
Techniques; ‘Social scientists who use archives enter a new world of information. These 
repositories challenge and extend the usual methods of finding and collecting data. The 
special interests and needs of the social scientist require an introduction to archives that 
specifically encourages our collective sociological imagination’.29
     However, the above being said, once at the archives problems of accessing the 
information stored within them can frequently present researchers with problems. Many 
of the documents stored in archives, such as war diaries, are written in long hand which 
is often very difficult to read. Moreover, much of what is written is frequently 
abbreviated and quite often peppered with shorthand references to people, places and 
  
                                                 
29 Michael R. Hill, Archival Strategies and Techniques (London: Sage Publications, 1993) p. 1. 
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equipment which have long gone out of common usage. To those reading these reports 
at the time the script would no doubt have been perfectly understandable but to modern 
day researchers it is very difficult to decipher.  
     Consequently in order to gain the full meaning of what has been written time and 
patience needs to be devoted to learning how to read the documents. Only once this skill 
has been learnt can the researcher hope to successfully decipher the abbreviations and 
oblique references. Also many of the most important and interesting incidents 
referenced in war diaries, accounts of battles for example, were written under extremely 
difficult circumstances. Consequently with the diarist under pressure simple mistakes 
can often appear such as timing of events, direction of travel and even the day on which 
the action took place. Therefore, wherever possible, even first hand accounts need to be 
carefully checked against other references.        
     Moreover, attaining, reading and deciphering individual archival documents by no 
means answers all the questions a researcher might have. Within most documents, 
especially war diaries, there will often be references to other units or other positions. 
Sadly these references will frequently be incomplete. They may give tantalising clues to 
some other nugget of information, which might be found in another document, but they 
obviously do not tell the researcher exactly where it might be found. In such cases many 
baron documents, not necessarily even in the same archive, might need to be searched 
before the grain of information sort can be found.  
     In other respects archives can be very disappointing in what they can and cannot 
supply. By no means all the documents that a researcher might desire will exist. Gaps in 
the available material are frequent. In the case of this work the obvious omission is the 
war diary of 9RB.  
     Other material which might be deemed useful, although it exists, might not be 
available to researchers. This is certainly the case with the Wavell family archive. 
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Although many of Wavell’s private papers are known to be in existence, held by his 
family, these have not been placed in the public domain. Indeed at the time of writing as 
far as is known only one researcher, Victoria Schofield, has, in recent times, been 
granted limited access to the collection. It is rumoured that a family member intends to 
write a biography of his relation and perhaps understandably wants to keep the details 
of the collection private until this work is undertaken.  
     However, in regard to this work the absences of the Wavell private papers are 
considered to be of relatively little importance. Most if not all of the correspondence 
between Wavell and his senior commanders, which relates to the events described in 
this work, is already in the public domain. Even the letters he sent after the war to 
people like O’Connor, which he often asked not to be made public, were, when the 
recipient died, lodged in archives. The O’Connor papers, for example, are lodged at the 
Liddell-Hart Centre. Also all the official cables, telegram’s and letters between 
government officials and Wavell, in the period being referenced, are in the public 
domain.  Moreover, and it is perhaps worth noting, Wavell released some documents 
himself to back up his interpretation of certain events.  
     Furthermore, several very extensive collections of private letters, diaries and papers 
are now available to researchers. The correspondence, for example, between General 
Dill, who was Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Wavell during the war, which is 
stored at the National Archives, is extensive and very revealing. The Eden papers which 
are kept at Birmingham University are also very helpful when researching the 
relationship between the political and military hierarchy in this period. In regard to this 
work they were very helpful in revealing the complex relationship between Dill, 
Churchill and Wavell.  
     The diaries and papers of Sir Philip Mitchell, who in 1940/41 was the British Chief 
Political Officer in East Africa, which are housed at the Rhodes House Library, Oxford 
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University, give a fascinating perspective on how a serving diplomat viewed the way in 
which the war in East Africa was being waged. Furthermore, the edited diaries of 
several important military and political figures; that held significant positions of power 
and influence at the time, are now available. These are very useful to cross reference 
many of the issues mentioned in the archive material. The diaries of Sir Alan Brooke, 
edited by Arthur Bryant,30 and Sir Henry Pownall, edited by Brian Bond,31
COMMAND AND COMMANDERS IN CONTEXT     
 for example, 
give first hand and almost immediate reactions to virtually all the major events in the 
war.          
As command, command decisions and command structures play such a prominent part 
in this thesis it has been considered necessary to devote a whole section to the subject of 
command. Moreover, in the main body of the work several crucial, individual, 
command decisions will be scrutinised in considerable detail. Methodologically the 
approach adopted to inform the reader on the complex issue of military command has 
been to place in context each of the senior commanders involved in the defence of 
Brega.  
     Consequently this element of the research will commence with an in depth review of 
Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command, General Archibald Wavell. Wavell, as 
theatre commander, had overall responsibility for all actions taken in his command area. 
As with any military structure Wavell’s command was not administered by the C-in-C 
alone. Consequently the actions and responsibilities of several of Wavell’s subordinate 
commanders will also be scrutinised. These will include his de facto second in 
command General Maitland Wilson. Wilson, among his other tasks, was mostly 
responsible for building the vitally important base instillations in the Middle East. 
                                                 
30 Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide (London: Reprint Society, 1958) 
31 Brian Bond, Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall Vols I and II 
(London: Leo Cooper, 1972) 
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Several Army Commanders will also be reviewed these will include General Richard 
O’Connor, who was responsible for the first successful desert offensive Operation 
Compass.  
     In regard to the defence of Brega itself all the senior commanders, and their actions 
prior to, and during, the battle, will be reviewed. For reference these will include in 
hierarchical order of command General Philip Neame VC, C-in-C Cyrenaica Command 
and General M. Gambier-Parry, C-in-C 2nd Armoured Division. Moreover, for 
completeness the two Brigade commanders, Brigadier Gordon Rimington, commander 
of 3rd Armoured Brigade, and Brigadier H. B. Latham, commander of 2nd Support 
Group, will also be referenced. 
REFERENCE TO THE LITERATURE ON COMMAND 
It would be fair to say that the literature referencing command and the various roles and 
functions that commanders undertake has been explored in some detail. In this regard 
works by authors such as T. N. Dupuy, Sun-Tzu, Elliot Cohen and Carl von Clausewitz 
proved to be particularly useful. References from these authors, and the many others 
studied, will it is hoped build up for the reader a comprehensive overview of how 
command and successful commanders, working under the military and political systems 
prevailing in their era, achieved their success. While on the other hand demonstrating to 
the reader how and why military commanders, working within the same military and 
political constraints, sometimes fail.  
     So what is the role of the military commander in the modern era?  For Dupuy the 
study of the Clausewitzian theory of command reveals the complexity and importance 
of leadership. ‘Clausewitz’s thinking about the obvious scalar or dimensional nature of 
a theory of combat, and the hopelessness of quantifying some aspects of war – and 
particularly the vagaries of human nature – was his recognition of the overwhelming 
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importance of leadership’.  Elliot Cohen, in Military Misfortunes, tells us that; ‘the 
modern commander is much more akin to the managing director of a large 
conglomerate enterprise than ever he is to the warrior chief of old.  He has become the 
head of a complex military organization, whose many branches he must oversee and on 
whose cooperation, assistance, and support he depends for his successes.32
     Sun-Tzu, on the other hand, as highlighted by Ralph B. Sawyer in his work on the 
Art of War, ‘frequently discusses the essential problem of command: forging a clearly 
defined organisation in control of thoroughly disciplined, well-ordered troops’.
  The military 
commander therefore, as we shall see in more detail in the main work, must be more an 
organiser than a fighter. He must coordinate the activities of a multitude of branches 
within his command structure. He should seek, and hopefully gain, the assistance of 
others, and his job will be made infinitely easier if he gains support from those above 
and below him.  
33
     However and again we shall explore this aspect of command more thoroughly in the 
main work, personality traits and institutional influences can, and often do, shape the 
military commander. As Cohen again writes:  
  This 
view of command is particularly pertinent to this work, for as we will see in later 
chapters, some of the command practises mentioned above, particularly well ordered 
troops, were clearly absent from the British forces defending Brega.   
The people who get to the top do so because they posses certain 
institutionally desirable characteristics: They are cautious, they adhere to 
rules and regulations, they respect and accept authority, they obey their 
superiors, and they regard discipline and submission to authority as the 
highest virtues. Twenty five or thirty years spent gaining promotion 
simply accentuates these characteristics, so that by the time a soldier 
reaches the top of the tree he lacks the very qualities of flexibility, 
imaginativeness, and adventurousness he needs to exercise command 
effectively.34
 
                            
                                                 
32 Elliot Cohen, Military Misfortunes (New York: Free Press, 2006) p. 7.  
33 Ralph B. Sawyer, Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Metro Books, 1994) p. 142.  
34 Cohen, Military Misfortunes, pp. 8/9. 
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This assessment of how senior commanders might develop should also be kept in mind 
when we reach the main work. It shows a remarkable degree of similarity to several of 
the military commanders, primarily Wavell, whose command decisions, the thesis will 
argue, played such a prominent part in the defeat at Brega.         
     Lastly we may look at the commanders’ relationship with his political master. A 
relationship which; in regard to this work, was primarily between Churchill in London 
and Wavell in Cairo. Unfortunately, as we shall see in the main work, this was not to be 
a particularly harmonious or indeed productive relationship. Nonetheless, strained 
relations between political leaders at home and commanders in the field are not an 
uncommon situation in times of war and they do not, in themselves history suggests, 
preclude commanders from winning victories.  
     While each group has the same overriding objective, which is defeating the enemy; 
their perspectives and methods for achieving this goal are often divergent. Politicians in 
order to satisfy public opinion may well want results faster than the commander on the 
ground thinks he can deliver them.  This divergence of views, which becomes more 
pressing for the politician as the need for a victory for politician reasons becomes more 
important, inevitably results in tension. Indeed, the culture in which each operated, 
perhaps inevitably, resulted in friction. As Cohen suggests in Supreme Command: ‘The 
give and take between politicians and their generals exacts a real price, and by and large 
that price fell on the shoulders of the generals, who found themselves broken down by 
the strain of managing a war while in turn being managed by a civilian leader who 
treated military advice as just that – advice, not a course of action to be ratified with no 
more than formal consideration’.35
                                                 
35 Elliot Cohen, Supreme Command (New York: Anchor Books, 2002) p. 209.   
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     In the Middle East the tension between the political leadership in London and the 
military leadership in Cairo stemmed from their differing perspectives as again Cohen 
points out: 
The Prime Minister [Churchill] was preoccupied with the sacrifices made 
to sustain the armed forces in the Middle East, including the dispatch of 
convoys sent at great risk through the Mediterranean; the local 
commanders [Wavell] saw chiefly the difficulties in assimilating the new 
equipment into their forces. Local commanders saw chiefly the 
operational task before them, and pleaded for time. Churchill, an avid 
consumer of intelligence, particularly decrypts of Rommel’s 
communications, knew just how badly off the Afrika Korps was (or 
claimed to be), which made his irritation at the failure of his commanders 
to crush the Germans all the more intense and in retrospect, 
understandable.36
  
   
     Furthermore, this tension can be greatly enhanced when politicians, who are often 
many miles away from the action, have to rely on information given to them by their 
field commanders. Politicians rely on accurate reports from their field commanders to 
make wider strategic decisions. If they are given inaccurate or even false information 
then this can lead to inappropriate decisions being made. This tendency to make 
inappropriate decisions was certainly the case with regard to decisions Churchill made 
on information he received from Wavell. Information Churchill received from Wavell 
persuade him to order Wavell to undertake operations, and to not undertake operations, 
which with more accurate information may well have led to completely different 
instructions being issued. We will see several examples of where had Churchill and the 
War Cabinet been given all the facts and true estimates they would almost certainly 
have issued different instructions to Wavell. In this regard we may keep in mind the 
highly possible advance on Tripoli and the highly dangerous intervention in Greece. 
Had Churchill been given all the relevant information on these two operations he may 
well have embarked on a totally different courses of action.  
                                                 
36 ibid, pp. 128/129. 
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     Indeed, in this regard, perhaps, the ideal relationship between commander and 
politician is not that the politician should expect from his commander total obedience.  
He should, perhaps, expect dialogue and commanders that will not hesitate to argue 
with their political masters if they feel they have valid reasons for the objection. ‘What 
occurred between president or prime minister and general was an unequal dialogue – a 
dialogue, in that both sides expressed their views bluntly, indeed offensively, and not 
once but repeatedly. Far from the simplistic conventions of the “normal” theory of civil-
military relations – which seems to reserve dialogue for only the beginning and end of a 
war – the practise of these men was interaction throughout the conflict’.37
     This dialogue, when missing, as was certainly the case between Wavell and 
Churchill, inevitably leads to tension and misunderstanding.  Consequently, as Cohen 
points out; ‘British soldiers like Field Marshals Sir John Dill and Archibald Wavell 
were prime cases of intelligent, well schooled, and able men who simply could not get 
along with a prime minister who had greater respect for another sort of men with more 
evident brilliance and less stolid reserve’.
   
38
     The above, therefore, establishes, in broad outline, how this research a topic has been 
undertaken. Explaining, as it does, how the various research sources, such as, 
secondary, primary and archival references, have been used.  Moreover, it establishes 
the need to thoroughly understand certain specific aspects of the topic being researched, 
for example in the case of this work, understanding the need to be familiar with the 
intricacies of command and command structures. However, it is also felt necessary to 
understand the methods used to explain to the reader how and why practical aspects of 
the research where addressed.           
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CONTRADICTIONS: TERRAIN AND UNIT AVAILABILITY      
As mentioned earlier many contradictions and anomalies were found in both the 
primary and secondary sources. Issues, such as the suitability of the terrain to sustain a 
defensive location, were brought into question. Also the availability of units to man 
positions should it be established that Brega was suitable for defence needed carful 
evaluation. Many authors who referenced the battle felt that the terrain around Brega 
had outstanding defensive qualities and could be made into a very strong defensive 
position. Rowan-Robinson in Wavell in the Middle East felt that the British positions 
around El Agheila/Brega were ‘regarded as particularly strong. The single approach to it 
from Tripoli was flanked on one side by the sea and on the other by semi-desert and, 
therefore, appeared easily defensible’.39  Conversely, there were other authors who put 
forward contradictory views about the suitability of the terrain around Brega being good 
for defence. Brian Cull, for example, considered that ‘Rommel’s rapid advance revealed 
the vulnerability of Mersa el Brega’.40
     Most authors agreed that the defenders of Brega were few in number, perhaps no 
more than fifteen hundred men. Moreover, some felt that, given the military 
circumstance prevailing at the time, this number could not have been significantly 
increased. Alexander Clifford, for example, had this to say: ‘In all Cyrenaica there were 
now only the Ninth Australian Division and elements of the newly arrived Second 
Armoured Division from England. Wavell had stretched his resources to provide armies 
for Greece and Abyssinia, and Cyrenaica had been left almost bare’.
   
41
                                                 
39 H. Rowan-Robinson, Wavell in the Middle East (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1941) p. 190.  
   
40 Brian Cull, Hurricanes Over Tobruk (London: Grub Street, 1999) p. 83. 
41 Clifford, p. 83.  
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     However, evidence gained from several sources suggested that despite these 
commitments Wavell still had many unused military assets laying idle in the Delta.42  
Moreover, aside from the substantial military assets already in the Middle East new 
units were arriving in a steady stream from several locations. Indeed, in this regard a 
complete infantry division, 50 Division, left the UK for the Middle East in May 1941.43
     Issues such as those mentioned above and other disputed points established a 
platform from which research could be undertaken to validate each individual claim. 
There were of course many issues to be resolved. However, the techniques used to 
verify the two points mentioned above, will it is hoped, serve to illustrate the diverse 
methods employed to validate the various claims.  
  
These facts therefore indicated that at the very least limited reinforcements could quite 
easily have been found to improve the defences at Brega without seriously jeopardising 
other parts of the command.     
     With regard to establishing how suitable the terrain around Brega was for defence 
the initial research focused on any information found in written accounts. These 
included primary and secondary sources, unit histories, war diaries and such maps as 
were available.  In regard to the amount of useful maps readily available this was at first 
disappointing. Notwithstanding this problem, two maps, one virtually contemporary and 
one more modern, were quite quickly discovered.44  Later as the research progressed 
more detailed maps began to be discovered in the many unit diaries accessed.45
                                                 
42 G. L. Verney, The Desert Rats (London: Green Hill Books, 1990) p. 50. The 7th Armoured Division 
was at the time of the German offensive uncommitted. ‘the armoured and motorised troops who had had 
several years’ experience in the Desert and nearly a year’s fighting there, were now back in Egypt’.  
  Both 
the modern and more contemporary maps, when closely examined, revealed many 
43 P. J. Lewis & I. R. English, Into Battle with the Durhams (London: The London Stamp Exchange, 
1990) p. 40. 
44 Defence Mapping Agency Map of Libya Series TCP Sheet H-4A Edition 3 1996.  
45 Detailed maps War Diary of  7 RTR Found at PRO WO 169/1416 Also War Diary B/O Battery 1 RHA 
WO 169/1436 
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important features of the Brega position. Information on features such as the other 
significant villages in the area, for example, El Agheila and Agedabia, was gained.  
     Also information was gained on the only tarmac road in the area, the Via Balbia, and 
many of the significant tracks in the region. Aside from giving information on the 
settlements, road and tracks in the area the maps were also useful in identifying many of 
the natural features in the region of Brega. These included the Wadi el Faregh, the salt 
marshes and the Bir el Suera sand sea which, as we shall see later, had a significant 
influence on the battle.  
     Notwithstanding the above, while the maps indicated where these natural and 
manmade geographical features appeared on the desert floor they could only give a 
partial appreciation of how significant such features might be in a defensive situation. In 
order to understand their significance in relation to the defence of the Brega defile 
extensive research had to be carried out. From secondary sources, such as The Crucible 
of War46, Rommel’s Desert War47 and The Trail of the Fox48
     While the maps and written sources gave a clear picture of the layout of the terrain in 
and around Brega they failed to give detailed information on what conditions were like 
at the time of the battle. Information on conditions contemporary with the events was 
 useful indications could be 
gleaned in regard to various aspects of the position and the surrounding terrain. In The 
Trail of the Fox a description of the village of Brega is found giving its position as near 
the coast and straddling sand hills. From an account of the Brega position in Rommel’s 
Desert War we learn that to the north of the village there were extensive sand dunes. 
These aspects of the position are confirmed in The Crucible of War and we gain further 
information indicating that the ground around the village was suitable as a forming up 
area. This information indicated that it was good solid ground as apposed to soft desert. 
                                                 
46 Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1980) p. 254. 
47 Martin Kitchen, Rommel’s Desert War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p. 75.  
48 David Irving, The Trail of the Fox (London: Papermac, 1985) p. 69. 
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lacking as were details on the significance of the various geographical features 
identified. For example, although they had provided a detailed geographical map of the 
area, and an understanding of the significant natural and manmade features, this 
information gave little indication of what each feature could contribute to the defence. 
Nor, indeed, how they could be made to interact together to form a defensive barrier. To 
acquire this information a two pronged approach was utilised. Firstly primary and 
secondary sources were sought out which contained accounts of the terrain from people 
who had been in or around the Brega position at the time. Secondly experts in 
geological terrain were contacted with a view to establishing what affect the various 
geographical features, such as salt mashes, would have had on the fighting.49
     In regard to understanding the debilitating effect the sand and the sand seas had on 
men and vehicles H. W. Schmidt’s book With Rommel in the Desert
  
50 gave valuable 
information. Schmidt gives a detailed account of the problems he encountered when he 
undertook a mission which required him to leave the tarmac road and strike out into the 
open desert.51
     While books such as Schmidt’s gave a first hand account of the effect sand could 
have on vehicles and men unit histories proved invaluable in describing the actual 
  He supplied detailed information on how difficult traversing desert sand 
was and how he avoided, because of the difficulty he found in crossing them, the many 
sand seas he came across. This information confirmed that travel in the open desert was 
both difficult and time consuming. Even without the added problem of enemy troops 
being dug into defensive positions and impeding his progression with gunfire Schmidt 
found it almost impossible to make his way through the sand dunes. Indeed he 
concluded that traversing the sand seas was almost impossible.  
                                                 
49 Mike Windel and Stuart Swann of the Yorkshire Geology Trust Based in Robin Hoods Bay North 
Yorkshire 5 Station Workshops Station Road.  
50 H. W. Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert (London: Harrap & Co, 1951) pp. 21/26 
51 William F. Buckingham, Tobruk: The Great Siege 1941-2 (Stroud: Tempus, 2008) p. 25. The Via 
Balbia was a 935 mile long tarmac road which ran along the full length of the Libyan coast from Egypt to 
Tunisia. It was opened by Mussolini in 1937.  
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layout of the British positions in the Brega defensive line. C. N. Barclay52
     However, while the significance of geographical features such as the high ground of 
Cemetery Hill are self explanatory, that is, for example, giving better visibility to 
artillery spotters, and the difficulty of traversing cloying sand dunes is understandable, 
the importance of other features was less obvious. In this regard the significance of sand 
seas and salt marshes was more problematical. Many sources, Schmidt for example, 
indicated that sand seas were almost impossible to cross.  Others, such as Pitt,
 in his book 
The History of the Northumberland Fusiliers 1919-1945 gives a detailed account of 
where the fusiliers took up their defensive positions and details several significant 
features which played an important part in the battle. Barclay gives us a detailed 
description of the positions the fusiliers occupied prior to the battle and places the only 
significant high ground in the area, Cemetery Hill, into its geographical location. These 
first hand accounts of the terrain and the dispositions of the various combatants helped 
to build up a comprehensive overview of where each detachment of the defence was 
situated. It also helped to place them on or near the various significant geographical 
features found in the vicinity.  
53
    In an effort therefore to understand the significance of these geographical features 
experts were consulted. For information on both salt marshes and sand seas the director 
of the North East Yorkshire Geology Trust,
 had 
indicated that salt marshes made the Brega position to quote Rommel ‘difficult either to 
assault or outflank’ but in none of these sources was a clear explanation of why these 
geographical features should be so difficult to traverse.  
54
                                                 
52 C. N. Barclay, The History of the Northumberland Fusiliers 1919-1945 (London: William Clowes, 
1952) p. 54. 
  Mike Windle, and geologist Stuart 
Swann, gave detailed information on the consistency and nature of these features. They 
53 Pitt, Crucible of War, 1980, p. 254. 
54 Windle & Swann, North East Geology Trust. 
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also, very helpfully, provided reading material giving detailed knowledge on how these 
natural features function55
UNIT DEPLOYMENT AND CAPABILITY 
. 
From the above sources it was eventually possible to construct a detailed plan of the 
whole Brega position from a geographical and topographical perspective. However, for 
a detailed understanding of the status of units actually deployed to Brega, and any 
potential units which might have been deployed to the area, other research methods 
proved to be needed. From the many primary and secondary sources accessed, Neame,56 
Connell,57 Strawson58 and Raugh,59
     Unit histories proved to be a valuable source of information with regard to where 
units were at specific times and their states of readiness for combat. Also extremely 
useful in this respect were the letters and correspondence of officers and men found in 
several repositories. Further useful information was found in several magazine articles.  
Purnell’s History of the Second World
 for example, a detailed list of units either already in 
Middle East Command or coming to it, was established. Armed with this list it was 
possible to embark on a regime of research with the objective of establishing the 
availability, whereabouts and fighting potential of over twenty units.     
60
                                                 
55 P Kearey, The New Penguin Dictionary of Geology (London: Penguin Reference, 2001) p. 232. 
Definition of sand sea known as Sebcha [also spelt Sabkha or Sebkha] ‘broad plain or salt flat in an arid 
or semi-arid region containing evaporites at a level dependent on the local water table’. 
 proved to be very useful and gave many 
detailed accounts of desert conditions, equipment and some informative maps. 
However, in most cases it was the detailed information found in the unit war diaries, 
stored at the Public Records Office in Kew, which allowed the picture to be made 
complete. Unit war diaries gave detailed information on the day to day movement of the 
56 Philip Neame, Playing With Strife (London: Harap, 1947) 
57 John Connell, Wavell Scholar and Soldier (London: Collins, 1964)  
58 John Strawson, The Battle for North Africa (B. T. Batsford, London: 1969) 
59 Raugh 
60 Purnell’s ‘History of the Second World War’ (London: Purnell Publishing, 1967)  
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troops. They also gave additional information on such things as unit casualties, 
commanding officers, issue of new weapons and the arrival of reinforcements.  
     With such information it was possible to then research the fighting capability of each 
unit referenced. As an example of how sources such as those mentioned above 
enhanced the accuracy of the thesis we may look at the research carried out on the 7th 
Medium Artillery Regiment (7MAR).  
     Shelford Bidwell, in his book Gunners at War61 gives a good insight into where this 
unit was prior to the Brega battle and where it was later in April. He supplied 
information on their equipment, the types of guns they had and the vehicles they used to 
transport them. The unit war diary62
     This information enabled research to be carried out on the capabilities of their 
weapons. This allowed information to be gathered on such issues as rates of fire, weight 
of shot, and range.
 gives the names of their senior officers the exact 
numbers of men available and revealed exactly where they were at crucial dates 
significant to the battle of Brega.  
63  Further investigation revealed the types and capabilities of their 
artillery tractors.64
     Moreover, to back up the information found in biographical, archival and technical 
sources, wherever possible, personal correspondence was also sort. In this regard the 
letters and personal diaries of veterans held in repositories such as the Imperial War 
Museum and the Liddell-Hart Centre were also accessed. These records proved to be 
very useful in revealing, among other things, how senior commanders and rank and file 
  This knowledge allowed research to be undertaken to establish how 
far these vehicles could travel, how fast they could travel and how many spare rounds of 
ammunition each vehicle normally carried.  
                                                 
61 Shelford Bidwell, Gunners at War (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1970) 
62 War Diary of 7th Medium Artillery Regiment WO 169/1491 
63 Chris Bishop, The Encyclopaedia of Weapons of WWII (London: Amber books, 2007) 
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soldiers viewed the capabilities of those around them, the conditions under which they 
fought and the quality and effectiveness of the weapons they used.     
CONCLUSION 
Thus the reader may be confident that the research methods employed to compile this 
project were both rigours and comprehensive. References found in, for example, 
secondary sources and journals have in all cases been verified by primary sources. Unit 
histories and war diaries have been thoroughly consulted and cross referenced to 
establish the veracity of claims made in secondary sources and primary sources.  
     Where possible the thoughts of both senior commanders and ordinary soldiers have 
been consulted to give extra reassurance that the information quoted is accurate. To 
compliment these sources expert advice has been sought such as in the case of 
establishing the relevance of the geological condition of the ground around Brega. In all 
cases the quality and ability of the weapons and vehicles used in the campaign have 
been researched in great depth. In conclusion the reader may be reassured that the 
conclusions reached in this thesis have been arrived at by the use of a number of 
complimentary and well established historical methods.    
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The root of bad writing is to compose what you have not worked out for yourself. Unless 
words come into the writers mind as fresh coinage for what the writer himself knows, 
knows to be true, it is impossible for him to give back in words that direct quality of 
experience, which is the essence of literature.65
 
 Alfred Kazin (1915-1998) U.S. Literary 
critic  
This literature review will seek to convey to the reader the depth and breadth of the 
sources used to conduct this research thesis into the battle of Mersa el Brega. The 
review will commence with an in depth study of how four writers have described the 
                                                 
65 Dr Laurence J. Peter, Peter’s Quotations (New York: Quill, 1992) Alfred Kazin, (1915-1998) U.S. 
literary critic, p. 511. 
40 
events surrounding the battle of Mersa el Brega and the consequent loss of Cyrenaica. 
The purpose of this element of the review will be to seek to discover what various 
authors have contributed to the debate. The four historians whose works have been 
chosen for analyses are, Henry Rowan-Robinson,66 Correlli Barnett,67 John Connell68 
and Basil Liddell Hart.69
     These authors are by no means the only writers who have referenced this subject, 
they are, however, included here as their writings and conclusions are typical in many 
respects of authors such as Victoria Schofield,
   
70 John Strawson,71 David Fraser,72 
Ronald Lewin73 and Harold E. Raugh74
     The views, conclusions and assertions contributed by authors and historians, such as 
those mentioned above, frequently, and perhaps inevitably, define and shape how 
historical events, such as those reviewed in this work, come to be understood by those 
who read them. It follows, therefore, that if authors give an event perfunctory treatment, 
assigning to the event little or no importance, others will inevitably follow. 
Furthermore, should these authors consider that on the evidence received the event 
needs no further investigation their opinion will, almost certainly, become the received 
wisdom.  In relation to the subject matter of this work, the defeat of British forces at 
Mersa El Brega and the subsequent loss of Cyrenaica, this has undoubtedly become the 
case.  
 who have also referenced the events 
surrounding the battle of Brega. They will therefore hopefully serve to give the reader a 
broad understanding of how writers have, in the main, covered this subject.  
                                                 
66 Rowan-Robinson.  
67 Barnett 
68 Connell 
69 Liddell-Hart   
70 Schofield. 
71 Strawson, The Battle for North Africa. 
72 David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them (London: Book Club Associates, 1994).  
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     All our authors to some degree mention the loss of Cyrenaica and some even 
reference the battle of Brega itself.  However, in their view it seems that the battle and 
the events surrounding it were so insignificant and the outcome so unavoidable that in-
depth research has not been deemed necessary.  This lack of accurate and informative 
research is when one considers how devastating the consequences of defeat at Brega 
were to British war aims hard to understand. The military gains made in North Africa, 
in nearly three months of hard fighting, were lost, some might say thrown away, in one 
day.  
     Moreover, the defeat at Brega undoubtedly jeopardised Britain’s whole military 
position in the Middle East leaving open as it did the road to Cairo and the oilfields 
beyond.75  As Kenneth Macksey writes in his book Military Errors of World War Two: 
‘Wavell’s decision to relegate North Africa to a subsidiary role in favour of an entry 
into the Balkans may be adjudged a strategic error of the first magnitude which had a 
profound effect upon the future course of the war’.76
     Nor is the lack of in-depth research of the battle, or the events surrounding the battle, 
by our authors’ the only disservice they have done to this potentially disastrous 
engagement. Successive writers, be they participants in the battle who subsequently 
wrote their memoirs or historical chroniclers, have, to a large extent fed off each other’s 
work. They have habitually taken the views and research of their fellow authors as 
completely accurate, true and defining and repeated their conclusions in their own 
accounts. However, investigations for this work suggest that their research, conclusions 
and memories are often at odds with evidence uncovered for this reappraisal of the 
battle. Their appreciations of the British command structure in the Middle East and the 
  
                                                 
75 Irving, p. 66. Rommel said ‘my first objective will be the re-conquest of Cyrenaica; my second, 
northern Egypt and the Suez Canal’.  
76 Kenneth Macksey, Military Errors of World War Two (Poole: Arms & Armour Press, 1987) p. 75. 
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abilities, or other wise; of the personalities involved in the events leading up to the 
battle can be particularly misleading.  
     Of particular note in this regard, and an aspect which the main work will investigate 
in some detail, are the misleading interpretations of the actions, or perhaps it would 
more accurate to say inactions, of the senior British commanders in the Middle East. 
Their assessment of the actions and abilities of General Sir Archibald Wavell, 
Commander-in-Chief of all troops in North Africa, is of particular interest in this regard. 
As one of the crucial personalities in the run up to the battle for Brega Wavell’s account 
of what he knew about his enemies intentions and what he could or could not have done 
to avoided the defeat, is, vitally important to any understanding of how and why events 
unfolded as they did at Brega.  Not surprisingly, perhaps, as the senior British 
commander in the Middle East Wavell’s recollections and actions feature to some 
degree in most of the written accounts on the subject.77
MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY ROWAN-ROBINSON 
  However, as can be judged 
from the conclusions reached by our first author, we may fairly question how accurately 
some authors have chronicled Wavell’s command in the Middle East.     
Major-General Henry Rowan-Robinson wrote the first account of Wavell’s actions in 
the Middle East in his originally entitled book Wavell in the Middle East. The work was 
published in late 1941 and is the first to relate some details of how and why Cyrenaica 
was lost.  Robinson, who was 68 in 1941, and knew Wavell well, was a distinguished 
soldier and on his retirement from military duty became a writer on military affairs.78
                                                 
77 There are two detailed accounts written by Wavell on his actions in the Middle East in 1940/41 one is 
his September 1941 report to the British Cabinet and the other is a letter sent to General O’Connor in 
1947 both will be reviewed in detail later in the work.  
  
78 The editors of Wavell in the Middle East had this to say about Robinson and his book; ‘it deals with a 
number of stirring events: the Italian invasion of Egypt and Greece; the German occupation of Rumania; 
the splendid counter-attack of the Greeks; the battle of Taranto; the whole series of General Wavell’s 
victories in Egypt, Libya and Abyssinia. General Robinson is a well known soldier who is also a 
recognised authority on eastern affairs’ (Back cover sheet). The editors it seems cannot bring themselves 
to even mention the defeat at Brega and Wavell’s part in it. 
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In his 232-page book on Wavell’s exploits in North Africa he recounts in some detail 
the Italian invasion of Egypt, the successful British counter offensive and subsequent 
defeat of the Italian Army, the defeat of Italian forces in Somalia and British support for 
Greece. However, for the defeat and withdrawal of British forces at Brega he can find 
only 24 lines of narrative. His account of the battle is, however, revealing and in many 
respects typical as we shall see of the way in which later writers have tackled the 
subject.  
     Robinson, and he is far from alone, begins his account of the battle by virtually 
absolving all the senior commanders involved from any blame in the defeat. Robinson 
instead, as is often to be the case with later writers, chooses to blame just about 
everything else but poor command decisions for the defeat. In his sparse account of the 
events leading up to the British withdrawal at Brega Robinson cites three major factors 
which he considers were the deciding factors in the defeat.     
     He opens his account thus: ‘The first shock to hopeful feeling was caused by the 
sudden and unexpected appearance of German armoured forces in western 
Cyrenaica’.79  Secondly, ‘our position at Al Aghaila [the more common spelling in 
British usage is El Agheila and will be used hereafter in this work] was regarded as 
particularly strong. The single approach to it from Tripoli was flanked on one side by the 
sea and on the other by semi-desert and, therefore, appeared easily defensible “except” 
against tracked vehicles’.80  Thirdly, ‘a single mechanized brigade was watching this 
approach, the remainder of the armoured division having been withdrawn in part for 
despatch to Greece and, in part, for very necessary re-fitment after its arduous 
campaign’.81
                                                 
79 Rowan-Robinson,  pp. 189/190 
  If put simply then, according to Robinson, the British were forced out of 
Cyrenaica because they had poor intelligence, the enemy used tanks and there was only a 
80 ibid 
81 ibid  
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single brigade available for defence, as most of the British tanks were either hors-de-
combat back in Cairo or had been sent to Greece.  
     Therefore, if we accept Robinson’s account as accurate it is not difficult to come to 
the conclusion that no blame should be given to the commanders for the defeat. His 
friend Wavell, especially, could not be blamed as all the factors listed above were quite 
clearly either beyond his control or impossible to rectify through lack of resources. 
However, Robinson’s account of why Brega was lost is not only sparse; it is also open 
to serious question regarding its accuracy.  
     His first assertion that the appearance of German armoured forces in western 
Cyrenaica was “sudden and unexpected” is extremely difficult to accept. There is sound 
evidence confirming that the British knew in mid February, six weeks before the enemy 
attacked, that German and Italian troop re-enforcements were landing in Tripoli.82  It is 
hard to accept that Robinson did not known, as he was extremely close to the action, 
that G.H.Q. in Cairo was receiving photographic evidence,83 taken on an almost daily 
basis by British pilots, showing that the enemy was unloading tanks in Tripoli harbour 
almost as fast as they could be got off the ships.84  By late February the British also knew 
that the commander of the German forces in Libya was Erwin Rommel.85   Furthermore, if 
they needed any clearer confirmation that the Germans had arrived in Libya; on 24 
February, British forward troops were attacked by German armoured cars.86
     Robinson’s second reason for the defeat was that El Agheila ‘appeared easily 
defensible “except” against tracked vehicles’. The question that must be asked here is 
why should the bottleneck position at El Agheila be considered by Robinson to be 
vulnerable to attack from tracked vehicles?  The El Agheila position and the Brega 
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position for that matter were, in fact, narrow defiles bordered on one side by the sea and 
on the other by impassable salt marshes. This combination of terrain made blocking either 
defile; whether to armour or any other kind of attack, relatively easy.  Laying minefields 
across the defiles and covering them with artillery and machine guns would make any 
attempt to force the defiles extremely difficult and costly even for tracked vehicles.  
     Robinson’s third conclusion is that El Agheila was lost because there was only “one 
brigade available for defence”. However, in the same passage he contradicts himself by 
claiming that ‘our position at El Agheila was regarded as particularly strong’.87  The 
truth, as we shall see later, is that neither claim can be substantiated. The British had 
virtually no troops at El Agheila and certainly none in strongly prepared positions when 
the Germans attacked.88  There is evidence that the British did lay a minefield at El 
Agheila and had a few armoured cars in the area.89
     However, research for this work can find nothing to corroborate Robinson’s claim 
that the British position at El Agheila was particularly strong. As the officer in charge of 
defending Cyrenaica at the time, General Wilson, says: ‘Owing to commitments with 
other campaigns, especially in regard to air forces, one had to be content with moving 
armoured cars and a portion of the Support Group to the frontier between Cyrenaica and 
Tripoli at a place called Agheila’.
  At the time of the German attack 
there is further evidence that a troop of Australian anti-tank gunners was also in the 
vicinity.  
90
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  As for there only being one brigade available for 
defence this also incorrect. There was, in fact, another brigade actually involved in the 
defence which Robinson completely ignores. Moreover, as will be demonstrated later in 
the work, more forces could quite easily have been made available to the defence.        
88 Wolf Heckmann, Rommel’s War in Africa (London: Granada, 1981) Heckmann comments on ‘the ease 
with which Streich’s small party had occupied Fort El Agheila’. p. 71.     
89 Clifford, p. 82. 
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     As can be seen, therefore, Robinson’s account of why the British defence of 
Cyrenaica in February and March 1941 failed is incorrect in virtually every respect. 
Moreover, it fails in both detail and actuality to give sound and provable reasons for the 
defeat.  This trend, started by Robinson, of giving a very brief description of the events 
leading up to the defeat at Brega and often misinterpreting or even leaving out 
altogether important facts relating to the battle, may have been the first, but it has by no 
means been the last example of this trend. This practise has been continued over many 
decades by most writers who have addressed this subject.    
CORRELLI BARNETT 
The next author whose work we shall review is Correlli Barnett and his book on the war 
in the Middle East The Desert Generals. In this most illuminating account, 309-pages in 
the 1960 edition, of the war in the desert and the senior officers involved in the conflict, 
Barnett treats his readers to many accurate and detailed reviews of the significant events 
which occurred in the three plus years of war in the desert.  However, for the German 
breakthrough at Brega he can find only 23 lines of narrative. He begins his sparse 
account thus: ‘Now, on the morrow of Beda Fomm, the apparatus of O’Connor’s 
victories, and their effects, vanished with the suddenness and completeness of a 
phantom at first light. It is a sad story, quickly told’.91
     The lack of military preparedness prevalent throughout the Cyrenaica Command he 
blames on the inexperience of the troops assigned to the defence. As for the scattering 
on miscellaneous duties throughout Egypt of the experienced Seventh Armoured 
Division,
  He then commences to blame, in 
a similar vein to Robinson, everything but the British high command for the defeat.  
92
                                                 
91 Barnett, p. 62. 
 a decision which many would consider was a serious and indeed dangerous 
course of action to take; again he can find no one to blame. The mistaken assumption 
92 Verney, p. 50.   
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made by the British high command that the attack would not come when it did, on 31 
March, but would come in May he considers is perfectly understandable as the 
intelligence was so poor.   
     As with Robinson’s conclusions it is hard to reconcile any of Barnett’s conclusions 
with the evidence. If we take just one of the reasons Barnett puts forward for the defeat, 
the lack of intelligence with regard to when the enemy might attack, we may see how 
little research he must have undertaken and how casually he regards the failure of the 
commanders on the spot to prepare defensive works. The reality of the situation that the 
British high command actually found itself confronted with in February/March 1941 
clearly indicated that attack was imminent and there was, even in 1960, plenty of 
evidence available to confirm this fact.  
     Indeed high calibre and reliable local intelligence was, prior to the attack, available 
to Wavell in some quantity. This local intelligence gave Wavell clear warning that the 
enemy was reinforcing his position in Libya.93  At the end of January, for example, 
local Bedouin tribesmen were reporting the presence of German officers in Libya.94  
Moreover, Michael Carver, who was actually at HQ Cairo at the time, tells us that: 
‘Intelligence told Wavell a fortnight after Beda Fomm that German troops had reached 
Tripoli’.95 General Verney wrote in 1954 that: ‘For some time prior to the end of March 
there were many indications of the build up of a German Army in Tripolitania, and 
there was much German air activity from the middle of February onwards’.96
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  Virtually 
every piece of intelligence Middle East Command received throughout February and 
94 Adrian Fort, Archibald Wavell: The Life and Times of an Imperial Servant (London: Jonathan Cape, 
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March 1941 suggested that attack would come sooner rather than later. Consequently 
preparations for defence could not commence soon enough.97
     Wavell himself recognised that attack was imminent and reported to the Chiefs-of-
Staff in London on 2 March that ‘the enemy could possibly maintain up to one infantry 
division and one armoured brigade along the coast road in about three weeks’.
       
98   This, 
by Wavell’s own admission, suggests that an attack was possible by 23 March, a week 
earlier than the actual attack. Moreover, Wavell continued that ‘if they had a second 
armoured brigade they might send it across the desert to attack the British flank’.99  
They might, he continues, ‘do some offensive patrolling at Agheila and if they found 
the British screen weak, [which Wavell, as we shall see, knew it was] push on to 
Agedabia’.100
JOHN CONNELL  
   However, Barnett makes no reference to Wavell’s well documented 
appraisal of what the enemy might do and, in fact, what he did do. Nor is there any 
criticism of Wavell or the high command in general for their complete failure to 
implement even basic military practices and prepare Cyrenaica for defence.  
Our next author, John Connell, was again an acquaintance of Wavell. How well they 
actually knew each other is unclear; however, it is known that they both served in the 
same theatres of operation and at the same time. Connell worked for Wavell as a 
propaganda officer at G.H.Q. in Egypt and later in India as Chief Military Censor. In his 
1964 work, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier, Connell gives us a little bit more in the way of 
narrative on the events leading up to the battle for Brega devoting as he does about 11 
pages, out of his 507-page work, to the event. However, as with Barnett, in his 11 pages 
he too can find little to criticise in the way the high command prepared the ground prior 
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to the battle. Nor any real fault in the way the senior commanders carried out their 
duties.  
     For Connell the main reason why the British were unable to adequately defend Brega 
was their lack of resources. Connell’s view is that ‘there were not enough troops; there 
was by no means enough equipment, to go round. If Greece got men, aircraft, tanks, 
trucks, field guns, A.A. guns, radar and signal equipment, the Western Desert went 
without’.101  He adds, like Barnett, that the inexperience of the troops, and for good 
measure the inexperience of the commanders on the spot, also contributed to the defeat. 
His view seems to be almost a mirror image of Wavell’s, who wrote after the battle that 
‘everything seems to have gone wrong, tanks broke down and communications broke 
down, the enemy air making a dead set at all W. T. vehicles. Gambier-Parry102 was not 
a sufficiently experienced commander to cope with such a situation; and Neame 
remained at his H.Q. in Barce’.103
     Again the pattern is repeated, everyone, except Wavell, is to blame for the defeat at 
Brega and the subsequent loss of Cyrenaica. It is self evident that the equipment was 
poor the communications broke down and the commanders were not up to the job. 
However, the fact that Commander-in-Chief Wavell appointed these commanders and 
that Commander-in-Chief Wavell was ultimately responsible for seeing that his 
subordinate commanders had the means to fight for him seems to have completely 
escaped Connell.   
   
BASIL LIDDELL-HART 
The last author this part of the work will review is Basil Liddell-Hart a military theorist 
who contributed over his long writing career many voluminous tombs to the cannon of 
military history. Hart’s contribution on this subject was published in 1970 in Liddell-
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Hart’s History of the Second World War. In this august 713-page tomb, which 
admittedly covers the whole war and not just events in the Western Desert, Hart donates 
approximately 34 lines of narrative to the loss of Cyrenaica. Hart gives, as might be 
expected in such a short appraisal, a very scant account of the events surrounding the 
German breakthrough at Brega. He fails, in fact, to even mention Brega at all preferring 
instead to refer to it as ‘the bottleneck position east of Agheila’.104
     The poor intelligence available to Wavell and G.H.Q. in Cairo is first on the list of 
excuses. Hart confidently informs his reader: ‘Rommel’s opening thrust at the end of 
March 1941, and its far-reaching exploitation, created all the greater shock because the 
possibility of an early advance by the enemy had been discounted on the British 
side’.
  As for who might be 
to blame for the loss of the “bottleneck position” Hart gives no names, instead, like so 
many others before him, he blames all the usual suspects.  
105  He then goes on to mildly criticise the commanders on the spot, again without 
actually naming them, and again adds to the list of factors which he considers caused 
the defeat the poor quality of the troops available to the defence. He declares with some 
authority that ‘quality was lacking, both technically and tactically’.106
     Never once does he question why the excellent defensive position at Brega was not 
reinforced. Nor does he question why Wavell ordered the forward defence to be 
abandoned if attacked. The quality of the troops and their poor equipment, dreadful 
tactical dispositions and lack of technical proficiency are mentioned but little 
explanation is given as to why, if he is correct, they should find themselves in such an 
odious position. However, although he acknowledges that the breakthrough at Brega 
was a very serious blow to the British war effort, and in his words it; ‘opened the way 
for Rommel to enter a desert expanse where he could exploit a wide choice of 
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alternative routes and alternative objectives’107
     So we may see that attention to detail regarding an event which could so easily have 
resulted in the British being knocked out of the war has been, at best, poorly recorded 
and at worst virtually ignored by the authors mentioned above. Moreover, as we shall 
see in later chapters these authors are by no means by themselves in their scant coverage 
of this crucial battle. Authors such as Raugh, Schofield, Strawson and Fraser are all just 
as sparse in their coverage of this crucial event. 
 he can find no culprit or culprits 
responsible for the disaster.  
     However, it must also be stressed that it would be unfair and perhaps unjust to say 
that in the many books which have been referenced and give accounts of the events 
which are central to this work that they are all completely worthless and contribute 
nothing to the debate. In virtually all the works referenced valuable and interesting 
information has been found which although often confused and sometimes less than 
accurate gives the researcher clues and pointers which indicate how and why events 
unfolded at Brega as they did.   
MORE GENERAL READING 
It would be fair to say that many of the authors who have written accounts reviewing 
the events surrounding the British defeat at Brega have steered away from open 
criticism of Wavell. Indeed for the most part all the senior officers involved in the 
defeat at Brega are exonerated from blame. In Wavell’s case many authors have either 
ignored his part in the defeat completely or have even commiserated with him in regard 
to the inadequacy, among many other things, of his subordinate commanders. However, 
some authors, notably Kenneth Macksey, in Military Errors of World War,108
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     As for the commander on the spot at Brega, Neame, ambiguities in regard to his 
abilities abound. Pitt for example in The Crucible of War tells us that Neame was ‘not 
living up to Wavell’s hopes’.109  A theme, it has to be said, which has also been echoed 
by others. Brigadier John Harding, who at the time of the battle was on the General 
Staff at Neame’s Head Quarters, was so pessimistic about Neame’s abilities that he 
begged Wavell to replace him.110  However, not all authors and commentators have 
been so critical of Neame. A. J. Smithers, for example, in Rude Mechanicals,111
     These ambiguities flagged up several issues which were crucially germane to this 
work. How, for example, should command function if best results were to be attained on 
the battlefield? How were armies structured generally, and more specifically, how were 
they structured in WWII?  In an effort to clarify these questions, and several other 
related topics, many sources were referenced. Information on command was obtained 
from authors such as Elliot Cohen and his work Supreme Command.
 has 
certain sympathy for the position that Neame found himself in, stating that his army was 
in a ‘wretched state’. 
112  In regard to 
how armies were structured generally various sources were reviewed. Christopher 
Bellamy’s, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice,113 was 
particularly helpful. Bellamy clearly demonstrates the benefits that a well marshalled 
army brings to the battlefield. In this regard William E. Livezey in his work on Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, Mahan on Sea Power, also confirms Bellamy’s conclusions; his chapter 
on the doctrine of sea power and the principles of naval strategy being particularly 
informative in regard to the marshalling of forces.114
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     For information regarding the origins of force composition and deployment in the 
modern era, Stephen Biddle, in his work Military Power, proved to be very informative. 
In regard to mobile warfare and how it functioned in the WWII Martin Van Creveld in 
his work Command in War115
     As to the actual composition of Wavell’s armed forces in the Middle East various 
works were referenced. Brian L. Davis, in The British Army in WWII 
 gave useful guidance. Creveld’s chapter on mobile 
warfare gave clear indications of how motor vehicles had changed the pace and scale of 
forces that could be brought to bear in military engagements. Moreover, it indicated the 
scale of vehicles required to move and maintain fighting units.  
116
     For more detailed information on the actual army units fighting in the Middle East in 
the early stages of the desert war, George Forty, and his book The First Victory: 
O’Connor’s Desert Triumph
 gave very 
precise information on the hierarchy of command prevailing in the British Army in 
WWII and also gave detailed information on unit composition. Davis’s work in regard 
to specific unit arrangements showed how the command structure worked in each type 
of significant unit in the British Army. His work detailed the ranks and roles of soldiers 
from Generals right down to private soldiers. In regard to specific units Davis gives 
details of the function, composition and equipment of units as diverse as armoured 
divisions to medical services.  
117 gave concise information. Forty lists all the significant 
units fighting in the desert in the research period being referenced. This information 
enabled unit histories to be scrutinised. Works such as Hector Bolitho’s, The Galloping 
Third,118 the story of the 3rd Hussars, Dudley Clarke’s, The Eleventh at War 1934 – 
1945119 and R.H.W.S. Hastings’s, The Rifle Brigade in the Second World War120
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revealed many significant details about the fighting ability and movements of these 
units. For details of RAF forces available in the Middle East, their quality and quantity, 
reference was made to works such as John Terrain’s, The Right of the Line121 and Philip 
Guedalla’s Middle East 1940-42: A Study in Air Power.122  In regard to naval resources 
Admiral Cunningham’s work A Sailors Odyssey123 and Bernard Ireland’s The War in 
Mediterranean 1940-43124
     For details on what traits and abilities make a competent and well rounded 
commander, again, multiple texts were referenced. Initial research centred on Carl von 
Clausewitz’s seminal work, On War.
 gave excellent, and in Cunningham’s case first hand, 
accounts, of the availability of shipping in the Middle East.    
125  This work revealed many aspects of military 
competence, such as the commanders need to understand strategy, offensive and 
defensive operations and military virtues. For further attributes in regard to command 
and understanding the commanders place on the battlefield Sun Tzu’s The Art of War126 
was extensively referenced. As strategy and command form such a significant element 
of the work reading Clausewitz and Sun Tzu led to more detailed reading of authors 
such as Van Creveld and Colin S. Gray. Gray’s Modern Strategy127
     As we have seen from the earlier reviews of authors who have contributed to the 
early desert war, and in regard to this work the contributions they have made in relation 
to the events surrounding the battle for Brega, intelligence, or the possible lack of 
intelligence on enemy activities, has been given great credence for the British failure to 
 was useful in 
explaining modern strategic thought and how this related to events and actions which 
occurred at Brega.  
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defend their Desert Flank adequately.  Consequently research to establish how much or 
how little Wavell and his subordinate commanders knew of enemy activity in Libya has 
formed a recurring theme throughout this work.  
     In all cases, it would be fair to say, the early authors who have chronicled the events 
prior to the battle of Brega have concluded that poor intelligence significantly 
contributed to Wavell’s mistaken belief that his enemy would not attack him until May 
at the earliest.  As Woollcombe was to write in 1959; ‘until about a week before the 
Athens conference of 22-23 February the balance of his [Wavell’s] information was 
against the likelihood of German infiltration into Libya’.128  This view was continued, 
in 1960, by Correlli Barnett in The Desert Generals when he wrote: ‘Wavell saw no 
danger in Libya: British intelligence considered that the newly arrived Rommel and his 
fledgling Italo-German force could not be ready to advance before May’.129
     So was there, what we might call, an intelligence gap? Indeed the question must be 
asked, did Wavell have creditable intelligence which indicated that the Germans had 
arrived in Libya in strength and if so should he have anticipated an earlier attack. To be 
fair to our earlier authors this gap in the amount and quality of information on enemy 
activity available to Wavell was almost impossible for them to gauge. At the time of 
their writing no detailed accounts of how good, or bad, British intelligence was at this 
time had been released. However, details of how effective British intelligence had 
become by 1941 were released in 1969 when F. W. Winterbotham published Secret and 
Personal.
  However, 
as we know the Germans and their Italian allies were ready to attack Wavell’s forces in 
Libya long before May.  
130
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gaining and reading enemy intelligence. Moreover, since Winterbotham’s work was 
published in 1969 a steady stream of publications dealing with the activities of British 
intelligence in WWII have been released into the public domain. Notable in this respect 
was F. H. Hinsley’s British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 1; Its 
Influence on Strategy and Operations.131
     More detailed evidence of what Army Intelligence, via Signals Intelligence 
(SIGINT), was providing to commanders in the Middle East is provided by Kenneth 
Macksey. Macksey tells us that; ‘in Cyrenaica, in January, clear evidence of an 
increasing Luftwaffe presence, to be followed in February by army units, had been 
provided by SIGINT and Ultra’.
  This work revealed many aspects of what 
British intelligence knew of German intentions prior to their attack on Brega.   
132  Moreover, Ralph Bennett in Ultra and 
Mediterranean Strategy133 confirms that on 3 March Wavell was given information, 
obtained from the recent breaking of the German Air Force Light Blue Enigma key, 
which told him that the Germans would be ready to attack sooner than expected.  Hugh 
Sebag-Montefiore’s Enigma: The Battle for the Code134
     Logistics, with regard to the military requirements needed to either fight defensively, 
as at Brega, or offensively, as in any offensive operations which might be contemplated, 
needed to be scrutinised in some detail. Two sources proved to be extremely useful in 
  gives further details on how 
much information was available to British intelligence and when it was made available 
to Army Intelligence in Cairo. More detailed reading of sources such as those 
mentioned above all indicated that Wavell and his Middle East command knew as early 
as mid January that the Germans were coming to Libya and as the weeks prior to the 31 
March attack passed this information, as we will see in the main work, became more 
and more certain. 
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this regard. The Royal Army Service Corps publication, The Story of the Royal Army 
Service Corps 1939-1945135 and the History of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps 1920-
1945136 by A. H. Fernyhough. These publications gave details of virtually all the 
measures undertaken prior to the 31 March attack to establish a suitable base 
organisation in Egypt and to quantify what resources were available to support military 
operations. In a more general sense Martin van Creveld’s Supplying War: Logistics 
from Wallenstein to Patton 137
     For detailed information on both armoured and soft skinned vehicles several 
publications were accessed. In regard to armoured vehicles Armour in Conflict
gave detailed information on how armies are supplied and 
how logistics can influence battles. These works were very informative on issues such 
as fuel provision, food and transport.  
138 by Ian 
V. Hogg, Armoured Firepower by Peter Gudgin and Tanks of World War 2139 by Chris 
Ellis all gave much useful information. With reference to the operational qualities of 
British tanks four publications stand out for mention. Tank Men140 by Robert Kershaw, 
Winged Dagger141 by Roy Farran, Taming the Panzers142 by Patrick Delaforce and 
Panzer Bait143 by William Moore. These publications gave good insight into how 
British tank units were organised on a practical operational bases and how they 
compared to both Italian and German tanks. Accounts of the abilities and performance 
of German and Italian tanks were sourced from several publications Julian Jackson in 
his The Fall of France144
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tactics. In Panzerkrieg145
     Soft skinned vehicles played a crucial part in all operations undertaken in the 
Western Desert and their availability or otherwise features prominently in most 
accounts of the early desert fighting. The lack of transport was, in fact, cited by Wavell 
as his ‘chief difficulty’ in reinforcing and supplying his troops holding the desert 
flank.
 Peter McCarthy & Mike Syron give details of both Blitzkrieg 
and of how German tanks performed in the Western Desert.  
146  Indeed W. G. F. Jackson in The North African Campaign 1940-43 tells us that: 
‘Wavell often stressed that shortage of trucks hampered him more than anything else 
during his campaigns’.147  This view is echoed by Michael Carver in Dilemmas of the 
Desert War who wrote: ‘The principal determining factor in the speed with which [an] 
advance could be conducted was logistic, and the key to that was the availability of 
motor transport’.148
     Consequently this aspect of the battle was investigated in some detail. In regard to 
the overall amount of transport available in the Middle East several sources proved to 
be useful. The official histories of both the RASC and the RAOC give quite detailed 
information on many aspects of transport availability in the Middle East, such as arrival 
rates, unit composition and vehicle type and purpose.  More general sources, Jackson, 
for example, in The North African Campaign 1940-43, gives additional information in 
this case precise numbers of vehicles arriving from the U.S between January and March 
1941.
   
149
     Technical reference sources were found to be essential in compiling this work.  
Titles such as The Encyclopaedia of Weapons of World War II,
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Data Book,151 British and Commonwealth Armoured Formations (1919-46),152 Images 
of War: Afrika – Korps153 and Regiments and Corps of the British Army154
     Although the main thrust of the work has been to examine the events leading up to 
the battle of Brega, and the reasons for, and the consequences of, the defeat, from the 
British perspective German sources (either primary or secondary) written by authors 
looking at the war in the desert from the German perspective, cannot be ignored. Indeed 
publications such as With Rommel in the Desert
 by Ian S. 
Hallows have proved to be indispensable in giving background information on 
weapons, vehicles, units and illustrations of troops and their equipment in the desert.     
155 by H. W. Schmidt and Rommel’s 
War in Africa156 by Wolf Heckmann, both German authors, and British authors David 
Irving and his work The Trail of the Fox157and George Forty and his book The Armies 
of Rommel158 proved to be extremely useful. These works gave background information 
on such things as the terrain over which both sides fought and the defensive qualities of 
the Brega position, as seen from the German stand point. They also served to confirm 
such things as troop arrival dates, types and quantities of equipment and details of the 
actual battle. Of particular interest in regard to establishing Rommel’s abilities as a 
commander and additional information on the German presence in Africa two works 
were helpful, Desmond Young’s Rommel159 and Ronald Lewin’s Rommel as Military 
Commander.160
     As the most significant feature in the defeat at Brega was command and the reactions 
and actions of the senior officers involved their biographies and auto biographies have 
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contributed enormously to this work. Regrettably of the six most senior officers 
involved in the events surrounding the battle of Brega, that is Wavell, Neame, Wilson, 
Gambier-Parry, Rimington and Latham, only Neame and Wilson wrote up their 
memoirs. This absence of memoirs, in the case of Wavell at least, is extremely 
surprising. Wavell it must be noted was a prolific author who wrote most of his life. Yet 
when it comes to what must be in any commanders’ life the biggest and most significant 
event he could possibly be involved in, a World War, Wavell chooses not to give his 
side of the story. Bernard Fergusson in his book on Wavell, Wavell Portrait of a 
Soldier161 tells his readers that Wavell confided to him in February 1950 that he was 
about to write his memoirs, and had even thought of a title, they were to be called 
Reasons in Writing.162
     Wavell’s reticence in writing his memoirs is all the more surprising when one 
realises that he wrote for money. He was never a wealthy man and the money he 
received from writing supplemented his army pay. Had Wavell written his auto 
biography or even just an account of his time in World War II it would, in all 
probability, have earned Wavell some very useful additional income. Moreover, as even 
at the time Wavell was receiving considerable criticism from some of his colleagues for 
his command decisions in the war, criticism it has to be said Wavell strongly refuted; it 
seems odd that he did not use a book to rebut some of these adverse question marks 
over his actions in the war.  
  However, even though Wavell had been largely unemployed for 
over two years before his death in May 1950 he never wrote his memoirs and even now 
access to his personal papers is denied by the Wavell family and they are still not in the 
public domain.     
     The above being said many authors have written accounts of Wavell’s life and his 
actions in WWII. As mentioned Henry Rowan-Robinson, wrote Wavell in the Middle 
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East in 1941. This work has been followed by at least five major works on Wavell and 
his life. In 1961 Bernard Fergusson gave a very personal account of Wavell’s early 
army life and war career. However, whether Fergusson’s account is unbiased is open to 
question. Fergusson informs his reader that: ‘I shall be grateful all my life for the 
fortunate chance that brought me into his orbit’.163  Several other accounts of Wavell’s 
life have followed in subsequent years. Robert Woollcombe’s work on Wavell, The 
Campaigns of Wavell 1939-43,164 was published in 1959.  In 1964, John Connell, as 
referred to earlier, wrote Wavell Scholar and Soldier.165  Ronald Lewin, wrote The 
Chief 166 in 1980. Harold E. Raugh, Jr contributed Wavell in the Middle East 1939-
1941167 in 1993. This last work is a very focused look at Wavell’s early war career and 
proved to be extremely useful in the research. The most recent work on Wavell has been 
contributed by Victoria Schofield, in Soldier & Statesman 2006.168
     General Maitland Wilson, who did write up his memoirs in his 1948 work Eight 
Years Overseas 1939-47,
  From these works it 
has been possible to build up a very detailed understanding of Wavell’s early life and 
his army career. Unfortunately word restrictions have made it impossible to include any 
details of Wavell’s early life in the main work.  
169 was Wavell’s second in command and played an important 
part in many of Wavell’s campaigns. Consequently his first hand accounts of some of 
the crucial stages of the early desert war were found to be very helpful. General Philip 
Neame V. C. also wrote up his memoirs in his 1947 work Playing with Strife.170
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Cyrenaica and gave details of what was discussed at the pivotal 16/18 March meeting 
between Neame and Wavell.  
     As for the other senior officers they remained mostly silent on the events 
surrounding their part in the defeat at Brega. Such details of their part in the Brega 
defeat that have been gleaned have come mostly from the accounts by Wilson, Neame 
and the authors of work on Wavell. In the case of Rimington further information was 
contributed in a very illuminating report on his actions just after the defeat at Brega by 
Brigadier John Coomb. This information was found in the O’Connor papers in the 
Liddell-Hart centre at the University of London. One further source which proved to be 
very helpful in detailing Wavell’s domestic life in Cairo and to some extent his military 
activities was Peter Coats book Of Generals and Gardens.171
     As mentioned in the methodology the various unit war diaries referenced
  Coats was Wavell’s ADC 
and with him almost constantly during the early desert campaigns including the defeat 
at Brega.  His recollections of daily life in Cairo in the Wavell household and accounts 
of many of the crucial meetings which took place in the months before the defeat at 
Brega provided invaluable insight into how Wavell lived and made decisions.  
172
     The literature available to conduct this research project was it has to be said, 
extensive. However, this did not make the project easy to research. The various threads 
 in the 
Public Records Office (PRO) at Kew proved to be invaluable in confirming such things 
as unit movement, manpower and state and quantity of equipment. Unfortunately the 
war diary of the 9th Battalion the Rifle Brigade, the main infantry component of the 
defence at Brega, did not survive the German attack on 31 March but of the rest of the 
units involved all their war diaries survive. The reading and photo copying of the 
information in the relevant documents in the PRO, found in over twenty unit diaries and 
reports, required seven separate visits totalling over 90 hours of study.  
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of the project had to be meticulously drawn together before even a partial picture of 
what happen on 31 March 1941 began to appear. Conflicting and contradictory accounts 
of the battle, the personalities involved, the terrain, transport, intelligence and even the 
quality and serviceability of the weapons used by the various combatants, to list but a 
few of the topics researched, have all required detailed investigation before they could 
be fitted, with confidence, into the overall picture.   
     Investigations have ranged from reading perhaps five or six first hand accounts of an 
incident, to gain an accurate understanding of how events unfolded, to scrutinising the 
actions of a single individual, such as Wavell.  Technical manuals and or reference 
books have been used extensively to establish, definitively, how, for example, particular 
weapons, vehicles or pieces of equipment functioned in the various situations in which 
they were used. The reader can therefore be confident that the account offered here of 
the battle for Mersa El Brega is both precise and accurate.       
 
ELEMENTS OF COMMAND 
 
King Richard III to his subordinate commanders on the eve of The Battle of Bosworth 
Field, ‘Come, noble gentlemen, let us survey the vantage of the ground. Call for some 
men of sound direction: Let's lack no discipline, make no delay, for, lords, to-morrow is 
a busy day’. William Shakespeare, "The Tragedy of King Richard the Third" Richard III 
Act V scene 3.173
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Alfred Thayer Mahan,174
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 the influential American naval and military thinker, wrote 
that; ‘not by rambling operations or naval duels are wars decided, but by force, massed 
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and handled in skilful combinations’.175  One of the essential ingredients of military 
affairs; and the ingredient which often dictates whether a battle, campaign or war is won 
or lost is how skilfully the commander involved masses and handles his forces. As 
Mahan clearly observes, the skill and quality of the commander and the soundness of 
the command structures under which he operates often decide military duels.  This part 
of the work will, therefore, have as its objective a two-fold role. Firstly the work will 
seek to explain, in a broad-brush approach, how command structures in WWII 
functioned. The works second objective will be to describe in some detail what personal 
traits and abilities make a successful commander or what Carl von Clausewitz calls, a 
“Military Genius”.176
 
  
THE STRUCTURE OF COMMAND 
Turning firstly to the structures of command under which virtually all commanders in 
WWII operated, we may say that most of the structures adopted by the various 
combatants in WWII broadly conformed to a similar pattern. Inside the worlds’ war 
rooms, which in Britain’s case in WWII were situated in London, there was the 
administrative body, consisting of the War Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister, 
advised and assisted by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S) and his service 
heads from the Army, Navy and Air Force.  The first rank of commander outside the 
war rooms was the theatre or area commander. This commanding general, we may call 
him Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), would have at his command all of the military 
forces in a given area. In the case of Britain, for example, this might be command of the 
home army, tasked to defend the home island, or perhaps a more distant region such as 
Middle East Command. 
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     The size of such commands could, and did, vary wildly. Again using the British 
experience as our paradigm we may see that the pre-war Middle East Command area 
was huge.  The C-in-C, Middle East Command, in 1939, had under his ‘command all 
British land forces in Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine, Transjordan and Cyprus, and when 
Britain’s ultimatum to Hitler ran out on September 3 the Army formations in British 
Somaliland, Aden, Iraq and along the shores of the Persian Gulf also came under his 
command. The area for which he had thereby accepted military responsibility measured 
some 1,800 miles by 2,000 and included nine different countries in two continents’.177
     The role that the C-in-C plays in the military theatre he commands is to be primarily 
a controlling force administering to the needs of his often-disparate subjects. ‘The ideal 
senior commander may be viewed as a device for receiving, processing and transmitting 
information in a way, which will yield the maximum gain for the minimum cost. 
Whatever else he may be, he is part telephone exchange and part computer’.
   
178  In the 
military sphere the C-in-C is the coordinator of everything the army needs to exist. He 
must ensure that his army is supplied with a vast panoply of goods and services. These 
services might range from an adequate food supply, accommodation, weapons and 
sanitary services, to military justice.179
     Furthermore, the mechanisation of the military in more modern times has only 
served to add more tasks to the C-in-C’s list of responsibilities. As Christopher Bellamy 
observes; ‘by the nineteenth century, and through to 1945, success in war was arguably 
dependent, more than any other single factor, on the logistic/organisational element: the 
ability to train, raise and deploy mass armies and to feed and supply them in the 
field’.
   
180
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enabler rather than a fighter. As an example of how this enabling role manifests itself in 
practical military terms we may look no further than to the actions of U.S. General, 
Dwight Eisenhower in 1944,181
     When reviewing the amount of landing craft he had been assigned Eisenhower was 
unconvinced that he had enough of these indispensable vessels to carry out the many 
tasks he knew his invading forces would have to perform.  It was known that the 
Germans had emplaced thousands of obstacles on the invasion beaches. Eisenhower and 
his planners realised that if the first wave of landing craft touched down at high tide, as 
had been planned, then large numbers might be wrecked on the beach obstacles and the 
whole operation jeopardised.
 with regard to what might seem on the face of it a 
mundane subject the amount of landing craft he had been assigned to undertake the D-
Day landings, Operation Overlord. Eisenhower’s decisions in respect of this one 
element of the invasion force may serve as a potent example of how critical a 
commanders enabling role, rather than his fighting abilities, can be in influencing 
battlefield outcomes.  
182   He felt therefore that he ‘had to have 271 landing craft 
beyond those already assigned to Overlord, and to have them he decided, within a week 
of his arrival in London, to put D-Day back a month, from May 1 to early June, in order 
to have available an extra months production of landing craft’.183
     Eisenhower’s decision proved to be doubly prudent and enabled his assaulting troops 
to weather the loss of many landing craft in the Omaha Beach disaster, and the 
subsequent losses sustained in the later channel storms.
   
184
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maintain the momentum of the landings which ultimately gave his field commanders 
the necessary men and materials to bring him success on the battlefield.185
SUBORDINATE COMMAND 
    
Moving down the chain of command from the C-in-C we may see that command 
structures in all military establishments rely heavily on subordinate commanders. If a C-
in-C, for example, needs to attack out of his command area, as General Eisenhower did 
in 1944 in Operation Overlord, or his command area is attacked, as General Wavell’s 
was in 1940, then the C-in-C rarely, if ever, actually fights the battles personally. 
Having enabled the forces under his command, to the best of his ability with the 
resources they require, a C-in-C usually hands over the actual fighting to his 
subordinate commanders.  These subordinate commanders are commonly known as 
army or field commanders. These generals would be responsible for sub-regions within 
the theatre and could be tasked with either using the forces allocated to them, large or 
small, to defend their command region or use their forces to attack from it. These 
commanders take on the military tasks the C-in-C deems necessary, beneficial or 
advantageous to his command overall. With such a heavy burden of responsibility, 
therefore, subordinate commanders need to be carefully chosen by the C-in-C if 
favourable outcomes on the battlefield are to be attained.  
     There is in Clausewitz’s view a major difference ‘between a commander-in-chief-a 
general who leads the army as a whole or commands in a theatre of operations-and the 
senior generals immediately subordinate to him’.186
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difference between the C-in-C and his subordinates arises from the fact that 
commanders in the second levels of command are subjected to much greater 
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supervision and control by their C-in-Cs and that this gives them far less scope to 
indulge in independent thought. Moreover, Clausewitz observes that some people 
consider that outstanding intellectual and military ability is only needed by the C-
in-C and that in subordinated commanders a more general level of intelligence 
can be acceptable. Clausewitz strongly disagrees with this assertion and considers that 
even junior positions of command require outstanding intellectual qualities if 
outstanding military achievements are to be gained.  Furthermore, as the demands on 
subordinate officer’s rise with every step up the promotional ladder they take then their 
abilities also consequently need to rise if they are to fulfil their roles with 
distinction.187
     For Clausewitz good subordinate officers are highly desirable, if not essential, to the 
whole command structure and their worth should never be devalued or underestimated.  
Their “practical intelligence”, as Clausewitz terms it, ‘although different to the 
polymath scholar, the far-ranging business executive, and the statesman, is highly 
desirable on the battlefield’.
  
188
ARMY ORGANISATION 
   
In organisational terms most armies in WWII conformed to a similar pyramid like 
hierarchical command structure. At the top of the military pyramid would be the C-in-C 
with, as mentioned, army or field commanders directly below him. Army/Field 
commanders could, theoretically, have any number of troops under their command but 
would usually have an army of approximately 70,000 men split between two corps. A 
British field army, for example, was ‘similar to that found in the U.S. Army, each 
consisting of a headquarters, certain organic troops, and a variable number of divisions 
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and corps’.189  In the British army, an infantry corps, approximately 35,000 men, was 
usually composed of two divisions.190
     Within the army organisation set out above the division is arguably the most useful 
and valuable individual unit to a field commander.  The role of a division, according to 
Shelford Bidwell in Gunners at War is to be a; ‘force of all arms sufficiently strong to act 
on its own as a wing or tentacle of the army. In the attack it must be able to grip and 
retain hold of the enemy force until the rest of the army can come up to finish it off, 
and in the defence it must be able to hold out for a period against the worst the 
enemy can do until the masse de manoeuvre in reserve can arrive’.
  Each division usually contains three brigades 
and each brigade consists of three battalions with each battalion being made up of 
approximately 800 officers and men.  
191
     Divisions, when properly constituted, can operate totally independently having 
organically all the requirements needed to function and fight. German Panzer General 
Heinz Guderian’s concept was that each panzer division should ‘be an army in 
miniature. A division would be a self-contained, all-arms unit - that is to say, it would 
contain tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, reconnaissance, anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
units as well as supply services, all the units necessary to fight and survive in the field, 
independent of reinforcements and supplies for as long as possible. Each division 
should carry enough fuel, ammunition and other supplies to be fully self-sufficient for at 
least five days’.
    
192
     In regard to sustainability in the field, a British infantry division in WWII would 
typically have, aside from its 9 infantry battalions, supporting arms consisting ‘of 3 field 
artillery regiments, 1 medium artillery regiment, 1 anti-tank regiment; 1 divisional 
reconnaissance regiment, signals, Royal Army Service Corps (QM), engineer, medical, 
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ordnance, provost, and other units as required’.193  The German 5 Light Division on 
deployment to Libya in January 1941 had, apart from similar levels of military 
equipment found in British divisions, a ‘Telephone Company, Special Supply Staff 
Company, Water Columns, Water Purification Columns, and Heavy Water 
Columns’.194
     This value and ability is, however, variable, as it is undoubtedly the case that some 
divisions carry out their military duties more efficiently than others. There can of course 
be many reasons why some divisions do not perform as well as others, lack of 
equipment, insufficient time for training and inadequate weapons, to mention but a few. 
However, as the experiences of the U.S. 88th Division cited below suggest given a 
similar body of men enough time to train them and an equal issue of weapons, a 
divisional commander who understands the business of war will invariably create a 
superior division.  
  These levels of establishment allowed 5 Light Division to fight in the 
desert for quite long periods of time without the need to call on the assistance of 
external services.  
U.S. 88th INFANTRY DIVISION 
The excellent battlefield results obtained by the U.S. 88th Infantry Division serve to 
illustrate that a commander of quality can, and often does, create a more efficient 
fighting force. ‘The 88th Infantry Division was activated at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma on 
15 July 1942 under the command of Major General John E. Sloan’.195
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  At the 
inauguration ceremony, of the newly reinstated division, the President of the 88th 
Division Veterans Association, said to Sloan, ‘“take up the job we didn’t get done.” In 
response, referring to the Great War veterans present, General Sloan assured onlookers 
that, “their faith will be sustained, their record maintained and the glory of the colours 
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never will be sullied as long as one man of the 88th still lives’.”196   With such 
confidence in the ability of his men it was, perhaps, not surprising that the 88th under 
Sloan’s command became one of the best divisions in the U.S. Army. As Colonel 
Dupuy observes, when reviewing the record of the 88th Division in Understanding War, 
‘the most important factor appears to be leadership by the divisional commander’.197
 
   
GOOD COMMANDERS MAKE GOOD UNITS 
So why was Sloan so successful?  Prior to WWII Sloan had held an impressive array of 
posts in the U.S. military.  Although Sloan had never been tested by battle his rapid 
promotions marked him out as, potentially, an exceptional soldier, and his knowledge of 
military science and tactics confirmed his credentials as a scholar of military command. 
As John Sloan Brown comments; ‘patterns that emerge in Sloan’s biography include 
appreciable troop duty, twelve years as an instructor in army schools or ROTC, and the 
number of occasions in which he created new organisations where none had existed’.198
     Sloan’s new division turned out to be the 88th Infantry Division and in common with 
other divisional commanders in most armies of the time, Sloan had little influence over 
which officers and enlisted men were assigned to his new command. The men assigned 
to the 88th were, in fact, just as raw and inexperienced as most of the other recruits 
hurriedly drafted into the U.S. Army after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 
December 1941. However, Sloan, as his record indicates, was not raw or inexperienced 
he was a professional soldier of many years standing and as it turned out an 
  
With this impressive record behind him it was, perhaps, inevitable that when the U.S. 
entered WWII and began raising new Divisions that Sloan should be one of the first to 
be given command of one of the new units.  
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inspirational leader.  As Dupuy comments; ‘by example and by tireless supervision and 
guidance, Sloan seems to have been able to instil his own high standards of conduct and 
leadership in all of the officers directly below him and, through them, in all other 
officers and non-commissioned officers of the division’.199
     The men of the 88th initially resented Sloan’s strict discipline, attention to detail and 
the rigorous training regimes he put them through. However, after their first few weeks 
in combat their opinion of Sloan, and what he had made them, began to change. ‘They 
were proud to be in a division that they knew to be an excellent, outstanding unit, and 
they realised that the man primarily responsible was Sloan’.
   
200  This division and its 
commander were a valuable and prized asset to their army commander and achieved 
great success in battle. ‘The performance of the 88th Division demonstrates that a 
commander who has an understanding of the components of a theory of combat can 
make use of that understanding to influence battle outcomes’.201
SO WHAT MAKES A COMPETENT COMMANDER? 
   
History and posterity reserve the name of "genius" for those who have excelled in 
the highest positions -as commanders-in-chief - since here the demands for 
intellectual and moral powers are vastly greater.202
 
 Carl von Clausewitz 
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AND TRAITS 
So what characteristics does a commander require to make him a competent commander 
or hopefully Clausewitz’s “Military Genius”?  In order to answer this question 
Clausewitz advises us that; ‘what we must do is to survey all those gifts of mind and 
temperament that in combination bear on military activity. These taken together 
constitute the essence of military geniuses.203
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harmonious combination of elements, in which one or the other ability may 
predominate, but none may be in conflict with the rest’.204
     To the above Clausewitz adds courage and determination ‘war is the realm of 
danger; therefore courage is the soldier’s first requirement’.
  For Clausewitz, therefore, 
we may say that intellectual powers working in harmony play the greatest role in the 
higher forms of military capability.  
205  While ‘the role of 
determination is to limit the agonies of doubt and the perils of hesitation when the 
motives for action are inadequate. Colloquially the term determination applies to a 
propensity for daring, pugnacity, boldness and temerity’.206  To these qualities 
Clausewitz’s also adds staunchness, presence of mind, firmness and strength of 
character.  John Keegan, in his book The Mask of Command, adds, being a known 
presence to his troops and leading by example to this list. ‘The first and greatest 
imperative of command, Keegan advises, is to be present in person. Those who impose 
risk must be seen to share it’.207  In The Art of War the Chinese potentate and war leader 
Sun Tzu, more than 2,500 years before Clausewitz, advised that a commander should 
possess the following attributes; ‘wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, tenacity and 
strictness’.208
     Sun Tzu further recognised that the scope of a military commander’s responsibilities 
must encompass more than just the immediate battlefield. All senior military 
commanders must be able to make the best use of the economic, military and political 
resources placed at their disposal whether these recourses are plentiful or scarce. Sun 
Tzu recognised ‘that a military struggle was not only a competition between military 
forces, but also a comprehensive conflict embracing politics, economics, military force 
   
                                                 
204 ibid  
205 ibid, p. 101. 
206 ibid, pp. 102/103. 
207 John Keegan, The Mask of Command (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987) p. 329. 
208 Sun Tzu: Stone, The Art of War, 1993, p. 20. 
74 
and diplomacy’.209  Even the “Military Genius” must take account of the political, 
economic and military factors surrounding him, as he does not, indeed cannot, function 
as some independent entity, he is inevitably tied to the body politic of his home 
administration, the economic resources available and the amount of industrial capacity 
supporting his endeavours. Clausewitz concurs recognising; ‘that although a 
commander-in-chief must be a statesman; he must not cease to be a general. On the one 
hand, he is aware of the entire political situation; on the other, he knows exactly how 
much he can achieve with the means at his disposal’.210
     Dupuy confirms that these realities also hold true in a more modern context. He 
considers that as the scope of war expanded in the twentieth century, and inevitably 
became more complex, many theoreticians, such as those on the German General Staff 
in WWII, realised that the scope of strategy in war was correspondingly expanding. 
Strategy now had to take into account, and deal with, non military considerations such 
as politics and economics; while at the same time often dealing with the problems of 
fighting wars on more than one front with several allies.
   
211
     These conflicting aspects of command, such as cooperating with allies, are perhaps 
no more clearly illuminated than by examining the relationship between Eisenhower 
and his political masters on the one hand and his multi national subordinate 
commanders on the other. To overcome these potentially damaging conflicts, 
Eisenhower the U.S. General under the ultimate command of an American President, 
chose as his deputy, Arthur Tedder, a British airman, under the ultimate command of 
the British Prime Minister. ‘Their co-operation as Supreme Commander and Deputy, 
with the latter having authority for air operations, proved a triumphant solution to the 
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problems of national loyalties, sensitiveness over seniority and dogged pursuit of 
policies at variance with the objectives of Overlord’.212
     Colin Gray, in his book Modern Strategy, adds that; ‘quality of command invariably 
makes a strategic difference, which is to say it is a dimension of strategy contributing to 
overall strategic effect’.
          
213
 
  Gray recognises, and it would be difficult to disagree with 
his assessment, that command is an important dimension of strategy. However, 
important as strategic understanding is, it is not always present, even in otherwise 
sound, or even excellent, soldiers.   
UNDERSTANDING OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
The use of technology, and an understanding of new methods of warfare, and the 
advantages that new technologies might bring to the battlefield, are seen by many 
commentators, Clausewitz, Dupuy and Mahan, for example, as highly desirable 
qualities in any commander.  As Dupuy, succinctly points out: ‘Technology wins wars. 
It would be a dim-witted historian indeed who would suggest that the echeloned, 
refused flank, formation of Alexander the Great at Arbela could have fought on equal 
terms with the echeloned, refused flank formation of Frederick the Great at Leuthen’.214
     Moreover, when one examines the advantages to the commander that new 
technology can bring to the battlefield it is, perhaps, easy to understand why this should 
be the case.  Stephen Biddle, in his work Military Power, identifies the benefits of new 
technology thus: ‘[T]echnological change since 1918 has had three main effects: 
  
This is of course an extreme, and improbable, example of the difference that a new 
technology introduced onto the battlefield could make, but the point is nonetheless easy 
to understand.      
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continued increases in firepower and lethality; greater mobility over longer distances; 
and the ability to see, communicate, and process information in greater volumes over 
larger areas’.215  As William E. Livezey writes in Mahan on Sea Power: ‘it cannot be 
argued that the phenomenal advances in military and naval technology in the past 
century in the fields of propulsion, armour, ordnance, and weapons have had far-
reaching repercussions’.216
     As an example of how dangerous the repercussions of ignoring new technology 
could be, we may look to the British naval high commands refusal at the start of the 
twentieth century to appreciate how devastating new submarine technology would 
become. ‘In Britain the submarine was not viewed with favour by some of the longer 
established naval officers and was regarded by some as a damned un-English 
weapon’.
    
217
     By the start of WWI the Germans had 10 modern boats each powered by new diesel 
engines and many more were under construction.
  The Germans were not so reluctant to adopt new submarine technology. 
They realised that Britain relied on its Navy to guarantee safe passage of its trade routes 
and to dominate militarily the high-seas which consequently ensured that Britain’s 
military position in the world remained unchallenged. They reasoned therefore that if 
they could sink enough British shipping they might break Britain’s world dominance 
and ultimately make the home island vulnerable. As they were too far behind Britain in 
the building of surface warships they opted for submarines and embraced the new 
technology.  
218
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submarines in World War I was greater than anyone had anticipated beforehand. The U-
boat campaign was perhaps Germany’s best chance of forcing Britain out of the war’.219
     The effect of new military technology, suddenly introduced onto the battlefield or 
applied more methodically over the course of an engagement, can, and has, the 
submarine being a classic example; quite literally change the course of war. However, it 
must also be stressed that wars are not usually won by new technology alone.  There is 
certainly an argument which suggests that wars are won with technology rather than by 
technology. Nonetheless it would, evidence seems to suggest, be a foolish commander 
who ignored the advantages that new technologies might give him. Indeed in regard to 
this work we shall see that had Wavell had a better understanding of the new 
technologies being used against him such as, dive bombers, anti tank guns and tanks, 
then his defence at Brega might have had more of a chance of success.       
  
Indeed ignoring this un-English weapon nearly brought Britain to its knees in both 
World Wars.   
WORKING WITH THE SYSTEM 
Norman Dixon, in On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, adds a further quality 
that all commanders, and certainly our “Commander of Genius”, must assimilate if they 
are to be successful on the battlefield, a complete understanding of the workings and 
machinations of the military system under which they operate. Dixon likens the actions 
of the military system to those of ‘a computer or telephone exchange whose modus 
operandi is based on rules which may have little relevance to the tasks it is called upon 
to perform’.220
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rule that all telephonists should have red hair, 38-inch busts and heavily lidded eyes’.221
     As an example of how frustrating the rules of the system could be we may look to a 
set of rules in force in the Middle East at the beginning of WWII. ‘Troops already in the 
Middle East drew clothing allowance, paid for boot repairs and so on. Meanwhile 
reinforcements from India, Australia and the UK were on active service scales and did 
not draw clothing allowance’.
  
Such rules close off many alternatives, petite blonds for example; however, 
unfortunately, the rules of the system must be obeyed even if obeying them impairs the 
functioning of the organisation.  
222  This obviously caused extra work for the already hard-
pressed personnel of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) who, as there was a war 
on, had more important tasks to carry out. This waste of effort is not lost on the official 
historian of the RAOC who points out: ‘[T]hese complications increased the difficulties 
of the RAOC and hampered preparations for war’.223
     As Kenneth Macksey points out in Military Errors of World War Two ‘misconceived 
doctrines arrived at through the sheer inability to foresee the future through the cloud of 
unimaginable innovations or changing circumstances have their impact, leading not 
only to the acquisition of inadequate equipment but also to the adoption of organisations 
and methods which, hamper, if not cripple, the true function of command’.
   
224
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institutions, methods, doctrines and practises, although supposedly designed to assist 
commanders, can, and often do, have a detrimental effect on a commanders abilities and 
the quality of his decisions. The French high command, for example, viewed their 
fortified defence system, the Maginot Line, as invincible. However, when the Germans 
attacked, the adoption of the Maginot Line and the organisation and methods supporting 
it, did, in fact, hamper, if not cripple, the French Army’s ability to defend its territory 
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from attack, coming as it did from an unexpected direction. ‘This fortified system was 
simply by-passed by the German panzer divisions and left for the follow-up troops to 
reduce at their leisure’.225
     However, competent commanders, and again certainly our “Commanders of 
Genius”, seem to be able to overcome the restrictions of the system and, working within 
the constraints of the system, still achieve military success. As Van Creveld observes; 
‘it is virtually certain that some breaks and errors will occur, a fact that a wise 
commander will take into account and provide for. While failure to do so may well 
result in catastrophe, it is equally true that not even the greatest victories in history 
resulted from anything like a perfect command system; in many cases, indeed, victories 
were won in spite of rather than because of, the way the army’s command system 
operated’.
      
226  As Vladimir Peniakoff, the creator of one of the most successful irregular 
units in WWII says in his book Private Army; ‘There is an art to disobeying orders and 
no commander who has not mastered it can hope to win battles’.227
     Indeed the roll call of generals who have mastered this art is impressive. Napoleon, 
for example, in his early military career devised an innovative and unorthodox, but 
ultimately successful, system for using cannon. Indeed throughout his military career 
Napoleon proved to be ‘a masterful artillerist, a commander who, in the apt phrase of 
Victor Hugo, massed and aimed his cannon like a single pistol shot’.
   
228
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     German General, Heinz Guderian, who is often referred to as the father of German 
armoured warfare in WWII, was treated almost with contempt by the system under 
which he worked. He saw the advantages of tank warfare long before his superiors and 
wanted to raise specialist tank units, which would be created by converting cavalry 
units, to armour. This was an anathema to the traditionalists.  He was therefore initially 
compelled to; ‘bypass trouble by distributing the armour through the existing regiments 
and then completely mechanising them; they might change their role but would not 
change their title or insignia’.229  This bending of the systems rules satisfied the 
traditionalists and laid the foundations for one of the most devastating operational 
concepts of WWII, Blitzkrieg.230
     The fundamental message, therefore, as Professor Stone observes in his forward to 
The Art of War, is that the commander should ‘try and overcome the enemy by wisdom, 
not by force alone’.
    
231  As Clausewitz further observes; ‘any complex activity, if it is to 
be carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and 
temperament. If they are outstanding and reveal themselves in exceptional 
achievements, their possessor is called a “genius”.232
CONCLUSION 
   Even the British playwright 
William Shakespeare, not a man renowned for his military prowess, realises that his 
Richard III would have the military sense to reconnoitre the battlefield before he fought 
on it, utilising his wisdom before he used his force.  
In conclusion we may see that military command functions within a highly structured, 
and sometimes constraining, well established and often difficult to alter, system. Within 
this complex system, however, the one constant is the hierarchy of command, which is 
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standardised, more-or-less, throughout most of the world’s military establishments.  The 
quality of the commanders within the system, however, varies and often dictates to a 
large extent how successful military units created by the system will be when tested in 
battle. The competent commanders, and hopefully “Military Genius”, who will emerge 
from the ranks of the many commanders produced by the system, are recognised by a 
distinct set of personal traits and abilities that are readily discernable and have long 
been established.  
     The competent commander will train the forces under his command with sincerity, 
benevolence, and strictness; he appreciates the need to have a clear understanding of his 
strategic objectives. He issues his orders based on wisdom, understands the benefits and 
dangers of new technology and leads his men with courage and tenacity. He will have a 
keen sense of the value of his subordinate commander’s worth and will choose them 
wisely. His recognition of the political, industrial and economic circumstances under 
which he is sent to war will be clear in his mind and well understood.    
     When a commander, imbued with the qualities and traits set out above, deploys the 
forces under his command, whatever their size or task, his troops, evidence discovered 
for this work suggests, will inevitably perform more efficiently and achieve more on the 
battlefield. Conversely a force with an inefficient commander, issued with an ill-defined 
military task or objective, badly trained, poorly motivated, out of step with the overall 
military strategy and ignorant of new technology will, evidence also suggests, 
invariably attain poor results on the battlefield.  
     However, the system is by no means infallible and in the case of long periods of 
peace, for example, it may be impossible to establish which generals, if any, may or 
may not be competent commanders or have potential “Military Genius”. In such 
circumstances, it has to be conceded, that military ability in real war situations can, 
perhaps, never be accurately established before hostilities begin.       
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     The above being said it must also be accepted that armies do not need exceptional 
generals or even “Generals of Genius” to succeed in their given tasks. The British Navy 
had had many victories before Nelson appeared and they would have many more after 
his death. What those who aspire to produce capable commanders need are systems 
which enable exceptional commanders to emerge if they exist but which also 
consistently produce capable, informed and competent commanders in war and in 
peace. As Stone says in his forward to the Art of War: ‘Sun Tzu had the rules of war 
worked out even before Alexander the Great and that therefore reading Sun would have 
saved many subsequent commanders from absurd misjudgements’.233
 
  As we shall see 
in the following chapters of this work Stone’s thoughts should be noted and the words 
“absurd misjudgements” seen as a recurring, and yet perhaps avoidable, theme.   
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
Sun-Tzu wrote that; ‘warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, 
the Way (Tao) to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and 
analyzed’.234
 
   
In an effort to follow Sun-Tzu’s advice this part of the work will seek to ponder how the 
Battle of Mersa el Brega came to be fought and analyze some of the significant aspects 
which ultimately led to the battle being lost. The chapter will commence with a review 
of Britain’s pre-war position in the Middle East. This will be followed by an 
examination of the resources Britain had in the region in the run up to WWII. The 
career and subsequent arrival in the Middle East of General Wavell will be reviewed. 
Wavell’s contribution to the build up of his base services will be scrutinised and 
significant aspects of the results will be chronicled. The review of the base organisation 
will include an examination of fuel, transport, food and military resources.       
 
BRITAIN’S POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA 
Prior to World War I the British Empire held sway over a multitude of states and 
territories in the Middle East and Africa. In the Middle East, along the Red Sea coast 
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and in the Mediterranean, Britain controlled Aden, Egypt, the Sudan, Cyprus, Northern 
Somalia, The Trucial States as well as Muscat, Oman, Kuwait and Qatar.235  At the 
conclusion of World War I British possessions in the region became even greater. As 
the British, French and Italian Empires, were the Victor Powers in the war they divided 
most of the remaining states and territories of North Africa, East Africa and the Middle 
East between themselves. ‘Where Coer de Lion had failed, General Allenby had 
succeeded: Jerusalem, Damascus and Baghdad were in British hands, and it had become 
possible for visionaries like T. E. Lawrence to dream of a new ‘brown dominion’ in 
lands soon to reveal a fantastic wealth in oil’.236  Through negotiations at Versailles 
each of the Victor Powers took a varying share of the spoils of war. ‘As a result of the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between the British and the French, the Turkish Empire 
south of Anatolia was shared out between the British, French and friendly Arabs’.237
     The Italians, although not part of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, retained Libya and 
certain territories in East Africa such as Italian Somaliland and Eritrea. The French 
gained control over various parts of North Africa part of Morocco, the whole of Algeria 
and Tunisia. In the Middle East the French acquired Syria and the Lebanon. In virtually 
all of the remainder of the Middle East the British took control. ‘By allying with the 
Turks, the Germans had made the Middle East a theatre of war. The result had been to 
hand the Middle East to Britain’.
    
238
     To give legitimacy to their occupation of the new territories, and save money, the 
British and French Governments establish a system of rule known as the mandate 
system.
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directed. The British created mandates for themselves in Palestine, Trans Jordan and 
Iraq. Furthermore, ‘the mandate system allowed Britain to take over German East 
Africa (Tanganyika, now part of Tanzania) and parts of Togoland and the 
Cameroons’.240
     At the start of the Second World War therefore Britain and France controlled most of 
North Africa, East Africa and the Middle East and by extension virtually all of the vital 
resources in the region, the most important being oil.
  Moreover, British influence was growing in Persia (modern day Iran) 
over the ruling Pahlavi monarchy. The British had acquired a majority shareholding in 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later to become British Petroleum) this gave them 
both influence and leverage in this strategically important oil producing country.    
241  The Italians on the other hand 
‘had succeeded in attaining the overseas colonies they had sought since the latter half of 
the Nineteenth Century. Italian East Africa dominated the Horn of Africa, dwarfing and 
virtually surrounding British Somaliland and thus dominating much of the southern 
shore of the Red Sea and access to the Suez Canal’.242
A TENUOUS GRIP 
  Thus although the Italian 
presence in the region was not at this time particularly threatening they nonetheless 
could, in theory, if they wished, challenge British and French use of the Suez Cannel 
from their Red Sea bases.          
Although the British held vast amounts of territory in Africa and the Middle East their 
military presence in the region was pre WWII, and for some time after hostilities broke 
out on 3 September 1939, not very strong. There were several reasons for the British 
Government’s military weakness in this vital region. The lack of financial resources in 
the late twenties and early thirties due to the world economic crash of 1929 which 
caused mass unemployment was one inhibiting factor. ‘Between 1921 and 1938, at least 
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one out of every ten British citizens of working age was without a job. In the worst of 
those years one out of every five was out of work’.243  Another reason for the lack of 
money to finance rearmament was the need to spend what money there was on social 
needs at home such as health, housing and education.244   These pressing social needs 
inclined successive governments to leave all Britain’s military forces under resourced. 
Between 1919 and 1932, for example, the Army had its budgets reduced every year 
despite a huge raise in its commitments.  Furthermore, pay cuts, prompted by a £5 
million cut in the Royal Navy’s budget in 1931, sparked a mutiny in the Atlantic fleet at 
Invergordon.245
     However, in October 1933, when the League of Nations rejected Hitler’s ultimatum 
that Germany would only consider disarmament within the wider context of general 
disarmament, Hitler withdrew Germany from the League and its rearmament 
constraints. In March 1935, Hitler went further and denounced the Versailles clauses 
which restricted the size of the Germany’s army and introduced conscription.
  This consequently meant that from virtually the end of WWI until the 
early 1930s, overseas commands, such as those in the Middle East and East Africa, 
were invariably maintained and garrisoned at the absolute minimum level. 
246
     This last action on the part of Hitler finally prompted the British Government to 
react. In March 1935, the Government published a White Paper entitled “The Statement 
Relating to Defence” which admitted; ‘that the situation was approaching a point where 
we are not possessed of the necessary means of defending ourselves against an 
aggressor’.
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towards the dictatorships of Italy and Germany, which had hitherto been seen as a way 
of avoiding conflict, was increasingly being recognised as no guarantee against war.       
     Therefore, ‘despite the policy of appeasement Britain and France embarked upon a 
gradual programme of rearmament from the mid-thirties, which became more and more 
frenetic as they realised just how far behind Germany they had allowed themselves to 
drift’.248  The British were, in fact, lagging behind Germany in virtually all aspects of 
military preparedness and in no area more so than in the production of modern aircraft. 
The realisation of just how far behind they were in the production of modern fighter 
aircraft, prompted the British Air Ministry, in 1935, to give approval to the aircraft 
builder Supermarine to produce a prototype of a highly advanced and extremely costly 
fighter to be known as the Spitfire.249
     With the commitment to rearm established the next problem was where the threat 
would be most likely to come from. With only limited resources available difficult and 
often hard choices had to be made. Should, for example, the British rearm to defend 
against the potential threat coming from Hitler in Europe or from Mussolini in Africa. 
Initially, at least, it looked as though the most immediate threat would come from 
Hitler.  
   
     However, in October 1936, the Rome-Berlin Axis was announced thus bringing Italy 
into the frame as a potential enemy. Now with two possible enemies and with scarcely 
enough military resources to confront one, the British had to decide where the most 
immediate threat lay. Would any belligerent moves come first from Germany or Italy?  
Although both threats loomed large it was felt that Italy at this time was the more 
immediate threat. The Italians were soon to launch two new fifteen inch gun battleships 
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the Vittorio Veneto, July 1937, and Littorio August 1937 and three more were planned.  
Therefore, in response to the growing belligerence coming from Rome and the 
increasing power of the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean the British felt that their 
position in the Middle East was the most threatened. Consequently, in an effort to make 
their Middle Eastern possessions more secure, in April 1937, the British decided to 
make Alexandria on the Eastern Mediterranean coast a main fleet base and stationed 
battleships there.   
     The debate over who was the greatest threat was, however, by no means over and the 
emphasis change frequently between both dictators.  On 5 July 1937, at the 296th 
meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Prime Minister Chamberlain stated that; 
‘we need not be afraid of attack by Italy, either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, 
unless she is sure of German support. If Germany was contemplating hostile action or 
became engaged in hostilities against us, there was little doubt that Italy would join in 
and take the opportunity to fish in troubled waters’.250  This statement seemed, at least 
temporally, to rule Italy out as an aggressor. However, towards the end of 1937 this 
certainty was removed and Italy was again confirmed as the most immediate threat to 
British interests. In December 1937, at a meeting of the Imperial General Staff the 
question was posed where was the Army most likely to fight? The answer was that now 
the Middle East was the danger spot.251
     Although a war in Europe with Germany and her allies could not be ruled out and 
was, in fact, becoming increasingly more likely, if Italy gained control of the Suez 
Canal and Middle Eastern oil then Britain’s ability to fight any war, without these vital 
strategic possessions, would be very difficult. A fact recognised by the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Duff Cooper, who declared that; ‘the Suez Canal was one of the most vital 
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and vulnerable points in the Empire’.252   A sentiment shared by Strawson who wrote; 
‘conquer Egypt, get control of the whole North African coast and Middle Eastern oil, 
strike a blow at British sea power, which enabled Britain to preserve a degree of 
initiative, and how would she be able to conduct offensive operations’.253
     The need to reinforce their forces in the Middle East was further confirmed in British 
minds by Italy’s withdrawal from international organisations such as the League of 
Nations which Italy left at the end of 1937. The Italian withdrawal from the League 
alarmed the British Government to such an extent that they almost immediately began 
to rearm their Middle East air force and to strengthen their army units in the region.  
This 1937 commitment from the British War Office to try and adequately defend the 
Middle East was, however, less than cast iron. The level of commitment would, in fact, 
fluctuate throughout the late 1930s. Indeed it was the Anschluss,
   Britain’s 
strategic interests in the Middle East, possession of the Suez Canal and access to almost 
unlimited and cheap Middle Eastern oil, could only be preserved by strong defensive 
arrangements in the region.          
254
     Thus late in the day the British Government began to take the defence of the Middle 
East seriously. The 1935 White Paper and the 1937 impetus caused by Italy’s 
withdrawal from the League of Nations had started a trickle of war materials flowing 
into the Middle East. Now, with the Anschluss and the German takeover of 
Czechoslovakia, the amount of equipment being sent to the Middle East to arm the war 
machine turned into a steady stream, eventually, as we shall see, it would become a 
 the enforced union 
of Austria with Germany on 12 March 1938 that finally shocked many out of their 
complacency.  
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flood.255
GENERAL WAVELL: SCHOLAR AND SOLDIER?     
  Moreover, as the war machine needs a driver the British also sent a new 
Commander-in-Chief.  
The general is the supporting pillar of state. If his talents are all-encompassing, the 
state will invariably be strong. If the supporting pillar is marked by fissures, the state 
will invariably grow weak.  Sun-Tzu256
 
  
On 6 July, 1939, George Giffard the ‘Military Secretary at the War Office wrote to 
General Archibald Percival Wavell and asked him whether he would like to be 
considered for the appointment of General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle 
East’.257   Wavell, not long back from Palestine, and with a reasonable knowledge of the 
area anyway from his service in the Middle East in the previous war, considered himself 
well qualified for the job. Furthermore, ‘by sheer fact of distance, it was bound to give 
him a degree of independence of command, which he always wanted and which (if he 
stopped at Salisbury) as a Corps Commander in the B.E.F. he might never attain’.258
G.O.C. MIDDLE EAST 1939 
  
Without much hesitation Wavell accepted the C.I.G.S. invitation, was appointed, and 
sailed for the Middle East on 27 July 1939.   
Wavell’s appointment was not, however, universally welcomed. It was perhaps 
regrettable for future British fortunes in the coming war that those with suspicions about 
Wavell’s ability to command at the highest level, such as Liddell Hart, did not voice 
their concerns at the time. Hart felt; ‘that both Wavell and Dill had passed their peak by 
having to wait too long for opportunity’.259
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departure, was presenting well-reasoned and convincing reports, on how he was going 
to tackle his new role in the Middle East, to anyone with the clearance to read them. 
     On 31 July, before taking up his appointment as G.O.C. Middle East, Wavell set out 
in a short report his views on the problems his new command would present him. He 
wrote prophetically: ‘The last war was won in the West…The next war will be won or 
lost in the Mediterranean; and the longer it takes us to secure effective control of the 
Mediterranean, the harder will be the winning of the war’.260  The key phrase here as far 
as this work is concerned, must be “effective control of the Mediterranean” which could 
only be achieved by gaining, and keeping, control of the whole of the North African 
coastline. To succeed in this endeavour Wavell continued; ‘the task of the staff of the 
Middle East Command is therefore to plan, in conjunction with the other services, not 
merely the defence of Egypt and our other interests in the Middle East but such 
measures of offence as will enable us and our Allies to dominate the Mediterranean at 
the earliest possible moment’.261
     It is, perhaps, a pity Wavell did not take his own advice or even that offered by 
Clausewitz, who suggests that; ‘as soon as difficulties arise – and that must always 
happen when great results are at stake – then things no longer move on of themselves 
like a well oiled machine, the machine itself then begins to offer resistance, and to 
overcome this the commander must have a great force of will’.
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A BASE IS BORN 
In order for any meaningful military operations to be carried out in the Middle East, or 
indeed in any theatre of military operation, a well organised base needs to be 
established. Consequently this section of the work will seek to clarify how the huge 
base organisation which eventually developed in the Middle East was established and 
which individuals and organisations were primarily responsible for its creation.  
 
It would be fair to say that some authors, perhaps most authors, who have reviewed the 
establishment of the vital base organisation in the Middle East, have concluded that it 
was primarily Wavell’s initiative and drive, after his arrival in August 1939, which 
placed Middle East Command on to such a sure war footing. Woollcombe, for example, 
writing in 1959, had this to say about Wavell’s contribution to the setting up of the base 
organisation in the Middle East.  
‘Within these wide and famous zones [Middle East Command] the military 
power of the Empire was to be raised on Wavell’s shoulders, and the 
foundations laid of the great Egyptian base. All the basic necessities of life 
which western mankind must take to war, the facilities for their reception, 
installation, maintenance or on-flow, together, with food and water and 
communications, and warlike elementals of ammunition, fuel, weapons and 
workshops, had to be largely superimposed on arid lands. And in this 
undertaking, besides provisions for its self, many utility services and stores, and 
all transportation, had to be provided by the Army for the Air Force. 263
      
           
So according to Woollcombe, and we could add Raugh,264 Connell265
     Work, in fact, started in earnest to construct the great military base which eventually 
rose out of the desert sand in Egypt, three years before Wavell arrived in the Middle 
East. In 1936 the Egyptian and British Governments signed a treaty in which ‘the 
Egyptian Government undertook to build certain roads and bridges for defence purposes 
 and many others 
to this list, it was Wavell who laid the foundations of the great Egyptian military base. 
However, when this claim is examined in detail there seems to be little evidence to 
support this conclusion.  
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and to replace dirt roads through the Delta and desert tracks’.266
FUEL 
  This road improvement 
scheme, as we shall see, turned out to be the first of a whole series of schemes designed 
to improve the fighting ability of Middle East Command. These improvements included 
new airfields, stores depots, fuel storage facilities and a huge expansion in the amount 
of transport units and their servicing facilities.   
The need to supply vast amounts of fuel to army and air force units was an obvious 
requirement should hostilities breakout.  However, pre-war, there were many 
shortcomings in the existing fuel supply set up in the Middle East. To remedy the 
problem an unusual partnership was formed in January 1939 between the Army and 
RAF who jointly funded a bulk fuel storage project called the Jebel Dave scheme. ‘This 
scheme entailed the construction of buried storage to hold six months’ reserves should 
the Suez Refinery be put out of action’.267
TRANSPORT  
  To fill the tanks a tanker berth was built on 
the Great Bitter Lake and a pipeline installed connecting the oil terminal with the new 
tanks at Geneifa near the infantry support base on the Sweetwater Canal, approximately 
80 miles east of Cairo.  Thus the initial lack of tankage for the reception of bulk stocks 
of fuel was satisfied by the completion of the Jebel Dave scheme during 1940.      
In regard to the provision of lorry borne transport and general transport company’s great 
improvements were made in the period before Wavell arrived in the Middle East. In the 
late 1930s transport deficiencies in Middle East Command were identified as a major 
problem and initiatives to improve the amount, quality and serviceability of vehicles 
were doggedly pursued by the RASC.  
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     At the start of 1939 the RASC, which had responsibility for providing motor 
transport and general supplies to the forces in the Middle East, had only ‘a dozen MT 
companies in Egypt and Palestine, most having the standard establishment of 24 
vehicles’.268  There was only one MT Company, No 39, stationed at Abbassia on the 
outskirts of Cairo, with Vehicle reception, MT stores, and repair shop facilities which 
served both Egypt and Palestine. ‘On the supply side, there were four small depots in 
Egypt and Palestine, and each contained a reserve of two months supplies’.269
     This level of transport companies and reserve of supplies, approximately 300 3 ton 
trucks and 60 days worth of supplies, was quickly recognised as being inadequate to 
service the vehicle needs or sustained supply requirements of even 7AD once hostilities 
began. Consequently the RASC set in motion a huge expansion of Motor Maintenance 
(MM) companies, Vehicle Supply (VS) companies, Motor Transport (MT) companies 
and General Transport (GT) companies.                           
   
     However, even with these new arrangements in place it was recognised that there 
would still be a problem resupplying units, with both replacement drivers and vehicles, 
once they were in the field. Consequently, in June 1940, HQ Cairo asked for the 
formation of a Vehicle Reserve Depot (VRD) to be set up in the Western Desert. 
Unfortunately, although the establishment of a VRD was agreed in principle in 
November 1940 it was not actually established until well after Operation Compass had 
finished in February 1941.270
     Therefore, and this should be borne in mind when we reach the main narrative, as the 
inevitable wastage of vehicles increased as Operation Compass progressed, the absence 
of a VRD restricted the prompt use of captured vehicles as there was no base 
organisation from which drivers could be sent forward to utilise captures. As operations 
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continued and the supply situation worsened drivers, who could have been formed into 
a VRD before operations started, were eventually found and sent forward to take over 
some of the captures. This resulted in three, very useful, 10 ton lorry companies, each 
comprising of approximately 65 captured vehicles, being established. One company 
came into operation on 19 December and the other two on 25 December 1940. In the 
later stages of the campaign these new transport companies greatly eased the supply 
situation. 271
     Therefore, we may conclude that although there were great improvements in the 
provision of transport and an increase in the amount of transport companies these 
improvements had been initiated prior to Wavell’s arrival.  Moreover, after Wavell’s 
arrival he failed to order the establishment of a VRD. Consequently, it is not difficult to 
argue, that far from improving the transport situation after he arrived; Wavell’s presence 
actually hampered improvements.  
   
HOBART ARRIVES 
Nor can Wavell claim any credit for the establishment of 7th Armoured Division (7AD) 
without which operations in the western desert would have been virtually impossible. 
The origins of what would become 7AD can be traced back to the early 1930s when 
General Percy Hobart (Hobo) became commander of 1st Tank Brigade (1 TB). ‘In 1933 
he became Inspector Royal Tank Corps, and after promotion to Brigadier the following 
year formed and commanded the 1st  Tank Brigade, the first armoured formation of that 
size in the British Army’.272
     Hobo quickly gathered together the scattered units he had been given and pushed 
them out into the desert to train both day and night.  The forces at his disposal were in 
  In 1938 Hobo was sent to Egypt where he arrived on 27th 
September.  
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the main accustomed to garrison duties and found their new commander a stern 
taskmaster much as the men of the U.S. 88th Division would later in the war.  However, 
despite their initial resistance to his methods Hobo soon infused his men ‘with the same 
magic morale he had given to the 1st Tank Brigade, and month by month he welded the 
scattered units into a determined, smoothly functioning fighting division’.273
     So good, in fact, did Hobo’s 7 AD become that O'Connor, ‘called the 7th Armoured 
Division "the best trained division I have ever seen’.”  The 7th was highly trained, and 
‘General Hobart had imbued them with that most valuable of all qualities, confidence in 
their comrades and in their own abilities’.
    
274
WILSON ARRIVES 
 
By early 1939 the promise of peace in our time brought home by Chamberlain275
On the basis of war against Germany and Italy in combination – possibly joined 
by Japan – and the scope should include all likely fields of operations, especially 
the Mediterranean and the Middle East.  
 looked 
to be increasingly unlikely. Therefore, in February 1939, the Chiefs-of-Staff contacted 
their French opposite numbers and advised them that plans should be drawn up:  
 
Military Planning for what was to become the ‘Battle for North Africa’ started with this 
directive’.276
     In an effort to comply with the ambitions of this directive the British Government 
sent a new commander to the Middle East. In June 1939, Lieutenant-General H. 
Maitland Wilson arrived in Egypt. Pitt described Wilson as ‘a soldier of wide 
experience, and calm and placid appearance’.
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things done – nothing was too difficult – and he was not afraid to speak his mind’.278  
Wilson’s instructions from the War Office; and it must be stressed here that these 
instructions came from the War Office in London not from Wavell, were to make ‘an 
examination of the potential defences of the area under his command, and to do what 
was necessary to build them up’.279
    His task was it has to be said enormous. Although many of the requirements needed 
to make Egypt a military base had, as we have seen, already been started many projects, 
such as the new roads and the fuel storage faculties, were still incomplete. There was 
still little suitable accommodation for troops and few training or administrative 
facilities. There where few ammunition dumps and even fewer artillery parks. There 
was still little in the way of transport to bring the infantry to the front and even less to 
sustain it while it was there, although, as mentioned, some improvements in the 
provision of transport had already been put in hand.  Moreover, there was hardly any 
manpower or expertise to remedy all these and many other defects. There existed in 
Egypt only a peacetime establishment of personnel for both the Royal Army Service 
Corps (RASC) and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) until some months after 
the declaration of war. However, Wilson, utilising the manpower available set about 
finding solutions to remedy to some degree all of these problems.  
           
     Although detailed planning for expansion was hampered by constant changes in War 
Office policy for the defence of the Middle East, this perversely helped Wilson in his 
quest to establish an adequate, and eventually excellent, base organisation in Egypt. The 
War Office plan, set out in October 1939, called for a base organisation capable of 
supporting 15 Divisions with a manpower allocation of approximately 300,000 
personnel and a reserve of supplies for 150 days. This plan was to change and grow 
several times in the next twelve months.  By November 1940, for example, the War 
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Office plan had expanded to the extent that they now wanted 23 Divisions available in 
the Middle East by March 1942.280
     23 Divisions for the Middle East was, however, a completely unrealistic ambition for 
the period, as there were nowhere near that amount of formed divisions in the whole 
British order of battle. Nor were there enough trained men to fill the ranks of 23 
Divisions even if they had existed, even on paper. In 1939 ‘besides her small but high 
quality regular army, Britain was just in the process of forming and equipping a 
Territorial field army of twenty–six divisions, and at the outbreak of war the 
Government had made plans for expanding the total to fifty-five divisions. But the first 
contingent of this new force would not be ready to enter the field until 1940’.
   
281
     The actual amount of divisions in Middle East Command by the end of 1940, even if 
the incomplete ones forming in Palestine and East Africa are counted, was nearer to 8 
than 23.  However, although the War Office commitments were unrealistic, the over 
estimate provided the impetus for a massive reinforcement programme for the Middle 
East. As these new forces arrived Wilson incorporated them into the various divisions 
forming in Egypt thus eventually increasing their fighting capacity enormously.  
   
      Moreover, while all this base work was going on Wilson was not idle on the 
political front. The Egyptian authorities were not committed to fully supporting the 
British cause and although not hostile in the main to the British war effort they refused 
to declare war on Britain’s enemies. The Egyptians wanted to see which way the war 
would go and therefore decided to sit on the fence. The Egyptians were not inclined to 
become an active ally of the British but they were, because of Wilson’s efforts and his 
powers of diplomacy, willing to cooperate with them. This enabled Wilson to press 
ahead with many of the vital projects listed above.282
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the rank of Field Marshal for reasons which are difficult to identify and have never been 
explained. Perhaps the very absence of originality or scintillation enabled him to float 
upwards unimpeded. But in 1940, at least, his recognised qualities as a trainer of troops 
and as an organiser were strong and evident’.283
     It should also be added that Wilson was ably assisted by both the RASC and the 
RAOC. These two organisations had, from early 1939 onwards, begun with some 
degree of success to tackle the many maintenance and supply problems associated with 
the various War Office directives. It was indeed the officers commanding these two 
organisations who realised that the deficiencies in equipment and manpower in the 
Middle East were unlikely to be satisfied wholly from UK sources.
  It is difficult to argue against this 
assessment.  
284  Therefore, they 
set in train a programme of trying to obtain local supplies of virtually everything the 
Army might need. Self-sufficiency soon became the order of the day. The self-sufficient 
character of Middle East Command also extended to programmes of instruction and 
military schools were established to instruct men in almost every aspect of military 
activity.285
     The early start on projects such as the road improvement plan, the Jebel Dave fuel 
storage scheme and the expansion of transport companies made movement and 
sustained fighting in the desert possible. The arrival of Wilson in the Middle East, 
brining as he did his resolute and competent approach to solving the many equipment, 
supply, accommodation and transport problems that the army and air force had was 
indeed fortuitous for the British. This enabled them to build up substantial numbers of 
well equipped, well trained and mobile forces in the region.  
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     The efforts of both the RASC and the RAOC cannot be praised highly enough. Their 
rapid introduction of the policy of trying to source as much food and equipment locally 
was absolutely vital and saved vast amounts of war making materials being shipped to 
the Middle East. Hobo’s drive and determination to create an armoured division was to 
bring lasting benefits to the desert army. Also in this regard, when more substantial 
reinforcements reached the Middle East, it is thanks largely to Wilson’s organisational 
efforts that they were able to be made battle worthy quickly. Thus it can be said with 
some degree of confidence that well before Wavell’s arrival in the Middle East much of 
the work to make Middle East Command a viable military entity was either completed 
or in course of completion.       
PLANS FOR ATTACK 
Nonetheless, even though Wavell played little part in preparing Middle East command 
for war he did at least set in motion plans to take it to war. Working, perhaps, on the old 
military maxim that attack is the best form of defence Wavell ordered plans to be drawn 
up for an attack on his potential enemy.  As Barnett says; ‘one of Wavell’s first acts was 
to instruct General Wilson, General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt, to 
prepare plans for an invasion of Libya, with particular reference to the novel problem of 
supply in the desert’.286
     In regard to military resources once war between Germany and Britain had been 
declared both the British and the Italians set in train a programme of substantial 
  However, while Wilson was ordered to prepare plans for an 
attack on the Italians in Libya, should war breakout, it was still to be some considerable 
time before the resources to carryout any plan arrived in the Middle East. Nor, when the 
resources did arrive, would the actual plan utilised to defeat the Italians be either 
Wavell’s or Wilson’s.   
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reinforcement for their forces in North and East Africa.287  However, initially both 
nations were hard pressed to find the men and equipment to full fill their respective 
ambitions in Africa. The British, for example, flew in aircraft, in penny packets, from 
Kenya, Iraq, and Palestine. Even so by September 1939, there were still only 90 front 
line bombers and 75 older fighter aircraft available in the Middle East.288
     Although the British High Command wanted to send more resources to the Middle 
East they now considered Hitler to be the greater threat. Consequently they sent most of 
their army, air force and heavy weapons to France. The Italians at this stage simply did 
not have sufficient trained men or modern equipment ready in large enough quantities to 
send much to Africa. The Italian ‘Foreign Minister, commenting on 24 August 1939, 
said that we are absolutely in no condition to wage war. The Italian Army is in a 
‘pitiful’ state. On 1 September, the Italian Premier, Benito Mussolini, took up a position 
of non-belligerence, a status unrecognised in international law’.
   
289
     However, as the Italian Army was unable to take to the field of battle in Europe, 
through the excuse of Mussolini’s declaration of non-belligerence, this had a beneficial 
effect on the amount of war materials that could be made available for Africa. As new 
war materials were produced and new combat units were raised they could be sent to 
Africa rather than be kept in Italy in anticipation of a European engagement.  
Consequently ‘when Italy declared war on 10 June 1940 the approximate strength of 
Marshal Graziani’s forces, from the Egyptian frontier westward into Tripolitania, were 
250,000. The East African garrison under the Duke of Aosta was rather larger: some 
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300,000’.290
     The British on the other hand, because of the shear size of their possessions in Africa 
and their commitment to the European theatre, had not been able to find the men or 
materials to reinforce their forces in Africa and the Middle East on anything like such a 
lavish scale. As mentioned earlier Wavell’s Middle East Command was enormous 
encompassing many countries and parts of two continents, an area one thousand seven 
hundred miles by two thousand miles.
  The Italian Army in Africa was, therefore on paper at least, a formidable 
force of over half a million men by June 1940. 
291
     To defend this enormous area, Wavell, it would be fair to say, had on his arrival in 
Egypt a completely inadequate army and air force.  He had only one fully formed 
armoured division, 7AD, and this unit was not fully equipped.
   
292  To support 7AD he 
had spread around his vast command; ‘twenty one infantry battalions, two regiments of 
horsed cavalry, four regiments of artillery with sixty-four field guns, forty-eight anti-
tank guns and eight anti-aircraft guns’.293  Nor by the outbreak of war with Italy had the 
position improved significantly. By summer 1940 the British had in Egypt only 36,000 
men, in Palestine there were a further 27,500. In East Africa, the situation was very 
similar to that in Palestine.294
     The relative inferiority of British forces to Italian was, however, not as bad as the 
bald figures suggested. Most of the new Italian units raised were not fully motorised and 
in the vast distances to be covered in Africa only motorised units were of much value. 
Moreover, much of the Italian equipment was obsolete or of poor design, their tanks 
being particularly inferior to the tanks of most other nations. The British on the other 
  Thus when war was declared the Italians had an almost 
10 to 1 advantage in both theatres.  
                                                 
290 Lewin, p. 30. 
291 Barnett, p. 22. 
292 ibid, p. 23. 
293 Pitt, Crucible of War, 1980, p. 5. 
294 Forty, Victory Desert Triumph, p. 22.   
102 
hand although ‘greatly outnumbered, were fully motorised and well equipped with tanks 
– the only significant motorised unit the Italians possessed was their brothel’.295
     Britain’s military position in the region also benefited from the presence of French 
forces in neighbouring countries.  The French had large troop concentrations in their 
possessions in both North Africa, and the Middle East, which potentially gave added 
weight to the British defence of the region. As Julian Jackson points out: ‘The French 
presence in Syria to the northeast and Morocco and Algeria in the west provided some 
comfort’.
    
296
     Thus although Wavell’s army was not at this stage very large he was not, because of 
the large allied naval presence and the substantial French forces in the region, attacked 
by either Germany or Italy at the outbreak of the war in September 1939. The Germans 
were too busy crushing Poland and then working out how to get round the Maginot Line 
to bother with the Middle East.
  In Tunisia the French also had substantial forces. Furthermore, both 
nations held large naval resources in the Mediterranean, which should, in theory, deter 
any enemy from making war like moves in the region.          
297
FRANCE FALLS ITALY ENTERS THE WAR 
  The Italians, who did covert Egypt and other British 
possessions in the area, were content, mainly through lack of resources, for the time 
being at least, to see how things developed. Wavell was not attacked by the Italians, as 
mentioned, until September 1940 consequently this gave the British twelve precious 
months in which to reinforce the Middle East, as best they could, train their new forces, 
and most importantly, continue the improvement of their base facilities.  
At the start of summer 1940 the British position in the Middle East looked quite secure. 
The expansion of the base organisation, still under Wilson’s guidance,298
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under way and reinforcements were arriving from many parts of the Empire. ‘Cavalry 
came from the UK, a British infantry battalion from the Far East, a brigade from 
Australia and a brigade from New Zealand’.299
     On 10 May, 1940, the Germans attacked France; within two weeks the French and 
British forces in northern France were surrounded and cut off from their comrades in 
the south.
  The fledgling 7AD, although still 
incomplete, was becoming stronger by the day. Moreover, the large French army was 
comfortingly ready and available to support the British if they were attacked. To back 
up all this land based military capacity Wavell could count on the services of the huge 
French and British Mediterranean fleets. However, the relatively secure situation in the 
Middle East was about to change drastically as events unfolded in France.  
300  Although attempts to break out and link up with the forces in the south 
were made these attempts proved to be unsuccessful. On 26 May General Hasting 
Ismay, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet informed General Edward Spears, the 
British liaison officer appointed to work directly with the French Government, that ‘the 
attempt of the northern armies to break out to the south had been abandoned. It was to 
be an evacuation at Dunkirk’.301  This decision started a headlong retreat towards the 
coast culminating in the B.E.F being humiliatingly thrown out of France. By 3 June the 
last British troops were successfully evacuated and British engagement in France was 
over.302
     The defeat of the B.E.F. and its evacuation from mainland Europe had a stimulating 
effect on Wavell. Wavell had already written, on 22 May 1940, that in his opinion, Italy 
was on the brink and must soon take the plunge into war. ‘Musso looks to me rather like 
a man who has climbed up to the top diving board at a swimming pool, taken of his 
dressing gown and thrown a chest to the people looking on. I think he must do 
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something; if he cannot make a graceful dive, he will have to jump in somehow; he can 
hardly put on his dressing-gown and walk down the stairs again’.303
     Now with France looking as though she might be knocked out of the war Middle 
East Command appeared likely to be the next place to be attacked. This possibility 
presented Wavell with a problem. Although it had been nearly ten months since he had 
arrived in Egypt, Wavell had still not appointed an army commander to command the 
army Wilson had been so painstakingly building.  
    
     Fortunately, for Wavell, a talented commander happened to be available. ‘Major-
General R. N. O’Connor, who was then commanding the southern district of Palestine, 
received a signal, on the 7th June 1940, ordering him to report immediately to General 
Wilson’.304
     General Richard O’Connor is described by Robert Lyman as “one of the brightest 
stars in the British firmament”. ‘An intelligent practical man who enjoyed an easy 
rapport with his men, O’Connor possessed the rare trait of being able to judge issues on 
the basis of rationality rather than orthodoxy’.
  With the news of the German successes in France being received by Wavell 
at his HQ in Cairo every day, it seems that the prospect that his Middle East Command 
would soon be required to do more than just train and wait was finally dawning on him. 
Therefore, at almost the eleventh hour, Wavell had to hurriedly find a commander for 
his field army. He chose O’Connor, arguably one of the finest Generals of his 
generation.  
305
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his generalship as they were in those of his arch-nemesis, General Erwin Rommel’.306
     The evacuation of France by the B.E.F. prompted Mussolini to make his move. ‘On 
10 June Italy declared war on France and Britain. Mussolini made his motive for 
attacking when he did very clear:  I can’t just sit back and watch the fight. When the 
war is over and victory comes I shall be left empty-handed’.
  
However, just when things were starting to look up for the desert army in Egypt events 
back home took a turn for the worst.             
307
WAVELL IS CALLED HOME  
  On 22 June, 1940, the 
French capitulated to the Germans. The British had now lost their ally in both Europe 
and, most importantly for Wavell, in the Middle East. The cataclysmic fall of France 
changed the balance of power in the Middle East literally overnight.  
With this catastrophic change in the balance of power in the Middle East the War 
Cabinet; in an effort to establish what Wavell needed308 and what he could achieve with 
the resources he already had,309 felt it necessary to bring Wavell home to the UK for 
talks. Churchill wanted Wavell to appraise him and the War Cabinet on the situation in 
the Middle East and explain what plans he had for improving Britain’s position in the 
region if given extra resources. Churchill was to write: ‘I felt an acute need of talking 
over the serious events impending in the Libyan Desert with General Wavell himself. I 
had not met this distinguished officer, on whom so much was resting’.310
     It is perhaps relevant to note here that Wavell’s ability to withstand a concerted 
enemy attack, or launch an offensive himself, was at this time decidedly limited even 
taking into account the vast improvements in his base organisation and the dispatch of 
more troops. In early August 1940 Wavell’s ‘Western Desert Force could marshal only 
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the 7th Armoured Division with but 65 of its full compliment of 220 cruiser tanks (and 
these suffered from lack of spares parts and even lack of full armament) and 4th Indian 
Division, still short of one complete brigade and of much artillery’.311
   Moreover, despite the long months of inactivity in his command Wavell had done 
virtually nothing to resolve some of the glaring deficiencies in his organisation and 
equipment. For example the issue of fuel cans was still unresolved, with no suitable 
replacement for the wasteful flimsy being even considered let alone brought into 
production.
   4th Indian 
Division would, in fact, not be able to field its third brigade until it reached the Sudan in 
February 1941.  
312  There was also still no VRD and indeed the lack of a fully operational 
VRD would not appear in the Western Desert until Operation Compass had finished. In 
the aftermath of Operation Compass an investigation into the performance of 7AD was 
commissioned and the author of the report, Major General Gambier-Parry, of whom we 
shall hear more later, wrote that: ‘It is considered that it would be dangerous to rely in 
future on such a windfall of captured vehicles for vital replacements, and that 
immediate steps should be taken to form an Advanced VRD’.313
     In regard to military units although through Wilson’s efforts many were desert 
acclimatised and most were well trained many of the twenty or so infantry battalions 
Wavell had were scattered all over the command and had not been brigaded. Thus their 
potential military value was considerably diminished. Indeed, it is perhaps worth 
mentioning here that although Wavell now had nearly thirty British infantry battalions, 
at least three reconnaissance regiments and elements of at least ten artillery regiments, 
  His recommendation 
would, unfortunately, not be fully implemented before the Germans attacked in March 
1941.  
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enough British units, in fact, to make three wholly British divisions, there was not one 
fully formed British infantry division in the whole of Middle East Command.       
     Wavell arrived back in the UK on Thursday 8 August. Within hours of his arrival he 
was in his first meeting with Prime Minister Churchill. This first encounter and 
subsequent meetings did not, according to some of those present, go well.314  The 
animosity between the two men was noticed and commented on by several of those who 
attended the meetings. Brigadier John Shearer, for example, who accompanied Wavell 
at many of the meetings with the P.M. had this to say about the first meeting between 
the P.M. and Wavell: ‘I could feel the temperature rising between him [Wavell] and the 
P.M., whose interrogation seemed to me to become increasingly curt’.315
     After further conversations between Wavell and the P.M. and other Cabinet 
members the relationship between the two men became even more strained. When Leo 
Amery the Secretary of State for India asked Wavell to repeat his appreciation of his 
Italian counter parts probable intentions in the Desert Wavell impatiently repeated his 
previous statement. ‘Now the P.M. interjected, But, Commander-in-Chief, you said….’ 
In a flash, General Wavell replied, I did not.’  And the relations between these two 
magnificent men were, at that moment, irretrievably damaged’.
   
316
     Nonetheless, despite the animosity between the two men Churchill wanted to 
accommodate Wavell’s needs as much as he possibly could. After several rounds of 
talks it was agreed that Wavell should receive, as soon as possible by special convoy, 
one light and one Cruiser tank battalions, one heavy tank battalion equipped with 
Matilda tanks, forty eight 25 pdr field guns, twenty light Bofors anti-aircraft guns and 
an assortment of Bren guns, anti-tank rifles and as much ammunition for them all as 
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could be found before they sailed.317
     It had previously been agreed that from the end of August convoys from the United 
Kingdom would be sent to the Middle East in a six-weekly cycle. This meant that with 
the convoys from Australia and India an average of 1,000 men per day with a matching 
tonnage of equipment, vehicles and stores were arriving in the Middle East. This 
reinforcement would eventually complete the assembly of 7th Armoured Division and 
other British divisions and enable the 6th and 7th Australian and 2nd New Zealand 
Divisions to be brought up to fighting strength.
  This was on top of the resources already 
earmarked for Wavell.  
318
     By the end of 1940 Wavell would receive approximately 117,000 men and over 150 
tanks.
   
319  However, although the dispatch of the special convoy, which was to be named 
Apology, had been agreed how to get it to the Middle East was now the subject of 
intense debate. Despite the fact that the British Navy and Air Force had dealt the Italian 
Navy several stinging blows in June and July it was still felt by the Navy and the Army 
that sending all this war material through the Mediterranean was too risky.320
     Therefore, a decision had to be taken as to whether to send the supply and troop 
ships through the Mediterranean and risk the loss of valuable men and equipment to the 
Italian/German Navy/Air Force or take the longer safer route around Africa and up the 
Red Sea. If the former route were taken then the supplies could be in Egypt in a week 
and be available to contribute to the defence of the Middle East. If the latter route were 
chosen, then they might take up to eight weeks to arrive and be too late to help. In the 
end, however, the argument put forward by both the Army and Navy that the risk to the 
valuable and almost irreplaceable men and equipment was too great, won the day.
    
321
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The special convoy would go the long way to the Middle East.322
     On 15 August, Wavell embarked on his return journey to Cairo. His mission, 
although successful from the point of view of gaining the supplies he needed, had been 
less successful with regard to his relationship with his political master Churchill. 
Without doubt Churchill still had serious concerns about Wavell’s ability to command 
in the Middle East. Churchill was to write to Eden just before Wavell set off for Cairo 
that he did ‘not feel in him [Wavell] that sense of mental vigour and resolve to 
overcome obstacles, which is indispensable in war. I find instead, tame acceptance of a 
variety of local circumstances in different theatres, which is leading to a lamentable lack 
of concentration upon the decisive point.
  Wavell’s tanks and 
weapons reached Egypt intact in October better late perhaps than never.  
323
     Nevertheless, despite Churchill’s reservations about Wavell’s military prowess he 
resolved, at least for the time being, to leave him in post. ‘While not in full agreement 
with General Wavell’s use of the resources at his disposal, I thought it best to leave him 
in command. I admired his fine qualities, and was impressed with the confidence so 
many people had in him’.
  
324  It has to be said that at this time there were already doubts 
about Wavell’s ability to command, Liddell-Hart for example, but the people who had 
Churchill’s ear at this time were primarily Dill and Eden and as Wavell was Dill’s best 
friend and Eden was very close to Dill it is perhaps not surprising that both backed 
Wavell. Indeed, ‘Eden’s opinion of Wavell, as expressed to Churchill, was unequivocal: 
neither he nor Dill knew of any general officer in the British Army better qualified to 
fill this very difficult post [Middle East Command] at this critical time’.325
     However, Churchill’s willingness to give Wavell the benefit of the doubt, even with 
Eden’s and Dill’s endorsement, would be very short lived. Events about to unfold in 
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British Somaliland would not only, once again, sour relations between the two men, but 
it would also lead to Wavell taking military decisions later which would seriously 
compromise operations in the Western Desert.  
     The problems for the British in East Africa, and more specifically in British 
Somaliland, stemmed from the French surrender. With the French out of the war there 
was a consequent reduction in friendly forces in East Africa. Without the threat of 
French intervention the Italian commander in East Africa, the Duke-of-Aosta, decided, 
somewhat erroneously, that occupying British Somaliland would improve his tactical 
dispositions.  The British forces in British Somaliland in 1940 were, as the country had 
hardly any military value to the British, few in number. ‘The British garrison there, 
under Brigadier A. R. Chater, consisted of only four African and Indian battalions, with 
a British battalion, the 2nd Black Watch, on the way’.326
     As this force was nowhere near big enough to defend the country from attack by the 
Italians it was decided that if attacked in strength the British forces stationed in British 
Somaliland, after doing what they could to hurt the enemy, would be evacuated to save 
them and their equipment.  They could then, perhaps, be used more profitably 
elsewhere. Consequently when the Italians did attack with an ‘invading force comprised 
of twenty-six battalions provided with artillery and tanks’ the British forces put up what 
resistance they could, inflicting over 2,000 casualties on the Italians for the loss of only 
38 killed and 222 wounded, and then left.
   
327
     The 2nd Black Watch, Wavell’s old regiment, was the last to leave. After fighting a 
rearguard action they were evacuated in HMAS Hobart.
   
328
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successfully. On 17 August he wrote in his diary the British have evacuated Somaliland 
‘after losing a good many lives for – to my mind – no very good reason. However, if 
they get all the troops away and we get them back here so much to the good’.329
     Initially the decision to evacuate the troops in British Somaliland was accepted by 
Churchill without much comment. Wavell fully expected, perhaps justifiably, that this 
would be the end of the matter. He could not have been more wrong. When Churchill 
received a full account of the British evacuation, and the light casualties suffered by the 
British forces, he became very annoyed. He felt that so few casualties out of a force of 
over four thousand indicated that the resistance had been poor and that therefore the 
officer in charge was guilty of not putting up a good fight. Churchill confided to Eden 
that: ‘If this is the sort of resistance that is to be expected and pass muster in the Middle 
East we must expect further tame and timely withdrawals’.
  
330
     Churchill immediately fired off a cable to Wavell ordering him to suspend the officer 
in charge and to conduct a court of inquiry. Wavell was perhaps understandably upset 
by this charge of what amounted to cowardice against one of his officers and cabled 
back that he would not order an inquiry. Moreover, he added that a big butcher’s bill 
was not evidence of good tactics. Dill told Wavell sometime later that ‘this telegram and 
especially the last sentence roused Winston to greater anger than he had ever seen him 
in before’.
  
331
     The loss of British Somaliland, although of little military importance in 1940, and 
possibly of even less military importance in 1941, had caused Wavell to look 
inadequate in his political master’s eyes. Moreover, it had in his words ‘put a blot on 
my reputation’. Furthermore, and perhaps adding even more shame to the whole 
incident, the only British regiment involved in the fighting had been Wavell’s very own 
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beloved 2nd Black Watch.  The need to erase this blot, therefore, set in train a thought 
process which would lead Wavell to undertake military operations which, as we shall 
see later, jeopardised and undermined Britain’s whole position in the Middle East.  
   
THE ITALIAN ATTACK 
The long anticipated Italian offensive against British forces in Egypt, when it finally 
came, was a rather half-hearted and hesitant affair.332 ‘On 13th September, five infantry 
divisions, short of motor transport and supported initially only by some 120 tanks, 
began moving towards the frontier’.333   The British forward troops, as planned, fell 
back on to their defensive positions, which had been constructed around the railhead at 
Mersa Matruh.334  Matruh was at the time a village made up of a collection of white 
walled houses surrounding a small harbour set in a copper-sulphate sea. Its military 
value stemmed from the fact that ‘it was the terminus of the railway and the metalled 
road from Alexandria and now it became a base and a fortress’.335
     The British plan was to draw the Italians further and further away from their supply 
dumps until they reached Matruh where the British would make a stand behind their pre 
prepared defences. The Italian Foreign Minister Ciano immediately realised that the 
army in Libya might soon be in trouble. On 14 September he wrote ‘at the moment the 
British are withdrawing without fighting. They wish to draw us away from our base, 
stretching our lines of communication’.
   
336
     The Italians, however, did not reach Matruh. The Italian commander ‘Graziani halted 
his exhausted columns sixty-five miles inside Egypt at the fishing village of Sidi 
  Ciano’s assessment of British intentions was 
correct and would soon prove fatal to Italian aspirations in Egypt.  
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Barrani on 16 September’.337  With the occupation of Sidi Barrani complete Rome radio 
proclaimed Graziani’s victorious advance and claimed that all is quiet and the trams are 
again running in the town of Sidi Barrani338 which was strange as Sidi Barrani had no 
trams. The advance had so far cost the Italians ‘120 dead and 410 wounded. The British 
had lost a mere forty men. During the entire period since war had been declared 
Graziani’s casualties numbered 3,500 to 150 British’.339  Moreover, Italian moral had 
been severally shaken.340
     This disparity in casualty figures also proved beyond a doubt the vulnerability and 
ineffectiveness of the Italian forces and the military superiority of the British. With 
regard to tactics and equipment, the British forces, on land in the air and at sea (the 
sinking of so many Italian warships testified to the British superiority at sea) were 
proving to be superior to their Italian adversaries in every respect. A conclusion the 
Italians themselves were rapidly coming to: ‘At the end of the first week of war 
Mussolini confessed to the King: Affairs on the Egyptian frontier did not turn out too 
brilliantly’.
   
341
     With their advance to Sidi Barrani completed Graziani’s army set about 
consolidating their position and commenced a comprehensive programme of digging in. 
‘Starting at Maktila on the coast and working down to Sofafi about 40 miles to the 
south-west, the Italians began to build a series of fortified camps. There were eight main 
positions: ‘Maktila and Sidi Barrani on the coast; Tummar West, Tummar East and 
Point 90 to the south of Sidi Barrani; Nibeiwa was to the south of the Tummars and 
Sofafi and Rabia to the south-west of Nibeiwa’.
       
342  The Italians then set about filling 
these camps with stores and equipment of every kind and, in their usual manner, 
creating for themselves tolerable even luxurious living conditions. They lost no time in 
installing comfortable living quarters complete with electricity, water and refrigeration. 
To defend their camps the Italians deployed about 80,000 troops, supported by some 
250 guns, and somewhere in the region of 120 tanks.343
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CHAPTER 2 
Since war can be thought of in two different ways – its absolute form or one of the 
variant forms that it actually takes – two different concepts of success arise. In the 
absolute form of war, where everything results from necessary causes and one action 
rapidly affects another, there is, if we use the phrase, no intervening void. Since war 
contains a host of interactions since the whole series of engagements is, strictly 
speaking, linked together, since in every victory there is a culminating point beyond 
which lies the realm of losses and defeats – in view of all these intrinsic characteristics 
of war, we may say that there is only one result that counts – final victory. Until then, 
nothing is decided, nothing won, and nothing lost. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War 344
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter’s overall objective will be to examine the three main military engagements 
which occurred in the Middle East from winter 1940 through to March 1941. The 
chapter will start with a review of the British counterattack on the Italian forces that had 
invaded British held territory in Egypt Operation Compass. This engagement will not in 
its self be described in detail as there are many accounts which chronicle this operation. 
However, aspects of the operation such as the forces involved their character and 
deployment, logistic and intelligence issues which did effect later operations will be 
reviewed in some detail. The British involvement in East Africa will also be referenced 
and aspects of this operation that had implications for the later battle at Brega will also 
be reviewed. These two events will be paralleled by a review of the British involvement 
and intervention in Greece. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the 
overall military situation which prevailed in the Western Desert and more generally in 
the Middle East at the conclusion of Operation Compass in early February 1941.   
 
THE BRITISH COUNTER ATTACK COMPASS 
The story of the Italian Army’s defeat over the winter of 1940/41 in Operation Compass 
has been told many times and in great detail and will, therefore, not be recounted in 
depth in this work.345
     With the arrival of the Apology convoy and other reinforcements the amount of 
British military muscle in the Middle East was greatly increased. This fact was fully 
appreciated by Churchill who had taken considerable risk in sending reinforcements to 
Wavell and now wanted some action. As Jackson observes, and with some justification 
  However, there are logistic and operational aspects of this 
campaign, which impacted directly on events, which did affect the battle at Brega and, 
therefore these must be explored.  
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in view of the scale of the reinforcement now reaching Wavell, ‘Churchill felt that 
Wavell’s command was becoming a bottomless pit which devoured precious resources 
without giving anything in return’.346
     These reinforcements now made it possible to seriously look at attacking the Italians. 
On 20 October Wavell sent Wilson a letter in which he asked him to explore the 
possibility of attacking the Italian forward camps set out around and below Sidi 
Barrani.
   
347  Also enclosed in this letter was Wavell’s own plan for the operation. Thus 
the letter set in motion planning which would ultimately lead to Operation Compass 
being implemented.  The, Wavell, “five day raid”,348 as the initial British advance 
against the Italians is often labelled, was to be a rather tentative and limited attempt to 
try and force the Italians back over the Libyan/Egyptian border. Wavell wrote that the 
operation he ‘had in mind was a short swift one, lasting four or five days at most, and 
taking every advantage of the element of surprise’.349  Although, the plan did, as we 
shall see, have wider ambitions if things went well. Moreover, although it was billed as 
Wavell’s plan, and Wavell did little to dispel this impression, the actual plan adopted 
was devised and implemented by O’Connor. As George Forty says; ‘the initial idea for 
Operation Compass was thus Wavell’s but it would be O’Connor who would turn the 
‘five day raid’ into a spectacular victory’.350
the plan of battle was hatched in O’Connor’s brain, the tactical decisions on 
which success or failure depended were his, the grim determination that inspired 
all our troops stemmed from his heart; it was his skill in calculating the risks, 
and his daring in accepting them, that turned what might have been merely a 
limited success into a victorious campaign with far-reaching effects on the future 
course of the war.
  John Harding, who was O’Connor’s Chief 
of Staff, was to write of the origins of the plan:  
351
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     Following on from his 20 October note to Wilson, which as mentioned asked him to 
explore ways of counterattacking the Italians, Wavell sent to Wilson, on 2 November, 
his only written directive for Operation Compass.  
In continuation of my Personal and Most Secret letter of 20th October, I wish to 
inform your senior commanders in the Western Desert as follows: I have 
instructed Lieut-Gen O’Connor, through you, to prepare an offensive operation 
against the Italian forces in their present positions (if they do not continue their 
advance) to take place as soon as possible. 352
 
   
O’Connor, however, needed no instructions from Wavell or anyone else. By late 
November O’Connor, with virtually no input from Wavell, had completed his own 
plans for Compass.  Wilson delivered O’Conner’s revised plan to Wavell who 
immediately approved the plan and ordered that preparations for its implementation 
should commence at once.  
     However, although Wavell approved the plan it seems he had reservations about its 
success. In a briefing note given to Wilson on 28 November Wavell wrote: ‘I know you 
have in mind and are planning the fullest possible exploitation of any initial success of 
Compass operation. You and all commanders in the Western Desert may rest assured 
that the boldest action whatever its results, will have the support not only of myself but 
of the CIGS and of the War Cabinet at home’.353  This encouraging opening was, 
however, quickly qualified with the following remarks: ‘I am not entertaining 
extravagant hopes of this operation, but I do wish to make certain that if a big 
opportunity occurs we are prepared morally, mentally and administratively to use it to 
the fullest’.354
                                                 
352 Baynes, p. 72. 
  Wavell, it seems, was telling Wilson that although he had little faith in 
O’Connor’s mission succeeding, if it did and a big opportunity occurred, he would hope 
that, he, Wilson, would be bold and exploit any success to the fullest. Moreover, if he 
was bold and the success came he could expect his superior’s fullest support. The words 
353 Forty, Victory Desert Triumph, p. 82. 
354 Lewin,, pp. 67/68. 
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“big opportunity”, “fullest support” and particularly “administratively” must be borne in 
mind throughout this section of the work.    
     Regardless of the fact that Wavell was not entertaining extravagant hopes for the 
coming offensive the prospects of British success, despite the odds, looked quite 
favourable. While it might be remembered that the Italians themselves knew they were 
ill prepared for war so did the British. In May 1939 ‘Gordon-Finlayson, had observed 
Italian troops and remarked; how embarrassed the Italians are in many ways and how 
unlikely they are to make war in Libya on two fronts; and in any case how unlikely they 
are to rush into it without more preparations than they have now’.355
     It was soon confirmed after hostilities began that Italian preparations for war had not 
improved significantly since Finlayson made his comments in May 1939. On 11 June 
1940, only one day after war with Italy had been declared, a patrol of the 11th Hussars 
set an ambush which captured a column of Italian lorries and guns near Fort Capuzzo 
one of their bases close to the Libyan/Egyptian boarder.
   
356
     However, nothing in war is ever certain. Wavell was therefore, perhaps, correct not 
to over play his hand and declare Compass a full-blown offensive, which is what it soon 
became, until he had seen how things were going. The British logistic situation although 
greatly improved was still not perfect and there was the continual shortage of motor 
transport which would dictate to some extent how far and how fast the advance could 
proceed. As Michael Carver points out; ‘the principal determining factor in the speed 
  The Hussars, however, did 
more than just take prisoners and equipment they confirmed that the Italians facing 
them were in no way prepared for war.  Moreover, the Italian response to British 
skirmishing in the weeks following the Hussar’s ambush did little to greatly worry 
British commanders.      
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with which the subsequent advance could be conducted was logistic, and the key to that 
was the availability of motor transport’.357
THE FIRST THREE DAYS 
   
Nonetheless, despite Wavell’s low expectations for Compass, and the shortage of 
transport, the initial attacks by the two divisions assigned to the operation, 7th Armoured 
Division and 4th Indian Infantry Division, were spectacularly successful. The British 
made rapid advances over the first three days of the operation. O’Connor soon proved to 
be an excellent and inspirational leader. The forces under his leadership quickly 
overcame the poorly equipped and badly led Italians cooped up in their fortified 
encampments. ‘Surrendered Italian troops became so numerous, that unable to count 
them, a 7th Hussars officer reported, ‘As far as I can see, we have captured about twenty 
acres of officers and about a hundred acres of men’.358
     The captured Italian personnel were an encumbrance, and ‘the feeding and 
evacuation of the vast numbers of prisoners threw a heavy strain on the Lines of 
Communication, this was [however] eased by the Navy who took many back by sea’.
    
359  
This help from the Navy meant that the many serviceable vehicles which fell into 
British hands were freed up and had the potential to be a massive enhancement to 
capability. ‘The total of captured vehicles was never recorded (units were notoriously 
reticent on this theme), but more than a thousand were at least admitted to be in British 
hands’.360   Moreover, amongst the captured vehicles were large quantities of 10-ton 
Diesel lorries which proved to be extremely valuable.361  This haul of over a thousand 
vehicles was, in fact, enough to supply the front line needs of at least one division.362
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     There can be no doubt that Wavell’s lack of transport, one of his recurring 
complaints, would have been greatly relived, if not eradicated completely, if these 
vehicles had been utilised efficiently and promptly. However, Wavell, despite his 
insistence that Wilson should be “ready administratively”, had not, as we have seen,  
ordered before the fighting started, that additional drivers should be made ready to 
utilise any serviceable vehicles acquired. Whilst this lack of preparedness may be 
partially excusable in view of the fact that Wavell could not have know beforehand 
how many vehicles would be captured his action once this became a reality is far 
less excusable.  
     We will see shortly that Wavell intended to bring forward an Australian division. 
However, although there were over thirty thousand Australian troops in the Middle 
East at this time they were extremely short of transport.363  They were, however, not 
short of drivers.364  Because of the remote nature of their homeland, and the need 
therefore for men to be self reliant, the proportion of men able to drive in Australian 
units was far higher than in British units.365
                                                 
363 The Board of Management, Active Service (Canberra: The Military History and Information Section 
A.I.F, 1941) p. 5.  Throughout 1940 Australian troops poured into the Middle East by the time of 
Compass there were three complete infantry divisions and ancillary troops such as artillery, signallers and 
transport companies.  
  Consequently Wavell had a huge pool 
of unemployed drivers and vast quantities of captured unmanned trucks. It would 
therefore have seemed obvious to have ordered forward Australian drivers to both 
take over vehicles to equip their own units and to form ancillary transport 
companies. Unfortunately, no order was given and most of the trucks remained 
unused for quite some time.  Fighting units took what they could of the captures, to 
364 J. N. L Argent, Target Tank, (Parramatta: History Committee, 1957), pp. 20/22. Target Tank is the 
Regimental history of 2/3 Australian anti-tank gun Regiment. This unit composed of nearly six hundred 
men was at the time of Compass in Egypt but without guns. Consequently as they needed at least 200 
drivers to make them operational these drivers were left idle in the Delta.  Moreover, as with many of the 
Australian units they had set up their own motor driving school as a result this unit alone could have 
supplied many hundreds of drivers.   
365 Wilson, p. 63. Wilson tells us that the 6th Australian Division ‘contained a high percentage of men 
accustomed to various types of internal combustion engines’.  
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replace and enhance their existing issue of transport, but that is as far as it went.366
     British and Indian troops did, however, make more use of some of the other stores 
and war materials they captured. ‘The Italians went to war on a deluxe basis. It had been 
decided that it was too much of a hardship to expect Italian troops, or at any rate Italian 
officers, to drink the local water which was good enough for their British opponents and 
thousands of cases of bottled water from Reccoaro Spa were imported into Libya and 
carried forward in vast quantities; even to the most far flung outposts’.
  
This was to be one of many grievous administrative failures perpetrated by Wavell 
in this operation. 
367
     The British captured ‘a positive cornucopia of food and drink. According to one 
journalist who witnessed this on the spot, the latter included freshly baked bread, fresh 
vegetables, jars of liqueurs, huge amounts of spaghetti and macaroni and Parmesan 
cheese the size of wagon-wheels’.
  In the coming 
weeks this delicious water would be gratefully consumed by thousands of thirsty British 
and Indian troops, as would other stores captured from the Italians.  
368    Also among the captured stores were thousands 
of gallons of fuel, which again the British used to supplement their own supplies. This 
was doubly beneficial for as Verney points out in his book The Desert Rats ‘fortunately 
much of the petrol captured from the Italians was in more robust containers’.369
THE EXCHANGE OF 4 INDIAN & 6 AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONS 
  These 
robust containers, storage tanks of all sizes, barrels and drums were eagerly utilised by 
the advancing combat troops to carry extra fuel and water.      
This section of the work will examine the extraordinary decision taken by Wavell to 
remove 4 Indian Division from the Western Desert and send them to East Africa and the 
perhaps even more extraordinary decision to replace them with 6th Australian Division.   
                                                 
366Forty, Victory Desert Triumph, p.116. By the end of the third day of fighting the British had captured 
thousands of Italian vehicles.   
367 Hunt, p. 52.  
368 Buckingham, p. 91.  
369 Verney, p. 33. 
121 
     The success of the initial British attack had been truly breath taking and now all 
looked set for a complete route of the disorganised and battered Italians. However, on 
the third day of Operation Compass, with total victory within O’Connor’s grasp, 
Wavell, gave his army commander some remarkable news. Although Wavell now had 
the vehicles, fuel, stores, food and the obvious military success, which it will be 
remembered he had told Wilson to exploit to the fullest, Wavell now revealed to his 
army commander, that 4 IID, half his fighting strength, and over half of his serviceable 
transport was to be taken from him and sent to the Sudan.370
     Before a shot had even been fired in Operation Compass Wavell had made a series 
of bizarre strategic decisions which he now unveiled. What Wavell now intended to do, 
after just three days of fighting, was to remove 4 IID their accompanying artillery units, 
and all their transport and send them all to the Sudan. This Wavell contended was to 
bolster General Platt’s army facing the Duke of Aosta on the “important” East African 
front. Their place was to be filled, as quickly as resources would permit, by 6th 
Australian Infantry Division (6 AID) now on their way to Alexandria from Palestine.  
   
     Wavell’s extraordinary decision had been made the week before Operation Compass 
had begun.  ‘On the 2nd, Wavell held a conference in Cairo with General Platt from the 
Sudan and General Alan Cunningham from Kenya. He then shared with them a secret to 
which nobody but General Wilson was privy – nobody in London, not even O’Connor: 
he intended very shortly to switch 4 Indian Division from the Western Desert Force to 
the East African front’.371
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  Wavell’s reasons for withdrawing all three brigades of 4 IID, 
their divisional artillery and the supporting 7th Medium Regiment of artillery and send 
them to Sudan were many and varied.  However, as we shall see, none of the reasons 
given at the time were very compelling, and they are certainly not convincing, while the 
real reason, given later, is both surprising and militarily incomprehensible. Furthermore, 
371 Lewin, p. 69.  
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in regard to the events which would happen later at Brega, this withdrawal may be 
viewed as a major contributing factor in the subsequent defeat. 
SHIPPING 
Wavell, writing to O’Connor after the war on his decision to replace 4 IID with 6 AID, 
claimed that his main reason for making the swap when he did ‘was a matter of 
shipping; a convoy had come into Suez, and I could use some of the returning ships to 
transport part of the Division to Port Sudan, the only means by which I could get the 
Division complete in the Sudan by the time I had fixed as the latest favourable date for 
attacking the Italians’.372
     The truth is that he did not utilise the convoy he mentions to move the whole of 4 
IID, as he told O’Connor he did; only 7th Brigade of 4 IID was moved in this shipping.  
This Brigade, which had been earmarked to guard Port Sudan, landed there on 2 
January.
  This statement is not only contradictory it is also untrue. 
Wavell says that he needed to move 4 IID when he did because he could embark part of 
the Division in the returning shipping, which would pass Port Sudan. However, in the 
same sentence he contradicts himself by saying that this was “the only way” he could 
get, “the whole of the Division complete” to Sudan, not just part of it.    
373   The 5th Brigade and a field regiment of artillery did not use any ocean 
going shipping they moved first overland by rail and then in a Nile steamer, they 
eventually reached Khartoum on 9 January.374
                                                 
372 ibid, p. 70.  
  Moreover, this was a tried and tested 
way of moving troops down to the Sudan. The 1st Battalion the Worcestershire 
Regiment, for example, had taken this route in early 1940.  There was a railway which 
ran from Cairo to Shellal almost on the border with the Sudan. From Shellal boats on 
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the Nile River moved troops down to the township of Gebeit where another railway can 
be taken right in to Port Sudan.375
     The 11th Brigade and two field regiments of artillery were moved to Port Sudan in a 
separate convoy, which left Port Said on 1 January. These troops and guns arrived in 
Port Sudan on 14 January.
   
376  As may be recalled convoys arrived and departed Egypt 
approximately every six weeks. Consequently had Wavell wanted to he could have 
moved the whole of any division in the 1 January convoy. We may see therefore that 
Wavell’s argument, that the only way he could get the whole of 4 IID complete to the 
Sudan in the returning convoy is, at best, only one third true. Of the other two thirds of 
the division one third went overland and by riverboat and the last third was sent in a 
later convoy. As Raugh says, ‘Wavell’s emphasis on the urgency of withdrawing the 4th 
Indian Division to meet priority shipping schedules is not convincing’.377
4 INDIAN: CHARACTER, TRAINING & ADMINISTRATION 
   
Michael Carver gives us a further questionable set of reasons for the switch. He claims 
the decision to send 4 IID to the Sudan was that ‘both on account of its character and 
training and also for administrative reasons, it was more suitable than the inexperienced 
Australian for employment in Platt’s force’.378
     Carver further claimed that the men of 4 IID were proficient in mountain warfare; 
however, there is no evidence to support his claim that the Indians were mountain 
  In character 4 IID was, in fact, not that 
much different to any other division in British service. Its weapons, establishment and 
equipment were for the most part standard British issue. The training that 4 IID received 
was also not significantly different to that of a standard British division, although they 
were an extremely well trained and well-led division.  
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trained. The 11th Brigade (11 IB) of 4 IID, the first brigade to reach Egypt, had been 
raised in 1938. They had then commenced their training in India as a standard infantry 
brigade and were not fully fit for service until July 1939. Once they had completed their 
training they were sent, in late 1939, to the almost billiard table flat Egypt. Furthermore, 
in each brigade one battalion and all the gunners were British and they were certainly 
not mountain trained. The composition of 11 IB was, for example, 2 Cameron 
Highlanders, 1/6 Rajputana Rifles, 4/7 Rajput Regiment and 4 Field Regiment R.A.379
     The administrative reasons Carver alludes to are also difficult to reconcile with 
known facts. The use of Indian troops already in East Africa was for various reasons, 
mainly clothing and dietary, more burdensome on the supply system than using British 
or Australian troops. Australian troops wore essentially British uniforms and their 
dietary needs were the same as British troops and could easily be satisfied from existing 
stockpiles. Indian troops on the other hand had slightly different clothing needs and 
required a more specialised diet. The RAOC had this to say about supplying Indian 
troops. ‘Indian Army formations were not equipped to British scales when they arrived. 
This was an additional burden casually imposed on an already overburdened Corps’.
   
It is true that some of the Indians and Scots troops in 4 IID did originate from 
mountainous regions of India and Scotland, but this hardly qualified any of them to be 
classed as mountain troops.   
380
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Of particular burden were the Indian troop’s dietary needs. Accommodating the 
Indian’s meat requirements was to prove difficult on many occasions during the war. 
For example, ‘the lack of fresh meat was a great trial to Indian troops locked up in 
Tobruk, and it was difficult to provide a suitable substitute, but on two occasions live 
sheep for them were conveyed on the deck of a destroyer. When the ship reached the 
380 Fernyhough, p. 115. 
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entrance of Tobruk harbour, the sheep were thrown overboard, and those that managed 
to swim ashore had their throats cut by the cheering Indians’.381
SPEED 
            
Finally Wavell claimed that he needed to get 4 IID down to the Sudan quickly to 
prevent the Italians from interfering with shipping using the Red Sea to reinforce Egypt.  
However, if the threat from the Duke of Aosta’s forces had been real and the danger to 
British shipping using the Red Sea had been so acute, why take the costly and time-
consuming option of removing 4 IID from the fighting in North Africa when the 
Australians were readily available?  Most of the senior commanders of 6 AID had all 
served as regimental officers in the First World War, as had many of their unit 
commanders. This meant that the more junior officers had all been trained under battle 
experienced leaders. ‘Add to this the general toughness, fitness; enthusiasm, 
competence and good humour of the rank and file, and here was a force capable of 
performing miracles’.382
     This extraordinary decision to exchange the divisions is, however, in view of what 
Wavell had previously communicated to Wilson about exploiting any big opportunity, 
and the overwhelmingly favourable results that O’Connor had already secured, 
extremely difficult to comprehend. As Don West says of the switch of divisions; ‘if 
Benito Mussolini himself had dreamed up some fearful act of sabotage against British 
  If 6 AID was ready for action (indeed ready to perform 
miracles) against the Italians in North Africa by 3 January, and evidence confirms that it 
was, then logic dictates that it would be just as ready to fight Italians in East Africa well 
before Platt’s proposed attack date of 9 February.  
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forces, and had the muscle to carry it out, it could hardly have struck with greater force 
below the belt’.383
     So if none of the reasons given by Wavell hold any water why did he order such a 
damaging and potentially catastrophic substitution? The real reason Wavell ordered the 
switch of divisions was a vain attempt to try and restore his damaged reputation with 
Churchill. It was no secret in the upper circles of the government and the military that 
Churchill had little time for Wavell and considered him a poor general; and Wavell 
knew this. Wavell always conscious to preserve his reputation as a thinking general and 
keen to maintain his command in the Middle East felt, quite correctly, that the previous 
Augusts evacuation of British troops from British Somaliland and Churchill’s 
condemnation of the withdrawal and his subsequent criticism, cast a slur on his 
reputation. Consequently Wavell was desperate to retrieve British Somaliland and with 
it restore his reputation. Confiding his thoughts on the subject to Dill at the conclusion 
of Operation Compass Wavell was to write:  
  
The loss of British Somaliland has always rankled bitterly both with my 
Government and myself. I got a rocket from the Government and nearly 
lost my job at the time of the loss of Somaliland. I have ordered its 
capture as soon as resources are available, and am most anxious to 
remove this blot on my reputation.384
LOGISTICS 
       
Nonetheless, despite the impending removal of 4 IID, the results of the first three days 
of combat in Operation Compass had been very productive for the British. ‘In three 
days, Western Desert Force had captured 38,000 Italian and Libyan prisoners, 237 guns, 
73 light or medium tanks and over 1,000 vehicles’.385
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  All the enemy camps, which had 
been the objective of the “five day raid”, had been annihilated and many enemy soldiers 
had been killed. This unexpectedly quick and relatively cheap victory had radically 
384 Letter from Wavell to Dill CAB 106/1209   
385 Pitt, Crucible of War, 1980, p. 120.  
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changed O’Connor’s supply situation. The capture of the coast road, for example, had 
considerably eased the administrative situation. On the road a lorry could cover 250 
miles for the same amount of petrol it would take it to travel 100 miles in the desert.386
     It had been expected that the capture of the Italian camps, if they could be taken at 
all, would be a costly venture. It was thought that even if victory could be secured it 
would only be a limited victory, perhaps resulting in the Italians being pushed back over 
the boarder. Furthermore, even if this limited success could be achieved it would take at 
least five days to accomplish, would exhaust most of the supplies in the forward dumps 
and would almost certainly result in high casualties. The reality was that the success had 
been achieved at a cost of less than 700 casualties and in only three days. 
   
387
     The ease of the victory had, in fact, resulted in O’Connor being left with a 
considerable surplus of his own and captured supplies. Moreover, despite the loss of the 
transport of 4 IID, 7 AD still had ‘four companies of the RASC under command, Nos. 
5, 58, 65 and 550, plus the 4th (New Zealand) Reserve Company, and the 1st Supply 
Issue Section of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps’.
 
Consequently there were still plenty of supplies left in the dumps.   
388  Furthermore, the Armoured 
Corps Ordnance Field Park was sent forward which resulted in a proper organisation for 
the issue of vehicles and spare parts being set up.389
     Casualties as can be seen had been incredibly light; approximately 700 out of a force 
of 36,000, so very few replacements were required. The only serious area of 
expenditure had been in artillery ammunition. In the opening attack of the campaign, for 
example, the seventy-two guns of the divisional artillery delivered an intense 
bombardment on the Nibeiwa camp. 
   
390
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390 Raugh, p. 98. 
128 
Indian Infantry Brigade began with a fierce artillery duel which lasted all day’.391  
However, shortages in artillery ammunition were rapidly made good by the existing 
logistic arrangements.392
I can say with certainty that I have never met a more efficient body of men than 
those of the 7th Armoured Division R.A.S.C. They never failed the troops on any 
occasion, and in spite of every difficulty such as execrable going and continual 
dust storms, their maintenance was kept up to a very high state of efficiency at 
all times, and this efficiency was fully appreciated by all the other units of the 
Division who depended on them for supplies.
  In all other respects the supply and manpower situation was 
excellent. O’Connor was to write after the campaign that:  
393
 
      
The light resistance had required far lower than expected expenditure of rifle 
ammunition. The capture of food, water and fuel, lavishly stockpiled by the Italians in 
their camps, meant that O’Connor now had more of these valuable commodities than 
when he started his attacks. Moreover, the capture of so many nearly new vehicles, and 
especially the many 10 tonners, meant that his ability to re-supply his forward troops by 
road would eventually be vastly enhanced. Furthermore, the recapture of the small port 
of Sidi Barrani had enabled the Navy to bring forward bulk supplies. Prior to the start of 
Compass two large X-Type lighters had been pre-loaded with petrol and supplies and 
were now ready to be unloaded in the port.394
     To the advantages of light consumption of existing supplies, quick establishment of 
port facilities and windfall of extra transport, food and fuel, must be added the benefits 
of the huge logistic tail already in place to support the initial attack. The supply 
companies had been established on the scale they were to service the needs of two 
divisions now they only had to provide for one.  As hard fighting turned out not to be 
required, and now nearly all fighting had been suspended, the supply convoys were 
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bringing more stores forward than were being consumed thus increasing stocks even 
further.   
WAVELL’S LUCK HOLDS 
Wavell, as has been mentioned, kept his bizarre plan to transfer 4 IID almost 
exclusively to himself only confiding the move to a handful of his most trusted 
subordinates.395
     Churchill’s view, and one that he stated forcibly to Wavell at the time, was that 
Wavell should pursue the Italians in North Africa at all costs and without delay. On 13 
December 1940 he cabled Wavell and told him just that, mistakenly believing that 
Wavell felt the same way: ‘naturally, pursuit will hold the first place in your thoughts. It 
is the moment when the victor is most exhausted that the greatest forfeit can be exacted 
from the vanquished. Nothing would shake Mussolini more than disaster in Libya 
itself’.
  His motives for keeping the move secret are, perhaps, not difficult to 
understand. If O’Connor had been told earlier about the proposed move he would, as he 
did when he was informed, have objected. He may even have taken the matter up with 
some higher authority. Had Churchill found out what Wavell was up to he would in all 
probability, at the very least, have questioned Wavell’s motives. 
396
     On 17 December, Churchill, still completely unaware of the switch of divisions, 
cabled Wavell again congratulating him on the successes that had been achieved so far. 
He urged him again to continue with the assault and confirmed the secondary 
importance of the proposed campaign in Sudan. ‘The Army of the Nile has rendered 
glorious service to the Empire and to our cause, and rewards are already being reaped 
by us in every quarter. We are deeply indebted to you, Wilson and other commanders 
  It was perhaps fortunate for Wavell that Churchill, at this juncture, remained 
in the dark about the switch. 
                                                 
395 Jackson, p. 41. Jackson tells us that Wavell and Wilson did not tell O’Connor about the withdrawal of 
4 IID because they did not want to worry him.  
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130 
whose fine professional skill and audacious leading have gained us the memorable 
victory of the Libyan Desert’.397  Churchill’s congratulations were followed by his 
excited advice as to what should be Wavell’s next move.  ‘Your first objective now 
must be to maul the Italian Army and rip them off the African shore to the utmost 
possible extent. We were very glad to learn your intentions against Bardia and 
Tobruk and now to hear of the latest captures of Sollum and Capuzzo’.398
     As for the proposed reinforcement of Platt’s forces in Sudan by the two brigades of 4 
IID (there were in fact three by this time) Churchill makes it clear to Wavell, although it 
was by now too late, that this was of secondary importance.  
    
Churchill continued:  
‘I feel convinced that it is only after you have made sure that you can get no 
farther that you will relinquish the main hope in favour of secondary action in 
the Sudan or Dodecanese. The Sudan is of prime importance, and eminently 
desirable and it may be that the two Indian brigades can be spared without 
prejudice to the Libyan pursuit battle. The Dodecanese will not get harder for a 
little waiting. But neither of them ought to detract from the supreme task of 
inflicting further defeats upon the main Italian Army’.399
      
   
     Churchill, still unaware that the main advance through lack of troops and transport 
had stalled, cabled Wavell again on 18 December offering him, through biblical text, as 
much additional support as he needed. ‘St. Matthew, chapter 7, verse 7. "Ask, and it 
shall be given to you; seek, and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto 
you."400
INEVITABLE PROBLEMS 
   
Also on 18 December 1940, Wavell, no doubt with Churchill’s words at the 
forefront of his mind, sent a cable to Dill outlining the inevitable problems he was 
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now encountering (caused entirely by his own decision to switch 4 Indian) in 
maintaining O’Connor’s advance.  
Immediate problem is how to deal with Bardia. We can (a) try to induce 
garrison to surrender, (b) cut it off from Tobruk and lay siege to it, (c) 
leave road to Tobruk open though under observation and if enemy 
withdraws by it attack him in the open.  
     We have had a proclamation printed to drop on garrison to induce (a), and 
shall use it if situation seems favourable. At the moment it would not be 
likely to succeed’.  
     We are not strong enough for (b). We are operating at the extreme limit 
of our resources and it will be some days before we can supply any more troops 
as far forward.  
     Course (c) is on whole most favourable. Bardia and its resources as a landing 
place and source of water supply are more valuable to us than the bodies in it 
and it would be easier to attack them in the open than behind the strong 
defences. We are therefore leaving loophole of escape towards Tobruk, and at 
the same time bringing more troops forward as rapidly as transport situation 
permits, in case course (b) becomes necessary.  
     We shall try course (a) whenever situation looks favourable. Meanwhile 
bombardment by air and sea continues. We are considering plans if Bardia falls 
and I will outline them later. Meanwhile transport is my chief anxiety; these 
desert operations at such distances are throwing very heavy strain on all 
vehicles. Am already using captured Italian vehicles and have most urgent 
request from Greek C-in-C for transport.401
 
 
This cable reveals what Wavell must have known would happen to the advance when he 
decided to replace 4 IID with 6 AID. He tells us that he would like to lay siege to Bardia 
with the hope no doubt of inducing the garrison into surrendering. However, as Wavell 
freely admits, O’Connor now had insufficient transport and too few troops. It must be 
remembered here that at this date most of 6 AID were still in Egypt. Moreover, the three 
10 ton transport companies, which would come into operation using captured vehicles, 
were not yet available. Consequently, at this juncture, O’Connor was now not strong 
enough to embark on a full-scale attack. He was hardly able to maintain an effective 
siege. He would have to wait until the Australians and the transport were ready in 
January. 
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WATER 
As O’Connor and his remaining troops settled down to their siege the lack of water 
in the forward areas became particularly serious, and as the latter days of December 
passed by the situation became even worse.  Moreover, the delay in taking Bardia 
only exacerbated the problem. The water needed by the advancing units had been 
supplied, up to this point, by water trucks402 and water carried in 4-gallon tins by 
lorry or by captured water resources. Now the captured water resources were either 
running out or had been left far behind and most of the vehicles were either leaving 
the desert for good or being used to transport troops, consequently water was 
short.403   It had been hoped that the taking of Fort Capuzzo, an Italian held strong 
point in rear of Bardia, and known to have a large water storage facility, would ease 
the water shortages. However, ‘it was found that the water in the storage tanks was 
too salt for use and 12,000 gallons had to be brought forward from Matruh – by 
road, again, which used up mileage in the battered and now labouring 3-tonners’.404
     However, the discovery of the unavailability of increased water resources at 
Capuzzo did have its beneficial aspects, and would, as we shall see later, have a 
potential beneficial effect on the defence of Brega. The dire water situation forced 
Wavell to put in train a series of measures to help to try and solve the water 
problem.  He had in reality little choice in the matter. Either he supplied his men 
with water or they would have to retreat back to Matruh. As even the reduced force 
now stranded in the desert needed adequate water to function. Moreover, as Wavell 
must have known, had a retreat back to Matruh occurred it would almost certainly 
have prompted Churchill to ask potentially awkward questions.   
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     The immediate water problem was in the end largely solved by drilling pump-
holes at Sidi Barrani and Buq Buq and running a pipeline to Sollum and filling the 
tanks at Capuzzo once they had been cleared of salt water.405
BARDIA: THE FIRST AUSTRALIAN VICTORY  
   These measures, once 
implemented, significantly relived O’Connor’s water problems and eased the burden 
on the truck borne water-carrying companies. 
While all this work on the water supply system was being carried out 6 AID moved 
forward in preparation for their attack on Bardia. Had Wavell not decided to exchange 
divisions 4 IID would almost certainly have taken Bardia in mid December. The troops 
of its garrison were, as it turned out, as poorly motivated and equipped as all the other 
troops in the so-called fortress towns.  However, this was impossible as the first 
Australian troops, one brigade group, did not leave their camp site near Alexandria until 
16 December, 1940.406   Consequently due to the slow movement of the Australian 17th 
and 19th Brigades, and the never-ending problems of supply, the attack on Bardia could 
not take place before 2 January 1941.407  Bardia, when it was finally attacked fell to the 
Australians in two days. The assault finally went in at 5.30 a.m. on 3 January and 
continued for two days. By early afternoon of 5 January the Italians had surrendered and 
O’Connor was master of Bardia. That night Wavell hosted a “mammoth cocktail party” 
in Cairo. 408
     Had Bardia fallen earlier there is no doubt that it would have greatly eased many of 
O’Connor’s supply problems, notably water. Unfortunately the enforced delay caused 
by the transfer of the two divisions meant that virtually all the material advantages 
gained in the early stages of the campaign were wasted.  As it was by the time the town 
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was occupied in early January the British troops already in the forward areas and the 
Australian troops moving up, had consumed much of the surplus food, water and fuel, 
both captured and that already in the forward dumps.  Early capturer would have made 
available thousands more tons of Italian supplies stored within the town, enabling them 
to be utilised to support further advances. Moreover, occupying this port town sooner 
would have allowed the British to ship thousands of tons of supplies into the port. As 
Sun Tzu perceptively observes; ‘one who excels in employing the military dose not 
conscript the people twice or transport provisions a third time. If you obtain your 
equipment from within the state and rely on seizing provisions from the enemy, then the 
army’s foodstuffs will be sufficient. The state is impoverished by the army when it 
transports provisions far off’.409
     O’Connor was extremely lucky to get anything out of the capture of Bardia. Because 
of the delay imposed by the switch of divisions the Italians were allowed nearly three 
weeks to do as they liked in Bardia. The delay gave them plenty of time, if they had 
been so inclined, which fortunately for the British they were not, to set demolitions to 
destroy their supplies.        
    
     As luck would have it when Bardia was finally captured it was found that ‘the 
garrison had made no attempt to destroy the water supply or port facilities in their rush 
to surrender’.410  The garrison had also luckily made no attempt to destroy the 
thousands of tons of supplies and equipment still stored in the town. ‘The Australians 
took over 400 guns, 130 light and medium tanks, hundreds of machine guns and anti-
tank guns, thousands of rifles vast quantities of equipment, two complete field hospitals, 
splendidly equipped, many motor cycles and even a few good horses’.411
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found. Most importantly there were 26 heavy anti-aircraft guns and 40 light infantry 
guns.412
     The water resources, supplies, equipment, weapons and the intact port facilities of 
Bardia were of course very welcome. However, for the Australians, and for the next part 
of O’Connor’s plan the attack on Tobruk, the greatest prize was the acquisition of 708 
motor trucks captured in working order.
  These light infantry guns were, in fact, Breda’s, a type of gun highly prized by 
both the British and the Germans.      
413
liberal use of these vehicles. Despite Wavell’s debilitating orders and erratic use of his 
scare resources by mid-January O’Connor and his men were ready to continue the 
pursuit. 
  Unlike the British the Australians made  
TOBRUK 
The capture of Tobruk was O’Connor’s next objective. General Pitassi Mannella, 
commanded the garrison of Tobruk which comprised of the 22nd Corps with about 
25,000 men and over 200 artillery pieces.414   It might have been thought that Wavell 
would take a great interest in this next objective, as its importance from both a 
propaganda perspective and as a military asset were enormous. With such prizes in 
prospect it might have been expected that Wavell would remain at his headquarters as 
the attack date approached to give O’Connor support or advice should he need it. This 
was not to be the case. On 13 January Wavell headed off to Greece and did not return to 
Cairo until late on 17 January. His need to be away for so long was in part to have talks 
with the Greek military on developments in the Balkans. However, a secondary reason 
was so that he could host an enormous luncheon at the Hotel Grande Bretagne in honour 
of the Greek dictator General Metaxas.415
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     Despite Wavell’s absence this did not prevent O’Connor from pressing ahead with 
his plans to assault Tobruk.  By 21 January he was ready and the Australians attacked. 
The Australian infantry, supported by 7 RTR with their Matilda tanks, were soon 
through the Italian perimeter defences. Within 24 hours, Tobruk had fallen and again 
most of its infrastructure and supplies were little damaged by demolition.416  The 
capture of Tobruk was an enormous help to O’Connor. The amount of supplies captured 
in Tobruk dwarfed anything that had been taken in the other Italian garrisons. There 
were, once again, so many vehicles nobody bothered to count them; there were 87 
tanks; and 236 guns of a calibre of 75 mm. and over.  Moreover, ‘the amount of food 
found in the dumps and warehouses in and around Tobruk contained sufficient food to 
feed 25,000 men for two months’.417
     Furthermore, because the Italians had been kind enough not to damage much of the 
ports infrastructure the port was quickly made ready to receive supply ships. Indeed 
only 48 hours after its capture naval clearance teams had made Tobruk ready to receive 
its first shipment of supplies.
   The water distillation plant was still intact, the 
ports sub-artesian well system was functioning and the cisterns contained large 
quantities of water. Further water resources were captured in the form of 10,000 tons of 
bottled Reccoaro Spa mineral water.   
418   The ongoing objective was to prepare the port ‘to 
receive a weekly through put of 9,000 tons of stores, 2,500 tons of cased petrol, 1,500 
tons of water, 500 personnel and 350 casualties for evacuation’.419
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weeks delay imposed on O’Connor by the removal 4 IID he now had enough of 
everything he needed to pursue, and hopefully defeat, the retreating Italians.      
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THE GEOGRAPHY  
420
Up until this point the geography of western Egypt and eastern Libya had played little 
part in the outcome of the fighting. The Italian strongholds, ports, fortified villages and 
towns had been constructed largely without taking much consideration of the 
surrounding terrain. Most settlements had, in fact, been established where they were for 
their water resources and the availability of port facilities. 
 
However, west and south of Tobruk the geography and terrain played a far more 
significant part in the outcome of the fighting. The area O’Connor’s men were now 
approaching was ‘vastly different in character from the Western Desert. This region was 
dominated by the Jebel Akhadar, an upland area rising to heights of 2,500 feet. 
Possessing fertile soil and the recipient of adequate rainfall, it was an important area for 
Italian colonisation’.421
     It would be fair to say that the geographical conditions in the Western Desert, both 
manmade and natural, were to play an important and significant part in all future 
military operations. Indeed the military operations conducted by both sides would in 
large part be dictated by the geography of the region. In regard to the continuation of 
  Therefore, to understand how the British victory at Beda 
Fomm, the final act of Operation Compass, was achieved it is important to understand 
the geographical conditions which prevailed in that part of the Western Desert where 
the majority of the next round of fighting took place.   
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Operation Compass the geography of Cyrenaica now played an important part in the 
looming Italian defeat. 
     Looking at the manmade geographical features in the region the metalled road, the 
Via Balbia, is undoubtedly the most important to this work.  Leaving Cairo going west 
the road connects Tobruk, Timmimi, Derna, Benghazi, Barce, Beda Fomm, Mersa el 
Brega, El Agheila and ultimately Tripoli.422  This road, running along the coast dictated 
in great measure the speed of movement and volume of supply of any army seeking to 
operate in the Western Desert. The lack of water and absence of roads in the deserts 
interior confined all armies, at least in the opening stages of the war in North Africa, to 
the coastal plain through which the road ran.423
     Operations carried out away from the coastal plain, in the early stages of the desert 
war, were always-uncertain enterprises and were undertaken at considerable risk. 
Armies could, and did, in later phases of the war, because of improvements in 
equipment and greater experience of desert conditions operate further inland. However, 
in early 1941, the experience and equipment was not available. The skills and resources 
needed to survive and fight in the open desert were still being accumulated. With the 
dependence on the road and the water resources in the coastal plain in mind we may 
now look at the physical terrain.     
  The water resources found alongside 
the road and the metalled road itself therefore played a vital role in all military activity.    
     Described simply the fighting area in the concluding stages of Operation Compass, 
and what would again become a fighting area later in the war, was a roughly triangular 
area of desert. At its centre was a roughly kidney shaped area of high and fertile ground 
known as the Jebel Akhadar.424
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  Using the Via Balbia as our reference marker we may 
see that the north/south vertical axis of the triangle runs from the town of Benghazi in 
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the north down past the village of Beda Fomm and on to the bottleneck of Mersa el 
Brega in the south. The west/east horizontal axis runs from Benghazi in the west 
through Barce, Derna and Timmimi and on to Tobruk in the east. The diagonal axis of 
the triangle leaves the Via Balbia at Timmimi a small village near the northern coast 
and via a rough track hits the costal road near Beda Fomm approximately seventy miles 
below Benghazi. The Timmimi or Jebel track, which is approximately one-hundred and 
fifty miles long, winds its way down through Mechili, Msus and Antelat and finally, 
arrives at Beda Fomm close to the western coast.      
     This triangle or bump in the coastline was known as the Cyrenaica Bulge. Within the 
triangle of the Cyrenaica Bulge there is only one significant feature the Cyrenaica Hills, 
known in Arabic as the Jebel Akadir425 (Green Mountains) a hilly area quite thickly 
covered with trees. The Cyrenaica Hills are 50 miles across at their widest and extend 
‘for 150 miles following the curve of the coastline and separated from it by a strip of 
fairly level land that is between 10 and 30 miles broad’.426  Although somewhat hilly 
and quite thickly covered with trees good roads existed in the Jebel.427
                                                 
425 The following is a description of the Jebel Mountains by the German General Major Alfred Toppe:  
  This was not the 
case on the south/eastern edge of the Jebel where the Jebel track skirts the tree covered 
slopes. On the north/western side of the track the ground slopes upwards into the forest-
The mountains reached a height of 875 meters above sea level; they intercepted the moisture carried 
inland by the north wind. The heavier rainfall here is the reason why, in this area, the chalky ground 
carried a growth of macchia in contrast to the desert or steppe-like areas. These mountains rose in high, 
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covered mountains. South of the Jebel track, as the high ground gives way to the flatter 
desert, the terrain was bolder strewn and difficult.428
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
429
 
 
ALONG THE COAST AND AROUND THE JEBEL TO VICTORY 
In early February 7AD and 6 AID set off from Tobruk, along the Via Balbia, in pursuit 
of the remaining Italian forces still in Cyrenaica.  At Timmimi elements of 7AD left the 
metalled road and struck out on the more southerly Jebel track. Their initial objective 
was the desert fort at Mechili at the entrance to the Jebel Akadir which was strongly 
held by the Italians. On 2 February O’Connor arrived at Mechili where he set up his 
tactical HQ. Within hours he had decided to launch what would turn out to be the last 
act of Operation Compass. He would send elements of 7AD ‘across the desert from 
Mechili to the Gulf of Sirte, well below Benghazi, via Msus and Antelat, to the area of 
Beda Fomm’.430
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set up a blocking position. This would then prevent the Italians from escaping through 
Brega and El Agheila and on into Tripoli.      
     The Italian troops who had escaped from Tobruk and other troops in the remaining 
garrisons along the coast were trying to make good their escape on the Via Balbia. Their 
first objective was to reach Benghazi and then, turning down the road, head for Beda 
Fomm and the relative safety which lay beyond. They were hoping to find sanctuary by 
outrunning the perusing British/Australian forces and reaching the relative security of 
Tripolitania. Their plan was, however, thwarted by O’Connor’s forced march across the 
diagonal axis of the bulge from Mechili to the coast and 6 AID following behind on the 
coast road.431  On the morning of 5 February, 1941, O’Connor’s men reached Beda 
Fomm on the Via Balbia in front of the fleeing Italians.  Meanwhile 6 AID still on the 
Via Balbia were by 6 February closing in on the rear of the stalled Italian army.432
THE SPOILS OF WAR 
  The 
Italians were now well and truly trapped with 6 AID preparing to attack their rear and 
7AD blocking their forward movement. For two days the Italians struggled to 
breakthrough 7AD’s blocking position. Finally after vicious fighting in the early 
morning of 7 February the Italians gave up the unequal struggle and surrendered.  
Before O'Connor there now lay the wreckage of the Italian 10th Army and: ‘For the last 
time the booty of victory was counted: twenty two thousand prisoners, a hundred and 
twelve medium tanks, two hundred and sixteen guns and fifteen hundred wheeled 
vehicles’.433
Roy Farran remembers that; ‘the lorries were crammed with all sorts of loot 
which the Italians had hoped to get to Tripoli, and the tanks were so full of 
bottles of wine, boxes of chocolates and tins of fruit that we could not traverse 
   The shear scale of the defeat and the amount and variety of war materials 
which had fallen into British hands was staggering.  
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the turrets. There were china plates and silver cutlery in the officers’ mess; we 
all wore clean Italian shirts; every officer in the regiment had a civilian car; the 
fitters found tools they had only dreamed of; the doctors had medical equipment 
which would not have disgraced the best London hospital; round our necks 
dangled Zeiss binoculars’.434
 
   
Among the vehicles was found a ‘bus load of Italian ladies powdering their noses and 
brewing tea in the middle of the battlefield, protected by a loan priest in a soutane’.435
     The men of Marshal Graziani’s 10th Italian Army were, in fact, pleased the fighting 
was over. ‘The main effect of 20 years of fascism had been to produce in the average 
Italian total apathy and cynicism about anything connected with politics. In the army, 
too, corruption and favouritism in appointments had produced a serious deterioration 
compared with the First World War’.
    
436
     Sensing that the Italians after their crushing defeat at Beda Fomm were finished in 
Libya O’Connor contacted Wavell in Cairo. On the afternoon of 7 February O’Connor’s 
aide Dorman-Smith (Chink) fired off a message to Wavell, “Fox killed in the open,” 
indicating to Wavell that the enemy they had been pursuing was now beaten.
   
437
     Moreover, intelligence from prisoners suggested that there was no other organised 
enemy force between his positions in Cyrenaica and the Libyan capital Tripoli. 
O’Connor felt that his forces although worn and weary were still capable of taking on 
the task and he was determined to press on the approximate 450 miles to Tripoli and 
finish the job. ‘O’Connor’s armoured cars passed through El Agheila on 8 February 
and, if they had not been stopped, would have been in Sirte on 12 February’.
 
O’Connor went on to explain to his superiors in Cairo that the Italian forces he had been 
fighting had virtually ceased to exist.  
438
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     It was O’Connor’s intention to advance from Sirte on 20 February utilising 
Cunningham’s ships and supported by Longmore’s Air Force. He also intended to land 
a brigade group near Tripoli and he fully expected to enter Tripoli without much 
difficulty by the end of the month.439  O’Connor felt sure the order would soon come 
instructing him to continue the pursuit.440
     It is clear from Wilson’s writings that he also fully expected the re-grouping and 
reorganisation of O’Connor’s forces to begin quickly. This would, in Wilson’s view, 
enable the pursuit to be continued in the very near future. On 7 February Wilson 
realising that O’Connor’s army had ‘wiped out the bulk of the enemy forces in North 
Africa, and that any further resistance would be negligible, sent a signal to Wavell that 
night recommending that a light column be sent on to clear the Italians out of North 
Africa by advancing at least to Sirte and, if opportunity offered, to Tripoli’.
  
441
THE LOST OPPORTUNITY:  
   
When Wavell received the cable from O’Connor on 7 February and the one sent by 
Wilson later the same day he was initially in complete agreement with his field 
commander’s assessments of the enemy’s inability to fight on. However, he did not, 
perhaps surprisingly, either go up to see O’Connor or immediately authorise him to 
continue the advance. On the night of the victory, 7 February, Wavell went to yet 
another dinner party. This time the party was organised by Air Chief Marshal Longmore 
and among his guests was the Prime Minister of Australia, Robert Menzies. ‘During the 
dinner they listened to Churchill on the radio, praising his military commanders in the 
Middle East for their continuing victories in the Western Desert. [Churchill bellowed 
over the airwaves] Wavell, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armies of the Middle East, 
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has proved himself master of war, pains taking, daring and tireless, he declared’.442  As 
the oration from Churchill got underway, Wavell, according to one of the guests, ‘hid 
behind the door during the Prime Ministers effusion, only resuming his place when the 
eulogy had finished’.443
     Well might Wavell have had cause to hide his head at this time; knowing as he did 
that not only had he played virtually no part in the victories in the desert his actions in 
removing 4 IID had almost caused the whole operation to fail. Moreover, now he was 
going to compound his strategic mismanagement by ordering O’Connor and Wilson to 
stop the advance.
    
444  Perhaps David Fletcher’s opinion on this decision, given in The 
Great Tank Scandal, conveys the recklessness of this order: ‘Rarely in the history of 
warfare can the potential fruits of complete victory have been thrown away with such a 
lack of prescience as they were after Beda Fomm’.445
     After three days of reflection on O’Connor’s request to continue the advance Wavell 
eventually sent a half hearted cable to Churchill in London. He asked for permission to 
pursue the enemy to Tripoli where he might, or might not, be successful in defeating 
him. Wavell’s signal on 10 February began: ‘Extent of Italian defeat at Benghazi makes 
it seem possible that Tripoli might yield to a small force if dispatched without delay’.
     
446
     However, once Churchill received Wavell’s cable he was quick to reply. In return, 
on 11 February, Wavell received a telegram back from the Defence Committee 
informing him that he should not advance any further in Libya. After making himself 
  
It might be worth noting here that Wavell had already imposed a three day delay on 
O’Connor by not acting on the 7 February cables.  
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secure in Cyrenaica he should then give Greece and /or Turkey top priority.447
     However, before examining Churchill’s cable in detail it is important to understand 
the context in which its instructions were sent. Wavell’s 10 February cable expressed no 
positive indication that O’Connor would be able to take Tripoli indeed it gave a rather 
qualified indication that Tripoli “might yield” to a small force. Churchill with his 
broader view of the war to consider was, for obvious reasons; keen to get British troops 
back onto the continent of Europe fighting with as many allies as possible. Therefore it 
is against this back drop that the contents of his 11 February cable must be considered.   
  Also 
enclosed in this message there arrived Churchill’s own personal instructions and advice 
to Wavell. The contents of this message and its third paragraph in particular, are crucial 
in understanding what Churchill now expected from his Commander-in-Chief.  
Churchill wrote on 11 February; We should have been content with making a 
safe flank for Egypt at Tobruk, and we told you that thereafter Greece and/or 
Turkey must have priority, but that if you could get Benghazi easily and without 
prejudice to European calls so much the better. We are delighted that you have 
got this prize three weeks ahead of expectation, but this does not alter, indeed it 
rather confirms, our previous directive, namely, that your major effort must now 
be to aid Greece and/or Turkey. This rules out any serious effort against Tripoli, 
although minor demonstrations thitherwards would be a useful faint. You should 
therefore make yourself secure in Benghazi and concentrate all available forces 
in the Delta in preparation for movement to Europe.448
 
        
In the concluding sentence of the above message Churchill makes it abundantly clear 
that making the desert flank safe is the number one priority.449
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  Churchill clearly tells 
Wavell that he should make himself secure in Benghazi. Only then is he to concentrate 
all available forces in the Delta in preparation for movement to mainland Europe. As 
Churchill was to write in his History of the Second World; ‘All our efforts to form a 
front in the Balkans were founded upon the sure maintenance of the Desert Flank in 
North Africa. This might have been fixed at Tobruk; but Wavell’s rapid westward 
448 Schofield, p. 171. 
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viewed the security of the desert flank.   
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advance [note Churchill does not refer to the rapid advance as O’Connor’s] and the 
capture of Benghazi had given us all Cyrenaica. To this the sea corner at Agheila 
[Mersa el Brega] was the gateway. It was common ground between all authorities in 
London and Cairo that this must be held at all costs and in priority over every other 
venture’.450
     Churchill undoubtedly rules out a forward move on Tripoli, which Wavell later used 
as an excuse for his failure to order O’Connor to take Tripoli. However, it is 
inconceivable that had Churchill been made aware of the ease with which Tripoli could 
have been captured he would not have urged Wavell (O’Connor) to press on and take 
the city. As General Ismay was to write to O’Connor after the war: ‘Wavell never put 
forward even the vaguest hint that you should go on to Tripoli, had he done so, I am 
pretty sure that the Prime Minister would have jumped at it’.
   Only once this objective was achieved, the desert flank being made secure, 
would Churchill be content for Wavell to send forces to Greece and/or Turkey.     
451
ATTACK TURNS TO DEFENCE 
  Unfortunately, Wavell 
never gave Churchill any such advice or information.       
Sun Tzu wrote: ‘Those that excelled in warfare first made themselves unconquerable in 
order to await the moment when the enemy could be conquered. Being unconquerable 
lies with your self; being conquerable lies with the enemy’.452
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  What Churchill now 
expected of Wavell was that he should make him self unconquerable in Cyrenaica by 
making his desert flank secure. Once this objective had been achieved then he could 
turn his attention to other theatres. Unfortunately instead of making his desert flank 
secure before embarking on alternative projects, as he had been instructed to do by his 
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political master, Wavell stripped the Western Desert of virtually all its military capacity 
thus making it eminently conquerable. 
     With the decision to virtually ignore the defence of Cyrenaica taken by Wavell he 
now cast his eye over the prospects of a successful intervention in Greece, and/or, 
Turkey. The Service Chiefs, and Wavell’s, initial reaction to the Greece and/or Turkey 
mission, once the logistics of the operation had been explored, was not favourable. ‘The 
reaction expressed by Wavell, Longmore and Cunningham pointed to the logistic 
difficulties, both in terms of the burden placed on the Royal Navy in safeguarding 
supply routes and in terms of shortages of anti-aircraft guns and aircraft’.453
     The obvious military shortcomings already existing in the Middle East had 
persuaded Wavell, on 11 February that a military intervention in either Greece or 
Turkey at this time would be unsound. Notwithstanding this sound appreciation of the 
military situation, by the next day Wavell had completely changed his mind. Chink 
arrived at HQ Cairo on 12 February, having been sent their by O’Connor who had heard 
nothing from Wavell and wanted desperately to know what plans Wavell had for him. 
On entering Wavell’s map room Chink ‘saw to his dismay that all the desert maps had 
gone, replaced by maps of Greece. Wavell swept an arm sardonically at the new maps. 
You see Eric, he said, I’m starting my spring campaign’.
   
454   Wavell, literally overnight, 
had withdrawn his limited support for the pursuit in Libya and substituted it with his 
wholehearted support for the Greek adventure. ‘Wavell whose eyes had long been fixed 
on the Balkans and who never thought North Africa of vital importance, was giving his 
support to Anthony Eden’s wish to send the most powerful force which could be raised 
across the Mediterranean’.455
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     Wavell, it has to be said, never claimed that the instructions given to him by 
Churchill or Eden were his chief motivation for halting the advance on Tripoli, although 
it is difficult to come to any other conclusion when the evidence is scrutinised. Wavell’s 
decision to halt the advance in Cyrenaica was based, so he later claimed, on the fact that 
his logistic resources were inadequate to support an advance. Moreover, this lack of 
resources would be made even worse if he went to Greece and /or Turkey. He could not, 
he claimed, support two, Libya and Europe, three if we count the offensive in East 
Africa, campaigns simultaneously with the resources he then had available.     
     Consequently O’Connor would have to curtail his advance. Wavell’s reasoning in 
this regard has been supported by several authors a typical example being the official 
historian of the RASC. The author of the RASC history tells us that the advance could 
not have been continued because; ‘even if we disregard the fact that Rommel and the 
Afrika Korps were even then on the way, and that the 7th Armoured and 6th Australian 
Divisions were almost exhausted, there were simply not enough lorries or the men to 
drive them in order to maintain any appreciable force forward of the limits already 
reached’.456
     This appreciation, that it was not possible to go on to Tripoli for logistic reasons, is 
on the face of it reasonable and seems to rule out any possibility of continuing the 
advance.
   
457
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  Unfortunately, as with many events surrounding Wavell’s campaigns in the 
Middle East, all is not what it seems. It must be remembered that when many of the 
official histories were written, the RASC account for example being 1954/55, few 
official papers were available to historians or researchers. Therefore many of the 
conclusions reached about what was possible and what was not possible were based on 
information either elicited from people who were there at the time, Wavell for example, 
or from the documents, letters and newspapers articles which were already in the public 
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domain. However, with the advantage of official papers and more detailed memoirs 
published in later years a clearer picture of what was possible emerges. As we shall now 
see the arguments put up by Wavell and others, such as the RASC official historian, are 
less than convincing. Indeed their primary claims that logistics and the weariness of the 
troops would have prevented O’Connor from capturing Tripoli, are at best, 
questionable, and in most cases are found to be completely without foundation.  
THE OPPOSITION & TIMING 
The opportunity to carry on to Tripoli was, it must be remembered, presented in early 
February before any German and few Italian reinforcements had even landed in Tripoli. 
According to The Rommel Papers, Rommel, who landed in Tripoli on 12 February, felt 
that; if O’Connor’s army had pressed on to Tripoli all it ‘would have been obstructed by 
was some blown-up bridges over the wadis and some mines, and an artillery rearguard 
at Sirte. There was a heterogeneous array of Italians at Homs and the remaining Italians 
were moving into the defences in front of Tripoli’.458  Indeed it will be remembered that 
when British units, such as the armoured cars of 11th Hussars, pushed on to El Agheila 
and then some fifty miles beyond into Tripolitania they met no opposition.459
     In military terms therefore we may speculate that O’Connor’s army of two fully 
motorised divisions had more than enough military muscle to defeat any Italian forces 
still left in Libya. As for the Germans “even then” preparing to come to Libya, they 
were doing just that, preparing; they had not arrived and although some infantry and 
anti-tank gunners arrived in mid February the tanks did not arrive until the second week 
of March. ‘The first combat troops of DAK to arrive in Tripoli were Major Baron von 
Wechmar’s Reconnaissance Battalion (Aufklarungsabteilung 3 (mot)) and Major 
Jansa’s Anti-Tank Battalion (Panzajagerabteilung 39 (mot), both of 5 Leichte Division, 
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who arrived by sea on 14 February. Next to arrive in Tripoli was Panzer Regiment 5, 
who completed their disembarkation on 8-10 March’.460
     Moreover, even when they did arrive the troops and vehicles of the Deutsches 
Afrika-Korps had to be made desert worthy. ‘Wholly unaccustomed to desert warfare as 
they were, the Germans faced problems that reflected their lack of experience. Their 
diet, for example, was unsuited to the African heat, its fat-content being too high’.
    
461  
German vehicles were also not suited to desert conditions. They were far from immune 
to the wear and tear inflicted on them by the heat and sand of the desert. ‘German 
engines, especially those of motor cycles, tended to overheat and stall. Tank engines 
also suffered, their life being reduced from 1,400-1,600 miles to only 300-900’.462   The 
rate of mechanical attrition of the Panzer units was truly debilitating, of ‘the 65 
Pz.Kpfw.111 and gr. Pz.Bef.Wg. 44 fell out during the desert march because of severer 
damage to the engines’.463
MILITARY LOGISTICS  
   
O’Connor’s forces were also far from being unable to advance to Tripoli through lack 
of supplies. His supply situation was particularly strong at this time. He had just 
captured the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi which, as will be seen, could and were used 
to bring bulk stores forward by sea. Furthermore, he had only recently captured 
thousands of tons of food and fuel. Moreover, he had captured over 700 trucks in 
Tobruk and over 1,500 in the ten mile long convoy which had recently belonged to the 
Italian 10th Army at Beda Fomm.   
     Many new units of every kind, fighting and logistic, had also arrived in Egypt in 
quantity during the three months since the offensive had begun as had thousands of new 
                                                 
460 Forty, Armies of Rommel, pp. 114/115.  
461 Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, p. 183. 
462 ibid, p. 183. 
463 Thomas L. Jentz, Panzer Truppen (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1996) p.180.  
151 
vehicles. Wavell received from the U.S. alone, between January and April 1941, 5,865 
trucks.464   The 11 July, 1941, Cabinet Report on the action of 2nd Armoured Division in 
March and April 1941 says that it seems extraordinary that vehicles should not have 
been supplied for deployment to the Western Desert ‘at a time when no fewer than 
8,800 lorries were being embarked for Greece’.465
     Moreover, and it must be stressed, that although the many vehicles earmarked for 
Greece would be desperately needed to evacuate the troops when the fighting started in 
April, the majority of these new vehicles were not deployed until late March or early 
April. Consequently the dispatch of say 500 3-ton lorries, from the pool in the Delta to 
the Western Desert which would have greatly assist O’Connor in his February push on 
Tripoli, would not have had a significantly detrimental effect, probably no effect at all, 
on April operations in Greece.  
   
     Furthermore, new units were reaching the Middle East in an almost continuous 
stream throughout 1941. The Norfolk Yeomanry, an anti-tank gun regiment, arrived on 
16 February.466  The 50th Northumbrian Division departed the UK for the Middle East 
in April.467  1st Army Tank Brigade on 13 June468 and 8th Battalion the Durham Light 
Infantry on 8 July469.  As mentioned earlier Wavell was receiving on average 1,000 men 
with a matching tonnage of equipment, vehicles and stores every day.470
     As for the Australian 6th Infantry Division being exhausted this claim is extremely 
difficult to reconcile with the known facts of their deployment. The Australians had, in 
fact, at this time only been in the desert for just over four weeks. They had sustained 
relatively light casualties in their attacks on Bardia (456 killed, wounded and missing) 
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and Tobruk (49 dead and 306 wounded) and these losses were rapidly being made good 
from reserves in the Delta.471  In reality the Australian division was now because of all 
the captured stores, vehicles and weapons it had acquired, stronger than when it had 
deployed to the desert in January. Moreover, their removal from the desert was not to 
give them a rest period in the Delta but to prepare them for active service in Greece.472
     Artillery units were also plentiful as even more had been sent forward. At the start of 
Operation Compass O’Connor’s divisions had between them approximately 120 
artillery pieces. By the time they reach Beda Fomm, even though several regiments had 
been sent to the Sudan, they had 166 guns available.
  
473  As for the artillery units in the 
forward areas being incapable of making the 450 mile journey, or only the 350 mile 
journey for units in the very forward areas, to Tripoli, we know that they were more 
than able to cover these distances. When the advance was halted at Beda Fomm many 
of the artillery units involved in the battle turned round and drove the 500 miles back to 
the railhead at Mersa Matruh in their own trucks. The 3rd Regiment of Royal Horse 
Artillery went even further they drove the whole 1000 miles back to the Delta.474
     The units of 7AD, although most of their surviving tanks were much worn, still had 
more than enough track and engine life remaining in the majority of their tanks and 
armoured cars to get them to Tripoli. Indeed many of the Cruisers of ‘7AD were to 
trundle the 650 kilometres of road back to Mersa Matruh on their own tracks. It was 
without doubt an enormous waste’.
  
475
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have been sent up to the desert front. Also there were the 52 cruisers of 5 RTR which 
were already in the forward area at Tobruk. It is true that approximately half the tanks in 
this regiment were in need of overhaul and had very worn engines. Nonetheless, the 
other half were perfectly serviceable and with careful management and maintenance 
many of the worn tanks might well have been made serviceable. Drew, the commanding 
officer of 5 RTR, had, in fact, already ordered forward a number of new engines for his 
tanks.476
     Also uncommitted were the remains of 7 RTR and their Matilda tanks. 7 RTR which 
had started Compass with a compliment of 50 tanks, was in February 1941, in Tobruk 
with about 20 remaining tanks the other 30 being left at various locations between Sidi 
Barrani and Tobruk. Brigadier Harding had made it his duty to try and keep as many of 
these valuable assets in action as long as he possibly could. He had brought ‘all the 
resources of the staff together to see that as many as possible of the Matilda’s were 
available for each successive operation’.
  Had their arrival been given greater priority then even more tanks in this 
regiment might have been made serviceable.   
477  By the time of the Tobruk attack ‘by dint of 
extremely hard work eighteen tanks were, in point of fact, got ready and took part in the 
battle’.478
     While there may be debate over the ability of some units to continue the fight there is 
no ambiguity over 7 RTRs ability to fight on. After Tobruk fell and most of the tanks 
returned to the Delta four Matilda tanks remained in the town and were pressed into 
service when the port was besieged in April. Also interestingly many Matildas of this 
Regiment were to find themselves in battle in the very near future anyway.  As they 
were returned to Egypt they were allocated to various tasks. In early April six were sent 
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to Crete.479  On 19 April, when Tobruk was surrounded, six ‘A Lighters’ brought eight 
Matilda tanks of ‘D’ Squadron 7 RTR back into the port.480
     There were in February 1941, somewhere in the region of twenty five Matildas 
available in the forward areas. Furthermore, had the advance been continued there was 
no reason why, with ‘A Lighters’ available, the serviceable Matildas in Tobruk, rather 
than being shipped back to the Delta, could not have been shipped forward to one of the 
many small ports on the Gulf of Sirte such as Misurata or Buerat. A possibility 
O’Connor himself identified.  If this had been done not only would it have saved engine 
and track life but it would have placed them within less than 100 miles of Tripoli. 
Moreover, aside from the availability of the cruisers of 5 RTR and the 25 or so Matildas 
of 7 RTR there was also the 1 KDGs with 50 new Marmon Harrington armoured cars. 
Indeed to quote Brigadier Barclay who made a thorough study of Operation Compass; 
‘There may have been good reasons for abandoning the North African offensive in 
favour of the Greek venture; but the condition of units in XIII Corps [7AD and 6 AID] 
was not one of them’.
    
481
THE NAVY AND RAF 
              
Admiral Cunningham, the naval C-in-C, certainly thought that supporting a drive on 
Tripoli, although it would be difficult and might involve heavy casualties, was not 
beyond his navies capabilities. When he heard that the offensive had been stopped 
Cunningham wrote that ‘he was most bitterly disappointed at the turn this Libyan 
campaign has taken and continued I don’t know the reason. I know it was not due to any 
naval shortcomings’.482
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amount it had guaranteed to land daily at Tobruk’.483
     The RAF could certainly have supported the advance if it had been ordered to do so. 
The RAF squadrons following up the advance quickly made use of the many excellent 
Italian airfields the army captured. At Agedabia, for example, which was a major Italian 
air force maintenance centre; the lavish base facilities were captured almost intact.
  Cunningham was now confident 
that he could land approximately 2.600 tons of general supplies 700 tons of cased 
petrol, and 150 personnel, per day, at Tobruk alone.    
484   
The Officers’ Mess was a large and well-equipped underground room dug out of the 
rock. ‘Approached by a curving stairway, this extraordinary chamber had been found in 
good order, properly ventilated and complete with wiring and electric light’.485  
Facilities such as those detailed above were to be found at Italian airfields all along the 
Libyan coast. As for the scale of the losses imposed on the Italian Air Force by the end 
of Operation Compass these were truly staggering.  ‘The Regia Aeronautica had lost 
fifty-eight aircraft in action and ninety-one intact and 1,000 damaged were captured’.486
Since the war began you have consistently attacked without intermission an enemy 
air force five and ten times your strength, dealing him blow after blow, until finally 
he was driven out of the sky, and out of Libya, leaving hundreds of derelict air-craft 
on his aerodromes. In his recent retreat from Tobruk you gave his ground troops no 
rest, bombing concentrations, and carrying out low flying attacks on their MT 
columns. In addition to the above you have co-operated to the full in carrying out our 
many requests for special bombardments, reconnaissance’s, and protection against 
enemy air action, and I would like to say how much all this has contributed to our 
success.
  
O’Connor was so pleased with the RAF’s contribution so far that he sent Collishaw, the 
commander of No. 202 Group, a congratulatory message:  
487
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     The only reason the RAF did not continue in the same vain was because the 
squadrons operating with the army were mostly withdrawn and eventually sent to 
Greece. 
PRELUDE TO DISASTER: ADVANCE TURNS TO DEFENCE 
Nonetheless, regardless of how feasible his fellow commanders thought continuing the 
pursuit might be Wavell persuaded himself that other options should be pursued. ‘On 
13th February, O’Connor and Wilson learned that their campaign was, for the time 
being, at an end’.488  Despite the masses of new trucks, tanks and supplies coming into 
Egypt and the huge stock piles of captured Italian stores Wavell ignored the obvious 
advantages of going on to Tripoli for the illusion of helping Greece. John Combe felt 
that sending troops to Greece ‘denied the inevitable capture of Tripoli in February and 
so of imposing at least a long delay in the Germans arriving in North Africa’.489
If Wavell appreciated the importance of seizing the entire North-African shore, 
re-opening the Mediterranean to British shipping and thus contriving a vast 
saving of vital carrying capacity by obviating the need to send everything to and 
from the Middle East round the Cape of Good Hope, he gave no pronounced 
sign of it. Indeed, he did no even bother to visit the Western Desert Force to see 
for himself. Wavell’s decision to relegate North Africa to a subsidiary role in 
favour of an entry into the Balkans may be adjudged a strategic error of the first 
magnitude which had a profound effect upon the future course of the war.
  As 
Kenneth Macksey says in Military Errors of World War Two:  
490
      
  
     For the British the war in Libya would now take on a purely defensive nature. To 
accommodate this new situation Wilson set about consolidating his gains and organising 
his defence of Cyrenaica. He started by setting up his military headquarters at Barce in 
the luxurious barracks vacated by the Italians.491
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assistant manager of a hotel in Oxford.492  From his base in Barce Wilson toured the 
area visiting all the main centres of habitation. His motive for this inspection was to, as 
he puts it, ‘get an idea as to the suitability of that part of the country for defence against 
attack from Tripoli’.493
     Wilson had ample mobile forces available under his direct supervision to defend his 
command area. 7AD
  Wilson realised, even at this early stage, that although the 
Italians were beaten they might regroup and counterattack him.  
494 had its two armoured brigades the 4th and the 7th each of two 
armoured regiments equipped with cruiser and light tanks. Also, as mentioned, there 
was a heavy tank regiment, 7 RTR,495 re-equipping in Tobruk. Added to this tank force 
he had for reconnaissance the vastly experienced 11th Hussars and the less experienced, 
although learning quickly, 1st Kings Dragoon Guards in their armoured cars.496  In 
artillery he was particularly strong having the 1st 497 4th 104th 498and 106th Royal Horse 
Artillery Regiments with sixteen 25-pdr guns each.  He also had the 3rd RHA with 2 pdr 
and Bofors anti-tank guns499
     Virtually all his armoured forces, it is true, had fought hard and travelled a long way 
and many were very badly worn and in need of serious maintenance. However, although 
the units in the forward areas were depleted and needed maintenance, they were intact. 
 and the 51st Field Regiment RA with a mix of 18-pdr and 
4.5-inch guns which were supporting 6 AID on the escarpment above Benghazi. In 
heavier artillery he had the 7th Medium Regiment RA with 8 6-inch guns and 8 60-pdr 
gun howitzers and the 64th Medium Regiment RA with 16 4.5-inch guns.  All these 
artillery regiments were, as we have seen, mobile and though in need of a certain 
amount of rest and re-equipment were ready for action.    
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Consequently, now that operations had finished for the time being, Wilson no doubt 
expected these forces would be brought up to fighting strength in equipment and men as 
quickly as both became available.      
     Wilson’s command was experienced, had reasonable communications equipment, 
adequate transport and was building a reserve of supplies. His men had been bloodied in 
battle and their moral was sky high. Their leaders had gained knowledge that only 
action could buy. The troops had confidence in themselves and their officers. Their 
equipment, tanks and guns were worn but had worked well.500
THE WIND OF CHANGE 
  The areas which needed 
improvement had been identified and there seemed nothing that could not be sorted. As 
for the presence of the enemy; all seemed quiet on the western front.   
In mid February Wilson received information which informed him what forces he 
should have for holding Cyrenaica in the future.501  There would for the foreseeable 
future be no further advances so the area was to be stabilised and the battlefield cleared 
of any useful weapons and equipment. To achieve this objective he would keep 6 AID 
for the time being and receive the Australian Corps Headquarters with General Blamey 
in command.502
     To achieve these new dispositions there now started a most bewildering movement 
of men and machines up and down the desert road. From Cyrenaica to Cairo thousands 
  The intention was in the near future to move forward the 7th and 9th 
Australian Divisions to replace the 6 AID.  The retention of 6 AID in the forward areas 
was to be only a temporary measure as they had been earmarked for operations against 
an Italian occupied Greek island.  7AD would return to Egypt to rest and refit. The 2nd 
Armoured Division (2AD) would come forward and take its place. It all sounded very 
plausible.  
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of troops and their equipment were on the move west and east. Among the first units to 
leave the forward areas were the 11th Hussars.503  They handed over to the 1 Kings 
Dragoon Guards on 13 February and prepared to head back to Cairo.504
     On 18 February most of 7AD, including 11H, began their long march back to Cairo. 
Most of the support elements, with the exception of the Light Aid Detachment which 
remained in the forward area, returned in their trucks. The Hussars arrived back in Cairo 
on 22 February.
   
505  The 920-mile journey took them six and a half days to complete.  
Their return from the desert was made in a very orderly fashion and they returned with 
all their remaining armoured cars and support vehicles in reasonable condition. Their 
war diary proudly boasts how few breakdowns the squadrons had on their return trip to 
Cairo.506
   The remaining tanks of 7AD, however, did not make the journey back to Cairo on 
their tracks. Woollcombe suggests that all the tanks in the forward areas worth salving 
were sent back to Egypt by sea from Benghazi, and that all tanks that could still give 
battle remained in Cyrenaica.
   
507  This statement it has to be said is far from accurate. 
Some tanks may have been embarked in Benghazi but not many; the majority were 
driven back to Tobruk and embarked there. Some were even driven all the way back to 
Mersa Matruh and sent back by train.  As for all tanks that could still give battle being 
left in the forward areas this is completely untrue. All the British cruiser tanks whether 
they were still battle worthy or not, were, in one way or another, sent back to the 
Delta.508
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     Woollcombe has this to say about this move; ‘it was unfortunate that the veteran 
armoured car regiment 11H and Support Group could not have been retained, for after 
the Germans attacked these units had to be hastened all the way up again from 
Egypt’.509
WAVELL’S GREEK TRAGEDY:  
  The same may be said of the return of the battle worthy cruiser tanks. Their 
departure for the Delta left virtually no cruiser tanks in the forward area. This degree of 
emasculation, as we shall see later, had serious consequences when the Germans 
attacked.  
When discussing military genius in chapter three of On War, Clausewitz makes 
reference to military intelligence stating that; ‘Average intelligence may recognise the 
truth occasionally, and exceptional courage may now and then retrieve a blunder; but 
usually intellectual inadequacy will be shown up by indifferent achievement’. Perhaps, 
no other military adventure more accurately proves Clausewitz’s words to be correct 
than Wavell’s decision to send forces to Greece. On War.510
 
 
While Wilson’s strategy for holding the “Desert Flank” remained unchanged, wider 
Middle Eastern strategy was about to undergo radical change. As already mentioned 
when Wavell received the 11 February cable from London ordering him to consider 
operations in Greece and/or Turkey as his next priority he was at first very sceptical 
about undertaking such operations. Not, perhaps, surprisingly, in view of the obvious 
military problems of sending troops back to mainland Europe, Wavell considered such 
operations to be impractical and dangerous in several respects.511
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     Consequently if Britain wanted to get back into Europe it would have to be through 
Greece. The Italians had invaded Greece in late October 1940 and it had been felt for 
sometime, by London and in particularly by Churchill, that by helping the Greeks the 
British might regain a foothold on mainland Europe. The plan therefore was to send as 
large a force as Wavell could muster to help the Greeks. This decision, to send 
substantial forces to Greece instead of continuing the pursuit of the retreating Italians 
and capturing Tripoli, was seen at the time, as mentioned, to be highly dubious. Indeed 
it has come to be seen in more recent times, by many commentators, to have been the 
height of military folly. ‘The preparations for Lustre (the code name for the Greek 
expedition) went forward in what Alan Moorhead called “the hope that precedes 
adventure,” rather than after sober military calculation’.512
     Major General Sir Francis De Guingand who at the time of the Greek adventure was 
on Wavell’s planning staff had this to say about the opportunity that he felt was lost by 
going to Greece: ‘The prize was great [taking Tripoli]. It would mean that we should be 
in a position to avoid further major campaigns in North Africa. We would be able to 
link up with the French in Tunis, which might well lead to active collaboration. The 
shipping route through the Mediterranean might be kept open without great 
difficulty’.
   
513  De Guingand’s thoughts on this subject are echoed by many others such 
as General William Jackson514 and Liddell-Hart.515
     The obvious advantages in taking Tripoli had, it might be remembered, been 
identified by Wavell himself.  In the appraisal he wrote just before he arrived to take up 
his command in the Middle East Wavell set out what the primary objectives in North 
Africa should be: ‘The last war was won in the West [he wrote]…The next war will be 
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won or lost in the Mediterranean; and the longer it takes us to secure effective control of 
the Mediterranean, the harder will be the winning of the war’.516
     Moreover, the arguments against going to Greece, alluded to above, were not the 
only reasons for avoiding the operation. It had serious and potentially hugely damaging 
consequences for the whole British war effort. In order to transport all the troops and 
their equipment to Greece ‘fifty ships had to be withdrawn from convoys as they 
reached Suez and passed through the Suez Canal as and when German mining allowed. 
This was done at the expense of the import of supplies to the United Kingdom and to 
the flow of reinforcements to the Middle East’.
   
517
     However, despite his own sound reasoning and the perfectly sensible military 
appreciation arrived at by people like de Guingand, Jackson and Moorhead Wavell still 
forged ahead with his Greek tragedy. He ignored the damage the huge diversion of 
valuable and irreplaceable shipping, and possible loss of irreplaceable military 
resources, would have on his command. 
  Furthermore, a good part of the 
Mediterranean fleet was employed on escort duty for these transports and many ships of 
the fleet were either damaged or sunk.  
     So the question might fairly be asked, if sending troops to Greece was such an 
obviously bad idea (just like the removal of 4 IID earlier) and also so potentially, and in 
fact was, nearly fatally damaging to British war aims, why did Wavell send them?  To 
answer this question we must look to the origins of the Greek adventure and again at 
Wavell’s peculiar personality.  
     Italian intervention in the Balkans began on 7 April 1939, when Italian troops 
disembarked at Durazzo and other ports on the Albanian coast.518
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fearing that Greece might be next, promptly offered Greece military assistance should 
she be threatened. ‘Within a week of the Italian landings in Albania, the British and 
French announced that they had promised to give all the help in their power if Greek or 
Rumanian independence were threatened and if the Greek or Rumanian Government 
considered it vital to resist’.519
     It was not until 28 October 1940, the eighteenth anniversary of his march on Rome, 
that Mussolini invaded Greece from Albania.
   The Italians, however, did not immediately attack the 
Greeks, as with their later attack on the British in Egypt they waited until the French 
were knocked out of the war before striking. 
520  Mussolini was tired of always seeming 
to trail behind his German ally. Consequently he decided to invade Greece as a way of 
demonstrating to Hitler that he too was the master of his own destiny. ‘Hitler always 
faces me with a fait accompli he announced to his immediate entourage. This time I am 
going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I have 
occupied Greece’.521  The Italian invasion might, however, have satisfied Mussolini’s 
vanity but it gave Churchill’s Government a difficult choice. They now had to decide 
whether they should go to the aid of the Greeks or stay out of the Balkans. The pledge 
to help Greece was after all ‘given by Neville Chamberlain’s Government; Churchill’s 
Government [however] never repudiated it. France collapsed; Rumania declared 
neutrality; but so far as Britain was concerned [more probably Churchill] the guarantee 
to Greece was still binding’.522
     When Churchill received the news of the invasion he was delighted. ‘Churchill’s 
reaction was predictable and almost immediate. We will give you all the help in our 
power! he cabled the Greek Government’. 
    
523
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the war on the British side and at that moment Britain and Churchill needed all the allies 
they could get. ‘Hitherto we had not committed ourselves [Churchill wrote] to the 
Greek adventure, except by continuous large-scale preparations in Egypt, and by the 
discussions and agreements at Athens’.524
     Churchill saw the invasion as an opportunity to get British troops back onto the 
mainland of Europe with the added possibility of enticing other states in the region to 
join Britain and Greece in the fighting.  In 1948 Churchill clarified where he hoped the 
Greek adventure might lead, ‘I wanted to form a Balkan front. I wanted Yugoslavia, and 
hoped for Turkey. That, with Greece, would have given us fifty divisions. A nut for the 
Germans to crack’.
  Now that they had been invaded the Greeks 
were more willing to accept British help and Churchill was only too happy to oblige.  
525
     The problem for the British, however, was that at the time of the invasion they were 
militarily stretched, in several directions virtually to the limit of their resources. 
Consequently the ability of HQ in Cairo to find extra resources for Greece was almost 
impossible. Nonetheless, a promise had been made and Wavell was ordered to send 
what he could spare to help the Greeks. In November 1940 orders were sent to Wavell 
from London, which started the ‘movement to airfields near Athens of several bomber 
and fighter squadrons from the Desert Air Force, together with their necessary 
equipment and ground crews’.
  
526  Longmore viewed this order with considerable 
misgivings but attempted to comply with it as best he could. He immediately sent a 
‘mixed Blenheim squadron (No. 30) of bombers and fighters. Churchill told him: “You 
have taken a very bold and wise decision”.527
     The RAF contribution could, in any case, not at this time be any larger as there were 
not enough serviceable airfields in Greece for them to operate from.  There was, in fact, 
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‘not a single all-weather aerodrome in existence on the mainland of Greece; and the 
possibilities of airfield construction were restricted by an unhappy combination of 
weather and politics’.528  The weather throughout the winter of 1940/41 was extremely 
wet and cold in northern Greece making the construction of airfields very slow and 
difficult. Nonetheless despite these limitations ‘during November two more squadrons 
of Blenheim bombers (Nos. 84 and 211) and a Gladiator squadron (No. 80) followed, 
with a further Gladiator squadron (No. 112) in December’.529
     These air deployments were soon followed by limited army deployments and ‘by 
mid November the Army had also dispatched from North Africa over 2000 men and 
400 vehicles (from forty different units) to provide engineers, signallers, supply 
facilities and anti-aircraft defence’.
        
530   These British deployments and the badly 
organised Italian attack coupled with the unexpectedly rapid mobilisation of the Greek 
resistance slowed and eventually halted the Italian attack. The initial Italian successes 
were ‘driven back by a series of spirited Greek counter-attacks. But these, and the 
winter campaigns which followed, cost the Greek Army dear. Its determination to hold 
the Italians remained high, but, unaided; it was in no condition to resist a new attack 
from another quarter’.531
     Unfortunately for the Greeks, by January 1941, London was receiving mounting 
evidence which suggested this was about to happen. Increasingly intelligence was 
indicating that the Germans were becoming interested in attacking Greece sooner rather 
than later. Churchill took this evidence very seriously and wrote on 6 January ‘nothing 
would suit our interests better than that any German advance in the Balkans should be 
delayed to the spring. For this very reason we must apprehend that it will begin 
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earlier’.532   Churchill’s fears were confirmed very quickly by Enigma. On 9 January 
further intelligence reports confirmed that GAF units were moving into Bulgaria with 
instruction to lay telegraph lines from Bulgaria to the Greek border along the natural 
line of advance to Salonika.533  On 10 January London cabled Middle East Command 
instructing them to send as much assistance as possible to the Greeks.534  The cable then 
went on to dictate to Wavell what forces they expected him to send. He must send to 
Greece ‘tanks (both infantry and cruiser), anti-tank and anti-aircraft equipment, two 
medium regiments of artillery and more RAF squadrons’.535
     Wavell, upon receiving this news, in an unusual for him demonstration of military 
reality, cabled Dill the same day: ‘German concentration is more war of nerves 
designed with object of helping Italy by upsetting Greeks nerves, inducing us to 
disperse our forces in the Middle East and to stop our advance in Libya. Nothing we can 
do from here is likely to be in time to stop German advance if really intended, it will 
lead to most dangerous dispersion of force and is playing the enemy’s game’.
   
536
     When Churchill read Wavell’s cable indicating that he was, at least at this juncture, 
against the Greek adventure and wanted to continue the advance in Libya Churchill 
‘reacted venomously: Our information contradicts idea that German concentration in 
Rumania is merely move in war of nerves or bluff to cause dispersion of force. Nothing 
must hamper capture of Tobruk but thereafter all operations in Libya are subordinate to 
aiding Greece’.
   
537
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troops to Rumania, movements of signals and other advanced agents into Bulgaria, and 
that a large-scale movement may begin on or soon after 20th instant’.538
     On receiving this cable ‘Wavell made no demure. On the 13th he found himself in 
Athens conferring with the King of Greece, his Prime Minister, Metaxas, and the 
Commander-in-Chief General Papagos’.
    
539
     However, the die had not finally been cast and there was still time to reconsider the 
wisdom of embarking whole-heartedly on the Greek adventure.  ‘Metaxas, the Greek 
Prime Minister, viewed the situation in the Balkans with greater realism and less 
emotion than Churchill. He was prepared to accept logistic help, which Wavell offered, 
but not fighting units’.
   By the end of this conference Wavell had 
committed the British to substantial support for the Greeks. This would inevitably result 
in the very thing that Wavell said was his most important objective in the Middle East, 
that is the complete capture of the North African coast, being put on hold. Wavell was, 
in fact, preparing to divert the very resources which would make this possible away 
from O’Connor.    
540
     Wavell duly reported his new thoughts on the Greek deployment to London: ‘Present 
proposal is a dangerous half-measure. I do not believe that troops it is proposed to send 
are sufficient to enable the equivalent of three Greek divisions to hold Salonika if the 
Germans are really determined to advance on it’.
  Metaxas wanted the British to wait until they had a 
convincing army ready to take to the field rather than accept a token force, which might 
only accelerate German aggression. Wavell showing his usual oscillation on occasions 
like this began to change his mind again and agreed with Metaxas that delays in 
deployment were probably the best solution.  
541
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significance had left the desert fighting at this time O’Connor was able to take Tobruk 
and contemplate a further advance on Benghazi. ‘Metaxas had temporarily saved 
Wavell’s Western Desert campaign. Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff were forced to 
accept his verdict’.542
     Nonetheless, the momentum to send forces to Greece was soon back at work. 
Although the Greeks had refused British help Churchill still felt British forces might be 
needed in the future. On 20 January the Defence Committee in London cable Wavell 
instructing him that he should ‘build up a mobile reserve in Egypt for possible use in 
Greece or Turkey within the next two months’.
  
543
Your message received. Quite frankly contents astound me. I cannot 
believe you fully appreciate present situation Middle East, in which 
Libya drive in full career and Sudan offensive into Eritrea progressing 
satisfactorily. However strong advantages may be of impressing Turks, 
can you afford to lock up squadrons you propose in Turkey where they 
may remain for some time inoperative? Would it not be forsaking the 
substance for the shadow?
  Moreover, on 29 January Portal 
informed Longmore that he should be ready to send 10-15 squadrons to Turkey. ‘His 
reply was in character:  
544
      
      
     To conform to Churchill’s and Portal’s wishes, Wavell, rather than examine the 
proposed Greek adventure in the detail that was required began planning a huge military 
deployment to Greece.545
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In this cable he also included an estimation of the forces he thought he would have 
available to send to Greece in the coming months.  
     This cable makes for interesting reading and, perhaps, shows how far out of touch 
with the true military situation Wavell really was. In his cable he confidently tells Dill 
that he could find ‘one armoured brigade group and two brigades of the New Zealand 
Division’.546
     At that moment all the armoured regiments which had made up the brigades of 7AD 
were either spread around the Western Desert or starting to head back to the Delta. 
Moreover, wherever the armoured brigades were, none of them had a full compliment 
of serviceable tanks and this would be the case for many months to come. His other 
potential source of armoured brigade groups was the two incomplete brigades of 2AD. 
We shall examine the brigades of this division in some detail later in the work; 
however, when Wavell made his predictions to Dill it would be fair to say that neither 
of these brigades was in a fit state to take to the battlefield. In no sense at this time 
could they even remotely be considered as fully-fledged brigade groups, lacking as they 
did ancillary formations of virtually every kind.   
  Theoretically this objective might have been feasible but in reality it was 
completely impossible. In both cases there were at this time insurmountable obstacles in 
fielding either the two New Zealand brigades or an armoured brigade group. 
     As for his ability to deploy the New Zealand brigades this was in many respects even 
more problematical. The two New Zealand brigades did have a more or less complete 
set of infantry equipment and even first line transport. Unfortunately this was about all 
they had. They had no support units, artillery, second line transport, signals or anti-
aircraft protection.547
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Wavell. Connell, indeed, confirms that Wavell knew, for example, that the New 
Zealanders were short of artillery and signals equipment.548
     Moreover, even had these brigades been complete they could still not, at this 
juncture, have been deployed. Wavell, writing to Dill on 7 November 1940, observes 
that ‘Dominion Governments are reluctant to allow their formations to be broken up in 
any way or to permit their use in the field until fully trained and equipped or for guards 
on internal security duties except in a grave emergency’.
    
549  General Bernard Freyberg 
the commander of all New Zealand forces in the Middle East adhered strictly to this 
policy. Freyberg ‘insisted that the New Zealand troops must be held together, to fight as 
a full division, not as separate brigades’.550
     This ruling, therefore, effectively excluded the two New Zealand brigades from 
being dispatched to fight anywhere at this time. Indeed the New Zealand Division 
would in fact, not be deployable until its 5th Brigade arrived in the Middle East from 
Britain. The 5th Brigade of 2 NZD had been previously diverted to Britain in mid 1940 
when a German invasion of the UK looked likely. 
    
551  Consequently 2 NZD was not 
fully assembled in the Middle East until well into March and did not complete its 
concentration in Greece until 2 April.552
     However, Wavell was by no means finished with his lavish list of forces earmarked 
for Greece. He now went on to predict to Dill what he would have available in the near 
future. By the middle of March Wavell estimated that he ‘could add another armoured 
brigade group, and another two Australian brigades. A month later he could send a 
further Australian brigade, and at the end of April a complete Australian division’.
  
553
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available for the proposed operation Mandibles, an adventurous scheme to capture the 
Dodecanese. This allocates three Australian divisions to operations in the Greek theatre. 
However, Wavell himself had already assigned 9 AID to the defence of Cyrenaica. 
Therefore, as there were only three Australian divisions in the Middle East, if he were to 
send three on the Greek adventure there would be none left to defend his desert flank in 
Cyrenaica.            
     As has been mentioned earlier Wavell had at this time no tanks to equip the brigades 
of 7AD so they could not be sent to Greece. The ramshackle armoured brigade he did 
cobble together and send to Greece was the newly arrived 1st Armoured Brigade of 
2AD. The only other armoured brigade he possessed was 3rd Armoured Brigade of the 
same division and this brigade, as we shall see later, was in no fit state to fight anybody 
and was, in any case, only one regiment strong. Its other two regiments, which had 
arrived in Egypt earlier, had already been badly worn fighting the Italians in Libya with 
7AD and its tanks were now back in the Delta with all the rest. This brigade was 
anyway already assigned to the defence of Cyrenaica. Therefore, it was not available for 
Greece, even if it had been up to strength, which it most definitely was not.      
     Moreover, Wavell’s 10 February cable created a very dangerous impression in 
London, indicating as it did, that his forces in the Middle East were far more numerous 
and capable than they actually were. Eden who had been sent by Churchill to establish 
whether the Greek operation was worth the risk ‘should have cross-examined Wavell 
until he either exposed the flimsy factual basis of his recommendations or satisfied 
himself that Lustre’s prospects were good enough to justify the manifest risks entailed. 
He plainly did neither; nor did he secure the “precise military appreciation” which 
Churchill demanded and which would have condemned the operation’.554
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     By early February the scale of the German commitment to a Balkan campaign was 
becoming evident. The intelligence being received in London revealed an alarming 
build up of forces far greater than anything a few British/Dominion divisions could 
realistically resist. By mid February this unpalatable, but undeniable, fact was starting to 
develop in Churchill’s mind and was causing him to seriously reconsider the whole 
operation. Unfortunately his advisors on the ground in the Middle East, Wavell, Eden 
and Dill were still emphatically in favour of the operation. Eden, after a long discussion 
with Wavell and Dill cabled Churchill on 20 February and informed him that it had 
been agreed between them that Britain ‘should do everything in its power to bring the 
fullest measure of help to the Greeks at earliest possible moment’.555  Nonetheless, 
Churchill still had his doubts.  Consequently later the same day he cabled back to Eden: 
‘do not consider yourselves obligated to a Greek enterprise if in your hearts you feel it 
will only be another Norwegian fiasco. If no good plan can be made please say so. But, 
of course, you know how valuable success would be’.556
     Churchill wanted success in Greece, if it could be gained at reasonable cost, but he 
did not want another military fiasco like the one in Norway. Churchill’s 20 February 
message gave Wavell a get out of jail free card, all that was required was that Wavell 
should either cancel the move altogether or at the very least slow the deployment down. 
There were many ways in which this could have been done without losing face the 
actual lack of suitable shipping for one. However, Wavell took neither of these options. 
Instead, for some unfathomable reason, he pressed ahead with the deployment at a 
breakneck pace.   
              
     Churchill, therefore, perhaps not surprisingly, despite his worries about the Greek 
adventure turning into a military fiasco took Wavell’s deployment estimates at face 
value. He wrongly assumed that Wavell knew what he was doing and actually did have 
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the forces and war materials he said he had. With this reassurance that Wavell had all he 
needed to both secure the desert flank and send a strong expeditionary force to Greece 
Churchill gave Wavell the go ahead to embark on the Greek operation. The official 
confirmation came on 7 March and the first British troops landed in the Greek port of 
Piraeus on the same day.557
     Wavell it is true was in a difficult position on the one hand he had Churchill pushing 
him to action in Greece while on the other he could clearly see the problems of going 
there. That being said Wavell was the C-in-C on the spot and should have made his 
Prime Minister cognisant with all the facts. Had he done so it is very probable, in view 
of Churchill’s existing and well voiced doubts about the Greek operation; that he would 
have insisted on its cancellation. As Bickers soberly observes when reviewing the 
decision to send forces to Greece ‘it was obvious to any intelligent person, let alone to 
statesmen and senior military commanders, that, facing the Luftwaffe and German 
tanks, they would have as much chance as a tethered goat against a tiger’.
   
558
CHANGE OF PLAN IN THE DESERT 
      
The decision to send as strong a force as possible to help the Greek’s and the concurrent 
decision to withdraw 7AD back to the Delta to rest and refit had a profound effect on 
Wilson’s planned defence of Libya. As units of 7AD disappeared their place was 
supposed to be filled by 2AD.  Now half of 2AD was to be sent to Greece. In the 
provision of infantry things were also about to change.  6 AID was also to be sent to 
Greece and in its place Wilson could expect only 9 AID. The promised 7th Australian 
Division (7 AID) would now also be going to Greece so he could forget any 
reinforcement from that direction.  
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     Bad as all this change of units was to Wilson’s plan for the defence of Cyrenaica 
what happened next was even worse. The commanding officer was also leaving the area 
to take up command of the forces being sent to Greece. On 21 February just 14 days 
after assuming command in Cyrenaica Wilson was summoned to a meeting with Wavell 
in Cairo and told that he would be leaving the desert and going to Greece.559
NEAME TAKES COMMAND: THE POISONED CHALLIS 
  His 
command in Cyrenaica was to be handed over, as soon as possible, to General Philip 
Neame V. C.      
General Philip Neame V. C. took over from Wilson on 28 February and quickly came to 
two conclusions. Firstly he realised that with the mounting evidence of enemy activity 
and build-up of both German and Italian forces, there was a strong probability that he 
would be attacked in the very near future.  
Within a few days of my arrival at Barce, my headquarters in Cyrenaica, I had 
visited all my troops, the forward areas south of Agedabia, the ports of Benghazi 
and Derna, and the fortress port of Tobruk. From air reports and air photographs 
it very soon became apparent to me that large enemy forces were assembling on 
my front, near Agheila, and more were moving up from Tripoli. Intelligence 
agents brought in news of German troops near the front, and large convoys 
crossing the Mediterranean from Italy to Tripoli. By the middle of March, a 
fortnight after I took over, it was quite clear to me that a great German-Italian 
offensive was being prepared against Cyrenaica, and that it was imminent.560
 
      
Secondly he realised that the composition of his command was wholly inadequate to 
repulse them if they came.561
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  He therefore contacted Wavell and told him exactly what 
extra forces he felt he required to withstand the attack he was sure, and correctly 
foresaw, his command would soon be subjected to. ‘I put forward very clearly to 
G.H.Q. the poor condition of my army in training, equipment, and numbers, and 
repeatedly signalled my most grave deficiencies – namely, anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
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guns, armour, air support, and M.T. – all those things, in fact, which make a modern 
army’.562
     Wavell, however, considered the threat of attack to be far less imminent than Neame 
expected and ordered Neame to do what he could with the forces he had. ‘I was told that 
reinforcements would ultimately be sent, but that little would be available before the 
middle of May’.
    
563  Wavell added reassuringly that he would come and assess the 
danger to Cyrenaica himself as soon as he was free to do so. Michael Carver who was 
serving in G.H.Q. Cairo at the time considered that: ‘Wavell thought that the enemy 
would not be in a position to take the offensive until May at the earliest, and his orders 
to Neame were that if he were attacked, he was to fight a delaying action between his 
forward position at Mersa el Brega and Benghazi’.564
     Neame’s fears, brought about by his daily reading of the intelligence which 
suggested most conclusively that he would be attacked in the very near future, were 
dismissed by Wavell.  Wavell’s reading of the situation was that he had plenty of time 
to prepare for an attack, which, if it came at all, would not come before May. So the 
question might fairly be asked at this point what did Wavell know about enemy 
intentions, and did the evidence he had suggest that an attack was not as imminent as 
Neame supposed.  
    
WAVELL’S VIEW: INTELLIGENCE 
When the Germans attacked Brega on 31 March Wavell claimed that poor intelligence 
of enemy intentions was a major contributing factor in British un-preparedness. Wavell, 
in fact, claimed that ‘though unconfirmed reports had been received from time to time 
of the preparation of German troops for dispatch to Libya and of their progress via Italy 
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and Sicily, no definite information to justify our expecting the presence of German 
troops in Africa had been received up to the middle of February’.565
     Moreover, he further asserted that even when evidence proved, after mid February, 
conclusively, that German forces were in Libya his reading of the intelligence still 
suggested to him that they would not attack for quite some time. Wavell ‘estimated that 
it would be at least two months after the landing of German troops at Tripoli before they 
could undertake a serious offensive against Cyrenaica; and that, therefore, there was not 
likely to be any serious threat to our positions there before May at the earliest’.
   
566
     Wavell’s defence for his un-readiness at Brega, if we take his statements recorded in 
the above report as fact, suggest that he made no attempt to seriously defend Cyrenaica, 
prior to late-February 1941, because the information he was receiving on enemy activity 
in Libya was so imprecise that it gave him no clear indication that the Italians and 
Germans were substantially reinforcing their position in Libya. After, late-February, 
when intelligence definitely confirmed the presence of German forces in Libya and 
further indicated their intention to attack British forces in Cyrenaica; he claims that he 
failed to establish creditable forces to defend Cyrenaica, because his interpretation of 
the intelligence indicated to him that the attack, if it came at all, would not come before 
May. He would therefore, in his opinion, have plenty of time to establish a viable 
defence at some future, unspecified, date. Indeed even as late as 6 March, when there 
was overwhelming evidence that attack was imminent, Wavell was still telling his 
Director of Military Intelligence, Shearer, ‘that there was no real danger of 
counterattack before May.’
   
567
     So we may say that from Wavell’s point of view poor and inadequate intelligence 
was a significant contributing factor in the loss of Cyrenaica. However, as we shall see, 
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Wavell’s “lack of intelligence” defence, which he used in his September 1941 after 
action report, and a claim he maintained thereafter, to justify his lack of preparedness at 
Brega, cannot, on the evidence discovered for this work, support his claim.     
     Perhaps, the first point to emphasis when discussing what the British and Wavell in 
particular did or did not know about enemy intentions, is that Cairo and London both 
had access to accurate intelligence on enemy intentions. As Lewin observes in The 
Chief, ‘the Germans did not descend on Africa like a bolt from the blue’.568  Moreover, 
nor did their arrival come as any surprise to Wavell. As Lewin further observes ‘all 
Wavell’s strategic reflections since the summer of 1940 had allowed quite specifically 
for this contingency – a calculation, indeed, which no alert commander could have 
avoided’.569
     Starting in September 1940 information gathered by British intelligence indicated 
that, a ‘German advance in the Balkan direction was much less likely than a German 
attack on Egypt from North Africa’.
  By September 1940 British Intelligence had firm evidence, which 
confirmed Wavell’s earlier strategic reflections; that the Germans were indeed 
considering an intervention in North Africa.   
570  This view, that the Germans were now actively 
considering becoming involved in Libya, was reinforced a few weeks later when on 3 
October the Cabinet in London received ‘certain indications’ – that the next German 
move would be an attack from Libya, rather than into the Balkans or through Spain’.571
     The chief source of the intelligence coming to the British was the informative and 
accurate information gained by British Army Intelligence (AI) from reading the Italian 
Air Force (IAF) ciphers, which had been broken earlier in the war. These ciphers 
  
Indications that the Germans were preparing to send forces to Libya continued to build 
up throughout late 1940 and into early 1941.  
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produced rich and reliable intelligence on virtually everything the Italians were doing 
both at home and in Africa. By late 1940 British AI was able to read 80 per cent of all 
IAF high-grade cipher signals.572   Nor was this the only code to be broken by British 
AI from which they could gain valuable information on enemy activities. ‘With the help 
of the German Air Force (G.A.F.) Enigma and the study of G.A.F. low-grade traffic, AI 
was able from January 1941 to keep an accurate tally of the build up of Germany’s air 
power in the Mediterranean’.573  This information concerning the German air build up 
was being read by both AI in the Middle East and by Churchill in London. By early 
January Churchill was becoming concerned about the build up and warned Wavell of 
possible German involvement in Libya. On 6 January he cabled Wavell thus: ‘Time is 
short. I cannot believe that Hitler will not intervene’.574
     Churchill’s prophetic warning was not long in becoming a reality. On 10 January, 
Admiral Cunningham, commanding a fleet of nine British warships and the aircraft 
carrier Illustrious set out from his base in Egypt on Operation Excess destined for the 
Eastern Mediterranean. Not long after mid day a ‘large formation of aircraft were 
sighted to the northward, and were soon overhead. They were recognised as German, 
three squadrons of Stukas’.
 
575
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  These aircraft set about Cunningham’s ships damaging 
many of them and so severely damaging Illustrious that after being patched up in Malta 
she had to go to the U.S. for extensive repairs. This new situation, of German aircraft 
operating in the Mediterranean, was obviously a very serious development and was 
recognised as such by both Cunningham and his air force counter part Longmore. On 17 
January, when Cunningham returned to Alexandria, the two senior officers met to 
discuss the new situation. They concluded that the Germans increasing strength in the 
Mediterranean indicated that they were now committed to becoming intimately 
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involved in the fighting. Cunningham felt that they were ‘contemplating something 
more important than an attack upon [British] sea communications. It rather looked as 
though Hitler, fearing an Italian collapse, intended to come to their assistance by 
starting large-scale operations in the Mediterranean’.576
     In mid January German involvement in North Africa became definite when British 
AI confirmed that G.A.F. units were, for the first time, actually operating on Libyan 
soil. Confirmation that Wavell knew of this G.A.F. deployment is revealed in his 19 
January signal to Dill in which he wrote: ‘against present opposition I am prepared to 
continue advance towards Benghazi with present air protection…but effect of German 
aircraft in Libya remains to be seen’.
   
577
     By 26 January AI confirmed that there were 80 long-range and dive-bombers at 
Benina an airfield a few miles from Benghazi. 
  During the next few days’ further intelligence 
established more accurately the extent of the German deployment.    
578  Wavell, with irrefutable evidence 
such as this, was now under no illusion that more Germans would be coming to Libya, 
it was; he assumed correctly, just a matter of when. ‘I wonder [Wavell wrote] what 
Hitler will do next. I rather expect a busy and difficult six months in the Eastern 
Mediterranean’.579
     This build up of air power, by both Italy and Germany, in Libya and on many 
Mediterranean islands, was, AI in Cairo now knew, growing virtually by the day. 
Throughout January 1941 AI in Cairo built up a very accurate assessment of the 
  For the time being, however, the Germans were unable to use their 
aircraft based at Benina, or anywhere else in Libya, as the successful British land 
offensive against the collapsing Italians had forced them to withdraw to Tripoli. This 
withdrawal did not, however, prevent the build-up of German air assets in Libya. Nor 
would it be long before they were able to commit themselves to battle.        
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strength of the German air deployment to the area. ‘At the end of January, when the true 
figures were 120 long-range bombers, 150 dive-bombers and 40 fighters [AI] put the 
numbers at 160, 150 and 40 respectively’.580
FEBRUARY BRINGS THE WEHRMACHT   
  So good, in fact, was the information that 
AI was receiving that this over estimation of the amount of long-range bombers actually 
deployed was rectified correctly by 4 February. 
While the deployment of German air assets to Libya had been accurately confirmed by 
British AI in early January they were not, as yet, convinced that army deployments were 
about to be made. However, in early February, although evidence had been mounting 
for some time that the Germans were coming, AI finally began to take the reports of 
German Army deployments to Libya seriously. It has to be said however that even then 
they only belatedly came to this conclusion when the weight of evidence suggesting that 
this was about to happen became so overwhelming that they could no longer ignore it. 
Information from diplomatic sources, Italian POWs and Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS) agents had all indicated for sometime that large scale German troop movements 
were being made to Italian ports. While further reports from similar sources confirmed 
that practise troop embarkations were taking place in Sicily.581
     Now, at least, alert to the possibility that the Germans were preparing to move into 
Libya it was not long before AI had more definite information on German intentions. 
An SIS ‘source reported that huge quantities of colonial equipment and stores for war in 
African conditions were being transported southwards’.
    
582
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  Intelligence reports were 
also received from Poles who were monitoring railway movements in Italy, their 
observations identified large convoys of trains bringing more German troops to Italian 
ports. Furthermore, ‘air reconnaissance disclosed that by 3 February close on half a 
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million tons of shipping, consisting of ships of 6,000 tons or over, had been 
concentrated in Naples’.583  On 9 February a German signal was deciphered by AI, 
which indicated that this shipping might soon be on its way to Libya. The signal 
‘ordered special air cover for a Naples/Tripoli convoy, and [there were] indications of 
increased transport flights a few days later from Italy to Libya’.584
POST LATE FEBRUARY 
  
Rumours of German troops landing in Tripoli on 14 February (this was, in fact, the 
convoy and air movement identified by AI on 9 February) reached British HQ in Cairo 
almost as soon as they happened. Field Marshal Lord Carver, who, as mentioned, was at 
the time a junior staff officer in Cairo, and was intimately involved in the fighting in 
North Africa, claims in his book Dilemmas of the Desert ‘that intelligence told Wavell a 
fortnight after Beda Fomm that German troops had reached Tripoli’.585  The arrival of 
German ground troops was definitely confirmed as fact, on 20 February, when British 
armoured cars belonging to the KDG’s, clashed with German armoured cars belonging 
to 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion on the Via Balbia near El Agheila. ‘On the British side 
there was a long moment of question and incredulity (‘My God Weren’t those 
Germans?’) and after the briefest exchange of shots the armoured cars of the KDG’s, 
mindful of their chief duty to get back with information, circled around to the south and 
hastened back to report’.586
     This incident marked the commencement of a series of clashes between British and 
German forces around El Agheila. These confrontations were, perhaps surprisingly, 
instigated deliberately by the Germans with the precise intention of telling the British 
that German forces had arrived in Libya. The Germans hoped that by advertising their 
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presence this would discourage the British from pressing on to Tripoli. ‘Rommel 
decided that he must impose caution on the British by showing a German presence in 
the forward area’.587
     The clash did however cause Wavell to at least consider moving troops from East 
Africa back to the Western Desert. ‘The quandary, as Wavell phrased it, was to decide 
whether to make another effort to capture the Keren position and reach Asmara or to 
adopt a defensive attitude in Eritrea and begin withdrawing troops’.
  As it happened the Germans need not have worried about a British 
advance as no one in HQ Cairo had any intention of moving on Tripoli or anywhere else 
in the Western Desert for that matter.  
588
     However, the Germans were not to know any of this and consequently continued to 
advertise their presence in Libya. They gave the British further evidence of their arrival 
on 21 February. The pilot of a British reconnaissance aircraft flying west of El Agheila 
sighted an eight-wheeled armoured car which could only be German as they were the 
only army operating such vehicles at this time.
  Wavell, it seems 
considered that capturing Keren was the more pressing objective, and, despite the 
obvious threat building up against his desert flank, ordered Platt to take Keren thus 
denying Neame the troops he so desperately need in the Western Desert.    
589  This sighting was soon followed by 
more positive confirmation. On 24 February doubts were ‘finally dispelled in London 
and Cairo, after a clash of armoured cars at Agheila and history, selecting the 
appropriate man, chose Lieutenant E. T. Williams – later to be distinguished as 
Montgomery’s chief intelligence officer – to identify a German presence at the front’.590
     In an effort to establish the extent of the German advance in Libya British air 
reconnaissance was stepped up.  Air reconnaissance, which had already detected the 
presence of motor convoys leaving Tripoli heading east, soon reported a large 
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concentration of vehicles which had previously been about 150 miles east of Tripoli, 
were now approaching El Agheila.591
     Churchill, reading the intelligence he had received in London, also detected the 
movement east and was concerned. On 27 February he cabled Wavell thus: ‘in view of 
arrival of German armoured formations and aircraft in Tripolitania the question of 
defence commitments in Egypt and Cyrenaica has been considered here. Would be 
grateful if you would telegraph a short appreciation’.
  By late February HQ Cairo and Wavell not only 
knew that German air and ground forces had arrived in Tripoli they also knew, beyond 
per-adventure, that there were a lot of them and that they were on the move east.  
592  While Churchill waited for his 
appreciation from Cairo his code breakers were making significant progress on gaining 
even more information on German intentions. ‘On 28 February Bletchley broke the 
latest version of the Mediterranean Luftwaffe cipher (known as Light Blue) and 
continued to read it currently’.593
     The new intelligence gained from Light Blue only served to confirm what was 
already known in Cairo; the Germans were in Libya and heading in force towards what 
would be Neame’s command area. With intelligence of this quality and quantity it is not 
creditable that on the eve of Neame’s appointment, 28 February, Wavell could have 
been in any doubt that the British positions in Cyrenaica were imminently going to be 
attacked. Neame consequently needed to be ordered to put in place preparations to 
adequately defend his command as urgently as possible.  
   
     Wavell gave no such order instead his G.H.Q. advised Neame, as he was about to 
leave Cairo, ‘that Cyrenaica was now a passive battle-zone, with no possible enemy 
threats’.594
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  G.H.Q.’s reassuring words, however, failed to give Neame much comfort on 
his arrival in Cyrenaica when he looked at the daily intelligence reports which told him 
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of more German landings in Tripoli and he looked at the pitiful state the forces Wavell 
had allocated to him were in. In Playing with Strife Neame laments that: ‘I requested 
reinforcements, and also naval and air action against the enemy convoys streaming over 
to Tripoli. But no effective action was possible: everything was going to Greece’.595
 
   
CHAPTER 3 
 
Clausewitz wrote: The defender waits for the attack in position, having chosen a 
suitable area and prepared it; which means he has carefully reconnoitred it, erected 
solid defences at some of the most important points, established and opened 
communications, sited his batteries, fortified some villages, selected covered assembly 
areas, and so forth. The strength of his front, access to which is barred by one or more 
parallel trenches or other obstacles or by dominant strong points, makes it possible for 
him, while the forces at the points of actual contact are destroying each other, to inflict 
heavy losses on the enemy at low cost to himself’.596
 
   
This chapter will examine the main fighting elements of Neame’s command. A detailed 
review will be made of 2nd Armoured Division and its sub units. Reviews will be made 
of all the armoured units in the division 3rd Hussars, 5th Royal Tank Regiment and 6th 
Royal Tank Regiment. The artillery and infantry components of the division will also be 
scrutinised in this section. Having established the capability of Neame’s division a 
review of the available intelligence will be made. The chapter will then move on to 
chronicle Wavell’s visit to Neame’s command area and the advice he gave his 
subordinate. The chapter will then move on to chart the final dispositions of Neame’s 
forces. Reviews will be made of the terrain the importance of holding Brega and where 
each British unit was deployed prior to the German attack. The chapter will conclude 
with a review of the Germans preparation for their attack and the actual battle for Brega.   
NEAME AND HIS ARMOURED DIVISION 
Neame, it has to be said, was, on the face of it at least, a curious choice of commander 
for the huge Cyrenaica Command. The Command, according to Wavell, was not 
intended to be a fighting command more an administrative occupation with the garrison 
of two mechanised divisions having a static defensive role.597
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  However, Neame had 
little administrative knowledge and had never commanded any unit bigger than a 
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division. Moreover, he had no experience whatsoever of commanding armoured forces 
and had no experience of mechanised warfare.598
As Wavell was to write later of this appointment; I did not know him well; he 
had had 4th Indian Division and had gone to Palestine to replace George Giffard. 
He was a sapper, and had been an instructor at the staff collage, and was the 
author of a book on strategy, so I accepted him as a skilful and educated soldier; 
his V. C. was a guarantee of his fighting qualities. He was at this time a great 
friend of Dick O’Connor’s for whose judgment I had much respect.
        
599
 
  
It is perhaps significant to note here that although Wavell was Supreme Commander 
and could therefore make his choice of subordinate commanders based on his own 
judgment he subtly, when Neame is exposed later as not being up to the job, for reasons 
which we shall see were not completely his own fault, blames O’Connor for his 
choosing Neame.  
     Neame, in fact, paradoxically, was in many respects admirably suited to the task of 
defending Cyrenaica. As Wavell points out he was a sapper, an engineer, he had won a 
V. C. in the trenches in France and like many officers of his generation knew exactly 
how to construct and hold a defensive position.600
     Neame took up his new command on 28 February just as big changes were about to 
be made in Cyrenaica. The decision to go to Greece had caused a complete turn around 
in the quality of the forces allocated to defend Cyrenaica; well equipped and 
experienced units were leaving and poorly equipped and in some cases less experienced 
  He understood the strategic 
importance of holding Cyrenaica and knew how to deploy a division to gain maximum 
advantage.  Indeed Neame possessed all the military qualities required to hold Brega, 
and by extension Cyrenaica.  However, as we shall see, what Neame lacked was the 
clear instruction from his commanding officer, Wavell, to establish a creditable forward 
defence line.    
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units were arriving. This quickly caused Neame to complain that with the resources he 
had at his disposal he would be hard pressed to defend his new command should it be 
attacked.601  As Jackson writes; ‘Neame had a right to complain about the state of the 
Cyrenaica Garrison. In the first place it was established as a Garrison, and not as a 
fighting force. His headquarters was not mobile; he had too few radio sets, and was 
dependent on local telephone service boosted by his own signallers’.602   Furthermore, 
‘at the end of February 1941, with all quiet on the Western Desert front, 7th Armoured 
Division was withdrawn from El Agheila and replaced by 2nd Armoured Division’.603
     A fully equipped and trained British armoured division was, even in early 1941, a 
potent fighting formation. Theoretically an armoured division would be composed of 
three major fighting components. The cutting edge of the division would be its 312 
tanks split between two armoured brigades, 156 tanks in each brigade. Tank brigades 
would usually be composed of three tank regiments each equipped with 52 cruiser and 
or light tanks.
  
The 2nd Armoured Division was, in theory at least, the most important unit under 
Neame’s direct command but was not, as later events would show, in any way capable 
of delivering the fighting capability expected of it. 
604
     The third major fighting element of the division was its support brigade or Support 
Group. This part of the division would usually be composed of two battalions of 
motorised infantry supported by a variety of artillery units, however, it must be stressed 
that in the desert units were frequently modified to suit circumstances, and perhaps 
more crucially, by the availability of units.  That being said by 1940 the aspiration for 
  Where possible an armoured car regiment, motorised infantry 
battalion and artillery regiment would also support each armoured brigade.   
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Support Groups was that they should have two fully motorised infantry battalions a 
Royal Horse Artillery regiment (16 guns) a full anti-tank regiment (36 guns) and a full 
light anti-aircraft regiment (36 guns).605
     An armoured divisional commander would also normally have under his direct 
control a supply echelon, maintenance units and medical facilities two field squadrons 
of Royal Engineers and one field park squadron.
    
606
     Thus a model “Armoured Division” fighting in the Western Desert in 1941 would be 
composed of three brigades composed of around 20 major fighting units. Two armoured 
car regiments, six tank regiments, four infantry battalions, one machine gun battalion, 
three field artillery regiments, one, possibly two, medium artillery regiments, one anti-
tank gun regiment, and at least one anti-aircraft gun regiment. However, 2AD bore little 
resemblance to the ideal model set out above. As the official historian comments; ‘this 
so-called division amounted to barely one weak armoured brigade, not fully mobile, and 
likely to waste away altogether if it did much fighting’.
  To communicate with its three 
brigades divisional HQ would have a large signals unit with radio links to both its 
fighting units and a rear link to Corps or even Army HQ. In ancillary fighting units the 
divisional commander would often have under his command a medium, and sometimes 
even a heavy, artillery regiment. For added firepower a motorised machine gun 
battalion often supported divisions.                    
607
2nd ARMOURED DIVISION 
        
The 2nd Armoured Division was not, as Michael Carver observes; ‘an impressive 
collection. As 2nd Armoured Division arrived in the desert to relieve the 7th in January, 
its commander, J. C. Tilly, had died and been replaced by another Royal Tank Corps 
officer, Major-General M. D. Gambier-Parry, who had been head of the military 
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mission to Greece and had no recent experience of command’.608   Moreover, not only 
had Gambier-Parry no recent experience of command he also, like Neame, had no 
experience of desert warfare. So we may see that both Neame and Gambier-Parry were 
not, perhaps, the most suitable officers for the posts they now held. As Lewin says: ‘No 
professional German commander-in-chief would have tolerated [as Wavell did] such a 
dearth of experience among his senior subordinates’.609
     In view of Gambier-Parry’s lack of experience in armoured warfare his appointment 
on, 17 February, to such a potentially important command seems on the face of it to be a 
strange assignment. Moreover, this appointment becomes even stranger when one 
realises that at this time there were several outstanding officers with experience of 
commanding armoured divisions in combat standing idle in Egypt. The former 
commander of 7AD Michael O’Moore Creagh, for example, was now unemployed. 
Also available was Brigadier J. R. L. (Blood) Caunter who had stood in for Creagh 
when he became ill during Operation Compass. George Forty describes Caunter as; ‘a 
splendid CO of great energy and imagination, constantly encouraging his young officers 
to get out into the desert, so as to learn the hard way to live and navigate in some of the 
most inhospitable conditions on the planet’.
    
610
     However, when one looks a little more closely at the origins of this appointment it is 
not difficult to see why Wavell should have made Gambier-Parry commander of this 
crucially important division. Connell describes Gambier-Parry as a ‘cheerful and 
energetic tank officer whom Wavell had known from the days of the first Armoured 
   Aside from these two experienced 
officers already in theatre there was also Hobo languishing in retirement in the UK who 
could very quickly have been flown back to Egypt.   
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Force on Salisbury Plain’.611
3rd ARMOURED BRIGADE 
  Gambier-Parry had all the qualities, at least outwardly, 
that Wavell desired in a subordinate officer. He was as Connell says energetic and 
cheerful (similar to Chink in these respects) and like Chink Wavell knew him well, this 
made him exactly the kind of Officer Wavell liked to have around him. Gambier-Parry 
was, in fact, a tank officer who looked the part and would carry out Wavell’s orders 
without asking awkward questions. Unfortunately, however, although Gambier-Parry 
looked the part, the reality was that he had no combat experience, had never 
commanded an armoured division and, as events would soon prove, was in no way 
qualified to take on the job of making the dispersed elements of 2AD into an effective 
fighting unit. With Gambier-Parry’s depth of experience kept in mind we shall now 
review the progress that the two brigades, 2SG and 3AB, made under his command in 
the period between his appointment on 17 February and the German attack on 31 
March.   
So what exactly was the state of Gambier-Parry’s only armoured brigade, 3AB. To 
command this vitally important brigade again a rather questionable choice of 
commander was made especially when one reviews the pool of talent readily available.  
There were in Egypt at this time, arguably, three of the most talented brigadiers in the 
British army; these were Brigadiers H. E. Russell, (former commander of 7th Armoured 
Brigade) W. H. E. (Strafer) Gott, (former commander of 1KRRC promoted brigadier in 
early 1940) and John Coomb (former commander 11th Hussars and also promoted 
brigadier after Compass) all of whom had fought with distinction throughout Operation 
Compass.612
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     Nonetheless, despite the availability of officers with proven track records the brigade 
was left under the command of the fifty year old Brigadier Reginald Gordon Ward 
Rimington.613  In 1940 Rimington had been commander of 2 RTR before being relived 
of this command and made an instructor at the Armoured Fighting Vehicles Gunnery 
School. Rimington, like Gambier-Parry, had little in the way of battle experience and 
had never commanded a brigade in action having only recently been promoted to the 
rank of brigadier. He was, however, the son of one of Wavell’s close friends. Michael 
Frederick Rimington,614 Gordon Rimington’s father; was, during the Boer War, the 
commander of an irregular unit know as Rimington’s column.615  In 1901 Wavell was 
sent as a draftee replacement officer to Standerton in the south-eastern Transvaal where 
this unit was operating. In February 1902, Rimington’s column was engaged in 
operations against the Boers and four companies of Wavell’s Regiment, the 2nd 
Battalion the Black Watch, were attached to Rimington’s unit.616  Consequently during 
the course of these operations Rimington senior and Wavell became friends. Michael 
Frederick Rimington617
     Although Rimington was nominally the Brigadier of 3AB initially he had only one 
unit under his command, 1 KDG. The rest of his Brigade was cobbled together between 
late February and early March from four formally unconnected units. Rimington’s new 
Brigade would eventually consist of three tank regiments. The 3 Hussars (3H) and 6 
 was by any standards an outstanding soldier he fought with 
distinction in both the Zulu and Boer Wars and eventually became a Major General 
gained a KCB and a CVO.  However, Rimington junior was not, as events would soon 
demonstrate, of the same ability as his father.   
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Royal Tank Regiment (6 RTR) were allocated to 3AB in late February. The 5th Royal 
Tank Regiment (5 RTR) was added to the Brigade in early March. The artillery element 
of the Brigade, also added in early March, was provided by the addition of 1st Regiment, 
Royal Horse Artillery (1 RHA).  
     This unit was, it is true, a scratch formation, but, as we shall see, the units which 
made up the Brigade were by no means inexperienced. The personnel in these units 
were some of the most battle hardened and experienced troops in the Middle East. It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the fighting potential of these units was, if they 
were marshalled correctly, as good, if not better, than any four fighting units in the 
British order of battle. However, the crucial words here are “marshalled correctly” for if 
3AB were to play any significant part in the fighting to come, whenever that might be, 
then these units needed to be assembled, re-equipped and re-organised as soon as 
possible.  
3 HUSSARS 
The normal war establishment of armoured regiments such as 3H ‘specified three tanks 
to the troop. The troop was a subalterns command. He rode in one of the tanks. The 
Squadron was a major’s command and comprised five troops and a Squadron HQ. The 
latter comprised four tanks. Three Squadrons made up a unit’.618
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  Thus on this ratio a 
tank regiment such as 3H would have a war establishment of 57 tanks. However, it 
seems that few regiments at this stage of the war had a full war establishment. The more 
normal establishment appears to have been three Squadrons, each with 15 tanks; these 
would be split into four troops, not the authorised five. Each troop would have three 
tanks, and the HQ troop would also have 3 tanks. The Regimental HQ Squadron would 
typically have 7 tanks giving a normal operating establishment of 52 tanks. The 52-tank 
192 
establishment was, in fact, how 3H and most other tank regiments took to the field in 
1940/41.  
A PASSAGE TO EGYPT  
The 3rd Hussars were not pre-war part of the desert army but were added later as a 
reinforcing unit. With Italy’s entry into the war, in June 1940, the threat to Egypt 
obviously began to grow. Therefore, when Wavell returned to the UK in August and 
explained to the War Cabinet how deficient in armoured units he was, certain additional 
forces were made available to him. Consequently, on 10 August 1940, with the 
agreement of General Dill, and with Eden’s assent, a plan was placed before Churchill 
which included the sending of three extra armoured units to the Middle East.619  These 
additional armoured units were 2 RTR with cruisers, 7 RTR with Matilda tanks, and 3H 
with their Vickers light tanks.620
     Consequently in mid August 1940, 3 H received two pieces of news. Firstly they 
were to get a new commander, Lieut-Colonel W. G. Petherick became their new CO. 
Secondly they were being sent to the Middle East. They ‘sailed from the Mersey on 
August 22, 1940. Five weeks later, by way of the Cape, the convoy safely reached Port 
Said’.
   
621   Once in Egypt the Hussars began a rigorous regime of training and 
acclimatisation to desert conditions. This programme was so successful that within two 
weeks of their arrival in Cairo 3H were ready to move into the desert.622
     However, before 3H commenced active operations an important adjustment to their 
establishment had to be made. Experiences in France had shown that light tanks 
operating alone were vulnerable especially in tank versus tank fighting. Indeed against 
the well organised German armoured units the light British tanks had proved to be 
  
                                                 
619 Lewin, p. 41.  
620 Neillands, p. 48.  
621 Bolitho, p. 250. 
622 ibid 
193 
virtually useless.623  Therefore, in an effort to give 3H ‘additional strength, and to save 
time training a squadron in heavier tanks, ‘B’ Squadron was exchanged with its 
opposite number in the 2nd Royal Tanks, who were equipped with cruisers’.624
     To gain operational experience 3H were sent forward to the Mersa Matruh area 
where they operated against Italian columns. ‘They drew first blood, and suffered their 
first casualties – one officer and one man killed – in two actions in November’.
  Now 
equipped with Regimental HQ, 7 light tanks, and two light Squadrons ‘A’ and ‘C’ each 
with 15 light tanks, and one heavy Squadron ‘B’ composed of 15 cruiser tanks, the 52 
tanks of 3H began active operations against the Italians.  
625
CHRISTMAS 1940 
   
When the British offensive against the Italians, Operation Compass, began on 9 
December 3H were with the forward troops.  
After participating prominently in many of the early clashes with the Italians 3H 
gratefully accepted the rest that the lull in the fighting, caused by the replacement of 
divisions, had given them. Christmas found the men of 3H occupying dugouts and tents 
on one side of the El Adem road near Sidi Azeiz aerodrome opposite Tobruk. Roy 
Farran, a 3H lieutenant, reports that their ‘Christmas dinner was bully beef and salty 
water, but the Colonel authorised a special issue of rum’.626  This rather meagre ration 
was all the harder to take when they heard on the BBC evening news that all the troops 
in the Western Desert were having Turkey for their Christmas dinner.627
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  Consequently 
in an effort to improve their rations, Farran, as he was temporally without a tank, was 
ordered by his commanding officer to see if he could scrounge some better food for the 
troops. He makes the following observations on his efforts: ‘my first visit was to the 
624 Bolitho, p. 250. 
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Service Corps dump at Sollum, where I successfully looted two crates of oranges. I was 
astonished to see the large quantities of various rations in the dump, which somehow 
never seemed to get to the forward troops’.628
     Little did Farran know that the primary reason why rations and other stores were not 
getting to the forward troops was because of his Commander-in-Chief’s exchange of 
units’ order. This order had stripped the desert bare of trucks. There was, in reality, 
plenty of food and other supplies strewn across the desert but nothing to transport them 
to the front. As Farran further confirms when on his next foray he visited the fort at Sidi 
Omar where again he found, as he puts it, “valuable treasure”.
   
629  Nonetheless, despite 
their lack of rations, the Hussars continued with the advance right up to the battle of 
Beda Fomm. Once the battle was over 7AD and 3H were initially kept busy in the Beda 
Fomm area salvaging equipment and burying the dead. To assist in this endeavour two 
Light Recovery Sections were moved up and the Divisional Workshops were opened 
five miles south of Benghazi.630
     Towards the end of February, when 7AD began returning to Egypt, 3H were not 
included in the move. They were to be left behind with all their light tanks.
    
631  In an 
effort to make themselves more comfortable they established a makeshift camp in the 
hills near Agedabia just off the coastal road. Benghazi was north of their base about one 
hundred miles to their rear. The battlefield of Beda Fomm also lay to their north about 
forty miles from their base. The village of Mersa el Brega was situated about thirty 
miles to their south. On 9 February the war diary of 3H informs us that they had 
recovered from Beda Fomm ‘war materials consisting of vehicles, cars, diesel water 
wagons, petrol carriers and supplies of wine and food’.632
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     There now, theoretically, and in some cases in reality, commenced a period of peace 
and plenty, at least in regard to food, wine, clothing and vehicles. The contents of the 
ten-mile long Italian column and their own supply echelon had now provided an 
abundance of the necessities of life. The RAOC ‘established a series of Field Supply 
Depots at Mechili and Msus on the inland route and Tecnis (north-east of Benghazi) and 
El Magrum (south of Benghazi) on the coast road’.633  As for taking plunder from the 
Italian column this also continued. The 3H war diary, on 16 February, jubilantly 
declares that ‘numerous small lorries, Harrods delivery vans so-called, small Italian Fiat 
Togs, diesel lorries, for petrol loads etc, were all collected and transport made more or 
less up to strength, with Italian vehicles’.634
     However, it seems that not everybody in 3H benefited from the fruits of victory. Nor, 
it seems, was the lull in the fighting used by Colonel Petherick to bring 3H back to the 
peak of fighting efficiency. Instead of using the break in the fighting, however long it 
might last; to bring the tanks of his regiment back to full fighting ability, Colonel 
Petherick allowed resources to be wasted and men to leave the Regimental area. 
Lieutenant Heseltine, for example, acquired one of the Italian cars abandoned at Beda 
Fomm and drove it with some fellow officers all the way back to Cairo. Heseltine 
recalls that as they ‘drove into Cairo he remembered that they had just clocked up the 
thousand miles as they crossed the Kasr-el-Nil Bridge’.
   Moreover, a bus borrowed from the Italian 
column was run daily into Benghazi, which enabled the Regiment for the first time in 
three months, to eat fresh meat and vegetables on a regular basis.  
635
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  This was 1,000 unnecessary 
miles. The journey to and from the battlefield and his time in Cairo kept this valuable 
officer away from his unit for over two weeks.        
634 3 Hussars 169/1385  
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     Nor it seems were Colonel Petherick and Lieutenant Heseltine the only officers who 
seemed to be not taking the war very seriously. On his way back to his unit Heseltine 
stayed the night in Barce at the Hotel Moderna. Also staying at the hotel was none other 
than the commander of all British forces in Cyrenaica General ‘Jumbo’ Wilson. 
Heseltine recalls that General Wilson enjoyed his stay enormously. ‘In the evening the 
Italian staff put on a cabaret for him. One act, rather doubtful and suggestive, was a pas 
de deux danced by a great big fat chef and a tiny waiter. Before it was finished, up 
jumps Jumbo and, grabbing the waiter, danced around in a similar fashion to great 
applause from all of us’.636
     It seems that while some soldiers were able to take advantage of the spoils of war 
others were not so lucky. Despite the glut of supplies found in the abandoned Italian 
column at Beda Fomm and the stores brought forward by the British transport columns 
and the luxury to be found in nearby captured towns such as Barce and Benghazi men 
still went short of vital necessities. Heseltine back from his leave in Cairo describes the 
state of his men at this time thus; ‘this was the time when we thought of ourselves as the 
forgotten army. Rations were monotonous and meagre. The issue of one orange per man 
after about two months was an event. Nothing fresh seemed to reach the forward troops 
and the lack of vegetables and fruit gradually told on us in the form of jaundice’.
       
637
     Perhaps, had officers such as Lieutenant Heseltine not been allowed to go on leave 
and had instead used some of the captured transport they had acquired to bring fresh 
foodstuffs to their men then the jaundice they contracted might not have occurred. Had 
Colonel Petherick not granted unrestricted leave to his officers then they might have 
been able to rectify some of the many deficiencies in their battered tanks and 
equipment. Moreover, had General Wilson, perhaps, spent more time reorganising his 
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dispersed formations, and less time dancing with waiters in luxury hotels, then, when 
the Germans did attack, units like 3AB might have been in a fit state to resist them. 
WHERE HAVE ALL THE TANKS GONE 
While the patchy state of supply, in regard to sustenance seems to have varied 
throughout the unit, the supply of light tanks, suddenly, on 21 February, became 
plentiful. The war diary of 3H records that; ‘Regiment have light tanks showered on 
them by 7H and 6 RTR638 total at end of take over 63. Technical Adjutant spent 4 days 
going round choosing best only 46 were passed as possibles instead of 54 of 
establishment’.639
     Therefore, if we take the TAs assessment as accurate then it does not seem 
unreasonable to speculate that with the light and cruiser tanks that 3H already held they 
would be brought up to full establishment, 52 battle worthy tanks, by early March.  
This, unfortunately, did not happen. On 14 March, for example, several weeks after the 
TA said he could get 46 tanks operational, the Regiment had only 32 tanks available, 4 
in HQ, 11 in ‘C’ Squadron, 10 in ‘B’ Squadron and 8 in ‘A’ Squadron and 1 not issued.  
On 20 March, the situation was even worse with the war diary telling us that 3H had 
only 30 tanks available. This low tally of available tanks did not improve as March 
progressed.  On the eve of battle, 31 March, Woollcombe has it that 3H had 29 light 
tanks but fails to mention any cruiser tanks and gives no indication of how many of the 
  Along with the tanks, and probably more valuable to the Technical 
Adjutant, (TA) 3H where also gifted all the spares that the other regiments held as well. 
With these spares the TA gave it that in his opinion it would take two weeks to get the 
46 possibles up to scratch.  
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handover 2 RTR tanks.  
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lights were serviceable.640  Raugh informs us that 3H had 35 light tanks but again like 
Woollcombe fails to mention how many were serviceable or if any cruisers were 
available.641
     It is therefore virtually impossible to give a definitive tally of how many operational 
tanks 3H had at the time of the German attack but it seems to have been around 30 
lights and perhaps 10 less than perfect Italian cruisers. So, the question might fairly be 
asked, why, when the need for armoured units was so acute, and the means to re-equip 
this unit were at hand, was 3H not brought back up to strength in time to meet the 
German attack?  
   
     The cause of the pitiful state of 3H when the Germans attacked seems to have 
stemmed from three separate self inflicted wounds. Two of these wounds we shall 
review in detail here; these are the organisational structure of the Regimen and its 
operational use. The third wound, that is the decision to try and equip part of the 
Regiment with Italian cruiser tanks, we shall review later.          
     The first problem in getting this unit battle worthy was organisational. When 
operations came to an end in mid February it was decided that the establishment of 3H 
should remain as it had been throughout Compass.  HQ squadron would have 7 light 
tanks; two squadrons would also have light tanks, 15 in each squadron, and one 
squadron of 15 cruiser tanks, 52 tanks in total. However, this decision instantly caused 
3H a problem. It will be remembered that it had been decided to return all the British 
cruisers of 7AD back to the Delta for maintenance. As the existing cruiser squadron 
serving with 3H had been originally borrowed from 2 RTR, and 2 RTR were now 
returning with the rest of 7AD to the Delta, this would mean that 3H would lose its 15 
strong cruiser squadron.642
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     On 11 February orders were received by 2 RTR informing them that the light tanks 
they had received from 3H were to be returned to them and that they were to receive 
back from 3H their ‘B’ Squadron personnel and their cruisers. When this exchange was 
completed 2 RTR were told, on 16 February, that they should now hand their five 
remaining fully fit cruisers with all the remaining ammunition back to 3H and hand in 
their fifteen cruisers which needed overhaul to the Divisional Workshops near 
Benghazi. Once this hand over was complete 2 RTR, minus its tanks, was to make its 
way to Tobruk for embarkation back to the Delta.643
    However, on 19 February these orders were suddenly changed and the five fit tanks 
going to 3H were also dispatched to Divisional Workshops. On 20 March all the 
remaining ammunition with the Regiment was ordered to be handed into the Advanced 
Ordinance Depot at Benghazi. On 21 February all captured lorries and guns were 
disposed of at the dump for captured war materials near Beda Fomm. On 22 February 2 
RTR moved off for Tobruk which they reached on 24 February.
  
644  The 2 RTR tanks, 
which had been left at Div Workshops along with several tanks from 1 RTR and some 
Bren Gun Carriers from 2 RB and 1 KRRC, were driven by road to Tobruk where they 
arrived on 26/27 February.645
     Why 15 of the cruisers could not have been reallocated to 3H instead of being sent 
back to the Delta is unclear. As mentioned by the war diarist of 2 RTR at least 5 cruisers 
were completely fit for service and many others we know were runners as they made the 
journey back to Tobruk on their own tracks. Moreover, there was little room for these 
  Once the personnel of 2 RTR arrived in Tobruk the 
Regiment less heavy equipment, vehicles and tanks embarked for the Delta. Over the 
next few days most of the armoured vehicles in Tobruk were also evacuated back to the 
Delta. Thus there were now no cruiser tanks in the forward areas.   
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returning tanks as all the workshops in the Delta were already full to bursting with 
hundreds of tanks needing repair. This being the case it would have seemed logical to 
have left the 5 fully fit cruisers and 10 of the best runners with 3H, at least until there 
was space in the workshops for them.  
     However, logic seems to have been ignored and all the British cruisers were 
removed. With the cruisers gone the fitters of 3H now started salvaging the best of the 
light tanks they had been given and servicing those they already held.  The amount of 
work alluded to by the TA of 3H; to bring the light tanks given to the Regiment back up 
to fighting standard on 21 February was, it will be remembered, two weeks.646
     The decision to remove the British cruisers had a debilitating effect on 3H far greater 
than the loss of 15 tanks out of 52 might suggest. As mentioned armoured regiments 
composed exclusively of light tanks were practically worthless. Without tanks armed 
with an armour piercing gun accompanying them they were easy pray for enemy armour 
and artillery. This had been proved in France in 1940 and was still the case in the desert 
in 1941. Therefore without a cruiser squadron the fighting ability of 3H was seriously 
compromised.   
  This 
indicates a lot of workshop time and resources. Nonetheless, this level of resource, both 
workshop space and spares, must have been available at the time of the assessment 
otherwise the TA would have given a different time scale for getting the 46 tanks he felt 
recoverable back into action. Although why he felt the need to get as many as 46 
operational is a mystery as he must have known 3H only had crews available for 37 
light tanks (as 15 crews were being assigned to the Italian cruiser tanks).  
     The second reason for 3H not being fully operational was the cavalier way in which 
the remaining light tanks were used. The departure of the British cruisers meant that in 
theory the fitters of 3H now only had one type of tank to work on. Consequently it 
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might be expected that this work would progress quickly. Unfortunately this proved not 
to be the case. Instead of allowing the fitters to work on the light tanks, and thereby 
conserving engine and track life, the crews of 3H tanks were given pointless patrolling 
tasks. ‘Although Colonel Petherick protested that his tanks were capable of only another 
500 miles, the 3rd Hussars were required to waste at least sixty miles each day in getting 
to and from their patrol positions’.647
     For some unknown reason those above Petherick, probably Rimington, ordered him 
to send patrols down from his base near Agedabia 30 miles to the British forward 
positions at Mersa el Brega.
   
648  This was a futile and wasteful use of the remaining track 
and engine life left in the light tanks.  Moreover, while they were away from base vital 
maintenance, which was so sorely needed, could not be undertaken. Why this patrolling 
should have even been deemed necessary at all is a mystery. The armoured cars of the 
KDG already covered the forward areas.649
6 ROYAL TANK REGIMENT 
  Furthermore, there were plenty of other 
more suitable units available such as the Free French Marine Battalion and several 
Australian anti-tank and infantry units in the area. Any of these units could have 
satisfied the patrol function and some of them, as mentioned, were already doing so.  
The 6 RTR was already in Egypt when war was declared and because of its training 
under the supervision of Hobo was exceptionally well versed in desert operations. They 
were originally part of 7AD and were at the start of Operation Compass equipped with a 
mix of A9/A10 cruisers and some of the ubiquitous Vickers Lights. 6 RTR were, 
however, not at the start of the campaign a complete regiment of HQ and three 
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Squadrons. Part of their ‘B’ Squadron had been detached and sent to the Sudan before 
Compass started.650
     The main body of 6 RTR, however, remained with 7AD and were in the starting line 
up for Operation Compass. They fought, more or less continually, throughout the early 
stages of the campaign.  By 18 January the main body of 6 RTR, badly worn from 
travelling almost 500 miles from their start point in Egypt and doing some hard fighting 
along the way, had reached El Adem airfield outside Tobruk. They fully expected to be 
used in the imminent attack on Tobruk but were suddenly, and unexpectedly, taken out 
of the line. They were then ordered to hand over all their remaining tanks and some of 
their trucks to various units and return to the Delta.
  
651
     By late January they were hors de combat back in Cairo. They now spent the next 
few weeks doing guard duties and attending training courses. However, their leave in 
Cairo abruptly came to an end in mid February. The war diary records that on 19 
February the first inkling of move into the Desert was received. By early evening of the 
19th the initial alert was confirmed. Men were recalled from leave and the Regiment less 
most of it vehicles and equipment was ordered to Tobruk.
  
652
     The men of 6 RTR were being recalled to the desert. They went first by ship to 
Tobruk and then in borrowed trucks, back to where they had started, to El Adem 
airfield, on 23 February. At El Adem they were informed that they were to be re-
equipped and made part of the newly forming 3AB. Their new tanks; they were told, 
would be Italian M11/13s, which 2 RTR and 3H had captured at Beda Fomm. They 
would, in due course, collect their new mounts from the battlefield at Beda Fomm.
 
653
     Their re-equipment with Italian tanks started on 27 February when the personnel of 
‘A’ Squadron, the Light Aid Detachment, some selected tank drivers and the Signal 
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Troop; set off for Beda Fomm. They took with them rations for 7 days and petrol for 
400 miles.654
     They now spent the next six days trying to get some of the dilapidated Italian tanks 
into some kind of working condition. After much effort they managed to get 15 tanks 
serviceable, to a degree, and on 18 March attempted to take them down to 3H who, as 
mentioned, were leaguered some forty miles away near Agedabia. The intention was to 
make ‘A’ Squadron of 6 RTR the cruiser Squadron of 3H and ‘B’ Squadron of 3H the 
light Squadron of 6 RTR.  
  While ‘A’ Squadron made its way to Beda Fomm, the rest of the 
Regiment spent their time either organising transport or amusing themselves by 
removing M11/13s from the Tobruk defences and dismantling them. By 1 March ‘B’ 
Squadron were also ready to move up to Beda Fomm. They arrive at their new base 
about 6 miles from Beda Fomm on 4 March. On 12 March HQ Squadron and ‘C’ 
Squadron also arrived at the makeshift base. The Regiment was now mostly complete in 
squadron manpower and wheeled vehicles and had their pick of the abandoned Italian 
tanks. 
     These moves it was hoped would give both Regiments a mix of light and cruiser 
tanks. The Italian tanks, however, soon began to give trouble. The war diary of 6 RTR 
notes that ‘A’ Squadron managed to travel only about 30 miles on 18 March and 
leaguered for the night about 8 miles south of Agedabia. ‘A certain amount of trouble 
was experienced en route with the tanks from overheating and they were found to be 
very much slower than expected when on a long march. Steering on the road was also 
difficult’.655
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  This was a portent of the trouble these tanks would bring both units in the 
weeks to come. 
655 ibid 
204 
5 ROYAL TANK REGIMENT  
The 5th Royal Tank Regiment (5 RTR) arrived in the Middle East, along with its sister 
regiment 3 RTR, at the end of December 1940 and the tanks of both units then spent 
several weeks in workshops being made desert worthy before being deployed. However, 
before deployment could commence, in mid January, unusual orders arrived at the HQs 
of both 5 RTR and 3 RTR, which directed them to swap some of their tanks. Before 
they had left the UK both units had been equipped with an assortment of A9, A10 and 
A13 cruiser tanks. Now, suddenly, 3 RTR was ordered to give over to 5 RTR all their 
A13s and receive from 5 RTR as many A9/10s as were required to make up their losses.  
     With the transfer of tanks complete, on 2 February, 5 RTR now equipped mostly 
with A13 tanks left Amirya for Mersa Matruh by train. The train journey according to 
Jake Wardrop one of 5 RTRs drivers took about two days and on detraining they drove 
about forty miles down the Siwa track to a place some romancer had called ‘Charring 
Cross. At this place they stopped for two days then the big trek was on. We drove in 
easy stages to the El Adem aerodrome, which is just south of Tobruk’.656
     The 5 RTR now settled down, quite unexpectedly, to a period of quite prolonged 
inaction. The purpose of their move to El Adem was to bring them into the desert with a 
view to them replacing or reinforcing the advance units of 7AD which were by this time 
very short of tanks.
   They arrived, 
according to the war diary, at their leaguer area, which was, in fact, 13 miles west of El 
Adem airfield, on 6 February.     
657
                                                 
656 George Forty, Tanks Across the Desert: The War Diary of Jake Wardrop (London: William Kimber, 
1981) p. 42. 
  However, with the elimination of the Italian Army at Beda 
Fomm, on 7 February, the original urgent need for their services had temporarily 
disappeared. It might be recalled that at the conclusion of the battle of Beda Fomm no 
clear decision had been made as to whether the British should press on to Tripoli. 
657 War Diary 5 RTR WO 169/1414 
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Therefore, Drew’s men waited at El Adem for orders uncertain of their future 
deployment.  
     On 17 February, the day Gambier-Parry took command of 2AD, the war diary 
records that the ‘Brigadier [Rimington] returned from Corps HQ and gave verbal 
instructions about the formation of a Brigade Group including all Brigade services but 
without 5 RTR. 5 RTR to remain in El Adem area until receiving orders to move back 
to Egypt’.658  Between their arrival at El Adam on 6 February and 17 February when it 
looked as though they were going to be returned to Egypt it seems that no one in 
authority had decided what to do with 5 RTR.  However, with the confirmation that 
German troops had landed in Libya orders were quickly changed, for the time being 5 
RTR were staying at El Adem. Wilson, in Press on Regardless, has this to say about 
events now unfolding at El Adem. ‘At the end of February, (it was, in fact, 23 February, 
that 6 RTR arrived at El Adem) the 6th Battalion without tanks’ came, without 
explanation, under command of The Fifth, as did 1 RHA’.659
     The men of 5 RTR, with the departure of 6 RTR for Beda Fomm, now settled down, 
some 400 miles behind Brega, to a life of relaxed inactivity at their base near El Adem. 
Despite the growing evidence that the Germans were almost daily unloading troops and 
tanks in Tripoli ‘The Fifth continued at El Adem, taking advantage of the Australians’ 
generosity – especially with beer – and in Jake’s case, doing a lot of walking, trading 
WD-issue tea ration for eggs ‘with the wogs’, playing football and reading GONE 
WITH THE WIND. Before they left El Adem, the men were sunbathing’.
   
660
     This idyllic life continued for most of 5 RTR until mid March when at last it was 
decided to fully incorporate 5 RTR into 3AB and the first squadron was moved forward. 
The war diary tells us that ‘A’ Squadron, with 16 tanks, left El Adam for Agedabia on 
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12 March. On 16 March the Squadron had on strength, 11 A13 and 2 A10 tanks three 
A13s had by this time broken down on the march.661
1st REGIMENT ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY 
  On 17 March the war diary 
confirms that the 13 remaining tanks of ‘A’ Squadron finally leaguered for the night 
near Agedabia the first 5 RTR tank unit to arrive in the forward area.  
While the tanks of 3AB were virtually useless there was certainly more fighting ability 
in their artillery support.662
A
  The Brigade had been allocated a very experienced artillery 
regiment; 1st Regiment Royal Horse Artillery (1 RHA). On the outbreak of WWII 1 
RHA was already a fully mechanised artillery regiment. They were equipped with a full 
compliment of vehicles and 16 x 25 pdr guns. The unit consisted of two eight gun 
batteries /E (Chestnut Troop) and B/O. 1 RHA were initially assigned to the 1st 
Support Group of 1st Armoured Division. They were ultimately unable to take up this 
role as the armoured division was not ready for deployment therefore the Regiment, less 
A/E battery, joined 51st Highland Division. The two elements of the Regiment then 
deployed, in April 1940, to the Saar Front in the French Sector. In June 1940, most of 
the personnel of B/O Battery, after severe fighting, were captured at St Valery. A/E 
Battery, although heavily engaged like B/O Battery, managed to get out at Dunkirk.  
     Once back in the UK the Regiment reformed in North Wales around the survivors of 
A/E Battery and other members of the Regiment who had managed to escape from 
France. ‘After some strenuous reorganisation and retraining the loss of ‘B’/’O’ at St 
Valery was repaired by converting ‘E’ Troop to ‘B’/’O’ so that its trained horse 
artillerymen would act as a cadre for the new battery and the Chestnut Troop was 
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expanded to produce a new ‘E’’.663
THE 2nd SUPPORT GROUP 
  By October 1940 1 RHA were back up to strength 
and were sent to Egypt. Once in the Middle East the Regiment came under the 
command of the 7th Armoured Division and took part in Operation Compass. At the 
conclusion of Compass the Regiment was transferred to 3AB and joined 5 RTR at El 
Adem in mid March 1941 moving with them up to the front at Brega in late March. 
The other brigade of 2AD was its Support Group Brigade (2SG). Brigadier H. B. 
Latham commanded this brigade which would eventually, as we shall see later, be sent 
to occupy the Brega defensive positions.664  The Support Group was composed of a 
single infantry battalion, The 9th Battalion the Rifle Brigade (9RB) also known as The 
Tower Hamlet Rifles.665
9th BATTALION THE RILE BRIGADE 
  They were reinforced by a company of machine gunners from 
The 1st Battalion the Northumberland Fusiliers (1NF). Their artillery support was 
provided by 104th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (104 RHA) with sixteen 25-pdr gun 
howitzers and ‘J’ Troop of 3rd Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (3 RHA) with a mix of 
2-pdr and 37mm Bofors anti-tank guns, twelve guns in all.  There were just two anti-
aircraft guns to defend the Brigade from air attack but they did have a complete field 
ambulance unit. In front of 9RB were the armoured cars of 1 KDG with an 
accompanying troop of anti-tank guns, four 2-pdr anti-tank guns (mounted portee).  
The 9th Battalion the Rifle Brigade is unusual in that it has an alternative name (1st 
Battalion the Tower Hamlets Rifles) this can sometimes be misleading as in some 
accounts it is referred to by one name and in others by its alternative name; however, in 
this work 9RB will be used to denote this unit from this point forward. 9RB was, as 
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mentioned, a territorial battalion raised in the East End of London. They were, however, 
by no means a poor quality unit. The young men who made up this battalion were in the 
main the product of the harsh east London environment. They were tough, resourceful 
and used to privation. Moreover, they were highly motivated, their families and loved 
ones were nightly being subjected to the Blitz and they yearned for revenge.  
     The whole battalion left London in the 28,000 ton P&O liner the Duchess of Atholl 
under the command of Lt Colonel Shipton. They landed at Port Said Egypt on 31 
December 1940. The Battalion was described by one of its number as ‘a newly and well 
trained unit with brand new equipment’.666  The Battalion spent the next 5 weeks in the 
Delta preparing for active duty before being deployed to the desert. When they did 
finally get out into the desert they were given the rather mundane task of policing an 
area around Cyrene in the Jebel of Cyrenaica. This work continued for about two weeks 
until they moved to Benghazi to carry out a similar role in that area.667
MACHINE GUNNERS PAR EXCELLENCE: 1st NORTHUMBERLAND 
FUSILIERS  
  Mid March 
found 9RB, not stood on the ramparts at Brega, as perhaps it should have been, in view 
of the well recognised build up of German forces, but on the streets of Benghazi. They 
were still trying to keep the peace between Arab and Italian civilians.  
The 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers (INF) was a Medium Machinegun Battalion 
which had been involved in all the major engagements of Operation Compass. They 
were organised on a RHQ and four company basis ‘W’, ‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ each with 
twelve 0.303 Vickers medium machineguns. The Vickers medium machinegun was 
another remarkable British weapon. The Vickers had been developed before WWI and 
was adopted by the British Army in 1912 and remained in front line service until the 
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1960s. The early models, the types used by 1NF in 1940/41, could fire 450 rounds per 
minuet over 2,200 yards.668
     In early February [probably 8/9] after a few days at Soluch, which is west of 
Benghazi, 1NFs moved to Benghazi where they took up residence in the newly built 
Duke of Aosta Barracks. The bulk of the Battalion was given the task of guarding 
Italian P.O.W.s and arranging for their movement back to camps in the Delta.  
    
     While most of the Battalion was employed in this role one company was sent to the 
forward areas.  This was ‘Y’ Coy under the command of Captain R. F. B. Hensman.669  
Their orders were to give the Support Group of 7AD, which was at the time garrisoning 
positions in the forwards areas, some heavy machine gun fire support.670  Hensman and 
his men were ordered ‘to hold a defensive position on a ridge astride the Tripoli 
Benghazi road in the area of the village of Mersa Brega’.671  The men of ‘Y’ Coy now 
settled into their various positions.  They were mostly deployed on the south side of the 
road. The almost flat terrain was perfect machine gun country.672
     The 1NFs association with the Support Group of 7AD lasted until the latter were 
withdrawn in mid February 1941. Thereafter the 7ADs Support Group infantry units 
were replaced by a succession of Australian infantry battalions from 9AID. This 
continued throughout February and up to late March when, as we shall see, 2ADs 
Support Group, consisting almost exclusively of 9RB, arrived to replace the 
Australians.
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ANTI-TANK GUNNERS: 3rd REGIMENT, ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY 
The anti-tank gun element of Neame’s forces at Brega was provided in the main by the 
3 RHA. This unit was another British formation already in Egypt when war broke out.     
When 3 RHA took to the field in 1940 they were equipped with two models of anti-tank 
gun the British 2-pdr and the Swedish designed 37mm L45 Bofors. The British 2-pdr 
AT gun was a pre-war Vickers design and was consequently extremely well made and 
reliable. The 2-pdr was ‘in its day as good as, if not better, than any contemporary 
design, but the rapid increase in tank armour thickness during the late 1930s rendered it 
obsolete just at a time when it was being placed into widespread service’.674
     Its major fault, and one which was destined to render the gun almost obsolete by the 
time it was needed for mobile operations in the Western Desert, was its range. The 
maximum effective range was 600 yards; however, to stand much chance of delivering 
an effective hit 500 yards or less was desirable; at this range the gun could penetrate 53 
mm of armour. This armour piercing capability was by later standards virtually useless 
but in 1940/41 was just acceptable and could still disable if not knock out all German 
tanks and armoured cars sent to Libya. The German heavy armoured cars, for example, 
the SdKfz 231,232 and 234 series, only had 15 mm of armour.
  Although 
heavier than most of its contemporise, which made it slightly slower to deploy, it was 
very accurate, had a low profile and had a phenomenal rate of fire, 22 rounds per 
minuet, all of which made it popular with its crews. 
675  The German tanks 
had armour as follows, the Mark I A, 13 mm,  Mk 11 C, 30 mm, Mk 111, J/G 50/60 mm 
and Mk 1V 50/60 mm.676
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  As can be seen therefore all tanks sent to Libya in early 1941, 
were, in fact, vulnerable to some extent to the armour piercing shells of the 2-pdr.   
675 Forty, Armies of Rommel,  p. 102.  
676 Kenneth Macksey, The Guinness Book of Tank Facts & Feats (London: Guinness Superlatives Ltd, 
1972) pp. 221/222.   
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     Unfortunately, the need to be less than 600 yards away from its potential target 
placed the gun and its crew well within the range of most of the enemy’s machine guns. 
Therefore to give the gun and its crew any chance of survival and enable them to 
effectively engage their targets before they were destroyed the guns had to be well dug 
in. When this requirement was met then the 2-pdr AT gun could, even against the tanks 
being used in 1941, still be a viable weapon.  
     The other anti-tank gun in British service at this time was the Swedish designed 
37mm L45 Bofors (QF in British service) AT gun. These guns had not originally been 
intended to equip British anti-tank gun units but when many 2-pdr guns were lost in 
France and consequently all new production was needed to reequip returning units to 
the UK, few were available to reequip units in Egypt.  Therefore in an effort to find 
anything that could be used to equip units like 3 RHA the Ordnance Corps cast around 
for weapons which were available from sources closer to home.677
     The performance of the 37 mm Bofors was not significantly less than that of the 2-
pdr. The gun was also well made and much lighter than the 2-pdr, consequently it was 
also popular with its crews. As with the 2-pdr its effective range was only about 500 
yards. This again put the gun at a distinct disadvantage as it was obviously vulnerable 
from the small arms fire likely to be directed at it from its adversary the tank. Therefore 
some method had to be found to get the gun in and out of action fast.  This requirement 
was met by carrying the gun on the back of a vehicle portee. The gun crew would stay 
well out of range waiting their opportunity to rush in and get off a few rounds; the rate 
of fire was 10-12 RPM, before retiring again out of range. Again as with the 2-pdr, 
  As it happened the 
Sudanese Government had bought a number of 37mm L45 Bofors AT guns before the 
war and these were purchased by the Ordnance Corps in Egypt and some of them were 
issued to 3 RHA.     
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although not as effective as the later really powerful anti-tank guns eventually used by 
both sides in the desert, the Bofors portee was, if used in the right circumstances, a 
useful weapon.  Moreover, in contrast to the 2-pdr the 37 mm Bofors could also fire HE 
and Incendiary (filled with White phosphorus) rounds.     
     3 RHA was in action throughout most of Operation Compass and all four batteries 
were either at Beda Fomm or near the battlefield when the Italians surrendered. ‘J’ 
Battery was with the Australians on the coast road advancing on Benghazi and the other 
three batteries were with various elements of 7AD. ‘As ‘J’ Battery was about to enter 
Benghazi proper the armoured battle developed at Beda Fomm, so ‘J’ Battery raced 
south to join ‘D’ and ‘M’ Batteries in battle. However, it found the battle had already 
been well and truly won before it arrived’.678
     With the conclusion of fighting and the capture of most of the Italian Army in 
Cyrenaica 3 RHA like so many other units headed back to the Delta.  ‘Ten days or so 
after the conclusion of the Beda Fomm battle the Regiment began its long 1000-mile 
march back to the Delta. For the first time in well over a year it was reunited at Beni 
Yusif Camp, just to the south of Cairo, on the 1st of March 1941’.
   
679
104th REGIMENT ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY 
  The Regiment 
now commenced a period of rest and reorganisation in Cairo which would last until mid 
March.  
The 104th Regiment Royal Horse Artillery (Essex Yeomanry) (104 RHA) were 
mobilised on 1 September, 1939.  The Regiment was composed of two Batteries each 
equipped with 8 x 25 pdrs pulled by a team of horses. The British ‘25-pdr was a 
remarkable weapon with a number of exceptional features. It could be emplaced in one 
minute, had a lightweight firing platform which allowed rapid all round traverse (a 
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valuable asset when fighting tanks) and replaceable tube liners that could be quickly 
changed in the field’.680  In October 1940 the Regiment arrived in the Middle East, still 
with their horses, as part of the 1st Cavalry Division. Their brief stay in Cairo was by all 
accounts a happy time, George Crookenden, one of their officers, recalls that the unit 
‘was nicknamed “Groppi’s Horse” from the time and money spent by the officers at 
Café Groppi in Cairo’s Kasr el Nil Street’.681
     In late 1940 the Regiment was converted from horse to vehicles. In January 1941, 
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Todhunter, they left Cairo and moved 
into the Western Desert. They were at this time assigned to support 7AD who in their 
turn were supporting 6 AID in their attack on Bardia. The attack was successful and the 
men of 104 RHA took full advantage of the spoils of war.  They had earlier relinquished 
some of their transport, 20 30 cwts and 3 3 ton lorries, to Divisional H.Q., who like 
most other elements of 7AD were now short of transport.  The taking of Bardia 
radically changed the fortunes of 104 RHA especially in regard to transport. Their stay 
in Bardia lasted until mid January and they took full advantage of their time in the town. 
The war diary informs us that on 7 January after a frantic search for any captured 
vehicles which would go they found enough to make good all their deficiencies.
  
682
     This was a time of plenty for 104 RHA and many other units involved in this stage 
of the fighting. Gunner L. E. Tutt serving in 414 Battery of 104 RHA recalled that they 
could now enjoy a brandy after their evening meal and smoke a long black cheroot. 
They fitted themselves out ‘with soft blankets and warm pullovers and got rid of their 
ammunition boots in favour of the soft, untanned leather ones favoured by their foes’.
  
683
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B.B.C. in London.  They also acquired many Fiat and Lancia heavy trucks which they 
used to carry ammunition and tow guns if their quad gun tractors were put out of action. 
Tutt continues; ‘because of our looted Fiats and Lancias we were able to acquire even 
more food and drink. The shear bulk of materials, weapons, ammunition, vehicles and 
fuel was beyond belief’.684
     The unit now made up to more than full establishment in vehicles, and stocked up 
with supplies of every kind, soon moved on to its next mission the attack on Tobruk. 
Tutt remarks of this new move; ‘just when we reach the stage where we could not 
squeeze any more booty on to our vehicles we were ordered to move forward to support 
the infantry preparing to attack Tobruk’.
  
685
     The 104 RHA took part in the capture of Tobruk, their guns assisting the Australians 
to take the town on 22 January. The successful completion of this engagement rewarded 
the 104th with another haul of booty. 
    
686  The war diary tells us that on 23 January they 
were again fortunate to ‘find in their immediate neighbourhood a number of sound 
vehicles some diesel, but some petrol too. The C.O. took a heavy lorry to Tobruk and 
obtained certain foods stores for the men such as fresh frozen meat and tinned foods, 
sugar, chocolate etc.687
     With the surrender of the Italians at Beda Fomm 104 RHA settled down, like so 
many other units at this time, to a period of inactivity, presumably uncertain whether 
they were to go on to Tripoli or be sent back to the Delta. It was not to be until mid 
February that their uncertainty would be over when they were ordered back to the Delta. 
By 26 February they had reached Mersa Matruh and were no doubt thinking about the 
fun they would soon be having in Café Groppi when suddenly orders were received 
which put a break on their plans. The war diary continues; ‘at Matruh received orders to 
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return to Benghazi. We shall have to retrace our steps over more than 600 miles’.688
CREDITABLE INTELLIGENCE  
  
They were informed that they would now be the artillery component of 2nd Armoured 
Divisions Support Group. Throughout late February and early March 104 RHA made 
their way slowly back to Benghazi to join 9RB. It should perhaps be noted here that 
they drove back to Benghazi, which by the time they got there entailed a voyage of over 
1,200 miles, in trucks, that were according to Wavell, so worn that they could not go 
400 miles to Tripoli. 
In the Western Desert although the forces in the forward areas had no direct knowledge 
of the intelligence breakthroughs in Cairo and the UK, which as we have seen 
confirmed without doubt that attack was imminent, they did have tangible evidence that 
the Germans were on the move east. The first of the forward troops to have concerns 
about enemy activity on their front were the KDGs, who, as mentioned, had already 
clashed with German forces. The next allied unit to have concerns about enemy activity 
on their front were the Australians. ‘The 6th Australian Division had not yet been 
withdrawn for Greece, and the divisional commander, who was the officer responsible 
for the forward area, on 28 February, felt it necessary to issue a warning on the 
possibility of an attack’.689
     By early March Wavell also knew that the Germans were on the move east and that 
there was strong evidence to suggest that they would soon embark on a full scale 
offensive against his troops defending Cyrenaica. On 2 March, with unequivocal 
evidence of growing enemy activity on his Cyrenaican front, Wavell at last found time 
to give his response to Churchill’s concerns expressed in his 27 February cable. Wavell 
   The Australian commanders need to be concerned was 
confirmed a few days later when the KDGs were again attacked. 
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confirmed his knowledge that both the Germans and the Italians were reinforcing their 
forces in Libya and that they were moving east.  Wavell confided to Churchill thus: 
‘latest information indicates recent reinforcements to Tripolitania comprise two Italian 
infantry divisions, two Italian motorised artillery regiments, and German armoured 
troops estimated at maximum of one armoured brigade group’.690
     Moreover, in the same cable Wavell acknowledged what his air reconnaissance had 
told him earlier that there was a huge increase in the amount of enemy transport heading 
east on the Via Balbia.
   It must also be noted 
that all this reinforcement was on top of the still considerable amount of Italian troops 
already in Libya. These Italian troops had, since the defeat at Beda Fomm, been sent 
substantial amounts of new equipment and the convoys which had brought them had all 
been duly logged by Wavell’s HQ in Cairo.   
691  As to when this enemy force might move onto the attack 
Wavell also had a remarkably accurate estimate to offer Churchill. ‘He can probably 
maintain up to one infantry division and armoured brigade along the coast road in about 
three weeks, [end of March] and possibly at the same time employ a second armoured 
brigade, if he has one available, across the desert via Hon and Marada against our 
flank’.692
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    It must be asked here in view of the recognised poor state of Neame’s forces 
why Wavell should have thought that one infantry division and an armoured brigade 
group, and possibly a second armoured brigade group, turning up on Neame’s desert 
flank was not a significant problem. He knew perfectly well that Neame’s forces were 
short of everything and would at that time have been hard pressed to resist any sort of 
attack.  
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     On 3 March Wavell received two crucially important pieces of information. The first 
established that the commander of the German forces in Libya was Rommel.693  The 
second was the alarming news ‘that Rommel would be ready to attack sooner than 
expected. The [information] came from the newly broken Light Blue Enigma key, 
which revealed the scale of the German build-up in Libya’.694
     By early March Station X, the highly secret decoding organisation at Bletchley Park 
in Buckinghamshire, was at last reading the Axis wireless traffic almost as soon as it 
was received. This quickly revealed the type of unit the Germans were now assembling 
in Libya, 5th Light Motorised Division, and their plans to send it forward to Nofilia, a 
village about one hundred miles west of Brega, as soon as possible. The intended date 
for this unit to be at the front was 24 March.
   Furthermore, the 
intelligence services in London were beginning to receive even more detailed 
information on German intentions and the scale of the reinforcements they were sending 
to Libya.  
695
     With this mass of information indicating in early March that there was a growing 
likelihood of attack in Cyrenaica by late March at the latest, Wavell’s Director of 
Military Intelligence, Brigadier John Shearer, took it upon him self to write an 
appreciation of the military situation in Libya as seen from the German viewpoint. 
Shearer’s work entitled ‘an Appreciation of the Situation on 5th March, 1941, by 
General ‘X’, General – Officer – Commanding German Troops Libya, was an 
assessment of Rommel’s intentions and his chances of fulfilling them’.
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describes Shearer’s work as ‘a brilliantly perceptive appreciation’697
     Shearer’s appraisal prophetically described what the German commander’s options 
were; ‘as a striking force I have full confidence in my own Command. Subject to 
administrative preparations, I believe that the German Armoured Corps [note that by 
now Shearer is describing the German force as not just a Brigade group but as a Corps], 
after a few weeks’ training [it is perhaps also worth remembering here that the Germans 
had already been in Libya for three weeks] and experience in desert warfare conditions, 
and unless the British substantially reinforced their present forces in Libya, could 
successfully undertake the reoccupation of Cyrenaica’.
 and it is hard to 
argue with his opinion.   
698
     Wavell, on the same day, compiled a report of his own entitled “Defence of 
Cyrenaica” which confirmed that he too now understood that the intelligence he had 
received and Shearer’s appraisal of the situation were correct and that an attack on his 
desert flank would come in the near future. Wavell wrote thus of the situation now 
confronting him: ‘In view of arrival of German forces in Tripoli as well as Italian 
reinforcements, it is obvious that we have thinned out the defence of Cyrenaica 
prematurely and too much. We shall have to reinforce it’.
  Shearer presented his 
appraisal to Wavell on 6 March and the contents left his commander in no doubt that in 
his opinion the desert flank was in imminent danger.   
699
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  However, saying that 
Cyrenaica should be reinforced was one thing, actually doing it was another, and, as we 
shall see, turned out to be way beyond Wavell’s capability to successfully accomplish.  
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WAVELL ASSESSES THE SITUATION 
It is a doctrine of war not to assume the enemy will not come but rather to rely on one’s 
readiness to meet him, and not to presume that he will not attack but rather to make 
ones self invincible.700
 
 Sun Tzu  
Wavell finally found time to go out and see Neame in mid March. On 16 March, ten 
days after he had written, “we shall have to reinforce it” (the Desert Flank), Wavell 
turned up at Neame’s Barce HQ to see how acute, or otherwise, the military situation in 
Cyrenaica really was. The conclusions he reached, and the decisions taken at this 
meeting were crucial to the future defence of Cyrenaica. However, it is debatable how 
seriously those attending this crucial meeting took proceedings. Below are Peter Coats 
recollections of his time at HQ Barce.   
I lunched rather drunkenly one day with Peter Laycock and Michael Gold - both 
fellow-members of Mr Adie's house at Eton -we ate spaghetti and drank far 
too much Chianti in the garden of the mess. During lunch there was an air 
raid, and a bomb fell on the official brothel a hundred yards away. Years after, 
Peter Laycock and I were reminiscing about this particular lunch, and he 
remembered how clumsy I was in getting into the slit-trench, probably the 
effect of the Chianti. He also recalled an incident of the visit which well 
illustrates the difference in character of my Chief and the CIGS, Dill, who was 
admittedly ill and depressed at that time. While inspecting Peter's unit, Dill 
said something about Rommel and what a formidable fellow he was, and 
`With the guns you've got, you'll have a job standing up to him,' or 
something equally depressing to the gun crews and everyone else in earshot. 
Wavell, on the other hand, praised the guns (after all, they were the only 
ones they had) and expressed his complete confidence in the units' ability 
to see off any German attack. I will always remember that lunch in the 
Cyrenaican sunlight with my two old friends. For me it has always symbolized 
the end of the Wavell dream - the short halcyon few months of continual 
victories in the desert, a time which had effectively knocked Italy out' of the 
war and made my Chief a figure of world-renown.701
 
  
The importance of those involved in these meetings establishing all the facts which 
would then enable them to reach sensible and considered conclusions cannot be over 
emphasised. If a serious and realistic attempt was to be made to give Neame’s command 
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a fighting chance of resisting attack, whenever it might come, then action, not 
pontification, had to be taken now.  
     It seems logical that when Wavell saw the state of Neame’s forces he would have 
ordered as much help as possible to be sent forward. Wavell had already accepted that 
he needed to reinforce Neame and that there was an urgent need for troops and 
equipment and that unless Neame’s deficiencies were made good he would undoubtedly 
lose Cyrenaica. The consequences of failing to reinforce Neame’s army now had the 
obvious potential to be disastrous to British war aims.  If Neame’s forces in Cyrenaica 
were overrun it would leave the road to the vitally important oil and Suez Canal wide 
open. As Fraser says in And We Shall Shock Them: ‘To deny North Africa to the 
Germans was the greatest prize. The loss of Cyrenaica (and its airfields) was to place 
both Egypt and Malta in peril’.702  The stakes therefore could not be higher and Wavell 
must have known this when he visited Neame. Indeed he confirms his recognition of the 
risks he was taking with regard to holding Cyrenaica when on, 23 March, he telegraphs 
Churchill thus: ‘I have to admit to having taken considerable risk in Cyrenaica after 
capture of Benghazi; in order to provide maximum support for Greece’.703
     Wavell arrived at Neame’s HQ, as mentioned, on 16 March with Dill, Eden and his 
ADC Coats and says that he; ‘was appalled by what he found’.
       
704
                                                 
702 Fraser, p. 125. 
  In the slightly over 
two days he was in the area, he arrived late on the afternoon of 16 March and left on 18 
March, Wavell, according to his later writings, gained information about the terrain, the 
state of Neame’s forces, especially his armour, and the dispositions of his major units. 
Having evaluated Neame’s situation he offered him what he considered to be sound 
tactical advice on how he might remedy most, if not all, of his immediate problems. 
Wavell’s written appreciation of the military situation he found in Cyrenaica and the 
703 Lewin, p. 119. 
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advice he says he gave to Neame to remedy the deficiencies he noted seems, on casual 
reading, to be perfectly reasonable and sound advice.  
     However, on closer examination his writings and recorded comments bear all the 
hallmarks of a classic Wavell manipulation of the truth. Wavell’s subsequent writings 
on this subject, one written in September 1941 in the after action report he sent to the 
War Cabinet and the other a letter he wrote to O’Connor in 1945705
     Wavell’s 1945 letter tries to justify some of the earlier decisions he took and the 
orders he issued when he went to see Neame in March 1941. The beginning of the letter 
tries to justify his actions in the early part of Operation Compass giving weak and rather 
dubious explanations for his removal of 4 IID. However, the letter soon moves on to the 
reasons, as he saw them, for the loss of Brega and ultimately Cyrenaica. On page three 
of the letter Wavell, justifiably, blames himself for spending too much of his precious 
time in talks with Dill and Eden in Cairo when he should, perhaps, have been 
concentrating more on Neame’s problems in the Western Desert.   
, clearly demonstrate 
either his complete lack of understanding of how critical Neame’s military situation in 
Cyrenaica really was or his inability to confront the unpalatable reality that he himself 
had created. The latter conclusion, it has to said, being the more consistent with the 
known facts of the situation.  
     ‘Eden and Dill arrived [he writes] immediately after the Benghazi battle, and kept 
me fully occupied, and I never had time to go out till, I think, about middle of March 
when it was rather too late’.706
                                                 
705 Document 4/3/13 Liddell Hart Centre Kings Collage London: Letter dated 27 June 1945 sent by 
Wavell from Simla India to O’Connor.  
  Wavell would, had he not been forced into urgent talks 
with Dill and Eden about Greece, the letter implies, have come out to see Neame much 
earlier. However, he was unable to do so, not because he did not want too, but because 
his crucial talks with Dill and Eden would not allow him to do so.  This excuse for not 
706 ibid  
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going out to see Neame earlier, at a time when it must be remembered that Neame was 
virtually pleading for support from his Commander-in-Chief, because of his urgent talks 
with Eden and Dill about Greece, seems on the face of it to be rather weak. Both Dill 
and Eden would have understood the need for the Commander-in-Chief to go and see 
his subordinate at this crucial time and indeed went with him to see Neame on 16 
March. Moreover, Dill was a close personal friend of Neame’s and was very pleased to 
go and see him. Furthermore, the move to Greece was not at this time, early March, in 
full swing and even if it had been there was very little Wavell could do directly to help 
or enhance the chances of its success. His discussions with Dill and Eden could quite 
easily have been postponed for a few days and nothing untoward would have occurred, 
as, in fact, nothing did occur which Wavell could materially alter or assist.         
     With the blame for his late visit to see Neame safely shifted away from himself and 
onto the shoulders of others Wavell then casually blames Wilson for his imperfect 
understanding of the terrain of Cyrenaica. ‘From Maitland Wilson I had obtained a 
totally false picture of the escarpment running south from Benghazi and parallel to the 
coast, believing it to be similar to the land cliff running westwards from Sollum and 
thus impassable except at a few easily guarded points’.707
     An escarpment such as the one at Sollum is a formidable obstacle to overcome for an 
attacker and a great advantage to a defender. The Sollum escarpment was, and still is, a 
high stony plateau, which stretches straight out into the desert before tapering out 
around Fort Maddalena. The great escarpment as it was known ‘is some 600 feet high, it 
dominates the coastal plain from a few miles inland, and curves like a great wall down 
to the sea at Sollum’.
   
708
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   It consequently formed an almost impassable defensive 
barrier. Mobile troops equipped with adequate artillery give a defender, stood on the top 
of a high and steep escarpment with few passes up on to it, an easy task of beating off 
708 Neillands, p. 33.  
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enemy attack. The defender can easily move his forces to block access up on to the 
escarpment via the passes. Moreover, the defenders mobile troops could move quickly 
down the passes to take the enemy in flank while his artillery could shell the almost 
defenceless enemy troops on the plain below them.  
     Unfortunately, the escarpment adjacent to Benghazi was nothing like as formidable 
as the one at Sollum. The escarpment overlooking Benghazi was a line of low gently 
sloping hills which everyone, except Wavell, seems to have known could be scaled 
almost anywhere along its length. Even had the Benghazi escarpment been as 
formidable as the one found at Sollum Neame could not take advantage of its qualities 
as he had very few mobile troops or artillery to carry out either defence or attack.  The 
quality, or otherwise, of the escarpment above Benghazi was therefore militarily 
irrelevant to Neame’s real needs and again it is hard to accept that Wavell did not know 
this.         
     Wavell was also extremely critical of Neame’s tactical dispositions, which he 
described in his September 1941 report as “crazy”.  Neame, he claims, had placed ‘a 
brigade of Morshead’s 9th Australian Division out in the middle of the plain between 
Agheila and Benghazi, with both flanks exposed, immobile with no transport, 
completely useless and an obvious prey to any armoured vehicles that broke through at 
Agheila’.709  Wavell claims that when he discovered this “crazy” disposition he ordered 
Neame to move the brigade back to the escarpment east of Benghazi, ‘where there was 
at least a defensible position’.710
     This proposed redeployment is however; in view of what Wavell tells us he knew 
about the heights above Benghazi, which is that they were not formidable in the way the 
escarpment was at Sollum, a strange, and in many respects dangerous proposal. An 
enemy manoeuvre, which bypassed, and therefore out-flanked immobile troops on the 
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so called Benghazi escarpment, as the Australians would be if they conformed to 
Wavell’s orders, made them just as vulnerable, if not more vulnerable, as they had been 
in their old positions. The British had just demonstrated the vulnerability of troops who 
found themselves in this vicinity when they had cut off the fleeing Italians a few weeks 
earlier at Beda Fomm. 
     As for the escarpment above Benghazi being advantageous for defence or attack this 
is plainly not the case.  As the Australian brigade had little organic transport how could 
it manoeuvre if attacked, even if it was on the top of the escarpment?  Furthermore, as 
the escarpment east of Benghazi was easily scaled almost anywhere along its length, as 
Wavell says he discovered, how could it be considered to be defendable.711  Moreover, 
as the brigade in question had hardly any transport, artillery and no armour it could not 
possibly be expected to mount an attack from the escarpment.712
     Wavell, it must be remembered, wrote his report in September long after the disaster 
at Brega was over. He knew that the only reason the Australian brigade had been saved 
from annihilation in April was because of its earlier, mid March, rearward move to the 
Benghazi area.  The Australians, had they been left out in the open without transport 
and inadequately supported, as Wavell quite rightly points out, would have been either 
outflanked and isolated or overrun by the German armour either way they would have 
been lost. The rearward move, supposedly ordered by Wavell, luckily placed the 
Australians in the Benghazi area when the Germans broke through at Brega. 
Consequently they could be evacuated before they were cut off, and like most other 
units attacked that March/April they eventually managed to reach the relative safety of 
the Tobruk perimeter where they were to play such a crucial, heroic, part in the defence.  
  So why, it might fairly 
be asked, did Wavell claim credit for this seemingly pointless and potentially dangerous 
redeployment.      
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     Wavell’s order therefore, if it existed, would be seen as both a testament to his high 
tactical insight, military knowledge, and a vindication of his claim that Neame’s 
original deployment was “crazy”.713  The inference is therefore that without Wavell’s 
timely intervention the Australians would have been lost and consequently so would 
Tobruk. This sentiment is in fact confirmed by Wavell himself in his 1945 letter to 
O’Connor in which he says; ‘I found that he [Neame] was proposing to place an 
infantry brigade in one long thin line from the sea to the escarpment south of Benghazi. 
It would have been completely sacrificed, as it had no transport. I ordered him to move 
it to the escarpment just above Benghazi, and thereby at least saved it from annihilation, 
and for the eventual defence of Tobruk’.714
     However, Wavell’s claim that it was he who ordered the redeployment of the 
Australians is highly questionable. The reason this brigade was in the position it was 
when Wavell belatedly arrived in Cyrenaica on 16 March was not because of some 
“crazy” deployment ordered by Neame but was rather as a consequence of the 
Australians Corps commander, Blamey, ordering that the complete and well equipped 6 
AID should be replaced by the incomplete and poorly equipped 9 AID.  Blamey felt, not 
unreasonably, that if he was to send troops to Greece as Wavell wanted him to do, who 
would almost certainly see action soon after they landed, then these troops should be the 
best equipped and the best trained he had available.
  
715
     Consequently as the first brigade of 9 AID arrived in Cyrenaica they naturally 
assumed the positions vacated by the brigade of 6 AID, which was in the forward 
position where Wavell claims he found them. The fact that this brigade of 9 AID had 
virtually no transport or heavy weapons was not, in early March, considered by Blamey 
or Neame to be a serious problem as they were not going to be attacked by Wavell’s 
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calculation until May by which time their deficiencies would, in theory, have been made 
good. For the time being they ‘would be occupied in garrison duties only, and they 
would have a good opportunity to complete their training’.716
     It had been intended to bring forward the whole of 9 AID where they were to be 
trained and equipped in the field.  This plan was quickly found to be impossible as there 
was insufficient transport available to move or supply them and anyway only one 
brigade, the first to arrive which was now in the forward positions, had a near full 
compliment of even basic weapons. Therefore this brigade was left to support the 
British armoured force which, Morshead was reliably informed, would soon be 
deployed to the area. The other two brigades of 9th Australian Division would be held in 
rear. One brigade in fact never came forward being left in Tobruk and the other brigade 
which only had two battalions and no guns was left in the Benghazi area.
   
717
     The detached brigade in the forward area, which Wavell says he had moved because 
of its “crazy” deployment by Neame, was, in fact, deliberately left where it was by the 
Divisional Commander of 9 AID, Morshead, to help support the anticipated British 
armour.  However, it quickly became apparent to Morshead that the so called armoured 
unit his brigade was supposedly supporting (it was the motley collection of tanks 
assigned to 3AB which had not yet deployed to the forward areas and in fact never 
would) was a figment of someone’s imagination. Consequently if his brigade was 
attacked, a prospect which almost everyone except Wavell thought was becoming daily 
more likely, it would be hopelessly exposed where it was. This exposure to enemy 
mobile forces was recognised by Morshead and in late February he wrote to Wavell 
telling him that the positions his Diggers were holding ‘provided no more obstacles than 
a billiard table’ and were therefore not the best place for non-motorized infantry’.
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the authors of the Australian’s official history Active Service say; ‘By 19 March it was 
clear that at least the greater part of a German armoured division was in Tripoli. The 
prospect of one immobile and incompletely armed infantry brigade remaining opposite 
this force was disturbing, especially as only eight guns were supporting it’.719
     The danger the Australian brigade was in if the German armour broke through the 
paper thin British defence line at Brega, which at that time was composed of a few 
armoured cars and a small detachment of anti-tank guns, was clear to Morshead. ‘In 
consequence, orders were issued for the withdrawal of the detached brigade to the Er 
Regima area, east of Benghazi, where it arrived on 23 March’.
    
720
     It is beyond question that when the decision to move this brigade was taken, on 19 
March according to the official Australian History, Wavell was not even in the area 
having returned to Cairo on 18 March.  Moreover, had Wavell made a serious and 
informed appreciation of the tactical benefits of keeping any part of 9 AID in the 
forward areas in the state it was in, as he should have done, he could have come to no 
other conclusion than that keeping even one brigade of 9 AID in the forward areas made 
no military sense. Keeping any troops in the forward area who were unable to defend 
themselves was indeed “crazy”. 
  Morshead’s re-
deployment of his brigade to Er Regima undoubtedly saved the unit from annihilation 
not Wavell’s claimed intervention.   
WAVELL SAVES THE ARMOUR? 
Having claimed the credit for saving the Australians Wavell now turned his attention to 
claiming the credit for sounding the alarm over the state of Neame’s motley collection 
of armoured forces.721
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  Wavell wrote in September 1941 ‘the really alarming feature 
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was the state of the cruiser tanks of 2AD, which were the core of the whole force. Out 
of fifty-two tanks, half were already in workshops and the remainder kept breaking 
down at intervals’.722
     The unit Wavell is referring to is undoubtedly 5 RTR. At the time of Wavell’s visit 
to Neame this was the only tank regiment with fifty-two cruiser tanks. However, this 
unit, as we have seen, was not even in the forward operating area between 16-18 March. 
Most of this unit was, in fact, four hundred miles behind the front at El Adem airfield on 
the outskirts of Tobruk when Wavell says he saw them. Nor were half their tanks at that 
time in workshops. Most of the fifty-two cruisers in 5 RTR were, in mid March, still 
operational. Where the real concern for Neame’s armour should have been voiced by 
Wavell, had he seen them, was over the state of the other two regiments in 3AB, 3H and 
6 RTR.
  However, again evidence suggests that Wavell’s concern was 
created long after the defeat at Brega.  
723
     Further evidence of Wavell’s lack of knowledge about the state of Neame’s armour 
at this time, is confirmed by his comments about the size and deployment of 2AD’s HQ. 
Wavell says in his September report that he; ‘was appalled at the size and unwieldiness 
of the 2nd Armoured Divisions headquarters. Gambier-Parry, though he only had one 
brigade to handle, [this is also incorrect as the Support Group Brigade was part of 
Gambier-Parry’s division so he had two brigades to handle] had brought forward the 
  However, he fails to even acknowledge the existence of the other two units 
in the brigade. Nor is his inspection of any of the units in 3AB recorded in any of their 
unit war diaries. This event, had it happened, the G.O.C. visiting units in the field; 
would surely have been recorded in one of their war diaries, however, no mention of a 
visit is to be found in any of them.  
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whole of his headquarters, with the idea of getting them exercised in the field. All right 
if they were not attacked but a dangerous encumbrance if they were’.724
     On this statement Jackson comments that it is surprising that when Wavell 
discovered the appalling state of 2AD in mid March he did not replace ‘Gambier-Parry 
with a more experienced desert commander from 7th Armoured Division, which was 
back in the Delta refitting’.
   
725  Raugh says of Wavell’s tolerance of Gambier-Parry 
remaining in command when he allegedly discovered how bad things really were with 
2AD on his 16/18 March visit that; ‘had Montgomery or Slim made such a visit it is 
certain that, whatever the consequences, Neame or Gambier-Parry would have been out 
on his ear’.726
     When Wavell went to see Neame in March 2AD’s HQ was still at Barce. Neame 
says that 2AD’s ‘HQ arrived eight days before Rommel attacked’.
  So it might fairly be asked why indeed did Wavell not replace both 
Neame and Gambier-Parry if things were as bad as he thought they were with 2ADs 
HQ. The answer is simple. At this time Wavell could not have made a judgment on the 
suitability of Gambier-Parry’s HQ as it had not yet been deployed.  
727
     Moreover, had Wavell really seen the state of Neame’s armour and been as alarmed 
as he says he was by the deployment of 2AD’s HQ surely he would have ordered, as he 
says he did with the Australian brigade, that it should be redeployed for its own safety.  
The obvious course of action would have been to seek to improve the state of Neame’s 
armour by any means possible and insist on the removal from the forward area of the 
  As Rommel 
attacked on 31 March this gives an arrival date in the forward area for HQ 2AD of 
23/24 March, five or six days after Wavell had returned to Cairo.  Wavell could not 
have seen the danger that 2AD’s HQ might be in if it was attacked because at this time 
they had not even arrived in the danger area. 
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unneeded elements of Gambier-Parry’s HQ.  However, Wavell advised that none of 
these things should be done. In fact, he gave Neame no advice at all about what he 
should do to improve the fighting ability of his armoured forces, the state of which, he 
claimed, had “really alarmed him”. 
     However, Wavell did give Neame some advice on his 16/18 visit and later gave him 
even more when he got back to Cairo.728  While at Neame’s Barce HQ Wavell 
instructed Neame that ‘if his advanced troops were driven back, he was not to attempt 
the direct defence of Benghazi, but to pull his Armoured Brigade back on to the left 
flank of the Australians on the escarpment above Benghazi’.729
     There are several obvious problems for Neame in complying with this instruction. 
Assuming that the Australians made the move to the escarpment above Benghazi they 
would be, as they had virtually no organic transport, in acknowledged danger of being 
out flanked and cut off. Likewise, therefore, if any of the ramshackle tanks of 3AB 
retreated back to the same location as the Australians then they too would obviously be 
in the same danger. Moreover, as Wavell was, as he says, alarmed by the state of 
Neame’s armour, which he thought had a fighting strength of only twenty-two tanks 
many of which were constantly breaking down,
  In other words Neame’s 
armour was to withdraw northward up the Via Balbia towards Benghazi.   
730
     As Wavell freely acknowledged ‘the enemy would have local superiority both on the 
ground and in the air’.
 how many tanks would it be 
reasonable, for even a layman let alone a military scholar like Wavell, to expect to 
successfully reach the escarpment?   
731
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   The chances therefore of Neame’s motley collection of tanks 
reaching the escarpment with any fighting ability were obviously so slight as to be 
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virtually non-existent, and indeed this proved to be the case. This conclusion was also 
evidently reached by Dill who said to Neame on the eve of his departure from 
Cyrenaica; ‘you are going to get a bloody nose here, Philip, and it’s not the only place 
where we shall get bloody noses’.732
CAIRO REFLECTIONS    
  
On his return to Cairo, however, Wavell suddenly had second thoughts about the advice 
he had given Neame. On 19 March, he dictated a detailed directive for Neame’s 
attention with subtle but important amendments to his original advice.733  The new 
directive set out exactly what should now be Neame’s immediate tasks and how he 
should react if attacked. Neame’s armour was now not to retreat up the Via Balbia to 
support the Australians on the escarpment above Benghazi. ‘Having considered the 
alternative routes by which the enemy might advance, he advised Neame to keep his 
armour on the flank near Antelat, always flexible and ready to oppose and harass, to 
catch the enemy in rear and to manoeuvre him whenever possible on to concealed 
minefields’.734
     This last instruction, to use his armour to manoeuvre the enemy on to concealed 
minefields, illustrates just how little, on 19 March, Wavell understood about Neame’s 
true position in Cyrenaica. Not only was Neame’s armour virtually useless, as Wavell 
says he knew all too well, he also had no mines to construct minefields even if he had 
been given the time and manpower to lay them. As for Neame’s armour being able to 
manoeuvre the enemy in any way shape or form this suggestion was utterly impossible 
for Neame’s forces to carry out. 3AB could barely manoeuvre itself and could certainly 
not push a German armoured brigade around.   
   
                                                 
732 Neame, p. 268. 
733 Strawson, The Battle for North Africa, p. 52.  
734 Connell, pp. 386/387. 
232 
     The tasks detailed above were obviously far beyond Neame’s existing resources yet 
Wavell had still more chores for Neame’s ramshackle little army to perform.735  Wavell 
advised Neame that ‘the enemy’s supply and maintenance problem will be a most 
difficult and precarious one, and do everything in your power to render it more so’.736  
He advises Neame, as if he would not have been aware of the fact, that a sign of an 
impending attack would be the accumulation of stores by the enemy in the forward 
areas. These dumps Wavell advised ‘should be attacked by air action as far as possible. 
Similarly, during the advance, attack on his maintenance system will be one of the best 
methods of brining him to a standstill’.737
     Neame, it will be remembered, had virtually no air resources and only one bomber 
squadron under his direct command. The few extra bombers he did eventually received 
were only provided after the Germans had broken through the Brega defences. Neame 
could not order attacks on his enemy’s dumps or maintenance systems without either a 
strong and well equipped armoured force or a strong bomber force, preferably both, and 
he possessed neither, and Wavell knew this.    
   
      Wavell was, however, by no means finished with giving his tactical advice to 
Neame. He next turned his attention to the possibility of improving the defensive 
positions around El Agheila. ‘He asked Neame to consider the possible improvement of 
his Agheila positions by a forward, westward move to the salt marshes’.738   He gives 
Neame this advice even though he admits that he had not reconnoitred the area 
personally.739
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impassable salt marshes and sand seas between El Agheila/Mersa el Brega; ‘If I had 
gone out there and seen for myself what a formidable defensive barrier they could be 
736 Connell, p. 387. 
737 ibid, p. 387. 
738 ibid, p. 386. 
739 Raugh, p. 186.  
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made, I think I should certainly have insisted on our pushing our forces down to these 
marshes, whatever the supply difficulties were’.740
     His sudden enthusiasm for a stronger defence set up at Agheila/Brega, even though 
he had not seen the terrain personally, probably came from information received about 
the terrain from someone who had, possibly Chink. Again, however, his lack of 
understanding of the problems associated with defending Cyrenaica and his reluctance 
to seriously address these problems when the consequences of defeat in the area were so 
serious is breathtaking. The defensive possibilities of the Agheila/Brega defile, as this 
work has already reviewed in part and will review in depth later, were undeniably 
excellent.  His negligent misunderstanding of the escarpment above Benghazi and his 
original instruction that 3AB should retreat on to it if it was forced to withdraw was, 
using his word, crazy. His failure to order Neame to exploit the defensive possibilities 
of either Agheila or Brega may be considered to be a grievous mistake.   
   
     Having given Neame extensive tactical advice Wavell now proceeded to give him 
more operational advice. He made it clear to Neame that his primary objectives were to 
one, inflict as much hurt on his enemy as possible before retreating and two to keep his 
forces, as far as possible, intact so that they could participate in the counter-attack when, 
at some unspecified date, this occurred. ‘Neame had been instructed not to try to hold 
on to ground if attacked in strength but to fall back to previously agreed defensive 
lines’.741  He was not to risk his army in an attempt to defend Benghazi.  As Connell 
says, ‘the infliction of losses and ultimate defeat of the enemy were of much greater 
importance than the retention of ground. It was not, Wavell said firmly, worth risking 
defeat to hold Benghazi’.742
                                                 
740 Connell, p. 384. 
   
741 Ian V. Hogg, Armour in Conflict (London: Jane’s Publishing, 1989) p. 98.  
742 Connell, p. 386. 
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     However, these statements raise some further puzzling questions; if it was not worth 
holding Benghazi, and the escarpment above Benghazi was of little military advantage, 
why deploy troops on to it to defend it as Wavell had previously recommended. There 
was in any case no possibility of defending Benghazi with the forces Neame had at his 
disposal.743
     Wavell now gave Neame some news he was longing to hear. Wavell listed what he 
considered to be Neame’s most urgently needed reinforcement of troops and weapons.  
‘The immediate requirements seem to be to see what reinforcements we can make 
available of armoured troops, anti-tank guns, artillery, anti-aircraft; to build up properly 
distributed reserves; to see that we have sufficient means of defence such as anti-tank 
mines’.
  Unless, of course, they were substantially reinforced. This brings us to 
Wavell’s next piece of information for Neame.  
744  All the things, in fact, that Neame had already told Wavell, on many 
occasions, he needed.745  Wavell concluded his 19 March dispatch by giving Neame an 
explicit warning: ‘Time is pressing and you must put all necessary moves and work in 
hand without the least delay’.746
     The inference must surely be that by this point even Wavell knew that attack was 
imminent a conclusion that his RAF colleagues had also arrived at. The RAF 
commander in Cyrenaica; ‘forming his own estimate from reconnaissance reports, and 
reaching his own conclusions of the Army’s likely reactions, the A.O.C., Group Captain 
L. O. Brown, warned his units on March 22 to be prepared to move back at short notice. 
  The question that must be asked here is; if Neame was 
not going to be attacked until May why must all necessary works be put in hand without 
delay?    
                                                 
743 Raugh, pp. 184/185. Raugh gives a full breakdown of Neame’s forces.  
744 Connell, p. 385. 
745 Neame, p. 273. 
746 Connell, p. 387. 
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It was a timely thought, but it did nothing to sweeten the pill of calamity soon to 
follow’.747
     As for readying the defences in Neame’s command area Wavell was of course 
stating the obvious; however, the recognition of his problems and the acknowledgement 
of his deficiencies must have been welcomed by Neame. Or perhaps it would have been 
if Wavell had actually sent him the reinforcements and equipment he needed. Or if he 
had received and read the message when it was intended that he should do so, 
unfortunately neither happened. No significant reinforcements or equipment reach 
Neame before the Germans attacked. Moreover, Neame did not receive Wavell’s new 
written instructions in time to make any use of them, even if they had contained useful 
information, which they certainly did not. These new instructions were, according to 
Wavell, ‘sent by air from Cairo on March 19, but these were somehow lost on the way, 
and Neame did not receive a copy till March 26’.
  
748
     However, this was all in the future and of little consequence to the formations of 2nd 
Armoured Division and the men of 2SG and 3AB struggling to make bricks with 
straw.
   
749
                                                 
747 Terraine, p. 335. 
  As mentioned none of Gambier-Parry’s fighting units, post the Wavell visit, 
was making much progress in getting themselves battle worthy. It might therefore have 
been expected that after Wavell’s visit and his professed alarm at the dreadful state he 
claims he found 2AD in that every muscle would now be strained to make these units fit 
for battle. Unfortunately for the hapless troops who made up these units this was not to 
be the case. It might be remembered that 3H and 6 RTR were both for the most part 
without useable tanks. It would therefore have seemed logical in view of the urgency of 
the situation that these units would be brought up to strength as soon as possible with 
whatever tanks could be readily and most easily made available.  
748 Neame, p. 268. 
749 Jackson, p. 95. For a breakdown of the tanks of 3AB   
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     This was not to be the case. As previously mentioned 3H already had existing 
problems in becoming fully operational, which were the lack of a cruiser squadron and 
the wastage imposed on its light tanks by unnecessary patrolling. To these handicaps we 
may now add the third obstacle on its progress to operational status. The third, and 
perhaps greatest break on 3H becoming even partially operational, was the decision to 
give the regiment a cruiser squadron made up of Italian tanks. To the two squadrons of 
badly worn light-tanks already with 3H it was now decided that they should equip their 
third squadron with Italian M13/40 mediums captured at Beda Fomm.750
     Just when the fitters of 3H were finally getting close to making a worthwhile number 
of their light tanks operational this good progress was thrown away. On 23 March the 
whole of ‘B’ Squadron 3H, now equipped with 13 reconditioned light tanks, was 
transferred to 6 RTR and became their ‘B’ Squadron. In exchange on 25 March 3H 
received ‘A’ Squadron from 6 RTR equipped, at least on paper, with 15 Italian 
cruisers.
   
751
ITALIAN TANKS 
  The acquisition of these troublesome tanks so retarded the work of the 
fitters of 3H that they would now get hardly any tanks operational before the Germans 
attacked.   
The Italian tanks being taken over by 3H and 6 RTR were M/11/39s and M13/40s and 
they were it would be fair to say, less than effective as armoured fighting vehicles.752
                                                 
750 Fletcher, p. 77. 
 
Robert Kershaw had this to say about the gun and armour of the M11/39; ‘Italian 37mm 
guns on the medium M11/39 tank were only effective against British A10s and A13s at 
point blank range. Two-pounder Cruiser and Matilda tank guns could penetrate their 
751 War Diary 3 Hussars WO 169/1385 
752 Verney, p. 50. Verney was to write: ‘Some regiments were even mounted in Italian tanks – and so the 
sorry tale runs’.   
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frontal armour at normal ranges’.753
     In the quality of their armour Italian armoured vehicles also fell far short of their 
German and Allied equivalents.  ‘Their hulls were poorly constructed and they were not 
riveted like their British counterparts. As a consequence they could be torn apart on 
impact. Even heavy calibre machine-gun strikes might pepper the crews riding earlier 
models with tiny metal flakes coming off inside the thin armour’.
  Moreover, the 37mm gun fitted to the M11/39 was 
mounted in the hull not in a revolving turret this restricted the traverse to a few degrees 
either side.   
754  The armour plate 
was prone to crack or split when hit, and generally speaking, the deficiency in the 
quality of the steel was not compensated for by any added thickness. This was almost 
certainly due to the high sulphur content in the steel. In the Australian attack on Tobruk 
‘the vulnerability of the M11’s was shown when fourteen of these enemy tanks were 
destroyed by the 2/8th Battalion merely with the use of rifle and anti-tank rifle fire’.755
     Italian tank crews tried to improve their chances of survival by sandbagging and 
fixing track links to vital areas, as did most tank crews, but this usually failed to save 
the Italian crews from destruction.
  
756   Indeed General Tellera in command of 10th 
Italian Army at Beda Fomm chose to ride inside an M13 and in the course of the battle 
had his head blown off by a British 2 pdr.757
     Mechanically both types of Italian tanks were of a very poor design and had many 
inherent problems. Their Vickers-type suspension systems were of poor quality which 
    
                                                 
753 Robert Kershaw, Tank Men: The Human Story of Tanks at War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2009) 
p. 141.  
754 ibid, p. 145. 
755 Active Service, p. 19.   
756 Hunt, p. 55. 
757 Farran, p. 68. Roy Farran, who had been ordered to extract the dead crew members from the knocked 
out Italian tanks after the battle of Beda Fomm, comments on one he came across; ‘one tank was so 
horrifying that we left it to the last. Known to the troops as Madam Tussauds, it was an M 13 which had 
not caught fire when hit by a two pounder shell. Instead, the shell had whistled round the inside the hull to 
decapitate the four members of the crew, who were still sitting, headless, in their action stations’.  
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made them difficult to drive across rough country.758  Their engine cooling systems 
were so inadequate that after ten or so minuets running they would overheat. 759  The 
lubricating system was so bad that it made the gears unbelievably stiff and difficult to 
operate.760  Moreover, to add to all these problems the examples available to the men of 
6 RTR were in a severally dilapidated condition having been left out in the open for 
weeks.  Indeed as Fernyhough observes; ‘Italian M13 tanks were in fact so 
unsatisfactory that they earned the nickname of “self propelled coffins”’.761
     Moreover, the work on the Italian tanks was a waste that could so easily have been 
avoided and it is surprising that Colonel Petherick and his fellow commanders should 
have allowed it to happen. It would seem obvious that priority should have been given 
to getting British tanks serviceable first and then if time and resources allowed work 
could commence on the Italian tanks. It was common knowledge that the Italian tanks 
were death traps and virtually useless and most everyone, except perhaps the new 
commanders now arriving in the desert, knew this to be the case.  
  
     Consequently from mid March, five weeks after Beda Fomm, until the Germans 
attacked on 31 March, the light tank strength of 3H hovered around the 30 mark, 22 
short of establishment. As for the 15 Italian cruisers sent from 6 RTR to 3H no record 
exists of how many of these cruisers actually reached 3H.  We know from the war diary 
of 6 RTR that several of the 15 M11/13s sent to 3H broke down on the way to Agedabia 
and no mention of their arrival at 3H base camp is made in their war diary. So it seems 
fair to assume that however many 3H actually received their contribution to the fighting 
ability of the regiment was negligible.  Moreover, any that were deemed serviceable 
were, because of their inherent poor quality and lack of spares, in reality a hindrance 
rather than a help.  
                                                 
758 Macksey, p. 126. 
759 Heckmann, p. 91. 
760 Farran, p. 72. 
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     Turning now to 6 RTR we may see that they too were having problems getting their 
tanks serviceable. With the move of ‘A’ Squadron in progress, on 23 March, the 
personnel of ‘B’ Squadron 6 RTR were also moved, in Italian trucks, down to 3Hs 
leaguer near Agedabia.762
     Nonetheless, the changes were made and the remaining men of 6 RTR, that is ‘C’ 
Squadron and HQ Squadron and their colleagues from ‘B’ Squadron 3H, now attempted 
to get some more of the troublesome Italian tanks into working order. This was to prove 
to be an unequal struggle.
   They were instructed to take over 13 reconditioned British 
lights. It might be thought that this effort to get at least some tanks operational, the 
British light tanks could at least be made to travel even if they were virtually useless as 
tanks, was because it was now beginning to dawn on somebody that making the Italian 
tanks battle worthy was a bigger job than had earlier been anticipated and was just not 
worth the effort.  However, this cannot be the reason as the crews of ‘B’ Squadron 3H, 
were, for some unknown reason returned in the Italian transport to 6 RTRs base near 
Beda Fomm. The intention was, perhaps, that they should take over some more of the 
Italian M13 cruisers. That being said, exactly why the personnel of these two Squadrons 
were exchanged at this time is unclear. It would seem on the face of it that both might 
just as well have stayed in their respective base areas and operated, or tried to operate, 
the tanks they respectively already held.   
763
     Thus on the eve of battle most of 6 RTR found its self at its base near Beda Fomm 
seventy miles behind the expected battle front at Brega. Moreover, a more forlorn little 
  Aside from the faults already mentioned other 
amendments needed to be made to get the Italian tanks operational. The British radios 
which were eventually fitted were found to need extra suppression to make them work 
properly. The engine oil in all the tanks needed changing, the fuel injectors needed 
calibration, oil filters required cleaning and all the drivers needed training.   
                                                 
762 War Diary 6 RTR WO 169/1415 
763 ibid 
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band of tanks it would be difficult to imagine. 6th Royal Tank Regiment now had their 
HQ Squadron with no tanks at all; their ‘C’ Squadron had 15 Italian cruiser tanks, but 
few of them were serviceable, their ‘B’ Squadron was from 3H with 13 light tanks but 
again how many were operational is unknown. Their ‘A’ Squadron was with 3H 
desperately trying to get some of the motley collection of Italian tanks they had into 
some kind of working order. Their own ‘B’ Squadron was not with the regiment at all 
but was making its way back to base with some more of the reconditioned light tanks 
given to them by 3H.  
     Even on the day after the Germans attacked 6 RTR’s Squadrons were still either in 
their leaguer area or with other units, the war diary entry for 1 April informs us that ‘‘A’ 
& ‘B’ Sqns of the Regt being attached to 3rd Hussars. The Regt was located in the 
BEDA FOMM area (X.2080) completing its organisation and equipping of M13 
tanks’.764  The fighting strength of 6 RTR at this juncture was almost none existent; in 
fact, they were a liability as keeping this unit in the field consumed valuable resources 
which would very shortly be desperately needed elsewhere. Raugh gives the fighting 
strength of 6 RTR as ‘1 squadron only of 15-M13 Italian tanks’.765
5 RTR  
  They probably had, 
as mentioned, a few lights working at the time of the German attack but whether any of 
the salvaged Italian or British A10 cruisers were in complete working order by that time 
is highly debatable and not very likely. Certainly none of any kind survived after 2 
April and consequently this unit’s contribution to the fighting strength of 3AB was 
negligible.  
In general, whoever occupies the battleground first and awaits the enemy will be at 
ease; whoever occupies the battleground afterwards and must race to conflict will be 
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fatigued. Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not compelled by other 
men. Sun Tzu766
 
   
While 3H and 6 RTR were struggling to get some of their tanks into some kind of 
working order 5 RTR was still kicking its heels on the outskirts of Tobruk at El Adem 
drinking Australian beer. This idyllic life, as mentioned, continued for most of 5 RTR 
until mid March when suddenly on 21 March they were ordered to join their ‘A’ 
Squadron already in the forward area. The war diary tells us that the Regiment was to 
move to join 2nd Armoured Division in the forward area, a distance of approximately 
260 miles. At this time HQ 2AD was still at Barce nearly 200 miles from the front line 
at Brega. Interestingly the war diary also gives us a tally of all 5 RTRs operational 
tanks, it states that HQ Squadron, had 6 A13s, ‘A’ Squadron had 11 A13s and 2 A10s, 
‘B’ Squadron had 13 A13s and 2 A10s, and ‘C’ Squadron had 14 A13s and 1 A10. This 
gave the Regiment an operational strength of 44 A13s and 5 A10s, 49 tanks in all, only 
three short of normal establishment of 52.767
     The above being said while the tanks of 5 RTR were mostly operational before the 
21 March move, they certainly were not after it. This march proved to be almost 
suicidal for the tanks of 5 RTR. The first few days of the move were made in normal 
stages and no breakdowns are recorded. Then on, 24 March, the Germans took El 
Agheila which seems to have prompted an accelerated rate of movement. This 
accelerated march rate soon caused the Regiment problems. By 27 March the war diary 
was warning that; ‘all tanks now in need of maintenance a considerable number 
  This conformation of where and at what 
strength 5 RTR was on 21 March is important to note as it directly contradicts Wavell’s 
claim that when he went to see Neame on 16/18 March half the cruiser tanks he saw 
were in workshops.  Most of 5 RTR, several days after his visit ended, were still at El 
Adem, with only three tanks in workshops. 
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showing signs of heavy engine wear’.768  On 28 March the war diary reveals that only 
28 A13 tanks are now serviceable.769
     Instead of a staged and sedate approach march to their operational area, which Drew 
would normally have ordered to conserve track and engine life, the panic engendered by 
the German move caused the Regiment to be ordered forward at top speed. Jake 
Wardrop refers to this accelerated march thus: ‘I don’t know how it started, but one day 
we moved and it was the slickest bit of work we ever did. For four days the battalion 
covered a hundred miles a day over desert the wogs wouldn’t go on. At the end of the 
trip we were facing the Agheila salt flats’.
   
770  Jake was not quite correct, 5 RTR was, in 
fact, about forty miles short of El Agheila. Their final assembly point was 
approximately five miles to the east and slightly north of the village of Mersa El Brega. 
Their operating base was with HQ 3AB who had set up camp halfway between the 
village of Maaten Bettafal on the western edge of the Wadi el Faregh. Divisional HQ 
was a few miles away at Bir bu Gedaria.771
     Due to their forced march, by the time the Regiment reached its operational area it 
was a shadow of its former self. On 28 March the regiment’s tank strength was down, as 
mentioned, to 28 A13s and no A10s. Moreover, of the remaining 28 A13s, quite a few 
were in need of urgent repair.
   
772
                                                 
768 War Diary 5 RTR WO 169/1414 
  Consequently on the 29th and 30th of March several 
more breakdowns occurred. Thus the final tally of serviceable tanks available to 5 RTR 
on 31 March seems to have been no more than 24.  These were divided between three 
groups. The Regiments ‘A’ Squadron, with possibly 11 A13s, had already moved 
forward and were in direct support of the troops at Brega. The rest of the Regiment was 
with Brigade HQ at Maaten Bettafal. Thus on the eve of battle 5 RTR had no more than 
769 ibid 
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771 War Diary 5 RTR WO 169/1414 
772 Wilson, p. 38. 
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11 tanks at Brega, probably fewer, and perhaps 13 worn but serviceable tanks at their 
base. Woollcombe comments that both 3H and 5 RTR ‘owing to constant breakdowns, 
worn-out tracks, battered engines and serious shortages of spare parts in the Middle East 
could muster no more than half strength’.773
FINAL DISPOSITIONS OF 3AB  
  In both cases he is probably being over 
optimistic. The 5 RTR which only a few days before had been a fully operational unit 
was now virtually useless.  
On 31 March the three tank regiments of 3AB were spread out along a roughly seventy-
mile north south axis at three different locations, Beda Fomm, Agedabia and the Brega 
area. In the far north around Beda Fomm lay the detritus of 6 RTR with their mix of 
Vickers lights, discarded A10s from 5 RTR774
     The tanks of 5 RTR were at three separate locations. Most of the broken down tanks, 
about 20, were scattered between Beda Fomm and Agedabia. The rest of the Regiment 
was further forward with, as mentioned, part of one squadron directly supporting the 
troops at Brega. The remainder of the Regiment was on the left of the Brega position 
some five miles away with HQ 3AB. The combined tank strength of the two Squadrons 
in the forward area was probably 23 serviceable A13 cruisers and perhaps 2 or 3 with 
the unit but unserviceable. Raugh gives it that 5 RTR had 25 A13 Cruiser tanks. David 
 and Italian cruisers. This regiment had 
after weeks of work on a variety of tanks virtually nothing to show in the way of 
fighting potential for their efforts.  3rd Hussars were at Agedabia and like 6 RTR had 
been trying, mostly unsuccessfully, to get some of their motley collection of Vickers 
lights into working order and integrate the squadron of M13s from 6 RTR into their 
order of battle. They probably had somewhere in the region of 30 light tanks ready for 
action and perhaps 10 Italian cruisers.  
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Fraser tells us that in total 2AD ‘could muster twenty-five light tanks and twenty-two 
cruisers, numbers reduced within days to single figures’.775
     Thus 3AB’s three regiments had, even taking the best estimates of serviceable tanks 
as accurate, no more than 75 tanks between them. The true figure will probably never be 
known but was almost certainly nearer to 50 rather than 75 and only half of these were 
gun armed.  Moreover, ‘the 40-mm. gun carried by the small band of British cruisers 
was outranged by the 50-mm. on the newer type of Panzer III which was present in the 
German 5th Light Division. The British cruisers, plagued by mechanical breakdowns, 
carried no high explosive shell for engaging the enemy’s anti-tank guns, at this stage of 
the war, but only carried solid shot for engaging hostile tanks – if they could get in 
range’.
   
776
     Furthermore, despite the fact that they had been brigaded for six weeks, the units of 
3AB had had no combined training whatsoever. They were spread out miles apart. Their 
Divisional HQ was completely unsuitable for the task it was about to undertake being 
established for European conditions not desert operations. Its Brigade HQ was stranded 
in a piece of sterile desert with virtually no contact possible with all its three dispersed 
regiments.  3AB was, in fact, thanks to Gambier-Parry and Rimington’s efforts, weaker 
on 31 March, after six weeks of non-combat and supposed thousands of hours of 
maintenance work, than it had been on its creation in mid February.        
    
2nd SUPPORT GROUP               
As we have seen previously prior to Wavell’s visit to see Neame on 16/18 March very 
little had been done to bring the disparate elements of 2SG together. However, whether 
by coincidence or because of the mounting evidence of impending enemy attack, a few 
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days after Wavell returned to Cairo, the various units of this brigade were slowly 
brought together and dispatched to Brega.777
     The men of 9RB, who were destined to be the infantry component of 2SG, were, in 
mid March, as mentioned, in the Benghazi area trying to keep indigenous Arabs and 
Italian settlers from killing each other. The men of 104 RHA, the unit allocated to be the 
Brigades field artillery regiment, were also in the Benghazi area, unemployed and 
waiting to know where they would be going next.
    
778
     Once at Brega they deployed alongside ‘Y’ Coy of 1NF and the armoured cars of 1 
KDG. ‘J’ Battery, of 3 RHA with 9 towed 2-pdr AT guns, and 3 37L45 Bofors AT guns 
mounted portee, arrived a few days later.
  For both units the waiting would 
soon be over. On 22 March orders were received at both HQs ordering them to move 
down to Brega and take over the defence of Cyrenaica. Late on 22 March, after leaving 
‘D’ company of 9RB at Agedabia to prepare reserve positions, the three remaining 
companies of 9RB arrived at Brega.  
779  These five units and the 11 ramshackle 
wrecks belonging to 5 RTR now constituted the total front line defence of arguably 
Britain’s most valuable external military asset, Middle East Command. Nor would they 
have to wait long for confirmation that the enemy was at the gate. The first Rifle 
Brigade ‘patrol, led by Jack Cope, identified Germans opposite the Battalion and soon 
afterwards the information was elicited that one German armoured division and part of 
another had moved up from Tripoli to join the forces already collected by the Italians 
near Agheila’.780  The total German force confronting the defenders of Brega was not 
quite as strong as Hastings imagined.781
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  However, as we shall soon see, it was quite 
778 War Diary 104 RHA WO 169/1431 
779 Dey, p. 9.  
780 Hastings, p. 62.  
781 Raugh, p. 185. 
246 
strong enough to overcome Gambier-Parry’s disorganised, ill equipped and badly led 
Division.     
THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING BREGA  
The importance of holding the Brega position for the British cannot be over stated. 
Once this easterly bastion was lost there was no natural or man-made obstacle to 
impede an enemy’s progression westward towards Benghazi and ultimately, if the 
attacker desired and had the resources, Cairo and the Suez Canal beyond. David Fraser, 
comments on the importance of holding Cyrenaica in And We Shall Shock Them thus; 
‘Cyrenaica could be held against attack from the west by troops in position on the 
boarders of Tripolitania, [Mersa El Brega] which was where O’Connor had reached.  
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Immediately that position was surrendered, however, a defender was bound to be faced 
with the threat of a bold outflanking movement of the kind O’Connor had just 
performed in reverse. Such a move must cut off troops fighting “a delaying action back 
to Benghazi”.783
     This view is echoed by David Hunt who comments on defending Cyrenaica thus: ‘A 
principle which was implicit in the Italian defeat was plainly demonstrated: that to lose 
a battle in the desert south of Gebel Akhadar meant the abandonment of the whole of 
the bulge of Cyrenaica, since the defeated side had nowhere to make a stand between 
Agheila on the west and the Gazala-Tobruk area on the east’.
   
784  Even Wavell realised 
the importance of holding the Brega position stating on 19 March that: ‘If our advanced 
troops are driven from present positions there is no good covering position south of 
Benghazi as country is dead level’.785
     The significance of the Brega position alluded to by Fraser, Hunt, Wavell and many 
others was not some theoretical “maybe” it was a cold military reality and even an 
untutored eye could clearly see that the consequences of allowing Brega to fall would 
make holding the rest of Cyrenaica virtually impossible. However, again unbelievably, 
Wavell, even though he knew the importance of holding Brega, had given Neame no 
instructions to hold this vital position.  In fact, Wavell’s orders were to abandon it if 
pressed. An order that Neame, even though he also must have known the dire 
consequences which would result if he abandoned Brega, amazingly accepted. As 
Jackson says: ‘Neame was following Wavell’s instructions to trade space for time but in 
abandoning the Mersa Brega position he uncorked the Cyrenaica bottle and allowed 
Rommel to use his numerical superiority once he was through the defile’.
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THE BRITISH DEFENCE. THE TERRAIN  
In order to understand exactly what the British defensive positions at Brega comprised 
of a comprehensive review of the topography of the area will now be undertaken. Once 
the geographical and physical elements of the battlefield have been clearly established 
the dispositions of the various units involved in the defence will be placed in their 
respective geographical locations.  
 
The two dominating features of the Mersa el Brega defensive position are the 
Mediterranean Sea coastline in the north, and a virtually un-crossable deep, high sided 
trench with huge almost vertical sides of thick sand, known as the Wadi el Faregh, in 
the south. The natural barrier of the Wadi el Faregh ran at this time almost parallel to 
the coast for approximately one hundred miles maintaining a distance from the coast of 
between fifteen and thirty miles. Travelling west the village of Brega is established near 
the coast about twenty miles from the western starting point of the Wadi el Faregh. At 
Brega the distance between the coast and the Wadi, the “Brega Gap”, is approximately 
eighteen miles.787
     To block the “Brega Gap” Mother Nature had bestowed on those wishing to achieve 
this objective some very useful geographical assistance. Starting at the northern shore 
line and moving south the first geographical feature of assistance to the defender is a 
two mile wide strip of soft undulating sand dunes. This coastal strip of soft sand 
stretched along the shore line in either direction from Brega for hundreds of miles. The 
presence of these soft and steep sided sand hills made progression through this area, for 
both men and machines, very difficult and slow. The sand in the coastal strip was 
extremely soft and could, and did, penetrate the mechanical parts of all motor vehicles. 
It played havoc with mechanical and electrical equipment. Indeed all vehicles had to be 
fitted with improved water pumps and sand filters.
   
788
                                                 
787 For a good overview of the Brega position and the terrain see Farran, Winged Dagger, p. 70. 
  Tanks were particularly 
vulnerable and even short exposure to the fine sand soon impaired their performance. 
788 Neillands, p. 36.  
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The sand got into the sprockets on the track rollers and caused them to overheat and 
seize up. It blocked the engine filters and caused the motors to stall and overheat. 
Virtually every moving part of a tank was affected by the invasive nature of the sand. 
Turrets would refuse to rotate, guns would jamb, carburettors would choke and even 
electrical instruments would begin to malfunction.  
     As for the men the physical effort of struggling through the cloying sand carrying a 
pack and a rifle or worse still a heavy machine gun would exhausted even a strong man 
quite quickly. Consequently this stretch of ground, sand, was relatively easy to defend. 
The slow moving men and machines would make excellent targets for both mortars and 
artillery. Moreover, even if the enemy could not be hit directly just keeping him pinned 
down in the sand by small arms fire would eventually reduce his fighting capacity to 
insignificance.  
     The next significant geographical feature of the Brega position was the ridge upon 
which the village of Brega itself perched. Barclay tells us that; ‘the village of Mersa 
Brega itself lies at the northern end of the ridge’.789  David Irving describes the village 
of Brega as ‘an Arab village straddling sand hills near the coast’.790
     The only road in the area, the Via Balbia, which was orientated at this point in its 
progression, almost exactly east west, paralleling the 
  The village 
consisted of a small collection of white washed houses, slightly elevated from the 
surrounding desert on a ridge. The ground between the village and the sea sloped gently 
downwards across the sand dunes and towards the shoreline, from where the 
inhabitants, long gone in 1941, launched their fishing boats.  
Wadi el Faregh. The road ran 
along the northern edge of the village approximately two miles from the coast. West of 
the village, ‘some 2,000 yards forward of the position was a small rocky hill, known as 
Cemetery Hill, which gave good observation over all forward posts on the position 
                                                 
789 Barclay, p. 53. 
790 Irving, p. 69. 
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itself’.791
     Moving two miles slightly south-west from the village the next geographical feature 
to be encountered is the vast 
  Further forward still, approximately 2,000 yards in front of Cemetery Hill, 
there existed the el Mineizla salt marsh. This marsh approximately one mile wide ran 
parallel to the road on the seaward side of the road for about two miles.  
Sebcha es Seghira salt marsh.792
Sebcha 
es Seghira
  This feature roughly 
adjacent to the coast road was a completely impassable, two mile wide, by four mile 
long salt marsh. While this feature was totally impassable the ground in between 
 and the village was not that much easier to traverse. Barclay describes the 
ground to the south of the road and west of the ridge as marshy.793
Sebcha es Seghira
  The two miles, of 
relatively flat and low lying ground between the village and the  
marsh, was very difficult terrain to traverse either on foot or by vehicle. The whole area 
was, in fact, covered by a succession of small salt marshes interspaced by areas of 
extremely soft sand.794
     On the southern side of 
 
Sebcha es Seghira moving still further south and slightly 
west we come to yet another impassable salt marsh the Bir es Suera. This marsh was, in 
1941, swollen by exceptional winter rains. In early February when 7AD were making 
their way to Beda Fomm they experienced appalling weather conditions. Vehicles 
became bogged down in the desert mud and a considerable amount of time and energy 
had to be expended to retrieve them.795  The weather was so bad and the mud so deep 
on 6 February that it took the 11th Hussars a whole day to extract themselves from it.796
     The Bir es Suera projected southward out into the desert and was, at this time, 
approximately ten miles long on its north/south axis and three miles wide on its 
 
                                                 
791 Barclay, p. 53. 
792 P Kearey, The New Penguin Dictionary of Geology (London: Penguin Reference, 2001) p. 232. 
Definition of Sebcha [also spelt Sabkha or Sebkha] ‘broad plain or salt flat in an arid or semi-arid region 
containing evaporites at a level dependent on the local water table’. 
793 Barclay, p. 53.  
794 Heckmann, p. 73. Johannes Streich who commanded the German troops at Brega said that there were 
only 8 miles available for manoeuvring between the sea and the salt pans.    
795 Barclay, p. 53. 
796 Clarke Dudley, The Eleventh at War 1934 – 1945 (London: Michael Joseph, 1952) p. 152. 
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east/west axis. The distance between the southern tip of the Seghira and the northern 
edge of the Suera was approximately four miles. However, like the gap between Brega 
and the Seghira, the ground between the Seghira and the Suera was extremely difficult 
to cross with safety. It was like most of the desert in this area pockmarked by small salt 
marshes and soft sand.797
     The final expanse of desert to be covered, if the whole Brega position was to be 
sealed, was the Suera/Wadi el Faregh gap, a distance of approximately seven miles.
 
798
     So we may see that for all practical purposes all the defenders of the Brega position 
had to seriously defend was the approximately four mile gap between the sea and the 
southern tip of the Seghira salt marsh. The Suera/Seghira gap might perhaps need 
 
This gap was without doubt the most difficult and problematical for an attacker going 
east west to get through. As with the other possible routes through the salt marshes and 
the sand seas further north this area had similar, but even worse, ground conditions. 
Moreover, anyone wishing to take this route would be nearly twenty miles from the 
road and the security of firm ground that it offered. Once stuck in this inhospitable 
region both man and machine would be in serious trouble and extremely difficult to 
rescue if attacked. Furthermore, if caught by hostile aircraft, as there was little or no 
firm ground to deploy anti-aircraft guns and no cover to hide in, both infantry and 
armour would be sitting ducks. However, we can eliminate this route from our possible 
access points as the Germans were sensible enough to know their limitations. No 
physical defence was needed for this route as at this stage Rommel’s men were not 
desert worthy enough to attempt it.  
                                                 
797 It must be remembered that all the distances given are “best estimates” based on maps and accounts 
taken from various sources and that distances involved and the size of the salt marshes and sand seas 
mentioned could, and did, vary, however, based on the available information the author is confident that 
the above gives a close approximation of the terrain in the Brega Gap in March 1941. 
798 For maps of the area see; Major-General W. G. Stevens, The Official History of New Zealand in the 
Second World War 1939-1945 (Historical Publications Branch, Wellington: 1962). Found in the section 
by R. L. Kay, The Left Hook El Agheila, (Wellington: Historical Branch, 1950), p.26. Also B. H. Liddell 
Hart, Editor, The Rommel Papers (London: Collins, 1953), p. Also map TPC H-4A Libya Produced by 
the Defence Mapping Agency. Revised 1995, FAA Distribution Division. 
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watching but it was unlikely that any serious attack would come from that direction 
because of the arduous ground conditions. As for the Suera/Wadi el Faregh gap this, 
because of the even worse going conditions, was even less likely to pose a threat to the 
defenders and indeed, as mentioned, was not even attempted by Rommel’s troops.  
     Taking a more detailed look at the area to be defended therefore we may see that 
looking west the position had the village at its centre. On its right, northern flank, were 
two miles of sand dunes.  On its left, southern flank, between the village and the Seghira 
there was a two mile succession of small sand saes and salt marshes. Therefore between 
the sea and the Seghira there was a four mile wide expanse of very difficult going 
comprising of a succession of sand dunes, salt marshes and sand seas. All of which were 
overlooked by Cemetery Hill in front of the village of Brega, which was itself set on a 
rocky plateau slightly elevated from the surrounding desert.   
     It is, therefore, perhaps little wonder that Rommel after surveying the potential 
defensive qualities of the Brega position said that; ‘it was with some misgivings that we 
watched [British] activities, because if they had been allowed time to build up, wire and 
mine these naturally strong positions they would then have possessed the counter of our 
positions at Mugtaa, which were very difficult to assault or out flank’.799
DEPLOYMENT 
   
So what, it might be fairly asked, did the British do with their time at Brega. 
Throughout early February and up to mid March various units deployed to the 
Agheila/Brega region, however, of the early arrivals only two units stayed until the 
attack on 31 March. The 1 KDGs were the first of the 31 March defenders to take up 
post. They had arrived in early February to relive the 11 Hussars and were used to patrol 
the Brega /Agheila defile.800
                                                 
799 Liddell-Hart, p. 107.  
  Although the KDG were based at Maaten Bettafal five 
800 Fletcher, p. 77.   
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miles behind the village they had also established a permanent outpost at El Agheila, 
which they subsequently lost, and had created several small supply dumps along the 
sides of the many tracks running through the salt marshes.  
     The second unit to arrive were ‘Y’ Coy of I NF with their twelve Vickers Machine 
Guns.  They deployed in and around the village. Most of their guns were sited on the 
left (south) of the village on the firmer ground and one section was placed on Cemetery 
Hill.801
     As the units of Brigadier Latham’s Support Group arrived at Brega he assigned them 
to their various defensive positions in and around Brega. The infantry positions of 
Shipton’s 9RB and the twelve medium machine guns of Captain Hensman’s ‘Y’ Coy of 
1NF were deployed as follows. Overlooking the road, and dug in on Cemetery Hill, 
were elements of ‘A’ Company, 9RB.  Supporting the men on Cemetery Hill was 
Lieutenant Wells No. 12 Platoon of ‘Y’ Coy 1NF with three Vickers machine guns.
  Between their deployment in mid February and the arrival of the Germans in 
late March these troops were accompanied by a variety of allied units. At first they had 
the company of the 7th Armoured Division’s support group, 1KRRC and 2RB. These 
troops were followed by men from 6th Australian Division. Then, when the 6th pulled 
out, they were briefly supported by units from Morshead’s 9th Australian Division. 
Lastly, and belatedly, on 22 March elements of 2nd Support Group arrived, 9RB and 104 
RHA, and some time later ‘J’ Battery 3 RHA completed the final line up.  
802  
Behind this position were ‘B’ and ‘C’ companies and Battalion HQ of 9RB. They 
established themselves in a series of defensive locations some of which had been dug by 
the Australians in front of and to the north of the village, astride the road and in the sand 
dunes between the road and the coast.803
                                                 
801 Hastings, p. 62. 
  The series of Australian trenches that ‘B’ and 
‘C’ companies occupied were of a very high calibre. Each trench could accommodate 
802 Barclay, p. 54. 
803 Hastings, p. 62. 
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five or six men; they were deep and each had a firing step. To the rear of each trench 
there was an underground bunker where the men could sleep. The trenches were 
grouped in threes to accommodate a platoon of sixteen men.804
     As the Australian unit which had previously been defending Brega were a Brigade 
size unit there were very many more trenches than Latham had troops to fill them as he 
only had one battalion not three.  Moreover, as there were now only two Companies of 
infantry, ‘B’ and ‘C’, approximately 300 rifles, and the nine remaining Vickers Machine 
Guns to cover the four mile gap between the sea and the Seghira they were obviously 
spread very thinly indeed. 
  
     South and north of the road between the village and the first salt marsh were the 
remaining three platoons of Hensman’s ‘Y’ Coy. One platoon was with ‘B’ company 
(commanded by Major M. G. Clayton) north of the road and the other two with ‘C’ 
company (commanded by Major Jack Andrews) south of the road. To the rear of the 
infantry were the 9 two pounder anti-tank guns of ‘J’ Battery 3 RHA. The whereabouts 
of the 3 remaining 37mm L45 Bofors guns of ‘J’ Battery, which were mounted portee, 
is unknown but they may have been kept as a reserve in the village.805   The two 
batteries of Lt Colonel Todhunter’s 104 RHA, 339 and 414 Battery’s with their 16 25 
pdrs, were in direct support of 9RB and ‘Y’ Coy INF. They emplaced their guns in two 
groups of eight guns approximately two miles in rear of the village. On Cemetery Hill 
‘A’ Troop of 339 Battery set up an observation post (OP) and ran telephone cables back 
to the two battery commanders. Regimental HQ of 104 RHA with the ‘B’ echelon 
vehicles was approximately 5 miles further west of the main defensive positions with 
HQ 2SG at Maaten Bettafal.806
                                                 
804 David Hurst-Brown, Interview with author 14 January 2011. 
   
805 Dey, p. 9. 
806 War Diary 104 RHA WO 169/1431 
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     For air defence the defenders had the 37th Light Anti Aircraft Battery with ten Bofors 
and two Breda anti-aircraft guns.807  Their ‘A’ Troop with four Bofors guns was 
stationed on Benina airfield south of Benghazi over one hundred miles north of the 
Brega position. Their HQ and ‘B’ Troop also with four Bofors were deployed around 
the HQ of 3H near Agedabia thirty miles in rear of Brega. Their ‘C’ Troop was 
deployed with 1 KDG the two Bredas operating with the armoured cars and the two 
Bofors at Maaten Bettafal covering KDG HQ.808
THE GERMANS TURN UP THE HEAT 
  Consequently the forward troops in 
the Brega positions had no direct anti-aircraft cover whatsoever.     
The Italian/German attempt to retake Cyrenaica began tentatively on 24 March with 
an attack on the KDG garrison stationed at El Agheila thirty miles west of the Brega 
position.809  Having realised how potentially strong the Brega position could be made, if 
the British were allowed time to reinforce it, an objective Rommel felt they were bound 
to attempt as soon as possible: ‘Rommel thought he would try an offensive move with 
what he had. His first aim was merely to occupy the Agheila bottleneck’.810  The small 
detachment of British forces stationed at Agheila, a troop of KDG and an Australian 
anti-tank gun troop, was soon routed. Rommel recorded that ‘the garrison, which 
consisted of only of a weak force, had strongly mined the whole place and withdrew 
skilfully in face of our attack’.811
     There are several points about this encounter at Agheila that are worth mentioning 
here as they have relevance to the main encounter at Brega seven days later. Perhaps the 
first thing to be noted about the British defence of Agheila is the large scale use of 
mines. Minefields, as experience has shown time and time again, are a very effective and 
   
                                                 
807 War Diary 37th LAA  WO 169/1656 
808 ibid 
809 Delaney, pp. 13/14 
810 Hart, p. 119.  
811 Connell, p. 387.   
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relatively cheap way of both delaying an enemy’s advance, and if he persists in forcing 
the field, inflicting casualties on his men and vehicles while he is doing so. All the 
defender needs to do is cover the minefield with a few machine guns which can then be 
used to prevent the enemy sappers from lifting the mines. However, in this particular 
case the enemy did not have to attempt the potentially costly task of gapping the 
minefield. Although the ground on either side of the road was mined the road itself was 
not. This meant that once the defenders had been forced to abandon the fort; all the 
enemy had to do was drive down the un-mined road and continue his advance, which of 
course is exactly what he did.812
     Moreover, even if the troops in the fort had been able to hold the village area, all the 
enemy needed to do was to move north or south of the fort to find a way through the 
undefended minefields. Although the minefields were extensive they were not covered 
by machine guns or even infantry with rifles consequently all the enemy had to do was 
lift the unprotected mines. This would enable them to create a gap in the minefield which 
would then allow them to pass through and continue their advance or attack any 
defensive positions, such as those in the fort, in rear. Furthermore, once made safe the 
now captured mines could be redeployed by the captor to make any defensive position he 
may chose to establish more difficult to assault. Accepting that this is the case it is 
incomprehensible that the British did not either deploy some infantry to cover the 
minefields they had so painstakingly laid, or if they were incapable of doing this, lifting 
the mines and redeploying them where they might be of some benefit, such as at Brega. 
They unfathomably failed to do either.  
  
     As for Rommel’s assessment that the British withdrawal was skilful it certainly did 
not look like that from the KDGs perspective. When the German 3rd Reconnaissance 
Battalion attacked Agheila in the early morning of 24 March they caught the garrison 
                                                 
812 Delaney, p. 14.   
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completely unawares.  Once the Australian and British troops realised that they were 
being attacked, and in superior strength, they put up little resistance preferring to 
evacuate the little fort they were sleeping in as fast as they could. ‘Last to leave was the 
duty troop of the King’s Dragoon Guards, the troop leader only getting out by the skin of 
his teeth’.813
     The pathetic British defence of this easily defendable location tantalisingly revealed 
to Rommel many significant aspects of British un-preparedness. Did the absence of a 
strong garrison in this vital position indicate that the British were weak in the region?  
Was the lack of a covering force for the minefields conformation of this weakness?  
Moreover, where was the counterattack to retake this excellent defensive position?
   The withdrawal of the garrison at Agheila, virtually without a fight, had 
serious consequences for the British defence of Cyrenaica. Not only was it an indication 
to the enemy that the British were not, for whatever reason, defending Cyrenaica in 
strength, it also indicated that they were, perhaps, incapable of putting up any serious 
resistance.  
814  
As might be expected the ease of the capture of Agheila and the lack of any attempt to 
regain it, now emboldened the enemy. Once ‘this significant position, considered ‘the 
gateway between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica’, was in German possession, Rommel 
boldly decided to exploit this unexpected windfall quickly, and a short pause ensued 
while the main bodies of the German and Italian units deployed forward’.815
     When Churchill heard the news that the positions around Agheila had been 
abandoned, virtually without a fight, he was very alarmed indeed and cabled Wavell on 
26 March: ‘we are naturally concerned at rapid German advance to Agheila. It is their 
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habit to push on whenever they are not resisted. I presume you are only waiting for the 
tortoise to stick his head out far enough before chopping it off’.816
THE GERMANS PREPARE FOR ATTACK  
    
It might be expected that with Churchill’s obvious concern and the fact that German 
troops were now incontrovertibly advancing down the Via Balbia towards Brega this 
would spur Wavell or Neame or both into action.  However, astonishingly, Rommel’s 
advance had virtually no stimulating effect on Wavell’s or Neame’s defence preparations 
at Brega. Wavell, in fact, decided to continue with a trip to Sudan and Eritrea which he 
had arranged sometime earlier. When Wavell returned to Cairo, on 27 March, he sent 
Churchill a remarkable telegram:     
 
 
A. P. Wavell to Prime Minister 27th March, 1941, 1905 hrs.  
 
No evidence yet that there are many Germans at Agheila, probably mainly Italians 
with small stiffening of Germans. I have to admit to having taken considerable risk 
in Cyrenaica after capture of Benghazi in order to provide maximum support for 
Greece. My estimate at that time was that Italians in Tripolitania could be 
disregarded and that Germans were unlikely to accept risk of sending large 
bodies of armoured troops to Africa in view of inefficiency of Italian Navy. I 
therefore made arrangements to leave only small armoured force and one partly 
trained Australian division in Cyrenaica.  
     After we had accepted Greek liability evidence began to accumulate of German 
reinforcements to Tripoli which were coupled with attacks on Malta which 
prevented bombing of Tripoli from there on which I had counted. German air 
attacks on Benghazi which prevented supply ships using harbour also increased 
our difficulties. Result is I am weak in Cyrenaica at present and no reinforce-
ments of armoured troops which are chief requirement are at present available.  
     I have one brigade of 2nd Armoured Division in Cyrenaica and one in 
Greece. 7th Armoured Division is refitting and as no reserve tanks were 
available is dependent on repair which takes time. Next month or two will be 
anxious but enemy has extremely difficult problem and am sure his numbers 
have been much exaggerated.  
     I cannot however at present afford to use my small armoured force as boldly as I 
should like. Steps to reinforce Cyrenaica are in hand. I hope fall of Keren will 
release some troops from Sudan before long and that I shall also get some South 
African troops from East Africa. You know our difficulties about aircraft. 
                                                 
816 John Strawson, Quoting Churchill in, The Battle for North Africa, p. 48. 
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Longmore and his people give me magnificent support everywhere but there is 
never quite enough of them. My own chief difficulty is transport.817
  
 
The contents of this telegram are nothing short of breathtaking. They confirm, if 
confirmation at this stage were needed, that Wavell was completely out of touch with 
the true situation in Cyrenaica. His opening statement that there was no evidence that 
there were many Germans at Agheila and that the troops that were there were probably 
mainly Italians with a stiffening of Germans is complete nonsense. On 19 March Wavell 
had received Ultra intelligence which had prompted him to report to the War Office that: 
‘Situation on Cyrenaica front is causing me some anxiety as growing enemy strength 
may indicate early forward movement’.818
     Furthermore, his subsequent prediction that enemy numbers were much exaggerated 
is contradicted by aerial observation which clearly identified hundreds of vehicles 
leaving Sirte and heading for El Agheila. Moreover, the garrison at Agheila was evicted 
on 24 March by a complete battalion of German troops, clearly identified by the KDG 
unit who were there.
  Moreover, the first patrol sent out by 9RB 
from Brega, on 22 March, established positively that German troops were on their front.  
819   Also, on 25 and 26 March patrols of the KDG encountered and 
reported that they had been in contact with German eight wheeled armoured cars.820  
Indeed on 29 March they discovered a German motor column moving south towards 
Marada and destroyed it.821
     The rest of this telegram is even more astonishing and difficult to accept as true. 
Wavell admits, so he says, to taking considerable risk in Cyrenaica in order to send 
  So although the precise number of enemy troops was 
perhaps uncertain; what was certain was the fact that there were a considerable number 
of enemy forces between Nofilia and El Agheila.     
                                                 
817 Connell, p 388.   
818 Raugh, p. 187. 
819 Delaney,  pp. 13/14. 
820 War Diary 1 KDG WO 169/1384 
821 National Archives Document CAB 16/17/32 report on actions of 2nd Armoured Division 
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maximum support to Greece. To defend Cyrenaica therefore he says he arranged to 
leave only small armoured force and one partly trained division. ‘Result is I am weak in 
Cyrenaica at present and no reinforcements of armoured troops which are chief 
requirement are at present available’.822
     Wavell knew that the Germans were sending troops to Libya in early February. The 
reason he was weak in tanks in Cyrenaica was not because he had no tanks, or because 
he had sent most of what he had to Greece, but because all the serviceable cruiser tanks 
in the forward areas had been sent back, on his orders, to the Delta.
   
823  Once back in the 
Delta, because he was convinced that there would be no attack in the Western Desert 
until May, even though there was mounting evidence to suggest that this estimate was 
wrong, little was done to speed up their repair and delivery to Neame.824
     Therefore, because of Wavell’s arbitrary decision that the Germans would not attack 
before May there had been little or no effort made to get any of the hundreds of tanks 
now stuck in workshops in the Delta serviceable and send them forward to reequip 
either 3H or 6 RTR. Wavell himself admits that he knew the tank situation in the 
Western Desert was dire when he came back from his 16/18 March visit to Neame but 
did absolutely nothing, as mentioned, to remedy the tank shortage by speeding up 
repairs to the tanks in the Delta.  
   
     Moreover, Wavell further claims that armoured troops were Neame’s chief 
requirement. However, what Neame really needed was more artillery, anti-tank guns, anti-
aircraft guns and infantry. In regard to the amount of anti-tank guns Neame had, one battery 
of twelve guns, this was way below what would normally be considered adequate to repulse 
an armoured brigade.825
                                                 
822 Connell, p. 388. 
  Wavell had, in fact, artillery available in some quantity, and did, as 
823 Wilson, p. 64. Wilson tells us that after Beda Fomm 7th Armoured Division returned to the Delta to 
refit.  
824 John Keegan, Editor Ian Beckett, Churchill’s Generals (London: Cassell Military, 2005) p. 78.  
825 Delaney, p. 11. 
261 
we shall see later, dispatch several units to Neame, but only when it was too late for them to 
be of any help.   Furthermore, he claims that he has no spare air resources to help Neame 
but again, as we shall see when it was too late for them to be of any real assistance to 
Neame, he suddenly finds extra squadrons.     
30/31 MARCH DEPLOYMENT: THE TAKING OF BREGA 
When Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr von Wechmar’s 3rd ‘Reconnaissance Battalion took 
El Agheila on 24 March with ease, and the British withdrew to ‘Mersa el Brega without 
a fight, Rommel decided to press on. Rommel considered that Brega was an ideal 
position to defend against a possible British attack as well as being a good ‘jumping off’ 
place for any assault on Cyrenaica’.826  With El Agheila secure Rommel began 
preparations for his next move. Thousands of troops and massive quantities of supplies 
were brought forward. A huge dump was established a few miles west of Agheila at 
Arco dei Fileni.827  By 30 March Rommel had thirty seven thousand Italian and nine 
thousand three hundred German troops available in the forward areas.828
     The 5th Light Division although it was an improvised unit with no experience of 
desert conditions, was nevertheless, a formidable fighting force. Its main armoured 
component was Panzer Regiment 5 with 155 tanks.
 The cutting 
edge of this force was the German 5th Light Division with a formidable array of fighting 
units.   
829
                                                 
826 Forty, p. 116. 
  It had an armoured 
reconnaissance unit, 3rd Recce Battalion; two machine-gun battalions, No’s 2 and 8, 
each with its own engineers. In artillery they had a 12-gun battery of field artillery, Regt 
75; and two anti-aircraft units, AA Bns 605 and 606; two motorised anti-tank gun 
battalions, 33 and 39, and armoured troop-carrying vehicles. Supporting these units was 
827 Pitt, The Crucible of War, 1980, p. 257.  
828 Delaney, p. 14. 
829 Forty, Armies of Rommel, p. 82.  
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a company of engineers from Engineer Battalion 39. Amongst the anti-tank or ‘tank-
hunting’ battalions, were a few 88-mm guns.830
     The Italian forces available to Rommel were ‘the Trento Motorised Infantry Division 
and the Ariete Armoured Division with approximately 60 tanks. Also available was the 
Italian X Corps, made up of the Pavia and Brescia Infantry Division’s.
    
831
THE BATTLE BEGINS 
   This gave 
Rommel an attacking force of nearly fifty thousand troops and over two hundred 
armoured fighting vehicles. It will be remembered here that the British garrison at 
Brega was approximately one thousand five hundred men strong with 12 anti-tank guns, 
16 artillery pieces and perhaps 11 working tanks.    
Throughout the daylight hours of 30 March the German and Italian forces allocated to 
the attack on Brega assembled around the old fort and water point at El Agheila. In the 
early morning of 31 March the attacking infantry and artillery men boarded their trucks 
and set out on the thirty or so mile voyage down the Via Balbia to their forming up area 
in front of Brega.  
     The German armour also set out from El Agheila at the same time but on two 
divergent courses.832  The main group of German armour headed east along the Via 
Balbia in support of the infantry and artillery.  However, there was a smaller group of 
tanks which turned right off the Via Balbia and headed south east towards Maaten 
Giofer (Maaten meaning shallow well in Arabic) on the so called Agheila/Giofer 
track.833
                                                 
830 Terry Gander, The German 88 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2009). For a full account of the effectiveness 
of the 88 see Gander.  
  Once there they were to turn due east and head towards Brega through the gap 
between the Seghira and Suera salt marshes. Their objective was to confront any British 
831 Delaney, p. 14. See also Verney Desert, p. 51. Also John Strawson The Battle for North Africa, p. 48.  
832 Forty, Armies of Rommel, p. 116. 
833 Heckmann, p. 67. 
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armour which might be in the Maaten Giofer area, to overcome it, and then to outflank 
the British positions at Brega.834
     As the smaller column of German tanks approached the Maaten Giofer track, turning 
off the Via Balbia, their suspicions about the presence of British armour in the salt 
marshes was soon confirmed.
  
835
     To facilitate these orders they had parked their armoured car in a depression which 
kept them partially hidden from observation by the rolling sand dunes. Lieutenant Fred 
‘Dusty’ Miller a nineteen year old newcomer to the desert was accompanied by 
Lieutenant James ‘Nobby’ Clark a veteran who had been responsible for capturing 
Italian General Annibale Bergonzoli, nicknamed “Electric Whiskers,” in early 
February.
  It is perhaps fitting, and perhaps not surprising, that 
the first troops to encounter the Germans on the early morning of 31 March 1941 were 
men from the 11th Hussars. A detachment of Troopers from 11H had been attached to 
the KDGs probably with a two fold intention. One objective would be to give the KDG 
troops advice on how to operate armoured cars, the KDG had up until January 1941 
been a horsed regiment, and consequently had plenty to learn about fighting in 
armoured cars. The second objective might well have been for the men of 11H to gain 
experience on the Marmon Harrington armoured cars which they themselves would 
soon be acquiring. However, whatever the reasons for their attachment to the KDG the 
men of 11H were, on the night of 30/31 March, out on an all night reconnaissance patrol 
observing enemy activity.  Their orders were to keep watch on the German troops who 
had occupied their former accommodation in the old fort at El Agheila.  
836
                                                 
834 Forty, Armies of Rommel, p. 117. 
  From the top of a sand dune they duly observed the fort and all seemed to 
be quiet and looked to remain so. Therefore they decided to go and eat and then, if it 
remained quiet, get some sleep. On their return to the car their driver, ‘Private Felton, 
835 Paul Carell, The Foxes of the Desert: translated from the German by Mervyn Savill (London: 
Macdonald, 1960) p. 8. 
836 ibid 
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had prepared a concoction of exotic food that even now, months after first tasting it, 
remained unusual fare for young Britons: captured Italian spaghetti, tinned cherries and 
Parmesan cheese. Felton had filled every spare space in the armoured car with these 
luxuries on 7 February when Benghazi had fallen’.837
     After their meal the men huddled in their blankets under the armoured car and went 
to sleep. Their sleep, however, was soon rudely interrupted. ‘The clank of tank tracks... 
Then silence and an oath. Fred Miller was on the alert, but there was no need for him to 
wake the others. Clark, too, was peering out from under the scout car. They lay on their 
bellies and stared ahead at the mighty shadows, which rattled as they moved. They 
heard shouts. “Tanks,” whispered Miller, “German tanks.”’
   
838
     Lieutenant Clark’s patrol had been spotted by elements of Colonel Freidrich 
Albrich’s 5th Panzer Regiment on their way to Brega on the southern track.  In record 
time the four men were back in the armoured car and Felton roared off into the early 
morning gloom and safety. ‘Dawn began to break on an historic morning. “German 
tanks on the coastal road” James Clarke shouted to the commander of a reconnaissance 
unit which lay in front of Brega’.
    
839
    As the Germans were carrying out these early morning manoeuvres the British were 
also up early. From their base at Maaten Bettafal approximately five miles in rear of 
their Brega positions, at first light on 31 March, HQ 3AB ordered a small patrol to be 
sent forward to Maaten Giofer. Whether this patrol was sent as a result of Clark’s 
warning or was just a routine patrol to watch the passes through the salt marshes and 
sand seas to the south of the Via Balbia and to observe the road itself, is not clear. No 
  Once they had lost the pursuing German tanks 
Clark raised the alarm with the first allied unit he came across, however, by this time 
other watchers on the desert floor were also aware of the German presence. 
                                                 
837 Lyman, p. 91.    
838 Carell, p. 8.   
839 ibid  
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mention of the alarm being sounded is found in either war diary. However, whatever the 
reason the patrol headed out westward into the salt marshes. This small British force 
consisted of six Cruiser tanks from ‘A’ Squadron 5 RTR commanded by Major T. K. D. 
Pritchett and two KDG Patrol groups each made up of three armoured cars belonging to 
‘A’ Troop KDG. No 1 Patrol being commanded by Lt Budden and No 2 Patrol 
commanded by Lt Whetherly.840
     Once underway, however, it was not long before two of the Cruisers developed 
mechanical problems and had to return to base. The remaining four tanks and the 
armoured cars carried on with their mission. The surviving Cruisers and No 2 Patrol 
headed west for Maaten Giofer while No 1 Patrol moved north towards the Via 
Balbia.
  
841
     As this encounter was taking place Lt Budden the commander of No 1 Patrol
  Having reached the Maaten Giofer area Pritchett also turned his force north. 
This placed Pritchett on a direct collision course with the German armour heading south 
which had just had its brush with Clark. The two groups met, according to the war diary 
of 1 KDG, at about 6:30 a.m. This meeting instigated a sharp little fire fight with both 
sets of tanks and the armoured cars firing enthusiastically at each other but with no 
discernable result.  
842
                                                 
840 War Diary of 1 KDG  WO 169/1384 
, 
some miles to the north/east of the Maaten Giofer battle, reported to Pritchett that he 
could see vehicles moving east on the Via Balbia. This was, in fact, the main German 
Battle Group heading for Brega although neither Budden nor Pritchett probably realised 
this at the time. This news prompted Pritchett to break off from fighting the southern 
group. His intention seems to have been to move up towards the Via Balbia via the 
tracks they had already reconnoitred through the salt marshes and come up in rear of the 
German column on the Via Balbia.  Budden, in an effort to conform to this plan, also 
841 Heckmann, p. 67. 
842 ibid 
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moved his Patrol through the salt marshes towards the German column on the road. 
While the British armour was carrying out this manoeuvre the German tanks on the 
Agheila/Giofer track turned east and continued their advance towards Brega.   
     In the marshes Budden and his cars were now drawing closer to the German column 
on the road. As he got closer however he soon realised that the column was far too 
strong for him to attack even with the rest of the Troop. The German and Italian column 
which Budden had discovered was, in fact, composed of over 2,000 wheeled vehicles 
and some 200 tanks and stretched for nearly twenty miles. Although Budden did not 
know how strong the column was at the time he realised that it was a substantial 
convoy. Consequently he radioed this information back to Pritchett, who, after digesting 
this information, decided to break off the pursuit and report back to HQ.  
     However, just as Pritchett was deciding what to do next some of the German tanks 
he had engaged earlier arrived on the scene.843  This prompted a resumption of the fight 
which had started earlier. Again, however, the engagement did not last long. Shortly 
after battle commenced, according to the war diary,844 one of Whetherly’s armoured 
cars was hit and destroyed and one of Pritchett’s Cruisers was hit on the turret ring and 
consequently could not move its gun.845
     This concluded 1 KDGs involvement in the battle for Brega. Why they were not sent 
back into the salt marshes in strength, perhaps with the 3 portee Bofors anti-tank guns 
of ‘J’ Squadron 3 RHA is left unrecorded. The appearance of thirty armoured cars and 
  This prompted Pritchett to withdraw from the 
battle and his tanks and Whetherly’s remaining cars retreated back to Brega. Budden 
and his Patrol were left in the salt marshes to watch the road. Subsequently they sent 
back many most valuable reports on enemy activity until they themselves withdrew 
later in the day.  
                                                 
843 War Diary of 1 KDG  WO 169/1384 
844 ibid 
845 War Diary of  5 RTR WO 169/1414 
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three anti-tank guns, which were equipped with white phosphorous shells which were 
deadly to soft skinned vehicles, might, in its self, have been enough to halt the 
German/Italian attack. However, no such orders were given. Consequently 1 KDG now 
spent, apart from Budden and his Patrol in the marshes, the rest of the day as passive 
observers of the battle not participants. They eventually withdrew completely with other 
retreating units later that evening.846
     As the skirmish between the armoured cars was being fought out in the salt marshes 
the German infantry and guns on the road were closing up to their jump off areas in 
front of Brega. The main German force of guns, tanks and infantry formed up on the 
south side of the Mineizla salt marsh. They assembled on solid ground around Maaten 
Bescer which, as mentioned, was about 2,000 yards in front of Cemetery Hill. However, 
a smaller force composed of Machine Gun Battalion 2 with some engineers and anti-
tank gunners approached Brega on an even more southern track. This group, however, 
failed to reach Brega as they were delayed most of the day trying to negotiate the 
adverse going south of the Mineizla.
   
847
     The first contact between the Germans who had advanced down the Via Balbia and 
the British forces deployed in front of Brega occurred when the German forward troops 
advanced from Maaten Bescer. At about 8:00 a.m. the carriers of ‘C’ Company 
commanded by Jack Andrews were attacked by a combined force of armoured cars, 
motor cycle troops and tanks.
   
848
                                                 
846 Heckmann, p. 67. 
  This confrontation caused the outnumbered and out 
gunned Andrews and his carriers to retreat back behind Cemetery Hill. Andrews’s 
withdrawal allowed the Germans to close up to Cemetery Hill on the seaward side and 
gave them clear observation of the British positions in front of Brega.   
847 Playfair, p. 25.  
848 Hastings, p. 63.   
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     Occurring simultaneously with the attack from Maaten Bescer on Andrews; the 
Germans also deployed troops into the sand dunes north of the road. Corporal Otto 
Ruprecht, who was in charge of a German machine gun section, moved his men forward 
through the sand dunes and established them in positions about half a mile west of 
Brega. While Ruprecht and his men were making their advance through the sand dunes 
the German artillery men were busy setting up their guns in positions in rear of the 
infantry.  
     Once the guns were set up the order was quickly given to open fire.849  The shells 
from the German artillery slammed into the buildings of the village blowing them to 
pieces and setting many on fire. German shells also fell on the British trenches in front 
of Brega. On the receiving end of these shells were the men of ‘B’ company and their 
supporting machine gunners. 2nd Lieutenant David Hurst-Brown’s platoon was badly 
hit, several men were killed or wounded and two of the machine guns were knocked out 
completely by direct hits.850
     Shortly after the artillery opened up the air filled with German dive-bombers. ‘Stuka 
dive-bombers climbed towards the top of the sky, paused, and plummeted like diving 
hawks screaming in elemental fury at the town’.
  
851  The British infantrymen ran through 
the exploding rubble strewn streets looking for cover. Next ‘German machine guns 
began chattering like angry woodpeckers. Desperate enemy soldiers were scrambling to 
find shelter from searching bullets and pirouetting like drunken ballet dancers when 
shot. The rattling guns continued sweeping the township with deadly fire’.852
                                                 
849 Otto Ruprecht http//:www.thecheers.org/…/article-2374-Mersa-El-Brega.html-United States 
  This 
initial softening up of the British outpost on Cemetery Hill and the positions in front of 
the village lasted for nearly an hour.  
850 David Hurst-Brown, Interview 14 January 2011. 
851 Otto Ruprecht 
852 ibid 
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     Then at about 9:00 a.m. the men of the outpost company on Cemetery Hill saw 
enemy armour advancing towards them. At 9:20 a.m. 104 RHA HQ intercepted a 
message from HQ 2SG informing them that they could now see armoured fighting 
vehicles and lorries approaching. These German forces were most likely the engineers 
of Ponath’s Machine Gun Battalion 8.853  At 9:25 a.m. HQ 2SG now reported that they 
had received information, probably from Budden, that 200 AFVs were moving east of 
Cheduet El Adem on the Via Balbia. The report added that 5 AFVs and 4 lorries were 
moving east 6 miles west of Brega. This report is obviously incorrect as it would have 
put the Germans into the HQ area of 2SG. What the diarist is almost certainly reporting 
is the German tank detachment south of Brega emerging through the Seghira/Suera gap. 
This report was followed at 9:30 a.m. by more news on enemy activity from the 104 
RHA observation post on Cemetery Hill. They reported that they could now see enemy 
troops on a strip of white sand about three miles from their observation post.854
     The Germans had now brought forward enough troops and guns to make a concerted 
attempt to take Cemetery Hill. Advancing from both the sand dunes and up the road 
supported by their artillery and Stuka attacks the German troops slowly forced the 
defenders to evacuate their positions on Cemetery Hill. At 10:15 a.m. ‘A’ company  of 
9RB retreated back to the main defensive positions in front of the village. They left 
behind the observer of 104 RHA, one platoon of infantry and the carriers to delay the 
Germans. These troops somehow managed to hold on for a further half hour.  
  
     At 10:40 a.m. the 104 RHA observer, via a request from the infantry commander, 
asked for artillery support to help cover the final evacuation of Cemetery Hill. This is 
the first recorded intervention from the guns of 104 RHA. They now fired three times 
onto Cemetery Hill 50 rounds per gun.855
                                                 
853 Schmidt, p. 27. 
  It is unclear how many guns were involved in 
854 War Diary 104 RHA WO 169/1431 
855 ibid 
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this shoot but if it was a Regimental shoot this would indicate that 800 rounds of high 
explosive shells hit Cemetery Hill. This bombardment by the 25 pdrs was for the 
German troops underneath it ‘unpleasantly accurate. Two Panzer attacks were thrown 
back. Although the high-explosive shells were ineffective against the German armour, 
direct hits were enough to tear the tracks off the bogeys and to give the crews a nasty 
shaking’.856
     In an effort to silence the British guns Streich ordered in another air raid by Stuka 
dive-bombers.
   
857  For the British gunners this must have been a frustrating and 
terrifying experience as they had nothing to fight off the dive-bombers.  It will be 
remembered that all the anti-aircraft guns available were deployed away from the actual 
fighting area. Consequently when the dive bombers left the German infantry pressed 
home their attack. Despite the strength of the shoot and the resilience of the gunners 
they failed to stop the Germans occupying the Cemetery Hill positions. This German 
victory had, however, not been won easily.  Although the British did not know it the 
Germans were at this stage becoming extremely apprehensive about their chances of 
taking Brega. The resistance had been far stronger than they had anticipated. Indeed 
there is evidence which suggests that had a coordinated counterattack been organised by 
the British with infantry, artillery and tanks, which were all available in the near 
vicinity, then the Germans might have been repulsed.858
     The idea of a counterattack was, in fact, contemplated by Brigadier Latham. 
Although no record survives of exactly when Latham received the unpleasant news that 
Cemetery Hill had fallen we do know that once he had the information he reacted 
quickly. At 10:45 a.m. it is noted in the war diary of 104 RHA that ‘Brigadier wants 
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Cemetery Hill reoccupied’.859
     With the positions on Cemetery Hill now taken by the German infantry there was a 
short pause while Rommel moved his tanks forward. At about mid day the German 
attack was resumed. German tanks and infantry attacked the main infantry defences 
manned by the remains of the 9RBs in front of Brega. The British infantry, however, 
stood to their guns and a furious fire fight developed. Hurst-Brown and his remaining 
men fired down on the advancing German infantry receiving in return a hail of machine 
gun bullets. Several of Brown’s men were again wounded including Brown himself. A 
bullet hit the wooden stock of his rifle smashing it and sending a splinter through two of 
his fingers.
  It was, however, not to prove possible; the war diary of 
104 RHA announces at 10:50 a.m. that their forward observation post reports that the 
German infantry and tanks are now north of the road in front of Cemetery Hill in some 
force and that there is a considerable amount of transport on the Via Balbia.           
860  It was at this point that ‘C’ Squadron of 5RTs, which had been hurriedly 
added to the defence, now tried to give the hard pressed infantry some help. The British 
tanks engaged Lieutenant-Colonel Albrich’s ‘Panzer Regiment 5, plus some supporting 
Italian M13/40s, and held the German attack’.861
     This encounter may have held the German advance but only temporarily. The event 
is described by A. J. Smithers in his book Rude Mechanicals ‘as the difference between 
an experienced pack of hounds and the inmates of Battersea dogs home’.
   
862  The British 
tanks were out gunned and out numbered and quickly retreated in disorder and 
confusion. The British infantry, however, seem to have viewed this renewed attack with 
little concern. Major Puckle now commanding ‘C’ company reported that his men were 
quite happy and intended to stay where they were.863
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of the British tanks, ineffective though they were, and the resolute resistance of the 
Rifle Brigade infantry and their artillery support, the Germans decided to brake off their 
attack.  
     From just after 12:00 p.m. until about 2:00 p.m. both sides seem to have undertaken 
a regrouping exercise. However, ‘at 2: 00 p.m. another German attack was launched, 
this time with the support of several waves of Stuka dive-bombers, but still the British 
held their ground’.864  The Stuka attack was in support of yet another tank attack by 
Panzer Regiment 5. Corporal Gerhard Klaue of No 8 Company was ordered forward to 
take part in this attack. As he moved forward he looked out from the turret of his tank 
‘and spotted his first enemy, a camel which rushed like a wild thing towards the 
German armour. Was this some devilish stratagem of the “Tommy”? Presumably not. 
The beast sheered off and disappeared in a cloud of dust. The Panzers continued to 
advance but they could make no headway against the strongly held British positions’.865   
The German tank attack was held this time by the intervention of the anti-tank guns of 
‘J’ Battery 3 RHA.  Sergeant Finagin tells us that following the Stuka attack his fellow 
gunner, Freddie Ellis, and he; ‘stopped the first three tanks and were credited with being 
the first people to destroy German tanks in North Africa’.866
     At 15:05 p.m. Brigadier Latham ordered the guns of 104 RHA to shift the tanks of 
5th Light Division which had halted in front of the Rifle Brigade’s positions. The 
ensuing artillery barrage forced the German tanks to withdraw and encouraged Latham 
to again consider a counterattack. At 15:25 p.m. he instructed the guns of 104 RHA to 
be prepared to follow up the infantry as and when they advance. However, this 
counterattack was never allowed to develop. Information soon arrived which informed 
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Latham that his defensive positions in the sand dunes were being attacked by both tanks 
and infantry.  
     ‘Unfortunately for the British Rommel had not been inactive during the morning. 
Sensing that the frontal assault was getting nowhere, he had earlier personally 
reconnoitred an attack route through the sand dunes along the coast which formed the 
northern flank of the British position’.867  The Germans now put in a concerted attack 
through the sand dunes to the north of the village with both ground troops and yet 
another dive bombing attack. The attack was made by Lieutenant–Colonel Ponath’s 8th 
Machinegun Battalion shortly after 16:00 p.m. His men moved through the sand-dunes 
to the north of the coastal road and then moved rapidly to out flank the British 
positions.868
     Wolf Heckmann describes this assault thus; ‘the attack by well trained foot soldiers, 
who made skilful use of the cover provided by the sand dunes, made obsolete the old-
fashioned British book of rules, which was based on the assumption of an orderly, tidy 
battlefield, with neatly separated lines, on which one had especially to beware of being 
outflanked, let alone encircled’.
   
869  This level of assault was becoming too heavy for the 
few hard pressed British infantry. They had already taken considerable casualties, and 
were, as Heckmann points out, in danger of being outflanked.  A situation no British 
unit of the time would wish to find itself in. Consequently at about 16:30 p.m., Shipton, 
fearing that he was about to be outflanked or overrun, or both, ordered his rifle 
company’s to start withdrawing. As Heckmann observes; ‘today one can venture the 
opinion that this advance was one of the most fateful of the African campaign’.870
     However, in a last ditch effort to rescue the situation Latham decided to ask 
Rimington for the rest of 5 RTRs tanks, and any other tanks available, to be sent 
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forward to mount a counterattack. At about 17:30 p.m. Latham requested that ‘3AB 
should attack the German right flank. Gambier-Parry, however, responded that there 
would be insufficient time to get them into action from their present position before 
dark’.871  Gambier-Parry did not want his armour fighting at night. This decision 
effectively ended the defence of Brega and as the evening darkness approached the 
battered remnants of 9RB, 5RTs, 1 KDG, 104 RHA, ‘Y’ Coy 1NF and ‘J’ Battery 3 
RHA began to beat a hasty retreated. Sergeant Finagin, for instance, ‘retired quickly in 
the evening as both of his guns were outflanked and amid transport of the Troop, 15-
cwts, burning from the Stuka raid, he occupied an intermediate position between Brega 
and Agedabia’.872
     The contribution of Rimington’s 3AB to the defence had been, as might be expected, 
virtually none existent. A fact that Rimington himself seems to have realised. Brigadier 
John Combe the former commander of 11H who had arrived in the forward areas not 
long after Brega fell says that he found Rimington ‘sitting in his staff car crying with his 
head in his hands. Gambier-Parry told Combe later that Rimington had lost his nerve at 
the end of the first war and that he had no faith in him and should have displaced him 
around Mersa Brega, but was sorry for him’.
  Hurst-Brown and his men were not so fortunate. In the darkness 
Brown and his men left their trench and made for the road. In the gloom they saw a 
soldier which they took to be British and approached the man. Unfortunately he turned 
out to be German and he and his colleagues quickly took Brown and his men prisoner. 
By the time the remnants of 9RB reached safety only three hundred and fifty of the 
original eight hundred answered the roll call as present. 
873
     The defenders had fought all day virtually unaided, the only extra support they had 
gained was from the attack by the ramshackle tanks of 5 RTR. They had thwarted the 
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attacks of an enemy at least six times their number. It truly was an heroic stand which 
so nearly held the German onslaught. However, ultimately the defence failed and the 
Germans were now through the Mersa el Brega defile. ‘Although penetration was only 
achieved on a limited front, the British 2nd Armoured Division’s support group began to 
withdraw, and from that moment on the campaign was lost. In two weeks the Afrika 
Korps clawed back what Wavell had taken two months to achieve - except a besieged 
Tobruk’.874
     With all the above being said, however, Brigadier Latham and his men, acquitted 
themselves with honour. Indeed even though his forces were so meagre and his 
resources inadequate he fought the battle with skill and tenacity. Also needing 
recognition for their determination and courage are Colonel Shipton’s 9th Battalion the 
Rifle Brigade. They fought almost single handily for the whole day and so nearly held 
the German advance. One can only wonder how much more successful Latham and 
Shipton might have been had they had even a small reinforcement.  Therefore the 
question must be asked, and will form the bases of the next section of the work, could 
even a modest reinforcement have been provided for the defenders of Brega? 
   
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
It is self-evident that it is the defender who primarily benefits from the terrain. His 
superior ability to produce surprise by virtue of the strength and direction of his own 
attack stems from the fact that the attack has to approach on road and paths on which it 
can easily be observed; the defenders position, on the other hand, is concealed and 
virtually invisible to his opponent until the decisive moment arrives. Carl von 
Clausewitz, On War.875
 
    
What might have been: This section will review what the British could have done to 
repulse the German attack on 31 March. The chapter will commence with a review of 
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the basic requirements needed to maintain a force in battle worthy condition. Reviews 
will be made of water, food, fuel, ammunition, dumps and transport. Having established 
the availability of material resources the chapter will move on to detail what forces 
could be made available to the defence. The chapter will then detail the availability of 
armoured cars, anti-aircraft guns, artillery, machine gun and infantry battalions. Once 
the status of these units has been established additional forces such as armour and 
aircraft will be reviewed.      
      
THERE WAS NOTHING INEVITABLE ABOUT DEFEAT AT BREGA 
As can be seen from the evidence presented in the previous chapter the German 
breakthrough of the British defences at Brega was by no means an easy undertaking for 
the German and Italian forces involved. As it was it took Rommel all he could 
realistically throw at the defenders to force the British infantry and artillery from their 
positions. Indeed had 9RBs ‘D’ company and ‘M’ Battery of 3 RHA been moved 
forward, for example, as they undoubtedly could have been, then it is highly debatable 
whether the breakthrough would have occurred at all on 31 March?876
     The above being said, therefore, this section of the work will seek to establish how 
many extra men, guns and tanks could have realistically been deployed to Brega if they 
could, in fact, be found. In an effort to quantify what deployments where possible the 
work will initially seek to establish the scope and availability of the six major elements 
required to form a creditable and sustainable defence at Brega, that is water, food, 
ammunition, fuel, transport, and of course, competent, fully equipped and suitably 
armed, combat units.  
  
     This section of the work will therefore commence with a review of the water 
requirements pertaining to any stand which might be made at Brega. In this regard an 
examination will be made of the general water situation in the Western Desert taking 
into account the measures which had already been taken to supply the original advance 
with water. This will be followed by a more focused review of the water resources 
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available in the region of Brega itself. Finally this section of the work will examine unit, 
and individual, water provision. 
     Having established the extent and availability of the water resources available the 
work will seek to establish what food resources were available and to what extent these 
could be made available to any troops which might be deployed to the Brega positions. 
The food review will consider various aspects of military rations including normal 
British military food stuffs, captured Italian rations and locally produced foods meat, 
fruit and vegetables etc.  
     In regard to ammunition and mines the work will review the availability of standard 
British ammunition, rifle rounds, high explosive shells and armour piercing shot. The 
use and availability of captured guns and ammunition will also be scrutinised. In regard 
to mines the extent, quality and availability of these vital munitions will be evaluated.  
     The availability and accessibility of fuel will be scrutinised from several 
perspectives. The overall fuel situation will be reviewed with attention being paid to the 
extent and organisational arrangements the British had in place at the time of the Brega 
defence. With regard to the amount and availability of fuel in the Brega area the work 
will seek to establish where stocks were situated and to what extent they were needed in 
the defence of Brega.          
     In regard to getting food stuffs to the troops in the Brega positions, and indeed in the 
supply of general war requirements (ammunition), (mines), (guns), (clothing), (spare 
parts) and the multifarious needs of combat troops, the various methods of getting such 
supply’s forward will be explored. The main methods of ongoing supply, if required, 
will be reviewed including motorised haulage and sea bound cargos.     
     Once the availability of water, food, general combat requirements, and a satisfactory 
delivery system, have been established the work will move on to review what if any 
additional combat resources, infantry, armour, artillery and aircraft, could or could not 
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have been made available to defend the Brega position. Indeed this section of the work 
will seek to establish why authors such as John Strawson could come to the conclusion 
that ‘there was no grip, no mobile striking force worth the name, and nothing in reserve 
to improve the situation’.877  Put simply this section of the work will seek to establish 
the veracity of Wavell’s claim that he could not adequately defend Brega because he 
had ‘nothing left in the bag’.878
WATER 
  
Perhaps the first thing to be said about the supply of water for men and machines  
fighting in the Western Desert is that their needs vary wildly throughout the year as 
temperatures rise and fall with the seasons.879 ‘Troops operating in the Western Desert, 
for example, had to contend with extreme heat by day and near-freezing cold by night 
as a matter of course, as well as sand storms that reduced visibility to zero and the 
Khamsin, a hot wind blowing from the Sahara between February and June that routinely 
raised the temperature to in excess of 140 degrees Fahrenheit’.880  Such extreme 
temperatures made even routine patrolling an arduous task and forced all combatants to 
adopt strict water discipline.881
     In the summer months in North Africa, as might be expected, water consumption for 
both men and machines is always at its highest. However, in the winter months, 
particularly at night, temperatures in the desert drop remarkably low reducing water 
consumption drastically.
 
882
                                                 
877 Strawson, The Battle for North Africa, p. 52. 
  As the defence of Brega was in February and March, both 
normally cold months in the desert, it will be realised that water, although still very 
important to the British soldier for brewing up his tea, was not in as greater demand as it 
878 Connell, p. 386. 
879 Kershaw, p. 140.  
880 Buckingham,  p. 58.  
881 Leakey & Forty, 1999, p. 15. Leakey gives a first hand account of how vital water discipline was to 
survival in the desert.  
882 Farran, p. 39.  
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would have been if the defence of Brega had taken place in summer. January and 
February, 1941, were, in fact, colder and wetter than previous average months, whereas 
March saw a marked improvement in the weather with hot days but still extremely cold 
nights.  
     Moreover, the level of water consumption in the desert is always dictated by the 
amount of movement a force is asked to undertake. Again, as might be expected, men 
and machines consume far more water when they are on the move. Physical exertion, 
even in cool weather, makes men thirsty. Travelling over even short distances in the 
desert often caused the vehicles of the time to overheat and consequently to lose water.  
On the other hand static or defensive positions, once prepared, require little physical 
effort to maintain them and consequently the men manning them require less water, 
especially if they can find cover out of the sun.  
     So what did this add up to in terms of water consumed per-man in North Africa?  
Harry Buckledee, a soldier with the 11th Hussars in the desert in June 1940, recalled his 
experiences thus; ‘water was in very short supply in the early days, with strict rationing 
of four pints per man per day. Not very much when you consider the heat, and that 
vehicle radiators had to be topped up out of the ration. The order was given, no washing 
or shaving, so we all grew beards and were filthy. We learned to shave and have a wash 
in a pint of water’.883  As the RASC historian confirms; men in the desert could survive 
on a water ration; ‘which often did not exceed three quarters of a gallon per-day for 
long periods and sometimes dropped to half a gallon’.884  Indeed Roy Farran a tank 
commander with 3rd Hussars comments that the normal ration throughout Operation 
Compass was half a gallon per man each day.885
                                                 
883 Neillands, p. 43.  
     
884 The Institution of the Royal Army Service Corps, p. 124. 
885 Farran, p. 62. 
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     There are several points of relevance to this work which need to be noted from 
Buckledee’s comments. Firstly it should be noted that Buckledee was in an active unit, 
that is to say a moving and fighting unit, in June, one of the hottest summer months, not 
March one of the coolest. As he says because he was in an active unit the trucks had to 
be kept moving, and if they needed water then they got it out of the men’s ration if there 
was no alternative source of supply.  Nonetheless, we may see that even in an active 
moving unit in one of the hottest months of the year men and machines could, for a 
limited time at least, function and fight on four pints of water per-day.      
     When this ration level is scaled up we may see that even in hot weather a moving 
unit of say one thousand men (a reinforced infantry battalion) could be kept in the field 
on 500 gallons of water per-day. That is less than the contents of one standard British 
Army water bowser.886
     Although water was short and re-supply difficult in the early months of the desert 
war as time went by the troops learned how to make the most of the water they had and 
exploit any water resources that came their way. Units and individual soldiers, quite 
quickly, learnt how to conserve water and to find ways to carry extra water with them. 
Evidence confirms that by the winter of 1940/41 most British soldiers had solved in 
great measure many of their personal water problems, quite independently of the War 
  The level of demand for water is obviously even lower when 
we look at the needs of men and machines in a defensive location such as the one found 
at Brega. As mentioned in winter water consumption per-man quite naturally goes 
down. When physical exertion is not needed and men can find shade consumption goes 
down even further. When vehicles are not being flogged over desert terrain, indeed used 
hardly at all, consumption also goes down. As has been established men in active units 
could move and fight on four pints of water per-day. But at Brega they did not have to.   
                                                 
886 Bart Vanderveen, Historic Vehicles Directory (London: After the Battle Publications, 1989) p. 166. 
The standard British bulk water carrier in WWII was the Bedford OYC truck which could carry 800 
Imperial Gallons of water. Also in use were Morris Commercial CS8 trucks which could carry 200 
gallons of water. Bart Vanderveen, p. 157. See also A. H. Fernyhough RAOC, p. 119. 
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Department or HQ Cairo.  Photographs of unit vehicles taken at the time clearly show 
tanks and trucks festooned with water bottles and auxiliary water containers.887
     However, although extra water was almost invariably carried by most soldiers in the 
desert, for British soldiers fighting in the Western Desert in early 1941, water soon 
became much less of a problem. As will be remembered the British advance in 
Operation Compass progressed rapidly for the first three days, however, after the first 
three days the advance was almost halted by the removal of 4 IID. This caused a lull in 
the fighting and a period of inaction for the forward British units which remained 
mostly in the open desert. These troops, some twenty thousand strong, now needed to be 
supplied with vast amounts of water or they would have to retreat back to where 
adequate water facilities existed, at least as far back as Mersa Matruh. Wavell could not 
allow this to happen, for reasons already stated; (Churchill’s displeasure) consequently 
this set in motion a series of measures which ensured a secure and permanent water 
supply being established almost as far forward as Tobruk.  
  Not 
only were vehicles carrying extra water so were many individual soldiers. Again it is 
not difficult to find examples of men with extra water bottles about their person.  
     This, as explained earlier, entailed a large amount of work and utilised a vast amount 
of resources. Wells had to be drilled pipelines laid and pumps installed. However, when 
all this work was done a very good water supply system was established which virtually 
eliminated water shortages between Alexandria and Tobruk. After Tobruk was taken the 
water resources available became even greater as the water distillation plant found in 
the town and the wells near the port produced over 40,000 gallons of water per-day.888
                                                 
887 Ian Baxter, Images of War Afrika-Korps (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2008) p. 75. Also Bryan Perrett, 
Allied Tanks in North Africa: World War Two (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1986) Plate 20 and plate 
32.  
   
Furthermore, from Tobruk right forward to Brega there were a succession of village’s, 
towns and even the city of Benghazi, all of which had good, even excellent, water 
888 John Foley, ‘History of the Second World War’ Volume 2 Issue 7 (London: Purnell, 1967) p. 621.   
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resources mostly supplied from the Jebel Akhdar hills. Derna, for example, known as 
‘the pearl of Cyrenaica’, a town of 10,000 inhabitants, had an excellent water supply.889
     Moreover, it will be remembered, that vast quantities of bottled water were 
discovered in the Italian dumps. Furthermore, thousands of Italian water containers, 
cans and bottles, and hundreds of water trucks were captured by the advancing British 
troops.
   
With these water resources available the whole road right up to El Agheila was, in fact, 
well furnished with water points.      
890
     In Greece there was abundant water just for the taking and in March/April 1941, 
because of the terrible winter weather, there was even more water than normal. Indeed 
when 3 RTR arrived in Greece the temperatures fell so low that they were given a snow 
warning. Moreover, the ground almost everywhere was waterlogged and the low ground 
was usually so wet that it became an impassable morass. 
  Nor, by March 1941, had very much of this booty been used or removed 
from the desert. At the conclusion of Compass the bulk of the British forces in the 
Western Desert were withdrawn either to go to Greece or to re-fit in the Delta. 
Consequently most of the bottled water, containers and water trucks were left, more or 
less, where they had originally been found.  In the next theatre of operations for the 
British, Greece, there was little need for either water containers or water trucks.  
891  The 2,600 metre high 
Pindus Mountainous, the spine of Greece, fed numerous rivers and lakes892 which 
because of the winter rains were overflowing. The River Venetikos, for example, which 
Bob Crisp, of 3 RTR, crossed in mid April 1941, was described by him as 
“torrential”.893
                                                 
889 Found in Rommel’s Desert War by Kitchen, p. 77 and taken by him from Siegfried Westphal, Heer in 
Fesseln (Bonn: Athenaum, 1950)    
       
890 Bickers, p. 52. 
891 William Moore, Panzer Bait (London: Leo Cooper, 1991) p. 31. 
892 Bill Willett Editor, Philips New World Atlas (London: Guild Publishing, 1991) p. 39. 
893 Patrick Delaforce, Taming the Panzers (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000) p. 53. 
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     However, none of these external water resources was even remotely necessary at 
Brega. Although the water situation in the village of Brega itself was not good, because 
the Italians, before they left, had polluted the well, the surrounding wells were literally 
overflowing with good clean water. Roy Farran whose unit was patrolling the area 
around Brega in March 1941 had this to say about the water situation he found; ‘most of 
the wells in the foothills were full after the heavy rain and there was no shortage of 
water’.894  This is further confirmed by Hurst-Brown who told the author that they had 
water trucks and that these delivered adequate water for the whole unit on a daily 
basis.895  However, if there was any doubt about the amount of water in the Brega 
region it might be instructive to have Rommel’s views on the subject and the benefits he 
saw in occupying Brega: ‘A further argument in favour of an immediate move was that 
our water supply had recently been so bad that it was essential to open up new wells. An 
operation against Mersa el Brega would give us access to plentiful water-bearing 
land’.896
     The land around the village of Brega could, and did, supply the water requirements 
for thousands of troops. It will be remembered that Rommel’s attacking force, 
comprising of approximately 50,000 men, was supplied from Brega after its capture.
  
897  
Without bringing in a drop of water a reinforced brigade, of say four or five thousand 
men, could be watered with ease from the wells in and around Brega. As Playfair says 
the water at Mersa Brega was plentiful.898
FOOD 
 
Although most soldiers on active service frequently and almost habitually seem to 
complain about their rations, British soldiers being no exception, the rations available to 
                                                 
894 Farran, p. 71. 
895 David Hurst-Brown, Interview 14 January 2011.  
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British troops fighting in North Africa in 1941 were, perhaps surprisingly, more often 
than not, both plentiful and good. There were three primary sources of food available to 
troops fighting in the Western Desert. Firstly there were the food stuffs available in the 
standard British ration packs. Secondly there were food supplies which could be 
obtained locally along the line of march. Thirdly there were the huge stores of supplies 
captured from the enemy.  
     In regard to the provision of British rations these were available in two separate 
formulas. In base areas or areas where there was sufficient time to establish cooking and 
messing facilities for large cohorts of men, permanent or field kitchens were 
established. The food to cook in the base and field kitchens was obtained wherever 
possible from fresh sources. From early 1940 onwards the RASC set in motion a rolling 
programme of schemes which had the objective of sourcing as much fresh food as 
possible from local suppliers. ‘Perhaps the most important of these schemes was the 
growing, in Egypt and Syria, of potatoes, without which the British soldier does not 
consider himself properly fed’.899
     Fresh meat was provided from cattle ranches established in the Sudan.
  Programmes were established to obtain, preserve and 
make available virtually every kind of food stuff the troops in the Middle East might 
require.  Huge farms were established to grow all kinds of fruit and vegetables. Fish 
curing plants were established at Port Said as were jam and marmalade making 
facilities.  
900   Other 
fresh meat including lamb and chicken was obtained from farms in the Delta. In late 
1940 Brigadier Galloway, a staff officer in Cairo wrote to O’Connor suggesting that he 
buy local sheep to feed his troops adding that he could also get ‘dates from Siwa which 
were only 7 Piastres per 4 gallon tin’.901
                                                 
899 The Institution of the Royal Army Service Corps, p. 106. 
  Obviously where there were cattle and 
900 ibid, p. 106. 
901 Liddell Hart Centre, University of London Document Numbers 22/6/09 and 4/2/7  
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chickens there were eggs, milk and cheese and these commodities were supplied to 
troops in huge quantities. Flour, salt, and cooking oil were all easily available and 
consequently bakeries were soon established making fresh bread, biscuits and cakes 
daily.  
     In the field or on active operations obviously alternative arrangements had to be 
made. It was accepted that the supply of fresh food while on active operations would be 
difficult to supply although it has to be said that the RASC did all they could and with 
some success to make bread and hot food available in the most difficult of 
circumstances. When the 1KRRC were on active operations in July 1940, they were 
harassing the Italians around Sollum which was over 400 miles from Cairo; however, 
‘in spite of the great distance and all the consequent difficulties, rations were extremely 
good and never failed to arrive’.902  Capitan Philip Gardener VC, a tank commander in 
the Western Desert in 1941, had this to say about operational rations he and his crew 
received while on a training exercise. ‘Eventually we reached the sea where we made 
camp for the night. We were terribly dusty and sunburnt so we all had a swim before 
getting down to steak and chips. The next morning we were up early and all had a hot 
bath in a sulphur spring. This was followed by a fine egg-and-bacon breakfast’.903
     However, even when the RASC could not provide fresh food, feeding troops far 
from base facilities proved to be relatively easy. Ration packs were issued containing 
‘bully beef and biscuits, with an occasional issue of tinned meat and vegetables. At one 
period all troops were issued with as much as eight ounces of jam and eight ounces of 
rice per day in order to produce a reasonably balanced diet’.
  
904
     The huge canning and food processing plants in Cairo and the Delta produced vast 
quantities of tinned and preserved food stuffs. Tinned beef, bully beef as it was 
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universally known, was available in almost inexhaustible quantities and almost without 
exception every soldier and vehicle in the Middle East would have stocks of it either in 
the cab or about their person. ‘During the first campaign it was not unusual to have 
bully beef for all three meals each day – fried for breakfast, cold for lunch and stewed 
for supper. This last meal was always good as it was flavoured invariably with tomato 
puree which was captured from the Italians’.905  Hard tack biscuits were also freely 
available and were often mixed with bully beef to make a satisfying stew or with 
condensed milk to make a kind of porridge.906
     Other commodities found in the kitbags and vehicle cabs of most British soldiers 
were tinned jam, bacon, cheese, fish and of course tea, sugar and condensed milk to 
make a brew up. Nor was desert ignored. For desert there were tinned peaches or 
apricots from the U.S. or dates and figs obtained locally. There was, in fact, never a 
sustained period when troops in the Western Desert went without food. As the RASC 
historian proudly boasts; ‘the field service ration scale, as issued in the Middle East, 
proved adequate throughout the war, and when fresh items could not be issued tinned 
equivalents were provided. In spite of tremendous losses at sea and on land there was 
never any real lack of food in the Middle East’.
  
907
     However, standard British rations were by no means the only form of food stuff 
available to men in the Western Desert. Another source of food supply which was 
extensively utilised by troops in the desert was the food stuffs obtained from local 
sources on the line of march. It must be understood that although there were very few 
humans in the desert interior along the coastal strip there were numerous settlements 
whose inhabitants farmed, fished and produced a variety of food stuffs. These 
commodities they were only too glad to either trade or sell to troops. The Jebel Akhdar 
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region, Western Cyrenaica, was extensively cultivated. The Italian colonists of this 
region especially around the port of Benghazi had built roads, railways and the 
considerable farming population produced a large array of foodstuffs.908
     Furthermore, there were indigenous nomadic Arabs who had flocks of both sheep 
and goats which again they were only too happy to trade. Pilots often reported seeing 
Arab tribes living in the most inhospitable terrain ‘it was startling in the midst of this 
barren waste of sand to fly across tents, flocks of sheep and camels’.
    
909   Moreover, 
there was a surprisingly large supply of wild animals which could be eaten. ‘Gazelle 
were plentiful, and casual, very casual, shoots provided some excellent fresh meat’.910
     From these indigenous sources of food unit cooks could and often did source 
excellent food stuffs. Moreover, while this source of extra food was available to some 
degree all along the North African coast, in the Jebel Akhdar area, not much more than 
one hundred miles from Brega, there was the most abundant supply of food stuffs to be 
found just about anywhere along the North African coastline. The Italian settlers had 
harnessed the plentiful water resources available in the Jebel to create large scale 
farming communities and were producing all kinds of fruit and vegetables and raising 
livestock. Most of this produce was used to supply the needs of the major settlements in 
the region such as Barce, Derna and Benghazi. However, when the troops who would 
eventually man the Brega defences arrived in the region there were plenty of surplus 
food stuffs available throughout the Jebel region.  
   
     The other, and potentially the most plentiful and immediate source of food stuffs, 
was the food captured from the retreating Italian forces. As has been noted in previous 
chapters as each of the Italian camps and settlements was captured huge, perhaps vast 
would be a better word, amounts of food were found. As Don West tells us; ‘the 
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extraordinary array of fine vintage wines and fine foods found in Sidi Barrani would not 
have disgraced the shelves and counters of those temples of excellence, Fortnum & 
Mason and Harrods Knightsbridge store.’911   In Tobruk the British captured enough 
tinned food to last the garrison of 27,000 men two months.912
     However, perhaps the most immediate and easily accessible food was the troops own 
hard rations, bully beef, biscuits and all the other tinned and dried food stuffs issued to 
British troops. These supplies were available in great quantity both in the many dumps 
which had been established to support the O’Connor advance and in the vehicles and 
kitbags of the new troops coming into the desert.  
  In the Italian motor 
convoy captured at Beda Fomm there were hundreds of tons more of food, including 
dried pasta, tinned meat, olive oil, tomatoes and tomato puree, to mention but a few of 
the commodities acquired. Moreover, and of great importance to the defenders in the 
later siege of Tobruk, there were extensive refrigeration facilities for preserving food 
stuffs found intact in Tobruk. As can be seen therefore there was generally no shortage 
of food available to British troops fighting in the Western Desert. More specifically to 
the men garrisoning the defences at Brega this general rule, of adequate food supplies, 
because of the closeness of the captured Beda Fomm convoy, was even more 
applicable. 
     Indeed most troops in the desert especially in the forward areas where there was the 
likelihood of surprise attack disliked central feeding stations. Therefore, alternative 
methods of messing had to be found ‘the most popular, for both tactical reasons and 
with the troops themselves, was to cook on a ‘vehicle’ basis. This meant in, say, the 
case of a tank, the crew of three or four, but there was very great variety in the size of 
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messes’.913  It is perhaps interesting to note here that while British troops were well 
catered for in the field German troops had far less appetizing food to eat.914
     Consequently even working on just crew rations alone it was quite possible to keep 
large numbers of troops in the forward areas for at least a week. However, any troops 
stationed at Brega had no need to fear going short of food and in indeed those that were 
in the garrison did not go short of rations. Indeed Hurst-Brown confirmed that in his 
whole time at Brega food was plentiful and of good quality.
   
915
FUEL 
  Food was plentiful and 
easily accessible, as mentioned the men of 3H ran a bus into Benghazi each day to get 
fresh food. Moreover, there were stockpiles of food both British and captured available 
no more than a few hours drive away.           
The evidence supporting the availability of adequate fuel supplies for any forces 
stationed at Brega is as easily satisfied as that of water. It might be said that as with 
water there was so much fuel available locally that none of the units sent to Brega even 
mentions it, and certainly never mentions being short of it.916
     However, as will be recalled initially there had been significant problems with 
moving the fuel from the refineries and storing bulk fuel in strategically beneficial 
locations. These problems were in great measure solved with the establishment of the 
Jebel Dave scheme which by the time war came to the Middle East in mid 1940 allowed 
 There were several 
reasons for this abundance. Prior to the outbreak of the war the British had gained 
control of the huge production facilities in Iran and Iraq from which they could produce 
literally millions of gallons of fuel as and when they required it.       
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the British to transport and stockpile bulk fuel close to their military concentrations in 
the Egyptian Delta. From the bulk storage facilities in the Delta millions of gallons were 
driven and shipped forward to support the advances made in Operation Compass. This 
level of supply was made possible by the establishment of dedicated petrol units. The 
first of these units had arrived in the Middle East in August 1940 and from this point 
onwards new units arrived in an almost continuous stream. By August 1941 there were 
more than a dozen petrol depots, two base filling centres and two storage companies.917
     When Operation Compass unexpectedly stopped in early February and the level of 
movement reduced the volumes of fuel consumed also reduced. The fuel tap, which up 
until this time had been turned full on, took some time to staunch. Indeed the tap was, in 
fact, never turned off fully and fuel continued to be brought to the forward areas far in 
excess of what, because of the suspension of combat missions, was now being 
consumed. Moreover, because of better handling and packing techniques of the 4-gallon 
flimsy cans more fuel containers were arriving in the convoys still full of fuel.   
     
     Consequently in the forward dumps and at the port facilities vast piles of fuel cans 
began to accumulate. In Tobruk, for example, prior to the German advance, large 
quantises of fuel had been stockpiled.918  This abundance of fuel also applied to the 
stocks in the forward dumps. Indeed after the German breakthrough at Brega there are 
numerous reports from retreating units commenting on the many burnt out fuel depots 
and tankers they came across in the rear areas.919
     Moreover, vast stocks of captured fuel, both diesel and petrol, were found in most of 
the towns and of course in the ten mile long Italian column taken at Beda Fomm. This 
fuel was for the same reasons as those mentioned above also now not being consumed. 
There were virtually no mobile troops left in the forward areas by late March to use all 
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this fuel anyway. The Sixth Australian Division began its return in mid February and 
the whole Australian Corps HQ was on the road to Egypt by 25 February.920
     Indeed the main reason the mobile forces eventually sent to the forward areas, such 
as 3AB, were ultimately to become short of fuel after the Germans attacked was 
because it was destroyed to prevent it falling into enemy hands.
   
921  For example on 3 
April a detachment of Free French troops stationed at Msus the main forward area fuel 
depot, mistaking a group of approaching British tanks and Long Range Desert Group 
troops to be German, set fire to millions of gallons of stockpiled fuel.922  The burning of 
stored fuel at Msus was followed by similar incidents at most of the British fuel dumps 
the last of these being the huge dump at Mechili which Gambier-Parry himself ordered 
destroyed on 8 April.923
     The above being said it must be asked what level of demand for fuel could a static 
command established in a defensive location need. The answer must be very little which 
perhaps confirms why no mention, in the many accounts referenced, refers to a shortage 
of fuel by any of the units stationed at Brega. Indeed 1 KDG, who were operating 
armoured cars which could only manage about 5 miles to the gallon, had enough fuel to 
not only mount daily reconnaissance but also to establish their own fuel supply depot in 
rear of the Brega defensive position.
  Had the Germans been held at Brega the ensuing panic in the 
British rear areas would not have occurred and the fuel would consequently have been 
available to fuel vehicles re-supplying the forward troops.  
924
     As for the rest of the garrison using fuel it will be recalled that most of them did not 
even arrive at Brega until just a week before the Germans attacked, and made no 
significant movement apart from short range patrolling, until they withdrew on 31 
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March. It will also be noted that when the garrison did withdraw they had enough fuel 
to transport themselves the 400 miles back to Tobruk. Had a decision been made which 
would have enabled the garrison at Brega to be doubled or even tripled in the last week 
of March, or even earlier, there is nothing to suggest that these forces would have been 
prevented from deploying, or of being sustained, through lack of fuel.   
AMMUNITION/MINES 
There was, as we shall see, enough ammunition to supply the needs of thousands of 
rifles, hundreds of artillery pieces and enough mines to sow a mine field eight miles 
wide and as deep as required should it be deemed necessary. Starting with artillery 
shells we may look to three primary sources of ammunition. As has been mentioned 
when the O’Connor advance came to a standstill in early February the supply echelons 
did not just suddenly come to a halt. Ammunition such as artillery shells had been 
ordered forward in huge quantities to support any advance that might be made on 
Tripoli. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the ammunition brought forward was 
returned to the Delta.      
     These shells were unloaded in most of the ports that had been captured. In Tobruk, 
for example, a quarter of a million artillery shells had been stockpiled before the 
Germans attacked.925  With the cancellation of the advance these shells were not used, 
consequently at the time of the German attack hundreds of thousands of artillery shells 
were available in the ports and forward dumps. This also applied to rifle and machine 
gun ammunition. Aside from the ammunition each soldier carried and the stocks held in 
reserve at unit level there were also millions of rounds stashed in the various dumps. 
There was no reported shortage of ammunition of any kind at Brega.926
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the Germans overran the Brega position and then captured the dumps they found plenty 
of petrol, vehicles and ammunition.927
     Furthermore, there were thousands of rounds of captured Italian ammunition to 
supply the many useful Italian weapons taken. Although many of the Italian weapons 
were inferior to their British counterparts there were at least two types of Italian guns 
which all sides coveted, the 20 mm Breda Heavy Machine gun and the Italian anti-
aircraft guns. Many units helped themselves to these weapons whenever they found 
them and the RAOC, as they occupied the Italian ammunition dumps, quickly 
established a system of ammunition distribution. They requested that units wanting 
refills of ammunition for these guns should simply produce an example.
  
928  The quantity 
of the Italian ammunition available to allied units may be gauged by the over 4,000 tons 
of Italian ammunition detonated by the British in Benghazi shortly after the Germans 
broke through at Brega.929
     In regard to mines there were so many available that suggesting that there were none 
available for Brega flies in the face of reality. As mentioned earlier a huge minefield 
had been laid at El Agheila which could quite easily have been transferred to Brega. 
Moreover, by this time mines made in the UK were now being sent to Egypt. To these 
existing and newly arriving munitions there were also those made in Egypt to be added. 
The Royal Engineers produced over one hundred and fifty thousand very powerful 
mines prior to the German attack.
   
930  However, as before, the most plentiful supply of 
mines was the millions captured from the Italians. These were found around all their 
defensive locations and also captured unused in stores.931
                                                 
927 Neillands, p. 67. 
   
928 Fernyhough, p. 143. 
929 Irving, p. 70.  
930 Fernyhough, p. 119. 
931 Forty, Victory Desert Triumph, p 165. Plate 3 Photograph of lifted Italian Mines.  
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     However, although there was an abundance of mines available to the defenders of 
Brega they failed to fully mine the position. Indeed no evidence can be found that any 
of the senior commanders even considered ordering minefields to be laid. Had Wavell, 
Neame, Gambier-Parry or even Latham ordered Brega to be fully mined then evidence 
suggests that there were the mines available to adequately cover the whole position.     
     Therefore, as can be seen from the above there was no shortage of ammunition or 
mines in the Brega vicinity. Moreover, none of the units already at Brega when the 
Germans attacked or the units sent forward when it was too late to help mentions being 
short of ammunition.  
DUMPS 
As for how all these stores might be made available to the men defending Brega we 
must look to the location of the dumps, storage facilities and unit allocations. As has 
been mentioned virtually all the towns and villages between Tobruk and Brega 
contained stores of various kinds useful to the defenders of Brega. At Mechili there 
were enormous stocks of food, fuel, clothing and even gin and whiskey.932
     As the O‘Connor advance moved past Tobruk the RAOC, as it had done earlier, 
established a series of Field Supply Depots. These were sited at ‘Mechili and Msus on 
the inland route and Tecnis (north-east of Benghazi) and El Magrun (south of Benghazi) 
on the coast road’.
   In Tobruk 
there were vast stocks of food, water, fuel and ammunition. There were also huge stocks 
of food in Barce; and in Benghazi there was a similar amount of supplies and stores as 
those found in Tobruk. At Beda Fomm there was the enormous column of abandoned 
Italian lorries which were literally bursting with supplies of every kind. However, these 
sources of supply were by no means the only storehouses available to the men at Brega.      
933
                                                 
932 Heckmann,  p. 111.    
  Once the advance came to an end it was realised that at some 
933 Fernyhough, p. 143. 
295 
point it might be resumed and consequently stores continued to be stockpiled in dumps 
such as the one established at Mechili and in the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi. Indeed 
immediately after the Beda Fomm battle the Royal Navy were able to land 2,500 tons of 
petrol and 3,000 tons of other supplies at Benghazi. Moreover, they then guaranteed to 
land double the amount they were currently landing at Tobruk. The Navy’s view on 
supply was that although it would not be easy they were confident that they could 
supply O’Connor’s army of two divisions if they decided to advance on Tripoli.934
     Indeed, as mentioned, supplies and petrol were continuously transported forward by 
the Navy and the road supply convoys and placed in the forward dumps right up to the 
time of the German attack. When 3rd Australian anti-tank gun Regiment arrived in the 
forward areas in early April 1941 they found that the dump at ‘Mechili had been 
established for a force of ten thousand men with rations, petrol and water for thirty 
days’.
  
935  The Mechili dump also contained more luxurious items. When the Italians and 
Germans captured the Mechili dump in early April they were astounded by what they 
found. ‘The Italians, not much pampered in life, were agog at the treasures: tins of 
apricots and ham and – for the lucky visitors to the store of the officers’ mess – gin and 
whiskey. German Warrant Officer Claus Wernicke, covered in sweat arriving straight 
from the desert was the first German to dive into the clothing stores. Here there were 
stacks of the comfortable, ample, well ventilated shirts and underwear worn by the 
desert-wise British’.936
TRANSPORT 
  This dump was established for the exclusive use of 2AD but 
other dumps were established and stocked for general issue.  
So would a lack of transport have curtailed any reinforcement of the Brega position. In 
regard to transport it has to be acknowledged that Neame had very little second, and 
                                                 
934 Raugh, p. 123. 
935 John. N. L. (Silver) Argent, Target Tank (Parramatta: The Committee, 1957) p. 50.  
936 Heckmann, p. 111. 
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even less, third line, transport available for all the troops in his vast command.  
Although it must also be acknowledged that all the units which ultimately went to the 
Brega area were fully mobile with their own first line transport.937
     In regard to second line transport Neame used the little he had to build up stocks of 
supplies in the three main forward dumps O’Connor had established, Barce, Benghazi 
and El Magrun
  Moreover, as we 
shall see shortly, other units which could have been deployed to Brega were not 
debarred from deployment through lack of first line transport.  
938
     The above being said, however, the question might fairly be asked how much second 
or even third line transport did a small static defensive garrison, surrounded by supply 
dumps and sitting on a huge water resource, actually need. The answer must be very 
little. As far as can be ascertained none of the units deployed to Brega complained about 
shortages of food, water, ammunition or fuel. Consequently it must also be assumed that 
they had adequate means of transport to supply their limited needs. Indeed it would be 
strange if they had not enough transport, as aside from their own first line transport they 
had available to them captured vehicles of every shape and size all along the Via Balbia 
right back to Tobruk. Although the Italian commanders had ‘constantly complained 
about their lack of transport, the British were delighted to capture large numbers of  
Italian trucks and then put them to good use, yet there were still plenty left at the end of 
the campaign (total number captured at Beda Fomm was 1,500)’.
 and the forward fuel supply depot at Msus. Neame also had the huge 
dump at Mechili. The Mechili dump had been established by the transport units which 
had supported the O’Connor advance and was thereafter topped up by Neame’s second 
line transport.  
939
                                                 
937 David Hurst-Brown, Interview 14 January 2011. 
    
938 Pitt, The Crucible of War, 1980, p. 251. 
939 Forty, Victory Desert Triumph, p. 35.  
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     It will be remembered that as with evidence provided by 11H, who incorporated 
many captured vehicles into their motor pool, many unit diaries confirm that most units 
stationed between Brega and Tobruk made liberal use of captured Italian transport for 
their own personnel use and for bringing supplies to their units. As Bickers says: 
‘Lorries, staff cars, personnel carriers and motorcycles stood ready for the taking. And 
they were taken. Officers and other ranks drove cars or rode motorcycles between their 
living quarters and the dispersed aircraft, offices and workshop tents’.940
     However, it must be stressed, that Brega was a static command and therefore the 
troops stationed there were not consuming vast amounts of supplies which had to be 
brought forward in huge motor columns. Indeed the trucks which brought Hurst-Brown 
and his men to Brega hardly moved until they were captured by the Germans.
  
941
     Consequently the Brega position could easily support many more men than it did 
when the Germans attacked. The position was as we know held by two under strength 
brigades, the exact number of men holding Brega and the surrounding positions will 
probably never be precisely known, but using the known unit strengths and estimates of 
what manpower units would normally be composed of we can estimate that even on the 
highest estimates there could have been no more than fifteen hundred men in and 
around the village of Brega. Behind the forward troops there were perhaps a further two 
thousand five hundred giving a total of four thousand personnel. This is six thousand 
under what the Mechili dump alone could support for thirty days.  It must therefore be 
made clear here that had Wavell ordered that say three thousand more men be moved to 
  There 
were now not the 30,000 troops between Benghazi and Brega who needed supplying but 
by early March at the most 10,000 and of these most, the two Australian Brigades, 
approximately six thousand men, were stationed adjacent to Benghazi where there were 
almost unlimited supplies available just a few miles from their base.   
                                                 
940 Bickers, p. 52. 
941 David Hurst-Brown, Interview 14 January 2011.  
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Brega there is no doubt that they could have sustained themselves from the various 
sources of supply already in the forward areas, definitely for many weeks and probably 
for many months.     
BUILDING A FORCE TO DEFEND BREGA 
The Brega position would, however, be useless, even with an adequate supply of food, 
water, ammunition, mines, fuel, and the transport to supply it without competent troops 
and suitable weapons to adequately defend it. To make a fight of it, in view of the size 
of the enemy forces known to be assembling in front of it, and accepted by Wavell on 2 
March as being at least one German armoured brigade group, two Italian infantry 
division, and two motor artillery regiments942 plus substantial air forces943
     So what size and composition of forces might have given the British a fighting 
chance of holding Brega?  In order to give the Brega position sufficient width and depth 
to repel a force of the size mentioned above a realistic defence force of at least one 
motorised infantry brigade (three battalions of infantry) would be required. This unit 
would need to be supported by a normal establishment of ancillary units comprising of 
field artillery, anti-tank guns, medium artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Tank support 
would also be useful, both in the static dug in role, and in the more normal mobile role 
to act as a strategic reserve to bolster any part of the defence that might come under 
extreme pressure. Reconnaissance in the form of armoured car regiments would also be 
vital both to warn of approaching danger and to operate in the marshes against the 
supply columns of the enemy. Air support would also be vital on as big a scale as 
 the 
commander of the Brega position would need a variety of military assets.  
                                                 
942 Woollcombe, p. 81. 
943 The Italian/German air forces were in fact not as strong as the British thought. Figures taken from 
British Intelligence in WWII p. 385 reveal that throughout the Mediterranean the Germans had 120 long 
rang bombers, 150 dive bombers and 40 fighters, 310 combat aircraft, this information was received by 
GCHQ Cairo and Wavell at the end of January. However, in Libya the Germans only had about 50 dive 
bombers and 25 fighters to directly support operations in the desert. Taken from John Terrain The Right 
of the Line, p.335. That being said as Wavell was working on the late January figures he knew or thought 
he knew that he would also be facing a large German air force in Libya.  
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resources would allow. All this would need a commander, a brigade head quarters and a 
mobile strategic reserve force of ideally one additional mobile infantry brigade, but 
failing that, as large a reserve as could be mustered.  
     So where was Neame to get such a force?  The answer to this question is that he 
already had most of these resources at his own command. Practically everything Neame 
needed to build the force described above was either already under his direct command 
or sitting idle in the Delta; all he had to do was assemble the various parts.  
ARMOURED CARS 
If we are to start anywhere in the construction of a credible force for the defence of 
Cyrenaica then, perhaps, the first thing we need to consider is the availability of a large 
reconnaissance force of armoured cars. Neame already had, as has been mentioned; an 
armoured car regiment in the Brega area, 1 KDG. The KDG were a newly converted 
armoured car regiment, only recently having been mounted on horses, and new to the 
desert.944
     The above being said the problem for Neame was that although 1 KDG were a good 
unit there were just too few of them. What Neame required if he was to carry out 
Wavell’s instructions to try and impede his enemy’s advance was another armoured car 
regiment. So the question must be asked was there another uncommitted armour car 
regiment available in the Middle East. To which the answer must be an unequivocal 
yes.       
  However, although they were inexperienced they were potentially very good 
material and proved their worth when the fighting started.      
     After the Italian surrender at Beda Fomm in early February the 11th Hussars (11H), 
arguably the most desert worthy armoured car unit in the entire British order of battle, 
came to rest at El Agheila. The exact number of armoured cars that 11H had at the start 
of Operation Compass, on 9 December 1940, is difficult to give with precise accuracy. 
                                                 
944 Buckingham, p.125. 
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George Forty gives a starting line up of 47 Rolls and 44 Morris’945 cars ten of which 
had been loaned, with crews; from the R.A.F.946   This indicates that 91 cars were 
available. However, during the ten weeks of almost continuous action 11H lost some 
very experienced men and according to The 11th at War at least thirty-one armoured 
cars were damaged or completely destroyed.947
     Nonetheless, although much under strength in early February 11H were still a 
coherent fighting force.
   
948  They still had operational armoured cars and indeed after 
Beda Fomm they sent patrols further forward well past El Agheila.  The 11th at War 
tells us that they conducted maintenance on the remaining cars at El Agheila. This is 
also borne out by the references made in both texts to the joining up of the various 
squadrons of the Regiment after the battle at Beda Fomm. The Regiments support 
elements were obviously still intact as the Regiment was being supplied with food, 
water, spares and petrol. Their ability to continue in the field is, in fact, confirmed by 
their war diary.949
     However, despite the fact that 11H were still capable of offensive operations the 
decision was taken, as with so many other units that February, to send them, not 
forward to Tripoli, but back to the Delta. After carrying out routine maintenance, 11H 
was soon ready to make the nearly one thousand mile journey back to Cairo.
  
950  The 
Hussars arrived back in Cairo on 22 February 1941 the 920 mile journey had taken them 
six and a half days. Moreover, the journey had been completed with virtually no 
breakdowns.951
                                                 
945 Forty, Victory Desert Triumph,  p. 60. 
     
946 ibid, p.126. 
947 Dudley Clarke, The Eleventh at War 1934 – 1945 (London: Michael Joseph, 1952) pages 
130/135/137/138/139/142/143/146/151/154/155.   
948 ibid, p. 153. 
949 War Diary 11H WO 169/1390 
950 ibid 
951 ibid 
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     After a two day rest, on 24 February, the war diary tells us that the Regiment started 
a program of training and men were sent on courses in gunnery, driving, maintenance 
and many other tasks.  Training as the war diary says progressed very favourably and 
the strength of the regiment grew in both physical strength and in competence.952
      So what contribution to the defence of Brega might 11H have been able to make?  
Even assuming that all the 31 cars damaged in the previous ten weeks fighting were 
completely lost; that still left around 40 cars available for service. Moreover, the ten 
RAF cars which after Beda Fomm were returned to RAF control could have been 
returned to 11H.
  The 
Regiments manpower also increased when, on 10 March, 8 officers and 129 other ranks 
joined the Regiment. This brought the Regiment in manpower up to full war 
establishment. Moreover, these new soldiers in no way became a burden to the 
Regiment, as new recruits might have been expected to do, as they were mostly ex 11H 
reservists and most had served with the Regiment in Egypt previously. 
953
     The actual use of this valuable unit is sadly mirrored by many other units that March. 
On 31 March 11H, who throughout the month, as mentioned, had been leisurely 
reorganising themselves in Cairo, were suddenly ordered to take over the guard duties 
of 1KRRC. This battalion was now being sent to the Western Desert. However, the 
Regiments new guard duties did not last long. With the news that the front was now 
crumbling completely 11H was also ordered to follow 1KRRC into the desert. As their 
old cars had by this time been sent to the workshops they were issued with some new 
Marmon Harrington armoured cars taken from the 1st Dragoon Guards. Their strength in 
armoured cars was at this stage 30 in total. This allowed ‘A’ Squadron with 12 cars ‘C’ 
  If these RAF cars are taken into consideration it is not unrealistic to 
speculate that 11H could have mustered somewhere in the region of 50 armoured cars 
complete with a full compliment of ancillary equipment and transport in mid March.  
                                                 
952 War Diary 11H WO 169/1390 
953 Fletcher, p. 75. 
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squadron with 12 cars Squadron HQ with 2 cars and Regimental HQ with 4 cars to 
move out of Cairo on 4 April.954
     Consequently when it was too late to make any worthwhile contribution to the 
defence at Brega this valuable and desperately needed unit was ordered into the desert. 
There is absolutely no doubt that had 11H been ordered forward in mid March they 
could have done so. We will of course never know what effect the appearance of this 
vastly experienced unit would have had on the fighting at Brega but there is no question 
that had they been ordered forward in mid March they could have been in the line long 
before the Germans attacked on 31 March.    
 
ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS      
Throughout the Second World War the battle, perhaps contest might be a better 
description, between the warplane and its pray on the ground or at sea, was a relentless, 
and often, merciless struggle. Rommel was to say of air warfare: ‘The battle on the 
ground will be preceded by battle in the air. This will determine which of the 
contestants has to suffer operational and tactical disadvantages and be forced throughout 
the battle into adopting compromise solutions’.955
     All those involved in this vicious struggle realised that to allow their enemy to gain 
mastery of the air above their forces would place them in extreme danger. General 
  In the Western Desert this contest 
was as bitterly fought, and because of the open nature of the terrain in the desert perhaps 
more merciless fought, as in any other theatre of the war. The fighters, bombers, and in 
the Germans case, dive-bombers, of all the belligerents involved, attacked whatever 
they could wherever they could find it. Conversely those they attacked fought back, as 
best they could, with anti-aircraft guns of just about every type and calibre that they 
could find in their respective arsenals.  
                                                 
954 War Diary 11H WO 169/1390 
955 http//:www.memorablequotations.com/rommel.htm 
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Montgomery commented thus: ‘If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and lose it 
quickly.’956
     To furnish their ground forces with air defence the British Army in WWII deployed 
two types of mobile anti-aircraft gun units, one light and one heavy. The light regiments 
were usually armed with 36-40mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns distributed between three 
batteries with 12 guns in each battery. Each battery was then sub divided into three 
troops with 4 guns in each troop. The heavy anti-aircraft regiments were armed with 36 
heavy 3.7" guns
  Mastery of the air, therefore, gave the side that achieved it a significant and 
often decisive military advantage. Consequently all sides strove wherever and whenever 
possible to equip their land and naval forces with as many of the best and most effective 
anti-aircraft guns that their respective armaments industries could procure, with the aim 
of avoiding this potentially disastrous situation.      
957 and 12-40mm Bofors guns 48 guns in total. The guns in this type of 
unit were distributed between four batteries, three batteries were equipped with heavy 
weapons and one battery was equipped with light guns. The batteries of heavy anti-
aircraft regiments were each sub divided as the light units. The fourth battery of the 
heavy anti-aircraft regiments was in effect identical to a light anti-aircraft battery in 
both manpower and weapons.958
     The Bofors gun, the standard equipment of light anti-aircraft batteries throughout the 
war, was an exceptional weapon by any standard. The Bofors fired a 40 millimetre, 2lb 
high explosive shell which was ‘fused to explode on impact, but to allow for mis-hitting 
a target, it could be set to self-destruct at either 11 or 17 seconds’.
  
959
                                                 
956 http//:www.afa.org/quotes/quotes. 
  The rate at which 
the gun could hurl these 2lb shells into the air was prodigious.  ‘The possible automatic 
rate of fire was 120 to 135 rounds per minute, but single-shot firing at 1 round per 
957 Bishop, p. 155.  
958 Davis, p. 41. 
959 Manx Aviation Preservation Society: http://www.maps.iofm.net/bofors-guns.htm  
304 
second was normally used to facilitate observation of tracers. The maximum effective 
ceiling of the gun is 7,500 feet’.960
     LAA regiments batteries and the light batteries of heavy anti-aircraft regiments were 
theoretically supplied with the same ratios of troops, weapons, vehicles and equipment. 
A battery would typically be composed of approximately 240 officers and men.  In 
addition to its Bofors Guns a battery would normally have a small collection of light 
and heavy machine guns, approximately 100 .303 rifles and in the early part of the war 
4 Boys Anti-tank guns.   
   
     To transport all the guns and troops of the battery a typical establishment of about 
forty motor vehicles was required. The following is a report listing the vehicles actually 
being used by a LAA in the desert in August 1941. The report tells us that the unit had 
‘12 Field gun tractors, 1 Utility, 3 8-cwt, 6 15-cwt 19 3-ton and 8 motorcycles’.961  The 
Field gun tractors, Morris Commercial CDSW, were the most important of these 
vehicles as they had been specifically designed to tow the guns and suitable 
replacements could not easily be found.962
     The main function of light anti-aircraft gun units was to give local air defence to 
mobile forces. Consequently they ‘were usually to be found at Battalion level, watching 
over the concentrations of supplies and transport, guaranteed to take the eye of any 
roving fighter pilot’.
  The other vehicles in the units inventory 
could and often were substituted by whatever transport came to hand.   
963
                                                 
960 Davis, p. 158. 
  It was against low flying fighters and dive-bombers that these 
weapons were most useful.  The Bofors gun was ‘no threat to the highflying bombers 
961 Ronnie Gamble, The Coleraine Battery, The History of 6 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery RA (SA) 1939-
1945 (Coleraine: Causeway Museum Service, 2006) p. 53.   
962 See Bart Vanderveen, Historic Military Vehicles Directory, p. 162.  
963 http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/Weapons/lightantiaircraft/light_anti_aircraft_weapons.htm - 
15k 
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but low flying, relatively lightly armoured fighters, so small that any hit would cause 
some appreciable damage, were vulnerable’.964
15 LAA 
   
The 15th (Isle of Man) Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery (15 LAA) was a 
typical example of the light anti-aircraft regiment and is one of two light anti-aircraft 
gun units (the other being 6 LAA) whose progress this part of the work will follow.  15 
LAA was raised in the Isle of Man (I.O.M.) and two Batteries became operational with 
a normal issue of Bofors guns in the summer of 1938. After many months of training 
the Regiment sailed, on 24 August 1939, to Liverpool where they took up duty guarding 
the ships on the river Mersey. While stationed at Liverpool a third battery, the 129th, 
which had also been raised in the I.O.M., joined the established units of 15 LAA and 
completed the Regiment.  
     Throughout August and September 1939, 15 LAA operated as a complete unit; 
however, in October the Regiment’s batteries were deployed separately for the first, but 
by no means the last, time. The three, 12 gun batteries of the Regiment, became 
virtually separate independent units. This type of deployment should be noted as it 
became common practise as the war went on, with single batteries, sometimes-single 
troops, of light anti-aircraft guns being sent wherever their services were most needed. 
The personnel of units like 15 LAA became accustomed to operating independently, 
and as the war progressed their equipment and vehicles became almost permanently 
organised for self-sufficient individual deployment.965
     In November 1940, the sub units of 15 LAA were, however, reassembled and on 19 
November the complete Regiment set sail for the Middle East. The three Batteries of 15 
  
                                                 
964 http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/Weapons/lightantiaircraft/light_anti_aircraft_weapons.htm - 
15k 
965 All the above details of 15 LAA have been taken from Manx Aviation Preservation Society web site: 
http://www.maps.iofm.net/bofors-guns.htm. 
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LAA were when they arrived in Egypt, quickly assigned to various tasks. 41 Battery 
was sent to East Africa 129 Battery sailed to defend Create. However, R.H.Q and 42 
Battery remained in Egypt where their 12 Bofors guns were sent to help defend the Suez 
Canal.966
6 LAA 
 
6 LAA were raised in Northern Ireland at the beginning of 1939. They were to form the 
light Battery of the 9th (Londonderry) Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment; Royal Artillery 
(Supplementary Reserve) and became known as the 6th (Coleraine) Light Anti-Aircraft 
Battery. Once assembled, like the men of 15 LAA, the men of 6 LAA now commenced 
a rigorous regime of training in the use of their weapons. By September 1940 they were 
as proficient as any anti-aircraft gun unit in the British Army.  
     On the night of 8/9 September 1940 the men and guns of Major James Hope’s 6 
LAA Battery set sail from Liverpool in the 28,000 ton liner QSMV Dominion Monarch, 
bound for Egypt. The men of 6 LAA arrived at Port Tewfiq, Egypt, on 22 October 
1940. The following day the Battery moved from Port Tewfiq to Beni Suef, a tented 
camp near Cairo. There, the Battery was fully equipped for desert fighting, trained in 
desert lore and made ready to play its part in the anti-aircraft defence of the Suez Canal.  
DEPLOYMENT 
The deployment of 42 Battery, 15 LAA, and 6 LAA Battery, of 9 HAA (12 Bofors in 
each Battery 24 guns in total) to the Suez Canal was, however, to turn out to be a rather 
wasteful and problematical use of these valuable and scarce guns.  The problem in 
deploying Bofors Guns to defend the Suez Canal against air attack was that the guns 
could only reach targets flying at or below their maximum ceiling of 7,500 feet. 
Unfortunately for the British the enemy were dropping their mines and bombs onto the 
                                                 
966 All the above details of 15 LAA have been taken from Manx Aviation Preservation Society web site: 
http://www.maps.iofm.net/bofors-guns.htm 
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Canal from aircraft flying well above this height and at night. Consequently the guns 
were completely useless deployed as they were to defend the Canal from this threat. 
However, even though the guns of 6 LAA and 42 Battery could not hit their adversaries 
they were employed in this static role for many months.967  While the men and guns of 6 
LAA and 42 Battery were uselessly guarding the Suez Canal their service were 
desperately needed in the Western Desert.968
     As was to be the case with many units which would have been invaluable to the 
defenders of Brega, when it was too late to be of any help to the defence 42 Battery and 
6 LAA were sent to where they could and should have been sent months earlier. After 
nearly six wasted months 42 Battery and 41 Battery which had just return from East 
Africa were belatedly reunited and moved with their RHQ into the Western Desert as 
were 6 LAA.  
       
     There was no reason why when Wavell wrote his initial shopping list of units needed 
in the Western Desert in early March, or even when he returned to Cairo on 18 March, 
after his visit to Neame, that he could not have ordered that the guns of 42 Battery, and, 
6 LAA, be moved forward to Brega. They were serving no useful purpose where they 
were and would be sent later anyway.  
     Had they left in early, or even mid, March, they would have been available in plenty 
of time to defend the troops garrisoning Brega from the terrifying Stuka attacks that 
they were subjected to and which contributed in no small measure to the withdrawal.  
We may conclude that from early March onwards there were at least 24 Bofors anti-
aircraft guns available in the bag.  
                                                 
967 All the above details of 15 LAA have been taken from Manx Aviation Preservation Society web site: 
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ARTILLERY 
At the outbreak of WWII the British Army had no modern medium artillery pieces 
readily available to issue to either existing or new units being formed. The medium 
artillery regiments already raised where therefore equipped with a mix of WWI vintage 
weapons such as the 60 pdr. gun and the 6-in. howitzer. The 60 pdr. gun, unfortunately, 
although of sound design was far from an ideal weapon.  ‘The 60-pounder (5in/127mm 
calibre) gun which had first appeared in 1904 was a cumbersome weapon by modern 
standards; it was considered obsolescent by 1939’.969
     The 6-in. howitzer, on the other hand, was a far more useful weapon and 
consequently had a much longer life in front line service. The 6-in. 26-cwt howitzer, as 
the version which saw service in WWII was known, to differentiate it from earlier 6-in. 
howitzers, first appeared in 1915. This weapon rapidly became one of the most useful 
guns in the army, with over 3000 being made before 1919’.
  The fact that the 60 pdr. was a 
cumbersome weapon was unfortunately not its only fault; it was fitted with wooden 
wheels with iron tyres, which made mobility difficult, especially in the desert. The 
wooden spokes often broke on the hard desert terrain and the iron tyres came off the 
wheels.  
970  After the armistice the 6-
in. howitzer became the backbone of the medium artillery component of the British 
Army throughout the inter-war years. The 6-in. howitzer proved to be a very versatile 
and adaptable gun and was updated on several occasions in the inter-war years. The Mk 
1P 6-in. howitzer, as the final version was designated, was used throughout the early 
desert campaigns.971
     The Mk 1P was for its time an advanced design. The carriage incorporated a 
hydropneumatic recoil system which kept the wheels and trail perfectly still when the 
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gun was fired. Thus the gun did not have to be re-aimed and could deliver round after 
round on to its target quickly and with accuracy.972  The gun was also fitted with a 
modern axel with steel wheels and pneumatic tyres.973  The Mk 1P was by any 
standards a remarkable weapon. This extremely reliable howitzer could throw a 100lb 
high explosive (HE) shell 9,500 yards or an 86lb HE shell 11,400 yards.974
     Although a heavy gun, the weight of the gun and breach mechanism was 2,856lbs, 
and the overall length of the weapon was 87.55in., with its modern carriage, 
hydropneumatic recoil system and pneumatic tyres the gun was relatively easy to tow 
and could be quickly brought into action giving rapid, heavy and accurate fire support. 
(An ability always appreciated by the PBI). As Shelford Bidwell states in Gunners at 
War; ‘it is sometimes forgotten that a medium battery has the firepower of a naval 
cruiser’.
  Even with 
the heavier shell the gun could deliver 100lbs of HE, with accuracy, onto a target over 5 
miles away. The crew could fire, in short bursts, 2 rounds per minuet and could easily 
mange 1 round per minuet in sustained fire.  
975
     To transport the guns into action medium artillery regiments in 1940/41 used 
primarily two types of prime mover. These were, the six-wheeled Scammell Pioneer R-
100 and the four wheeled AEC Matador 0853. Production of the nearly 10,000 AEC 
Matadors built started in 1938, the early model, the 853, had a petrol engine, this was 
later replaced by a diesel engine and these vehicles were re-designated Matador O853, 
evidence suggests that the vehicles used by medium artillery regiments in the desert in 
1940/41 had diesel engines and were therefore of the later type. ‘The Matador had a 40-
gallon fuel tank, which gave it a range of 360 miles. The fuel consumption was 
approximately 9 miles per gallon and the vehicle had a maximum speed of 36 miles per 
  
                                                 
972 Hogg, British & American Artillery of WWII, p. 50. 
973 Hogg, Allied Artillery of World War Two, p. 34. 
974 Davis, p. 155. 
975 Bidwell, p. 168. 
310 
hour’.976  The Matador’s ‘body could accommodate a nine man gun crew, as well as 
ammunition and gun equipment’.977
     The first of the 768 Scammell Pioneers built entered service in the mid 1930s and 
was so good that it remained virtually unchanged throughout its service life.
   
978  The 
Scammell Pioneer R-100 6 x 4 heavy artillery tractor was an excellent vehicle.  It had a 
‘steel-panelled body with accommodation for a crew of 9, ammunition and 
equipment’.979  The Pioneer, like the Matador, was powered by a diesel engine and was 
fitted with a useful ‘overhead 10 cwt block and tackle to load and unload ammunition 
and, on occasions, to lift the gun trails on to the towing hook’.980
     Medium artillery was normally employed on counter battery work and on other 
missions where use could be made of its long rang.
       
981  The 6-in howitzer was ‘used with 
great effectiveness in the counter-battery role in North Africa (where the Germans had 
few comparable weapons)’.982  Despite the much heavier guns used in a medium 
artillery regiment medium regiments were organised for manoeuvre and deployed in the 
same way as the field regiment.983
     The effects of artillery bombardment were greatly increased after the First World 
War by improvements in concentrations of fire.  In the inter war years the U.S. Field 
Artillery School, developed a means of concentrating any amount of artillery on a target 
of opportunity.
   
984
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telephones, enabled commanders of artillery to co-ordinate the fire of their guns much 
more precisely than had been the case in WWI. ‘Procedures were developed enabling 
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adjustments to be made and recorded as if seen from the forward observer’s position, 
instead of the battery position’.985
     In WWI the use of indirect artillery fire had enabled commanders to bring down 
enormous amounts of fire onto a target. Although devastating when it hit the target this 
was a very cumbersome and inflexible way of directing artillery fire. To improve the 
situation the Americans formulated a system using graphical firing tables which 
compensated for the different firing positions of the guns. This enabled a common 
reference point to be established in each divisional area. This new way of directing fire 
gave a single forward observer the ability to bring down as much or as little firepower 
down on a target as he wished. The new system proved to be very successful and is 
essentially the system still used today.
   
986
     A medium artillery regiment in 1940/41 had a notional establishment of 
approximately 700 officers and men, the regimental HQ officially comprised 204 
officers and men and each battery approximately 240, although in the desert this figure 
could, and often did, vary wildly, usually in a downward direction. Medium artillery 
regiments in WWII were composed of sixteen guns split into two eight gun Batteries. 
Each Battery was sub divided into two Troops of four guns. The ammunition carried ‘on 
each gun tractor (prime mover) was fifty rounds all HE no smoke being fired by 
medium artillery’.
        
987
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   Aside from the ammunition carried on the prime movers each 
Battery was supported by a Battery Ammunition Group (BAG) which carried a further 
400 rounds of ammunition usually in 3-ton lorries. This gave each gun in the Battery an 
organic 100 rounds of ammunition. A medium artillery regiment was a potent, versatile 
and highly prized military asset and in March 1941 Wavell had, arguably, the most 
experienced medium artillery regiment in the Western Desert at his disposal.  
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     The 7th Medium Regiment Royal Artillery (7 RHA) arrived in the Middle East from 
India in 1939.988  When Operation Compass started in December 1940 the Regiment 
was quickly brought into the fighting. The 7th‘s guns were found to be extremely useful 
in a variety of roles. ‘Medium artillery combines the mobility of field guns with the 
heavier punch of a larger calibre. With its long range it can support armoured forces 
from a distance, all without the need to move’.989  However, it is in the counter battery 
role where these guns excel, their ‘essential task is to fight a duel with the opposing 
artillery’.990
     In the Western Desert in Operation Compass their services were constantly in 
demand by the attacking infantry units attempting to take the Italian’s pre prepared 
defensive positions such as Fort Capuzzo and fortified towns like Bardia and Tobruk.  
At Capuzzo, for example, an Italian strong point was holding up the Australians 
advance. To clear the obstacle the four 60 pdrs of ‘A’ Troop of 25/26 Battery were 
called upon to give the infantry their support. The strong point was soon obliterated ‘an 
Australian eyewitness afterwards described how the small enemy battery which had 
been holding up the infantry was utterly demolished following an air shoot by the 
Troop’.
   
991
     Towards the end of January 7 RHA was assembled, as a complete unit, at Tobruk 
where it made itself ready to continue the pursuit of the retreating Italians. On 27 
January the Regiment moved out of Tobruk heading for the coastal town of Derna. 
Later, on the same day, ‘all guns went into action on the heights overlooking Derna but 
it was soon learned that the town had been evacuated’.
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   This was to be the last 
fighting the Regiment was to do in this period of the war. In early February most of the 
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Regiment moved into Benghazi where they were billeted in buildings belonging to the 
Benghazi Zoo.  
     The 27/28 Battery with their 6-inch howitzers remained near Tecnis, occupying an 
old Turkish castle. ‘Since the Regiment was not required for operations in the forward 
areas, there was an opportunity to get really clean for the first time in many weeks’.993  
The Regiment stayed in the forward areas until mid February. On 15 February they 
began their long trek of approximately 800 miles back to Cairo. They arrived back at 
Almaza Camp on 25 February. They now commenced a thorough overhaul of their 
equipment and new equipment was issued as necessary.994
     By late February 1941, 7 MAR was again a complete and fully equipped unit. There 
were, it is true, areas where the units equipment needed improvement, however, these 
deficiencies were not in anyway so great as to prohibit any part of 7 MAR from 
continuing the fight. This was proved to be the case when on 26 March ‘orders were 
received instructing R.H.Q. and 25/26 Battery to move out to Amiriya en route for an 
unknown destination’.
   
995
     Why these guns were removed from the forward areas in late February when by then 
it was becoming more likely by the day that their services would be required, is hard to 
understand. It seems incredible that when Wavell said in early March that he would 
have to reinforce Neame because, in his words, “he had thinned the defence down to a 
dangerous level”, these guns were not immediately redeployed to the Western Desert. 
  They were going to Greece from where a great many of them 
never returned. However, the 27/28 Battery, with its eight 6-in howitzers and their 
prime movers, which would have been of immense value to Neame and his defenders at 
Brega, were left, unused, at Almaza.  
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We may be confident that had 27/28 Battery of 7 MAR been ordered forward in March 
they could have deployed to Brega long before the Germans attacked.   
ANTI-TANK GUNS 
As has been mentioned Neame only had one anti-tank gun unit, ‘J’ Battery of 3 RHA 
with twelve assorted anti-tank guns.996
     When 3 RHA returned to the Delta the unit handed in most of its transport and 
reverted from a four Battery regiment to the more normal three Battery establishment. 
This meant that although the Regiment now had virtually no transport it was in all other 
respects over equipped with four Batteries of guns and the manpower to match. It might 
have been thought that as 3 RHA was the only, at least partly, operational anti-tank gun 
regiment in the whole of the Middle East that strenuous and urgent efforts would have 
been made to make this valuable and scarce asset fully fit for battle as soon as possible.  
  This was a pitifully small allocation of anti-tank 
guns for a defence which was known to be confronted by a German armoured brigade 
group. The composition of German formations was quite well known by 1941 and there 
is no doubt that Wavell would have known that an armoured brigade would have at least 
160 tanks. So, it might reasonably be asked, where were the other two Batteries of this 
desperately needed anti-tank gun regiment?    
     However, virtually no effort was made to make 3 RHA battle worthy. Indeed Dey in 
his history of the Regiment confirms that ‘the majority of the men now had a well 
earned rest’.997
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  Instead of being re-equipped with new or reconditioned vehicles, 
disposing of their surplus personnel and selecting and reconditioning the best of their 
guns the men of 3 RHA were either given leave or given the role of mentors to various 
forming anti-tank gun regiments. This combination of assignments had, without doubt, 
a debilitating effect on 3 RHA.  However, it should not be thought that this very 
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experienced unit could not rapidly have been brought back to fighting ability should 
need arise.  
     Throughout late February and early March 3 RHA were at Beni Yussef camp.998  
They had, as mentioned, at this time very few vehicles most having been handed into 7th 
Armoured Divisions Vehicle Pool this left only twenty one with the Regiment.999  They 
did, however, retain most of their guns. This situation changed when in late February at 
least 12 of their Bofors anti-tank guns and their 15 cwt Portees were transferred over to 
2/3 Australian anti-tank gun Regiment.1000
     Therefore when the order came, on 21 March, to send a unit forward, only ‘J’ 
Battery, with 9 2 pdrs and 3 Bofors, complete with their towing vehicles and Portees, 
were readily available. Nonetheless, when the order came to send the rest of the 
Regiment forward on 26 March ‘M’ Battery was quickly re-equipped and left on 30 
March. They drew 15 cwt and 30 cwt lorries from the vehicle supply depot at Mena and 
collected 12 Bofors anti-tank guns and 13 reconditioned Portees from the ordnance 
depot at Amirya.
  Of the remainder of their guns it seems that 
at some time in early March most were handed into the ordnance depot.  
1001
     The remainder of the Regiment, RHQ and ‘D’ Battery, left Beni Yussef for Brega on 
4 April. It seems that by this time they had sufficient vehicles for the whole unit but 
only 8 2 pdr anti-tank guns. The deficiency in guns was made good by the issue of four 
Breda guns from the RAOC base at Amirya.
  They arrived in the forward areas around Mechili on 4 April where 
they joined the Australian retreat into Tobruk.  
1002
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strength in weapons.1003  They eventually arrived in the forward areas on 7 April. By 
this time, of course, Brega was lost and ‘J’ Battery were retreating into Tobruk’1004
     Why, if the situation was as serious in the Western Desert as Wavell felt it was, and 
indeed it clearly was, was 3 RHA not put on alert in early March and then the whole 
Regiment ordered forward on, or before, 21 March? As can be seen all the elements 
needed, vehicles, guns, and trained men, were all readily available. Indeed it would not 
be an exaggeration to say that when one looks at the amount of equipment given to 2/3 
Australian anti-tank gun Regiment there seems to have been enough resources available 
in Middle East Command to make two anti-tanks gun regiments operational in early 
March 1941. We may conclude that the bag had anti-tank guns in it.   
        
MACHINE GUN BATTALION 
The contribution that The 1st Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, (1NF), might 
have made to the defence of Brega is perhaps far more direct and immediate than the 
other units we have examined. The 1NF were in early February guarding Italian 
P.O.W.s in Benghazi. However, by mid March their guard duties were rapidly coming 
to an end. A transit camp for P.O.W.s had been established at Barce and by 22 March 
1NF were completely free of this duty. Their CO, Colonel E. O. Martin, ‘immediately 
moved the Battalion out of Benghazi to an area in which training could be carried out, a 
few miles to the south’.1005
     The Battalion was, however, short of transport. In an effort to ease the transport 
problems of the Battalion Italian diesel lorries were taken over and even some Italian 
drivers co-opted to drive for the Battalion.
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completely mobile. Therefore there seems no reason why at least one company of 1NF 
complete with their twelve Vickers medium machineguns could not have been moved 
down to Brega to support the troops already there.  
INFANTRY 
It must be said that in regard to motorised infantry battalions Wavell could have given 
Neame his pick of a fine crop. Of all the British battalions in the Middle East only one, 
the 9th Battalion, The King's Royal Rifle Corps (The Rangers), was sent to Greece. All 
the rest of the over twenty motorised infantry battalions available in the Middle East 
were to remain in the Delta or elsewhere on various non combat duties.   
     However, if we are to choose one of these many unemployed infantry battalions to 
send to help Latham at Brega then perhaps we could find no more suitable candidate 
than The 1st Battalion The King’s Royal Rifle Corps (60th Rifles 1KRRC). 1KRRC had 
arrived in Egypt at the end of 1938 under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel William 
Henry Ewart Gott; M.C. Gott was born in Leeds, Yorkshire, on 13 August 1897. In 
WWI Gott had been a Lieutenant and at the end of the Great War, like Wavell, had 
remained in the army. In the inter war years he ‘climbed the slow peacetime ladder of 
promotion to command of his battalion. Within three years of the outbreak of war he 
was a Lieutenant-General, and Churchill’s nominee for command of the Eighth Army. 
His untimely and much lamented death (his aircraft was shot down near Cairo on the 
eve of his last great appointment) ended prematurely a brilliant career’.1007
     Gott was an outstanding leader and it is interesting to note that although Wavell was 
credited (by some) with developing mechanised infantry tactics with both 6EIB and 2 
Infantry Division in the 1930s it was, in fact, Gott who developed workable Motor 
Battalion procedures in the desert. As Wood the biographer of the KRRC was to write; 
Gott ‘had been largely responsible for developing Motor Battalion theories and, 
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although he never actually commanded a battalion of the 60th in battle, his training of 
the 1st Battalion was a major factor in its subsequent successes in the Desert War’.1008
     Indeed it was partly from the excellent results obtained by Gott in his work with 
1KRRC that the concept of the support group was formulated. The concept was, in fact, 
turned into reality in January 1940. The first support group ‘consisted of 1KRRC, 2RB 
and 4 RHA, Colonel E. S. B. Williams commanded it for a short time. He was 
succeeded by Gott, soon after promoted to Brigadier’.
   
1009
     1KRRC fought more or less continually throughout Operation Compass. However, 
‘on 18th February the Battalion set off for Cairo for a period of rest after 10 continuous 
months in the desert. They reached Mena camp on the afternoon of 28th February. The 
total distance was 764 miles. Breakdowns were remarkably few, considering the long 
and arduous service of their vehicles’.
    
1010
     The above being said, by late February, 1KRRC were back in Cairo. ‘After a week at 
Mena they moved to Kasr-el-Nil Barracks to take over various guard duties, the most 
important of which were the G.O.C.’s house guard and the guards at G.H.Q., Middle 
East. It required great efforts to bring our desert-worn clothing and equipment to 
anything like the necessary standard; their reward was a message from General Wavell 
congratulating the first 60th Guard at his house on their turn-out’.
  It is perhaps worth noting here, and this was 
the case for most of the fighting units returning from the Western Desert in February 
1941, that while it was felt by Wavell that his troop’s vehicles would be incapable of 
going on the 350 or so miles to Tripoli they seemed perfectly capable of doing twice 
that distance and more moving back to Cairo.  
1011
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  It seems that 
Wavell felt he needed his house guarding more than Neame needed his garrison in the 
Western Desert reinforcing. Incredible as it might seem Wavell had, arguably, the most 
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experienced and battle hardened battalion in the whole of the Middle East put on guard 
duties. He kept this fully equipped and ready to go battalion in Cairo when he was at the 
same time complaining that he had no troops to reinforce Neame who he acknowledged 
was under threat of imminent attack.   
     There appears on the face of it to be no rational reason for detailing 1KRRC to guard 
duties rather than dispatching them to the front. There were, as mentioned, many 
unemployed units in Cairo who could just as easily have undertaken this task and even a 
cursory examination of some of their war diaries or unit histories quickly confirms this 
fact.1012  It would therefore be pointless to list all the units available; however, one unit 
stands out for mention. Wavell’s father had been an officer in the Norfolk Yeomanry a 
regiment that the Wavell family obviously knew well. Indeed his father spent twelve 
years with the Regiment and would have taken command of it had it not been for the 
fact that it was posted to Burma and Colonel Wavell did not want to subject his young 
family to the rigors of the Burmese climate. He instead exchanged battalions with the 
commander of the 2nd Battalion The Black Watch.1013
     With this Norfolk Regiment connection in mind we must now move to Cairo January 
1941. On 16 January, 1941, the Norfolk Yeomanry, now an anti-tank gun regiment, 
arrived in the Middle East at Suez. Their biographer, Jeremy Bastin, tells us that; ‘the 
train from Port Tewfik took the Regiment as far as El Qassasin from whence they were 
carried by truck into the sandy wasteland which was Tahag Camp. Without their guns 
  Nonetheless, the Norfolk 
connection with the Wavell family, as with many soldiers and their former regiments, 
remained strong. Indeed Wavell senior retired to Norfolk when his military career came 
to end. 
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and vehicles and unattached to any division, the Regiment had very little with which to 
occupy their time’.1014
     They were to remain in this semi-idle state until their guns and vehicles arrived in 
late April. They did, it is true, take a turn watching for mines dropped in to the Suez 
Canal between 16 March and 19 April but this hardly excluded them from guard duties 
in Cairo. Indeed it confirms that they were completely capable of undertaking such 
tasks. So it might fairly be asked why when units such as the Norfolk Yeomanry were 
available for guard duties was such a valuable and experienced asset as 1KRRC given 
this task. The answer might be found in Wavell’s own vanity. 1KRRC were it might be 
remembered by the time they arrived back in Cairo a celebrated and famous outfit. They 
were just the kind of unit Wavell liked to surround himself with. These men were 
gallant, brave, battle hardened bronzed warriors and now they were the Commander-in-
Chiefs personal bodyguard. It might be seen as Caesar with his Praetorian Guard.  
   
     It is undeniable that had Wavell wanted to find a motorised infantry battalion to send 
to Neame he would not have had to look very far to find one. 1KRRC were right outside 
his door. Unfortunately for Neame and Latham Wavell, it seems, did not notice their 
presence. Like so many other units Wavell only ordered 1KRRC sent forward when it 
was far too late for them to be of any use to Neame. ‘On 29 March the Battalion set out 
again for the Western Desert. By 1 April they were at Tobruk, where reports were 
received of Germans advancing east of Mersa el Brega’.1015
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ARMOUR      
However, perhaps the most available and easily satisfied of all Neame’s requirements 
was the provision of armoured formations. It is worth remembering that armour was at 
the top of Wavell’s shopping list for defence of the Western Desert. The immediate 
requirement, he wrote, was to make available armoured troops. It is clear from this 
opening statement that he had no idea what Neame already had in the way of armoured 
troops, the state and quantity of their equipment, or of even where they were stationed.  
     It will be recalled that while Wavell was writing his note there were already four 
tank regiments in the forward areas three of which had virtually no tanks. What was 
required by Neame’s existing units was not additional armoured troops, that is not more 
tank regiments, but tanks.  Had Wavell taken the time to discover what Neame already 
had in the way of armoured units he would have soon seen that what Neame really 
required to make his armoured units useable was tanks. In the case of 3H just 15 British 
cruisers would have made an enormous diffidence to its fighting capability.  
     Moreover, in the case of units with a few usable tanks, such as 3H, he needed to 
make it clear to Neame that they should stop wasting the little remaining strength they 
had left in unnecessary patrolling, order the fitters to concentrate on getting British 
tanks running instead of useless Italian tanks, and return to it, fifteen, out of the literally 
hundreds of British cruiser tanks he now had languishing in workshops in the Delta.  
Had these measures been ordered in early March then by 31 March 3H might have had 
some fighting ability worthy of the name.  
     In regard to 6 RTR being without British tanks there seems no reason why more of 
the many Vickers lights with 5 RTR could not have been made available to them. 
Moreover, there were as already mentioned hundreds of cruisers in workshops. 
However, if it was deemed that these sources were unavailable and that the only 
alternative was to try and equip them with Italian tanks then the place to do this was not 
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in the open around Beda Fomm but in Tobruk. In Tobruk there were proper workshops 
and the men would make little demand on resources in the forward areas. Although it 
has to be said that no matter what was done to the Italian tanks nothing would make 
them serviceable against German armour.  
     A perhaps more effective, and certainly far less costly, use for these Italian tanks 
might have been to use them in a static defence role at Brega. When the British defences 
at Mersa Matruh had been constructed a number of obsolete medium tanks had been 
dug in and used as armoured pill boxes complete with built in anti-tank gun. As there 
were well over a fifty M13 Italian tanks in the abandoned column at Beda Fomm, less 
than a hundred miles from Brega, and many powerful 10 ton lorries to tow them, it 
would not have been a difficult task to have moved some of these useless tanks down to 
Brega and dug them in.  
     Had this been done then the only useful component on the M13, its gun, might have 
been of some benefit to the defenders.  6 RTR had enough crews for 52 tanks and could 
quite easily have taken the Italian armour they had been issued down to Brega and dug 
them into the sand dunes between the village of Brega and the sea. Had this been done 
not only would they have made little demand on the fitters time they would at least have 
given any attack through the sand dunes some opposition. This would, at least, have 
been of some benefit to the defenders of Brega.   
     As for leaving 5 RTR, a fully equipped and ready to go tank unit, idle outside 
Tobruk for six weeks this truly was a waste of resources. This unit could, without any 
problem at all, have made a leisurely move up to Agedabia in six or seven days, and 
once there have been amalgamated with 3H to form a coherent fighting unit of nearly 
seventy cruiser and thirty light tanks. They would, perhaps, not all have been in full 
working order by late March even had this been done but they would undoubtedly have 
been in better shape than they were when the Germans actually attacked.  
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     Had the move to Agedabia been made by 5 RTR in early March and the maintenance 
been carried out throughout the remainder of March on both Regiments tanks then 
when, or if, they were needed they could have moved forward the thirty or so miles to 
Brega in a few hours and given the defenders some useful support.  Furthermore, 7 
RTR, which was also sitting idle in Tobruk, could easily have been brought up to at 
least half unit strength in Matilda’s, as in fact it was to some extent when Tobruk was 
besieged, and the balance made up of lights. There were far more than twenty five 
unused lights in the forward areas. Had this unit been added to the mix at Agedabia it 
would have given Neame an almost fully up to strength armoured brigade. Had this 
been done and the Italian M13 tanks dug in at Brega then the armoured element of the 
defence might have performed some useful function.    
AIR POWER 
Although not on Wavell’s original shopping list it is beyond doubt that Neame could 
have used additional air cover. Moreover, although absent from the list as a 
reinforcement Wavell had ambitious plans for any air resources Neame may have been 
able to muster. However, before reviewing what air resources Neame had and what 
additional squadrons might or might not have be made available to him it might perhaps 
be instructive to examine what Wavell expected Neame to achieve with his twelve 
bombers and thirty fighters dispersed over an operational area the size of France. 
In Wavell’s dispatch to Neame on 19 March he wrote; the enemy’s supply and 
maintenance problem will be a most difficult and precarious one, and do 
everything in your power to render it more so. Forward dumps of stores are 
likely to be surest indication of offensive intentions of the enemy and should be 
attacked by air action as far as possible. Similarly, during the advance, attack on 
his maintenance system will be one of the best methods of bringing him to a 
standstill.1016
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There are of course some glaringly obvious questions which might be asked about the 
content of this statement, not least the inference that Neame, a General with a VC who 
had served in the army with distinction for many years should need to be told that a sure 
indication that the enemy was preparing an offensive was his accumulation of war 
materials. Or that he should use his air resources to attack the enemy’s supply dumps 
and supply lines. As for Neame needing to be told to attack his enemy’s maintenance 
systems, (that is the enemy’s supply convoys) this seems to be an action that any 
commander would attempt if possible.     
     However, leaving the rather basic advice to one side the more pertinent question here 
might be; what air resources had Wavell given Neame to carry out all these tasks.  
Neame’s air component, to carry out all the above tasks, actually consisted of one Air 
Group, 202, commanded by Group Captain L. O. Brown with four squadrons.  3 
Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, (3 RAAF) and 73 Squadron, RAF (73 RAF), 
both flying Hurricane Mark I fighters. 6 Squadron, RAF, (6 RAF) with two flights 
flying Hurricane’s and two flights flying Lysander tactical reconnaissance aircraft.  55 
Squadron, RAF, (55 RAF) flying Blenheim light bombers.1017
     So as with other forces needed by Neame the question must be asked, could the air 
component of Neame’s command have been increased without prejudicing any other 
operations. It will be remembered that at this time, because of Wavell’s decisions to go 
to Greece and the continuing war in East Africa and the obligation to hold the desert 
flank, Middle East air resources were stretched three ways. However, by March 1941 
  This gave Brown a 
tactical air force of thirty fighters, six reconnaissance planes and twelve bombers 
altogether forty eight aircraft. The chances of this small force being able to do all that 
Wavell was expecting of it were vanishingly small. 
                                                 
1017 Bickers, p. 54. 
325 
there were a great many squadrons in the command and more were arriving almost 
daily.  
     Plans had already been put in place in late 1940 to massively reinforce the Middle 
East throughout 1941. The defeat at Brega greatly accelerated the rate at which 
reinforcements where being sent to the Middle East but even before that new aircraft 
steadily reached the command. Although, it has to be admitted, that between January 
and March these replacements failed to keep pace with the losses, (184 aircraft lost 166 
arrived as replacement), and some aircraft could not immediately be used for teething 
troubles, nonetheless the squadrons already in the theatre were, at the end of March, all 
nearly up to strength.1018  Moreover, as mentioned, many more aircraft of all types were 
in the pipeline. By early May 328 were, in fact, already at sea. On 12 May fifty 
Hurricanes actually arrived at Alexandria. Moreover, by the end of May a further 880 
had been dispatched.1019
     So what squadrons were available in the Middle East to help Neame? As mentioned 
many squadrons were already assigned to theatres, four, for example, were assigned to 
Neame in the Western Desert. Others were in Greece, or about to go, and yet others in 
East Africa. However, there were still a good number of squadrons unallocated to 
fighting fronts. Careful scrutiny of the service deployment of squadrons in the Middle 
East reveals that at least a further six could have been made available to Neame and 
indeed as with so many other units when it was too late to be of much use to him many 
of these squadrons were suddenly assigned to the defence.  
   Therefore a certain amount risk taking with the aircraft 
already in the theatre, in view of the reinforcements known to be arriving and the 
imminent threat to the desert flank building, must at least have been worth considering.  
     So what extra help might have been made available to Neame and Brown?  To carry 
out Wavell’s instructions Neame needed bomber squadrons. He had, as noted, one 
                                                 
1018 Bickers, pp. 54/55. 
1019 ibid, p. 58.  
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Blenheim squadron 55 RAF however, also available were 45 Squadron RAF, and 30 
Squadron RAF both equipped with Blenheims and 39 Squadron RAF equipped with 
Martin Maryland bombers.1020
     In fighter squadrons there were several units uncommitted that March, however the 
two most readily available were 208 Squadron RAF and 274 Squadron RAF both flying 
Hurricanes.
  45 Squadron, who were based at Cairo, moved up to 
help Brown on 4 April. 30 Squadron who in March were based on Crete, were 
uncommitted as the Germans had not yet even invaded Greece. The German attack on 
Greece did not start until 6 April. 39 Squadron were in March already in the desert at 
Fuka a few miles from Mersa Matruh.  
1021 At the time of the attack 208 Squadron were stationed at Agedabia1022
     Had the above squadrons been made available to Brown he would have been able to 
field over fifty fighters; somewhere in the region of fifty bombers and perhaps twenty 
reconnaissance and load carrying aircraft. Again had these various squadrons been 
allocated to Neame on 19 March when Wavell was giving his advice to Neame on how 
he might use such air resources then he might have had at least a fighting chance of 
carrying out Wavell’s instructions?  However, Neame was given no extra air resources 
during March. The first air reinforcements he received were 45 Squadron on 4 April far 
too few and much too late to save the day.    
 
and 274 at Alexandria. To add to the list we might also look at the availability of 267 
Squadron RAF which was flying a mixed bag of aircraft some Lysander’s and some 
transport aircraft such as Lodestar’s. Although not geared up for offensive action this 
squadron would have been very useful to Neame for both extra recon and load carrying 
of urgently needed supplies such as, perhaps, 6-inch howitzer ammunition.    
                                                 
1020 C. G. Jefford, R. A. F. Squadrons (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1988) pp. 39/34/38. 
1021 ibid, pp. 69, 82. 
1022 Cull,  p. 83. 
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OVERVIEW     
Thus, bearing in mind the above, this work can confidently claim to demonstrated, with 
some high degree of certainty, that had Wavell taken his own advice and implemented 
his own recommendations, he could, without predigesting any other operation, have 
found and sent forward in time for them to have been of some use, significant 
reinforcements to save the British position in North Africa. The bag was, in reality, far 
from empty.   
     So, it seems fair to ask, if these reinforcements had, in fact, been sent forward, how 
would their arrival have effected the situation on the ground at Brega?  Starting with air 
defence it will be remembered that Latham had only two Bofors anti-aircraft guns in the 
forward areas. This scale of issue was quite clearly inadequate to defend four miles of 
front and indeed the lack of anti-aircraft defence was a huge contributing factor in the 
German breakthrough. However, as has been demonstrated, twenty four Bofors anti-
aircraft guns could have been diverted from the defence of the Suez Canal, where they 
were totally useless, and sent to Latham well before the Germans attacked.   
     Their deployment would of course have been at Latham’s discretion but it seems 
likely that had they been ordered forward in early March most of his main defence line 
could have been given at least some degree of anti-aircraft protection. Two anti-aircraft 
guns were totally inadequate twenty six on the other hand were a potent defence.  
     The same assessment might be given to all Latham’s units. The strength and depth of 
his armoured car screen, for example, could have been significantly enhanced by the 
early arrival of 11H.  They were destined to be sent forward anyway so why leave it 
until it was too late? At least two Troops of 11H, say thirty cars, could have been sent 
forward to help and reinforce 1 KDG from early March onwards, certainly after 19 
March when Wavell returned from the desert. Had this been done it would have nearly 
doubled Latham’s armoured car strength and also place virtually no extra strain on his 
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resources. The men of 11H were even more self-sufficient than even the most 
experienced desert hands and if they had arrived say in the last week of March would 
only have had to look after themselves for a week or so before Rommel attacked. This 
amount of unsupported time to these men would have been no problem at all.  
     The mobilisation of 3 RHA and it precious anti-tank guns was never going to be a 
problem and even when virtually at the last minuet they were finally ordered forward 
they managed to get their batteries on the road in a remarkably short space of time. 
When Wavell wrote out his shopping list of units he felt Neame needed in early March 
there is no doubt that had he instructed that 3 RHA be brought up to battle readiness this 
could have been done with a minimum amount of delay and at little cost to the greater 
war effort. Everything that they needed to make themselves battle ready was already at 
hand. Indeed it is in many respects astonishing that in view of the potential threat of 
attack by tanks that this very rare anti-tank gun unit was ever allowed to be denuded of 
vehicles and guns in the first place. Even had no enemy threat been considered 
imminent it would have seemed sensible to keep this valuable and scarce asset as near 
battle readiness as possible.  
     However, in view of the accepted knowledge that enemy tanks were being landed at 
Tripoli, and would thus at some point probably pose a threat somewhere; it seems 
incredible that this unit should have been rendered unusable for so long.  
     In regard to how they may have been able to assist Latham we may look to the 
afternoon engagement of the single Battery of 3 RHA which did get to Brega. The 
intervention of just nine two pounders effectively broke up a concerted German tank 
attack and disabled at least three tanks. We may only speculate how much more 
beneficial 3 RHA would have been to the defence if all thirty six of their guns had been 
available to Latham. As it was on the day after the battle; ‘hardly any of the Panzers, 
which had been unloaded in Tripoli in tiptop condition, could still be described as fit for 
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action. The inadequately filtered engines had long since swallowed too much sand and 
dust, worn pistons were knocking worryingly, and tracks and bogey wheels were in a 
dreadful state’.1023
     The contribution to the defence made by the sixteen guns of 104 RHA was huge. 
Commenting on the fighting around Cemetery Hill John Delaney says; ‘the tanks of 5th 
Panzer Regiment moved forward and were engaged by 25 pdr field guns of 104 
Regiment Royal Horse Artillery, deployed behind the hill. The guns, firing over open 
sights, brought the advance to a halt. Probing attacks by German infantry and panzers 
continued throughout the morning, but the British infantry held firm at the base of the 
hill, ably supported by their RHA colleagues’.
  The question might fairly be asked had Streich’s armour been 
confronted by the whole of 3 RHA on the 31st at Brega how many of his tanks would 
have been able to resume the attack on 1st April?   
1024
     However, as with all Latham’s units there were just too few of them. Sixteen guns 
could not adequately cover a four mile long defence line. That being said the remedy 
was close at hand. Why the sixteen guns of 1 RHA were not added to the defence, as 
they were only two miles in rear of the action, is beyond comprehension. These guns 
alone may well have tipped the balance the defenders way, at least on the first day of 
action. The only mitigating excuse, and it seems to be a weak one, is that these guns 
nominally belonged to Rimington’s 3AB and not to Latham’s Support Group but to 
leave them unused for the whole of the day when they could so easily have been 
brought into action seems like military correctness gone mad.  
   
     Moreover, the failure to order forward the eight 6-inch howitzers of 7 MAR seems 
equally remiss. Throughout March 7 MAR were completely ready for battle, they had 
guns, vehicles and ammunition. All that had to be done was to order them forward.  
What this unit’s firepower would have done to Rommel’s infantry forming up behind 
                                                 
1023 Heckmann, p. 112. 
1024 Delaney, p. 15. 
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Cemetery Hill can only be imagined but it must be calculated that as a battery of 6-inch 
howitzers had the same hitting power as a Royal Navy cruiser that it would not have 
been insignificant.    
     We might now turn to the infantry component of Latham’s brigade. The three 
companies of infantry of 9RB and their supporters, the twelve Vickers machineguns of 
1NF, could never effectively cover a four mile wide defensive position. ‘The first 
attacks by the 5th Light Division supported by artillery fire and Stuka dive bombers 
quickly pushed back the defending British infantry, the 1st Tower Hamlets Rifles, from 
their trenches on Cemetery Hill, the only piece of high ground on the battlefield’.1025
     As has been demonstrated both were readily available. 1KRRC were, as mentioned, 
dispatched to Brega when it was already too late. There was no logical reason why these 
troops cold not have been moved forward, at least to Benghazi, in early March when 
Wavell says he identified the potential short comings in his desert army and indicated 
that it needed reinforcing. Indeed had 1KRRC been brigaded with 9RB in late March, 
they too could have moved down to Brega on 22 March, and taken with them one of the 
machinegun companies of INF. This would have doubled the infantry component of 
Latham’s brigade and would have enabled him to deploy his battalions in both greater 
depth and covering a far longer front. Moreover, had they taken with them the 
thousands of mines which were ready and waiting for them in the Delta and utilised the 
miles of Italian barbed wire available in Tobruk they might have made Brega not just 
difficult to take but almost impregnable.  
  
What was required to give the defence, even with the added firepower alluded to above, 
a fighting chance of defending Brega was another battalion of infantry and a second 
company of machine gunners.  
                                                 
1025 Delaney, pp. 14/15. 
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     Again we can only speculate what such reinforcement might have contributed to the 
defence of Brega but it is worth considering here that had Ponath’s 8th Machinegun 
Battalion been confronted by a whole battalion instead of one platoon of infantry then 
his late afternoon breakthrough through the sand dunes might have been less successful 
than it was, indeed it might well have been heavily defeated. 
     Finally in regard to ground forces we may look to the shambolic state of 3AB. The 
failure by both Gambier-Parry and Rimington to get this unit into some kind of fighting 
condition was truly scandalous. They had six long weeks to make their regiments battle 
worthy and squandered every one of them.  There was no reason why 6 RTR could not 
have taken their Italian tanks down to Brega and dug them into the sand dunes at least 
then they might have served some useful purpose.   
     The time taken to move 5 RTR forward was ludicrous. It was known in early March 
that German armour was being landed at Tripoli it could, therefore, only be a matter of 
time before this enemy armour moved onto the offensive. Had 5 RTR been moved to 
the Brega area in early March they might have been able to make some useful 
contribution to the defence as it was by sending them in late March they were no value 
whatsoever.     
     Furthermore, the inability of 3H to make any worthwhile contribution to the defence 
was a totally self inflicted wound. There was no need to send all the British cruisers 
back to the Delta just leaving 15 for 3H would have made all the difference to the 
fighting ability of this unit. The release of officers to go on leave and the leisurely way 
in which the work on the light tanks was carried out is hard to understand. The tanks in 
this unit were virtually all the possible serviceable tanks in the forward areas their 
immediate return to fighting ability should have been their COs primary concern not the 
issuing of leave passes.  
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     As for the failure of Neame to resurrect 7 RTR; this must be seen as a major lost 
opportunity. While reviving this unit would have been problematical the benefits of 
bringing this unit back to even half fighting strength would have been enormous. What 
the Matilda’s would have brought to the defence of Brega would have been comparable 
to their vital contribution to the defence of Tobruk. Their armour could keep out all but 
the most powerful of German anti-tank shells, the mighty 88 mm, and as the Germans 
were hard pressed to deploy these weapons in an anti-tank role at Brega the Matildas 
would have acted like mobile pillboxes almost immune to shot and shell.       
     Turning now to the contribution that the RAF might have made on 31 March we may 
also see that their contribution could have been far more beneficial to the defenders than 
it was. If the squadrons identified instead of sitting idle on their various airbases had 
been mobilised and added into Neame’s order of battle they might on their own have 
been able to thwart Rommel’s advance.  
     Wavell was of course perfectly correct when he told Neame that he should attack his 
enemy’s supply columns, dumps and advancing troops. Such attacks invariably bring 
advantageous results. We of course will never now know how successful or other wise 
such attacks would have been at Brega.  However, we can speculate that the twenty mile 
long column of German and Italian transport held in the Brega gap by Latham’s infantry 
and guns would have presented any combat pilot with a target that most could only 
dream of.  Had the bomber and fighter pilots of the squadrons who could have been 
made available to Brown been given this opportunity it seems perfectly reasonable to 
speculate that many of Rommel’s precious trucks and tanks would have been blazing by 
the end of the day.  
     So we may say with some confidence, concurring with Ralph Bennett, that the 
enforced British retreat to the Egyptian frontier was not ‘the consequence of the 
departure of most of the army which had annihilated the Italians. It was in great 
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measure due to the defects of military tactics and foresight, which were themselves but 
one facet of that opaqueness of understanding, narrowness of outlook, and lack of 
professionalism which were to wreck so many of the desert army’s plans’.1026
     As Dill was to write on 19 April; ‘I realise fully the difficult position in which 
Wavell finds himself. I realise the mistake he and I have made, i.e., underestimating the 
forces the Germans could concentrate and maintain in Cyrenaica’.
   
1027
 
  However, his 
realisation was now of little consequence what could have been done so easily to defend 
Brega, prior to the German attack, could now never be done. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION  
There can be little argument, when reviewing the mass of books written on the desert 
war, that virtually every aspect of the conflict in North Africa has been extensively, and 
in many cases very thoroughly, researched and written about by a great many authors. 
That being said the Battle for Mersa el Brega stands out as being one of the few aspects 
of the desert war which has been almost airbrushed from history by desert war authors.     
     Consequently this thesis is not a reappraisal of the battle building on existing 
accounts. Nor is it a more detailed review of events that have already been chronicled 
by desert war authors because there are no in depth accounts of the battle for Brega; 
indeed there are very few references to the battle at all.  This work is, in fact, an original 
and unique piece of research. It seeks to fill the void which exists in the literature 
between the well documented arrival of the Germans in North Africa and their attack on 
British forces protecting the desert flank at Mersa el Brega.  
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     Moreover, while it seeks to explain the events of 31 March when the Germans 
attacked Brega it also endeavours to clarify, and accurately describe, the long sequence 
of events which led to the British defeat. The work sheds new light on the part that the 
various personalities involved in the British defeat played; highlighting what they did 
and what they did not do to avert the disaster.  
     Indeed, researching the part played by senior commanders and politicians in the 
defeat has revealed a significantly different interpretation of how the events surrounding 
the battle for Brega unfolded. In this respect research for the thesis has revealed that 
accepting as totally accurate the accounts of those directly involved in an historical 
event, especially an historical event where a serious defeat has occurred, or accounts 
written by friends of the principal players, should be treated with extreme caution.  
     Several highly contentious aspects of the early desert war, such as the highly 
questionable transfer of an infantry division from the western desert to the Sudan by the 
C-in-C Wavell, just when complete victory in the western desert was possible, or the 
deployment of substantial forces to Greece which has been wrongly attributed by many 
authors to Churchill when evidence confirms that it was Wavell’s decision, brings into 
question the reliability of certain authors research and the conclusions they deliver. 
Furthermore, biased and inaccurate research by authors, which has been a recurring 
handicap in the preparation of this thesis, has been avoided to such an extent that the 
author feels confident to declare that the narrative offered is both impartial and accurate. 
     In conclusion we may see that from the evidence presented in the previous chapters 
it is clear that responsibility for the defeat of British forces at Brega and the long years 
of fighting in the desert that were to follow, lies almost exclusively, with the senior 
commanders involved and with C-in-C Wavell in particular. Wavell’s complex, and as 
we have seen in many respects flawed, personality created the peculiar set of 
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circumstances which evolved throughout the early part of his tenure of command in the 
Middle East, leading ultimately to defeat on 31 March 1941.   
     It is, perhaps, interesting to note that Wavell, the man who would rise to the very 
pinnacle of military command, from virtually his earliest recorded comments, tells us 
that he never really wanted a military career. Wavell was to write; ‘I never felt any 
inclination to a military career, but it would have taken more independence of character 
than I possessed to avoid it’.1028  A former teacher of Wavell’s, M. J. Rendell, perhaps 
summed up best how Wavell’s career should have gone and where his real talents lay. 
‘He was “a sound classic” in the Winchester tradition, with prospects of an excellent 
career in the Civil Service, in the Church or in education. In a boy with as deep and 
sensitive a vein of poetry in him it was curious that he later recorded, he preferred Latin 
to Greek’.1029
     Wavell was indeed, as many have dubbed him, not least his friend and biographer 
John Connell, a scholar and was certainly not temperamentally inclined to military 
command and definitely not suited to high command in time of war. As his headmaster 
was to observe to his father Wavell had sufficient brains to find his way in other walks 
of life.
    
1030
     However, from this unlikely beginning Wavell would gain a series of commands and 
promotions which would by August 1939, right on the cusp of war, see him in 
command of arguably Britain’s most important overseas possession, Middle East 
Command. The decisions he would make, the promotions he would indorse and the 
plans he would promote would dictate in large measure British fortunes in the coming 
war. In regard to making these crucial decisions it could well be argued that he 
spectacularly failed.  
   
                                                 
1028 Connell, p. 34. 
1029 ibid, p. 33.  
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     It might be thought that when Wavell arrived in Egypt in August 1939, the hub of 
British military and political power in the Middle East, he would have immediately 
immersed himself in the many unresolved preparations necessary to put Middle East 
Command on a secure war footing.  His command was after all essential to British war 
interests, containing as it did the Suez Canal and most of Britain’s oil supplies, and as 
war looked imminent, securing both these strategic possessions was obviously essential.  
     Sadly this was not Wavell’s Modas-Operandi. His first job on arrival in the Middle 
East was to establish for himself some luxury accommodation which he did most 
successfully. Then he was to embark on a series of tours of his vast command, 
complaining all the while about the poor state of the aircraft the Royal Air Force had 
provided for him. Furthermore, his liking for early morning swimming, playing golf, 
riding, going to the races, writing poetry, finishing off his biography of Allenby’s life 
and of course looking after the needs of his wife and three teenage daughters all 
consumed much of his remaining time. 
     When war finally came in September 1939 it might have been expected that Wavell 
would put on hold his domestic pleasures and restrict his travel plans and concentrate 
instead on placing his command on a total war footing. It might also have been expected 
that as these arrangements were being put in place that he would press his home 
government to supply the many war materials he was lacking. However, life in Egypt 
and in the Middle East in general, changed very little, both militarily and socially, in the 
first year of the war.1031
      He instead left virtually all matters pertaining to improving his commands military 
preparedness to his second in command General Wilson. This may be considered to be 
  Wavell, even though he was surrounded by potentially hostile 
enemy troops in Libya and East Africa made virtually no significant preparations to 
increase the fighting ability of his command.  
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the first of many serious and potentially costly mistakes made by Wavell. His 
preference of flying to meet dignitaries and junior offices in far distant commands and 
territories consumed much of his time as did his social life. Time and energy which 
might more profitably have been spent on reorganising his army and satisfying many of 
its glaring deficiencies such as the provision of anti-tank and-anti personnel mines of 
which their were precious few in the Middle East. 
      In December 1939 Wavell was recalled to Britain to appraise the C.I.G.S on the 
situation in the Middle East giving him an opportunity to tell the Chiefs of Staff face to 
face what war materials he needed. However, although he indicated that he was short of 
modern fighter aircraft, had insufficient transport and not enough artillery pieces he 
failed to press home the urgency of his situation. Instead he indulged in discussions of 
what might happen if Germany attacked the Balkans and what responses might be made 
in such an eventuality.  He confidently told the C.I.G.S during the course of these talks 
that he believed the Germans would not attack in the West.1032
     When the Germans did attack in the West and France fell in June 1940, Britain’s 
position in the Middle East was significantly weakened. The French who up until that 
time had served as a support and bulwark to British military security in the region were 
now not there. However, many of the French troops in the various French colonies 
surrounding Egypt, Syria in particular, were inclined at least at first to come over to the 
British side and fight as Free French a situation both Churchill and de Gaulle saw as 
very beneficial to allied war aims.  
        
     However, even with the encouragement of his Prime Minister, Wavell felt that he 
would be more secure, not less secure, if he left this group of well armed and well 
organised, and now hostile, troops on his borders. This inclined him to reject 
Churchill’s advice and leave the various French colonial military establishments intact. 
                                                 
1032 John Kennedy, The Business of War (London: Hutchinson, 1957) pp. 41/42. 
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This failure to encourage French colonial soldiers to rally to the allied cause, which 
could be seen by virtually everybody bar Wavell as the sensible thing to do, was yet 
another grave mistake. The Vichy French Government turned against the British in the 
Middle East and Wavell eventually had to fight the very men who only a few months 
before could have been fighting for him.1033
     The fall of France prompted Wavell to ask London for the war materials he should 
have demanded in December 1939. Churchill viewed these requests with both surprise 
and a little annoyance. Although Wavell was still short of certain types of equipment, 
such as transport, modern tanks and fighter aircraft, he nonetheless had been massively 
reinforced. Therefore, as Wavell’s shopping list increased so did Churchill’s desire for 
results.
 
1034
     In August 1940 Wavell is again summoned home for talks. Again an opportunity 
arose for Wavell to press his case for more modern equipment and to acquaint himself 
with his political master. However, this meeting did not go well. Wavell, because of his 
taciturn and uncommunicative nature, alienated Churchill, his political chief, to such an 
extent that from this time on Churchill never liked, nor trusted, his military commander. 
As Lewin observes; ‘the deeper truth is this: as they sat round the conference table a 
chasm opened between the Prime Minister and his Commander-in-Chief that the future 
might bridge but would never close’.
    
1035  There is little doubt that Churchill wanted at 
this point to sack Wavell but on this occasion as on future occasions Wavell was saved 
by Dill one of his few friends and by Eden a man of a very forgiving disposition.1036
     When the Italians eventually attacked Wavell’s forces in the Western Desert in 
strength in September 1940 they made slow and unspectacular progress eventually 
crossing into Egypt and occupying Sidi Barrani just fifty miles inside the border. 
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However, because of the neglect of the British army in Egypt and its lack of modern 
equipment no counterattack could immediately be made. The counterattack would have 
to wait until the new equipment that Churchill, despite his dislike of Wavell, had 
insisted should be sent to Egypt, arrived in late September and October.  
     The British counterattack duly commenced in December. This operation, Compass, 
was a spectacular success. However, as we have seen, General O’Connor who planned, 
coordinated and executed this operation received hardly any credit for his hard work. 
The press carefully kept in Cairo by Wavell and initially receiving all their information 
about the operation from Wavell quickly dubbed the operation the “Wavell Push” or the 
“Wavell Five Day Raid”. Eager to assign the success to someone the media mistakenly 
gave the credit for the operations success to Wavell; credit Wavell did very little 
publicly to dispel. 
     Despite the initial success of Operation Compass Wavell after only three days of 
fighting without telling his field commander suddenly removed half his fighting forces 
and transport, and sent them to another theatre. This caused the advance to be curtailed 
and retarded the capture of the vital ports of Derna and Tobruk by nearly four weeks. 
Nonetheless, despite Wavell’s debilitating order O’Connor still managed to rout the 
Italians. At the battle of Beda Fomm O’Connor utterly defeated his Italian opponents 
and the road to Tripoli was virtually undefended and the city could undoubtedly have 
been taken. The prize was there for the taking but again Wavell intervened and denied 
O’Connor his opportunity to take Tripoli and throw the Italians out of Libya.  
     Wavell was now inclined to send troops to Greece. The decision to send troops to 
Greece rather than Tripoli was not because this was sound military logic but more to 
appease his political master Churchill who quite naturally wanted to regain a foothold in 
Europe. However, even Churchill quickly had his doubts about the wisdom of going to 
Greece only allowing the move to take place on the back of reassurances from Wavell 
340 
that the desert flank was secure.  The move to Greece was a thoroughly disastrous 
decision which not only lost the British the opportunity to take Tripoli but nearly cost 
them the war when the German’s in overwhelming numbers routed the British army 
sent to Greece. Wavell’s appreciation that an attack on Greece would be successful 
proved to be costly to the extent that the British lost thousands of men, hundreds of guns 
and tens of thousands of tons of equipment.  As Ralph Bennett observes; ‘Wavell’s 
appreciation was wrong when he made it, and it became more wrong with every day 
that passed’.1037
     Moreover, while Wavell was concentrating on Greece he was ignoring the Western 
Desert. Throughout the crucial period from the end of the Beda Fomm battle to the 
German/Italian counter attacked on 31 March Wavell failed to take seriously the threat 
building up on his desert flank. Perhaps his first and most serious failing in this regard 
was the selection of the senior officers he appointed to guard Cyrenaica. As Strawson 
comments so damningly; ‘General Neame, who knew nothing of desert fighting, 
commanded’.
                
1038
     A mistake compounded by Wavell’s incomprehensible failure to give Neame any 
firm orders, and certainly no orders to set his command area for defence. An omission 
which is all the more incomprehensible when one considers that even if the command 
was not going to be attacked at the end of March, it was definitely anticipated, even by 
Wavell, that it was likely to be attacked in early May. As Ralph Bennett says; ‘it was 
Wavell’s grievous error in believing that he could denude the desert with impunity that 
  Wavell’s appointment of Neame to command his vital Cyrenaica 
frontier, the peg upon all else hung, an officer without recent combat experience, 
possessing no competence in mobile warfare, and having no administrative 
qualifications, is at best highly questionable and must be viewed as a mistake of the first 
magnitude.  
                                                 
1037 Bennett, p. 30. 
1038 Strawson, The Battle for North Africa, p. 47. 
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underlay the disasters of the next few months, prevented the defence of Cyrenaica, and 
lost almost all that O’Connor had won’.1039
     Moreover, it seems that Neame’s preparations prior to the German attack were less 
than effective. As De Guingand observes Neame knew his command was vulnerable 
and yet seems to have been incapable, even though he knew he was going to be 
attacked, of setting his command for defence: ‘The Western Desert Force was gradually 
striped of its power – in the air and on the ground – and left a mere skeleton of its 
former self. No one felt happy about this; I know the new commander, General Neame, 
expressed his anxiety concerning the situation. Having made his protests he loyally did 
what he could with the inadequate resources at his disposal’.
  Wavell consistently claims, throughout 
March, that he understood that he must reinforce Neame and yet makes no preparations 
to send units forward to make up his deficiencies.  
1040
     Neame certainly made his protest to Wavell and was without doubt loyal; however, 
evidence would seem to suggest that he did not make the best use of the resources at his 
disposal. His failure, for example, to instruct Gambier-Parry to get 3H battle ready and 
to move 5 RTR and 1 RHA up to the front long before the Germans attacked, which 
could so easily have been achieved, must be seen as a major contributing factor in the 
German breakthrough.  
   
     Nor can a lack of sound and early intelligence be blamed for the defeat. With their 
undoubted accumulation of knowledge on enemy intentions evidence seems to suggest 
that Wavell and his field commanders should have been well placed to meet the 
growing threat building up against them. However, when the attack finally came, 
Wavell and Neame were completely unprepared to parry the German/Italian thrust. Can 
we believe Wavell’s claim that the German attack came as such a complete surprise to 
him, that his lack of preparation to meet it is perfectly understandable and acceptable?  
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1040 De Guingand, p. 50. 
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Clausewitz cautions that ‘many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more 
are false, and most are uncertain. What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he 
should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only from knowledge of men 
and affairs and from common sense. He should be guided by the laws of 
probability’.1041
     In the Middle East from mid February 1941 onwards the laws of probability were 
without doubt indicating that in the very near future the British forces stationed in 
Cyrenaica were going to be attacked. Wavell, however, seems to have lacked the 
common sense to appreciate the imminent danger Cyrenaica was in. Indeed a review of 
the intelligence Wavell and Middle East Command received throughout March, and 
recounted earlier in this work, suggests that an attack in the near future was almost a 
certainty and certainly should have been prepared for.   
   
     The certainty of attack, which became evermore evident to Wavell when he finally 
went to see Neame on 16/18 March, was not, evidence suggests, matched by a suitably 
urgent response. Indeed the response by Wavell articulated at the time and subtly 
modified in later accounts reveals how little he understood of Neame’s problems. His 
account of the state he claims he found Neame’s armour in clearly demonstrates that he, 
in fact, failed to fully appraise himself of the condition of the armour. An error he 
compounded by not fully understanding, the terrain, supply, deployment or fighting 
ability of Neame’s army.  
     Moreover, perhaps, the leisurely attitude to deployment of units and the undetectable 
response to the late March German advances, which suggested that more serious 
advances were at the very least being contemplated, must be viewed as the most 
reprehensible of misjudgements. The German preparations for attack and their 
occupation of El Agheila on 24 March were all well observed by Wavell and should 
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have sounded the loudest alarm bells.  Indeed with the imminence of attack so obvious 
it seems incomprehensible that Neame and Gambier-Parry should have wasted time and 
energy on trying to get the captured Italian tanks serviceable when even had they been 
made to run their fighting ability would have been negligible.  
     On 6 March Wavell wrote; ‘the immediate requirements seem to be to see what 
reinforcements we can make available of armoured troops, anti-tank guns, artillery, 
anti-aircraft; to build up properly distributed reserves; to see that we have sufficient 
means of defence such as anti-tank mines’.1042
     Wavell next singles out anti-tank guns as a needed requirement. As has been 
mentioned earlier there were hardly any anti-tank gun regiments in the Middle East at 
this time. The only one even remotely available in early March was 3 RHA. But almost 
as he was writing that Neame urgently needed anti-tank guns his subordinates were 
busily striping his only unit with this capability of its weapons and transport. Even if 
this unit was not desperately required for the defence at Brega it surly would be needed 
at some time in the near future. Dismantling this unit must be seen as the height of folly. 
But perhaps the question to be asked here is why was it done?  Units such as 3 RHA 
could not be acquired at the drop of a hat.  
  It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves 
here exactly what Wavell was proposing, but never achieved, taking each element in 
turn. As for the lonely plight of 1 KDG there was absolutely nothing to prevent at least 
two of 11Hs squadrons, thirty armoured cars, from being sent forward in early March to 
assist them.  The transportation of a few tanks to Tobruk, say fifteen cruisers and eight 
Matilda’s, would have caused Wavell hardly any extra logistical burden, but would 
have significantly enhanced the capability of the defence. Indeed when it was far too 
late for these reinforcements to be of any use all the above movements, and far more, 
were undertaken.  
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     As it happened, however, although 3 RHA were dismembered and denuded of their 
weapons and transport they were still able, when called upon to do so, to take to the 
field of battle with amazing alacrity. There is absolutely no doubt that had Wavell 
ordered that this unit be made ready for the Western Desert in early March they would 
have answered the call. As it was when they were called upon to make themselves ready 
and move forward they did so with remarkable speed and efficiency.  But again, by the 
time they were asked to make ready for the Western Desert, it was too late. 
     In field artillery units Neame already had three regiments under his direct command, 
1 RHA, 104 RHA, and 51st Field Regiment; however, whether Wavell even knew of 
their existence is highly debatable. If he had known of their whereabouts it seems 
remarkable that he did not immediately order that they be added to the defence. 
However, there is no evidence to confirm that he even enquired about the state of 
Neame’s artillery.  Had he done so he would have quickly seen that none of the units 
were in the forward areas, nor were they about to be deployed to the forward areas. 
Adequate artillery units existed in Neame’s command area but with no orders coming 
from his commanding officer to deploy them, because at this stage Wavell was still 
telling Neame that he would not be attacked until May, Neame quite naturally left them 
un-deployed.  
     104 RHA and their 16 25 pdr guns were allocated to the defence of Brega; however, 
again like virtually all other units assigned to the defence, they would not take up their 
place in the line until it was nearly too late. 1 RHA would likewise not move forward 
until almost the eve of battle. 51st Field Regiment would never be deployed forward 
they were destined to remain on the Benghazi escarpment with the Australians unused 
and only able to show their true quality when Tobruk was besieged.  
     Had these three regiments been ordered forward in early March with their forty eight 
guns, there is no reason why they could not have established sound firing positions.  
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They might then have been able to impeded, perhaps stop, the German advance. 
However, Wavell makes no enquiries as to the quantity or whereabouts of Neame’s 
artillery nor does he give any order that more should be added. Which brings us to the 
mystery of why the eight 6 inch howitzers of 7 Medium Regiment were not assigned, by 
Wavell, to Neame?  These highly effective and devastating guns with their six mile 
range would give any defence a distinct advantage. They were just the kind of weapons 
Neame needed and just the kind of weapons Wavell said Neame required. They were 
unused, uncommitted and ready to go why Wavell did not send them to Neame is 
incomprehensible.   
     Can Wavell blame his subordinate commanders for the defeat at Brega?  When 
Wavell wrote to O’Connor after the war he made a point of criticising all his senior 
commanders in Cyrenaica, Neame, Gambier-Parry and Rimington, and for good 
measure berated others that were not even present such as Caunter. Wavell was 
especially critical of Neame whom he felt had let him down badly and had failed to 
make the best use of the resources he had been given. However, as we shall see, 
although the incompetence of his officers was a defence Wavell was desperate to 
promote; it is difficult to blame them completely for the loss of Brega.   
     Indeed, when one looks at Neame’s performance over the six weeks he was in 
command it is difficult to see what more he realistically could have done to avert the 
defeat. He correctly identified that there was a distinct possibility that his command 
would be attacked sooner rather than later and dutifully reported his concerns to Wavell 
on numerous occasions. He could quite clearly see that the forces under his command 
were in no position to resist even a modest advance and asked his commander-in-chief 
for adequate reinforcements.1043
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     The response from Wavell to both of these concerns was unequivocal. Wavell’s 
advice to Neame was that he was not to worry or concern himself with the 
Italian/German build up in Tripoli; they were not going to attack before May at the 
earliest and might not attack even then. As Barnett observes in The Desert Generals 
‘Wavell saw no danger: British Intelligence considered that the newly arrived Rommel 
and his fledgling Italo-German force could not be ready to advance before May’.1044
     As for the poor state of Neame’s army it was Wavell who had ordered that all the 
armour should be returned to the Delta not Neame. There was no military imperative 
forcing Wavell to order that virtually all the armour should be withdrawn from the 
desert. None of the desert armour was sent to Greece or East Africa. In regard to Neame 
making better use of the forces he had, again, it is difficult to blame Neame for the 
deployments he made or the pitiful state of his army. The poor state of his armoured 
units was not because he failed to acknowledge their deficiencies or because he did not 
try to get reinforcements. Neame fully understood how weak his armoured units were 
and tried desperately to make Wavell send him replacements, however, all his requests 
for reinforcements were rejected by Wavell.  
    
     As for making better use of the armour he did have this was primarily the 
responsibility of Gambier-Parry the divisional commander and Rimington the brigade 
commander. Neame had a right to expect that both these officers, as professional tank 
commanders, would know how to get the best out of the tanks they had been given. 
Instead as we have seen they not only wasted the time they had to get their tanks 
serviceable they squandered the little remaining strength the tanks had left in them in 
useless patrolling and the forced march of 5 RTR. With regard to the forced march 
made by 5 RTR in its move from El Adem to Brega in late March during which nearly 
half of the tanks in this unit broke down, this was a particularly wasteful manoeuvre. It 
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was well known by both Rimington and Drew that the engines in some of these tanks 
were very worn and that consequently if they were to have any chance of remaining in 
action they would need intense maintenance and very careful handling.  
     The above being said it is difficult to blame Neame for the damage that the hasty and 
late move had on these tanks. From the time of their arrival at El Adem in February 
until their movement order in late March Neame was not directly in command of this 
unit, indeed, it was very nearly returned to the Delta. Had this unit been placed earlier 
under Neame’s direct command he may well have ordered them forward in early March 
to the Divisional Workshops outside Benghazi. Once there not only could more intense 
maintenance have been undertaken but they would then only have had a 120 mile 
advance to get them to Brega. Again we will never know if the earlier move and the 
benefit of bigger and better workshops would have resulted in more tanks of 5 RTR 
being fit for action but it would be unlikely that this would not have been a realistic 
outcome.  
     It is true that Neame could have ordered the whole of 1st Northumberland Fusiliers 
forward thus giving Latham the benefit of 36 additional heavy machine guns. But again 
was such an order the responsibility of the theatre commander or the divisional 
commander?  The other unit Neame might have been able to order forward was 51st 
Field Artillery Regiment with their field guns. But these guns had already been assigned 
to 9th Australian Infantry Division. Consequently it is more than probable that General 
Morshead would have objected strongly to the only artillery his infantry possessed 
being taken away from them. However, had the Australians been returned to Tobruk, as 
they undoubtedly should have been in view of their lack of transport and equipment, 
then 51st Field Regiment would have been free to support other units.   
     Within the rest of Neame’s command there simply were no further useful units 
which could have been deployed by him to Brega. However, even if there had been 
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deployable units available it might well be asked why should Neame make any effort to 
defend his command at all?  Neame had no orders from his commander-in-chief to set 
his command for defence, indeed quite the contrary he had orders to treat his command 
as a static and unthreatened province and to act as a provincial governor not as a 
military commander about to be attacked.1045
     Had Wavell given orders to Neame instructing him to do everything he could to 
defend his command then it is more than probable, given Neame’s training and known 
ability, that he would have tackled the task in a thoroughly professional and skilful 
manner. However, as mentioned, Wavell gave Neame no such orders.  
   
     So what of Neame’s subordinate commanders? In view of the lamentable 
performance of both Gambier-Parry and Rimington when they were called upon to 
defend Cyrenaica it might well be asked should their inadequacies have been recognised 
earlier. The short answer to this question is that the inadequacies of both men were soon 
recognised by their respective senior officers. Neame although he does not directly 
criticize either officer makes many scathing references to the poor state of 2nd Armoured 
Division in his after action report.  
     As for Wavell’s claim that he had nothing left in the bag, that is to say no combat or 
support units available to reinforce Neame, this claim is nothing short of ludicrous.  It 
will be remembered that as he was telling Neame that he had nothing to send him in the 
way of reinforcements he was, at the same time, being guarded by one of the most, if 
not the most, desert worthy infantry battalion in the whole of the Middle East 1 KRRC. 
His bag was far from empty; in fact, if we are continuing the golfing metaphor it 
contained a glittering array of clubs.  
     Moreover, throughout March, as has been demonstrated, a whole series of combat 
and support units became available in the Middle East. In Neame’s own forces, as 
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mentioned, three companies of 1 NF, with 36 precious medium machine guns, were 
stationed in Benghazi unable to join the defence for lack of transport. All that was 
required to get these guns into the line was the provision of 36 30 cwt trucks one for 
each gun and four 3 ton lorries to transport the ammunition and heavy kit. 40 vehicles 
when at the same time 8,500 were on their way to Greece.  
     Both anti aircraft and anti-tank gun units were lying idle in the Delta and could 
easily have been ordered forward at any time. Moreover, the 8 6 inch howitzers of 7 
Medium Regiment were likewise sat idle in the Delta. We know that 1KRRC and the 
anti tank, anti aircraft gun and artillery units in the Delta were either capable of being 
motorised or were already motorised as all these units, after the German attack on 31 
March, were sent forward by Wavell.  
     Had these units been formed into a battle group in early March, when Wavell 
acknowledged that he would have to reinforce Neame, which so easily could have been 
done; then these units could have undoubtedly been in the line well before the Germans 
attacked. We of course will never know what difference the presence of 700 infantry 
men, 36 machine guns, 56 artillery pieces, 24 anti aircraft guns, mines and barbed wire 
might have made to the defence.  
     However, as the battle was far from an easy victory for the Germans fighting the 
existing garrison then it seems reasonable to speculate that over doubling the strength of 
the defence and incorporating mines and wire into the defence would have made any 
victory even more difficult for the attackers. Indeed, even if a victory could have been 
achieved by Rommel it would almost certainly have been more costly in men and 
materials and probably more time consuming. Rommel could neither afford to lose war 
materials or expend time as he was in short supply of both. Moreover, he had exceeded 
his orders and a rebuff at Brega may well have brought his military career to an abrupt 
end.  
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     As Ronald Lewin remarks; ‘If the British could have held the front at Mersa Brega 
much might have followed. Rommel’s doubting masters might have increased their 
doubt, and the flow of supplies to Africa might have stopped. Rommel himself might 
have been submerged under a cloud’.1046  Had Rommel been ‘repulsed with a bloody 
nose, it is highly probable that he would have suffered Hitler’s extreme displeasure for 
(a) losing the battle and (b) exceeding his brief – which was simply to reconnoitre. He 
would probably have been pulled back to Sirte and told to wait until 15th Panzer arrived, 
after which, and when told, he could essay another attack. By which time, of course, the 
British would have been fully rested, re-equipped, reorganised and waiting for him’.1047
     Sadly, however, for the British, in the aftermath of the breakthrough, Rommel would 
not give Wavell’s forces the chance to rest, re-equip or reorganise. He would press 
home his attack and inflict great damage, both directly and indirectly, on the British war 
effort. When Rommel resumed his offensive on 1 April he had already virtually 
destroyed one armoured and one infantry brigade. In the coming days and weeks his 
breakthrough at Brega would decimate many more units and set in train the headlong 
retreat of thousands of British troops. This in turn would force the British to abandon 
hundreds and thousands of tons of almost irreplaceable stores and equipment which 
Rommel and his troops would soon eagerly turn on their former owners.  
      
     In this regard two pieces of captured British equipment, which were to become an 
enduring memory of the war in North Africa, standout. From 2 Armoured Division 
Rommel captured two Armoured Command Vehicles (ACVs), which he called 
Mammuten (Mammoths), and named Max and Moritz; and the pair of sun goggles he 
habitually wore on his peaked cap.1048
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     While the loss of formed units, base troops, stores and equipment was in its self 
catastrophic other losses were perhaps even more grievous to future British war aims. In 
a desperate attempt to restore the already hopeless situation in Cyrenaica, Wavell sent 
forward General O’Connor and Brigadier John Combe, to help and advise Neame.  Pitt 
was to write of this move that it was the most unfortunate move Wavell made in his 
long military career.1049  Lewin says of Wavell’s decision ‘that there is probably no 
serious student of military history who would support this decision: since O’Connor 
was the experienced senior, to have influence without executive command placed him 
in an intolerable position, and dual control is notoriously the worst way to run a 
battle’.1050
     The appearance of O’Connor and Combe, almost inevitably, did nothing to improve 
the military situation in Cyrenaica, however, their capture a few days later deprived the 
British Army of two of its most talented and irreplaceable senior officers.
                
1051
      Looking at the wider implications of the breakthrough at Brega we may see that 
Wavell’s neglect of his desert flank also resulted in other fronts being put in jeopardy. 
Rommel’s advance deprived vital resources being sent to Greece and Crete. In his 
desperation to halt the German advance in Cyrenaica Wavell committed aircraft and 
shipping which not only took casualties but because of its diversion to North Africa was 
not available to support the desperate struggle in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although 
the extra aircraft and ships would not, perhaps, have reversed the outcome of the battles 
soon to be raging in Greece and Crete, they might possibly have saved precious lives 
and inflicted more damage on the enemy.   
   
     Amazingly none of the adverse consequences which resulted from the loss of Brega 
highlighted above seems to have brought out in Wavell any sense guilt or contrition for 
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his part in the debacle. In a letter Wavell wrote to Dill in 1942 he set out his view on his 
stewardship of Middle East Command and the reasons, as he saw it, for his removal: 
 
I was very sorry, very sorry, to leave/ Middle East and should have liked 
to see it through there, but as the P. M. had obviously lost confidence in 
me, and bears the supreme responsibility, he was right to make a change 
of bowling, and I had had several sixes hit off me, some perhaps through 
bowling to orders. Anyway I had a long spell, got some wickets, and 
have no grouse at being taken off.1052
 
     
So there we have it, with thousands of men dead, hundreds of thousands of tons of 
irreplaceable military materials lost, three humiliating routes Cyrenaica, Greece and 
Crete, and British fortunes in the war at arguably their lowest ebb, Wavell was very 
sorry, very sorry. Not, however, for the catalogue of military disasters he had presided 
over but because he would like to have stayed in his command. Moreover, the P. M. had 
lost confidence in him not because of any real failure on his part; after all the several 
sixes hit of his bowling were only conceded because he was obeying the P. M.s orders. 
Consequently if there were any failures they were the P. M.s not his. On the other hand 
had he not taken some wickets? Had he not succeeded in clearing East Africa of its 
starving, demoralised and totally isolated Italian garrison? This victory, surly, justified 
throwing away everything won in North Africa.  
     This is, perhaps, the view of history Wavell genuinely believed to be true, still, as 
Lewin concedes; ‘the resulting failures stand on record and as W. H. Auden wrote 
History to the defeated. May say Alas but cannot help or pardon’.1053
       
  As for comparing 
his time in command to an innings in cricket Wavell was perhaps, right for as George 
Orwell observed: ‘cricket is a game full of forlorn hopes and sudden dramatic changes 
of fortune’ which for those under Wavell’s command could not have been more true. 
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